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This study explores the evolution of the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) and its interaction with the French public sphere, between 1900 and 1920. Animated by revolutionary syndicalist discourse, the CGT supported federalist worker control of industry in fin-de-siècle France, and, by World War I, had developed a distinctively productivist discourse, emphasizing increased material output through efficient, expert direction of the economy. Kenneth Tucker examines the triumph of this productivism and instrumental rationality, in contrast with other visions of society and the future. He gives an innovative Habermasian twist to the recent linguistic turn in labor history, focusing on the role of competing bodies of knowledge in influencing the self-understanding and strategies of the CGT. He also goes further to situate the rise of productivism within the social and cultural context of the French Third Republic. He makes an eloquent case for using history as a cultural resource in confronting our own fin-de-siècle.

French revolutionary syndicalism and the public sphere

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French revolutionary syndicalism and the public sphere

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For Sherry

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Introduction

Prologue

Sabel and Zeitlin, in their seminal article “Historical Alternatives to Mass Production,” discuss the triumph of a vision of the future based on mass production and a corporate economy rather than on small-scale economic organization in twentieth-century Europe. Echoing the views of an increasing number of historians, they argue that capitalism followed no necessary laws of development. The belief in the inevitability and superiority of mass production represented an ideological victory as much as an economic one, for other alternatives were branded as unrealistic. Especially puzzling to Sabel and Zeitlin was the acceptance of this new industrial model in the 1920s by French craft workers, who had advocated federalist control of production in the late nineteenth century. These workers not only dropped their opposition to large-scale industry; they came to embrace it enthusiastically. As Sabel and Zeitlin write, “It was almost as if Proudhon himself had awoken from a sleep of fifty years to discover not only that the world had enacted the ideas of his opponents, but that he approved of what they had done.”¹

For many left-wing militants in the post-World War I era, this new orientation had unfortunate political consequences. Council communism, based on decentralized worker control, swept parts of Germany and Italy, but had little resonance among the union leadership in France; and France was key to any European transformation.² In 1919–1920, French workers went on strike in great numbers, but this militancy did not translate into a movement for federalist worker control of production. France, the home of Proudhon, Sorel, and direct action revolutionary syndicalism, the birthplace of a decentralized vision of worker socialism, and a seemingly most appropriate place for council communism, did not follow the lead of its supposedly less radical neighbors. The reasons for this lack of response are indeed complex. Historians have pointed to the power of the postwar French state in crushing worker mil-

itancy, and the refusal of the leadership of the major French union, the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) to adequately coordinate and encourage the strikes that did occur.³ Yet why was the leadership of the CGT so unprepared for the postwar militancy that arose in France and throughout Europe, and frightened rather than exhilarated by it? Why did the tradition of direct action and federalism fail to influence the leadership at that time?

The answer lies in the history of French labor between the time of Proudhon and the end of World War I, and its relationship to the various republican, socialist, and economic discourses formulated in the French public sphere. In the wake of the June Days of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871, workers and republicans split into often-opposing camps. The particular “language of labor” formulated in France during the nineteenth century informed the revolutionary syndicalist wing of the CGT, which controlled the organization between 1902 and 1918.⁴ Though the prewar CGT was relatively small in numbers (approximately 700,000 members in 1912), its advocacy of direct action helped make worker strikes and demonstrations a part of everyday life in the Belle Epoque, and promoted the rise of the social question to public prominence. After World War I, the union ballooned to over two and one-half million members by 1920.⁵

However, the ostensible revolutionary syndicalists Léon Jouhaux and Alphonse Merrheim, who came to power within the CGT in the years after 1909, guided the movement away from some major themes of its *fin-de-siècle*, anarchist-inspired vision. By the immediate prewar years, French syndicalism’s leadership feared social change because of its anxieties about upsetting France’s economic equilibrium. Jouhaux and Merrheim formulated a productivist doctrine that emphasized increasing material output through the efficient, expert direction of the economy, rather than the federalist themes of worker mobilization and the ethical dimensions of labor’s control of the workplace.⁶ This orientation emerged out of an elaboration of syndicalism’s concept of labor in the context of the weaknesses of its revolutionary approach, as the movement entered a crisis and rethought its legacy. Its new theory of industrial society also converged with the rise of a Taylorist and productivist discourse attractive to many republican and capitalist elites, and an emerging cultural vocabulary that recognized the psychological and social complexities of social solidarity.

After World War I, the CGT participated with many elites in attempting to form a new understanding of labor’s role in public life, which drew extensively on productivist themes. This new doctrine

differed not only from fin-de-siècle syndicalism, but from the *solidarité* of Emile Durkheim and Léon Bourgeois as well. As these viewpoints faded, what was lost was not so much a revolutionary moment in European history, but rather a democratic vision of a more egalitarian, morally solidary Third Republic organized along principles other than corporate capital or a state bureaucracy.⁷ A major argument of this book stresses that social changes alone cannot explain this transition. Only an examination of the dynamics of the CGT's public discourse and its subtle relations with the liberal public sphere from the Belle Epoque to the postwar era can illuminate these processes.

This accent on public discourse intersects with major theoretical innovations within the historical profession. Several commentators have remarked on the discursive turn in historical analysis.⁸ For example, many historians now see the French Revolution as an explosion of new languages and a crisis of meaning rather than the outcome of a clash between a rising bourgeoisie and a reactionary aristocracy.⁹ Yet this new linguistic orientation often conflicts with historians' noted concern for clarity. As with many terms associated with the postmodern lexicon, attempting to define "discourse" is akin to the plight of Tantalus, for its meaning seemingly remains inevitably beyond our grasp.

If closure about the definition of discourse is not possible, and in fact contravenes the spirit of the open-ended conversation so favored by postmodernists, some different positions have been mapped out in the context of historical investigation. Scott's poststructuralist approach sees discourse as the inherently political, exclusionary, and hierarchical cultural vocabulary that societies use to frame the world and construct social identities.¹⁰ Sewell, following Geertz, renames discourse "ideology," and defines it as the collective symbols which create and maintain a specific sense and image of life.¹¹ Habermas views discourse as rational-critical debate about validity claims.¹² Despite this diversity, some guiding themes emerge. Discourse consists of shared public meanings; it does not derive from the isolated thoughts or actions of individuals. These cultural meanings frame conceptions of identity. They do not in any simple way reflect class position, for social groups are themselves created in large part through language.¹³ Social power operates through the use of these collective meanings. Scott and Habermas emphasize the epistemological dimension of discourse, for it invariably advances specific knowledge claims. Social power is based on particular forms of knowledge as much as on ownership of capital or class relations.

Many French labor historians, such as Scott and Reddy, have become increasingly concerned with the function of discourse and culture in

framing working-class action and interests.¹⁴ This most recent linguistic turn, though more radical in its conception of the autonomy of discourse than previous studies, nevertheless builds on the ground swell of earlier literature documenting the distinctiveness of working-class traditions. These studies crystallized in the 1980s into what Traugott calls a "new orthodoxy."¹⁵ Following Thompson's pathbreaking work on the critical potential of popular radicalism in England, this New Orthodoxy focuses on artisanal culture as the source of labor militancy, dismissing the Marxist reverence toward the emancipatory potential of the factory proletariat.¹⁶ Though concentrating on such objective practices as proletarianization and state formation, this approach demonstrates that these processes did not mechanistically deskill workers and destroy their communities. Rather, worker culture, ranging from leisure life in taverns to traditions of workplace autonomy, provided the symbolic and material resources for novel forms of labor radicalism. Labor historians of the United States, Britain, and France argue that culture furnished the interpretive framework and motivational reserves for worker militancy.¹⁷

Several of these authors contend that labor organizations built on these cultural traditions in order to create distinctive types of socialist and syndicalist public discourse so as to legitimate worker claims.¹⁸ Of particular importance for many labor movements was the synthesis of working-class and republican themes that Montgomery designates "labor republicanism."¹⁹ Though intersecting and sometimes competing with Marxist and Jacobin discourses, Vincent argues that different shades of labor republicanism informed much of the doctrine of the turn-of-the-century French left, from syndicalists to socialists. Lasch sees this as a distinctive type of working-class culture influencing labor movements in Britain and the United States, as well as France.²⁰

France and Britain developed relatively popular socialist or labor-oriented political parties, and the United States did not. No doubt there were differences in the worker organizations in each country. The timing of industrialization and the emergence and decline of labor republicanism varied within each nation. Labor republicanism in the United States did not critique small private property and was more sympathetic to religion than in France. In Britain, collective action was oriented toward suffrage. In France, direct action and an anti-state orientation on the part of workers often predominated.

However, much working-class resistance to capitalism was remarkably similar in the three countries. Drawing on a shared belief in the nobility of artisanal work, labor organizations in France, Britain, and the United States combined this producerist vision with a strongly democratic orien-

tation. Workers (or producers) were seen to be the carriers of the best parts of the democratic tradition. The British commonwealth tradition informed the radicalism of the Chartists and later the Guild Socialists; the French CGT and the American Knights of Labor drew on their respective republican heritages.²¹ In each country, labor republicans critiqued the “egoism” that they saw corrupting society. They stressed the necessity of worker participation in both state and economic institutions, tying worker control to labor emancipation. Each group also attempted to build distinctive working-class organizations that embodied the principles of democracy and emancipated labor; fearful of the anti-democratic effects of bureaucracy and centralization, they looked to decentralized worker organizations as the path to working-class solidarity. They viewed the public gathering as the major forum for the forging of a shared perspective, rather than the back-room meetings of elites that privatized power and corrupted the democratic tradition.²²

The movements also confronted events that shook the viability of their vision of artisanal labor and producerism. They had to legitimate their perspective in terms of a scientific public discourse that arose with the second Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century. These working-class organizations had to face actions on the part of the state that promised, and often delivered, social reforms which were justified in the language of social interdependence, efficiency, and economic growth. The progressive movement in the United States, the Radical Republican Party in France, and the Liberal Party in Britain all sought to renovate society in the name of science and progress.²³

Explanations for the decline of this distinctive worker discourse usually focus on state repression, industrialization, and the development of an unskilled working class through mass production.²⁴ More discerning observers of this decline, such as Lears, Trachtenberg, Gerstle, and Jones, see cultural hegemony at work. According to these authors, workers adopted the values of the hegemonic culture, thus blunting their oppositional perspective. Republicanism is seen as the culprit in some form, whether defined as Americanism or, in Jones’s work, the radical English tradition. Workers came to accept the principles of parliamentary government, gradualist visions of social change, and eventually individualistic and nationalistic definitions of social life. They did not sufficiently develop a unique cultural alternative that could withstand pressures toward integration.²⁵

This explanation cannot completely account for the French case. A form of labor republicanism was institutionalized in revolutionary syndicalism after the Knights of Labor and Chartism had declined. Further, French

syndicalists never fully embraced parliamentary government and the political culture of individualism. Despite its defense of the Republic in World War I, the CGT's path to cultural integration did not follow from its republicanism. Rather, its incorporation into French society developed in large part from its leaders' interpretation of industrial society, social science, and the nature of social knowledge, which had many affinities with the views of many French elites. An analysis of public discourse that stops at the level of shared political values among workers, and their articulation in everyday life and in movement doctrines, misses crucial aspects of cultural change. In particular, labor historians tend to refrain from probing the epistemological dimensions of worker discourse, for that leads into realms of philosophy and theory that seemingly depart from the veracity of the empirical.

However, in the process of creating union doctrine, worker elites reflexively examined their social conditions. In so doing, they fashioned an implicit and not always consistent epistemology, a way of illuminating, knowing, and evaluating the world. A focus on political values neglects the more subtle ways in which cultural consensus works. In fin-de-siècle Europe, by privileging particular types of knowledge over other ways of knowing, cultural constructions legitimated particular interests which claimed the mantle of science. Workers, like everyone in society, shared in this epistemological discourse. Many union leaders mimicked capitalists in developing productivist strategies of rationalization that could be used to "modernize" society. By adopting this point of view, they developed the productivist implications of their model of labor and subordinated the participatory, consensual, and pragmatic claims of the radical republican tradition to the demands of industrial progress. In sum, as Rabinbach states, to grasp these issues labor historians must investigate

the constricting effects of productivism on the movement's vision and practices – the ways that labor movements helped workers to adapt to industrial processes, accelerated improved techniques of production, and excluded significant dimensions of culture and politics not central to production. Most importantly, the ways in which scientific ideas, epistemological frameworks, and reform strategies redefined labor (and its practical consequences) eluded most social historians because they did not emerge directly from class conflict.²⁶

Rabinbach then notes that social philosophers associated with the Frankfurt School, such as Habermas, have long stressed the instrumental and productivist tendencies of working-class theorists, especially Marxists. Rabinbach devotes his work to unraveling the vision of labor

as a "human motor" developed by European scientists from the late nineteenth century to the post-World War II era. Lasch, as a cultural historian sympathetic to this approach, perceptively recognizes that the ideologies of progress and science helped undermine worker autonomy; however, he concentrates largely on how this was played out in the work of intellectuals sympathetic to labor movements such as Sorel and Cole.²⁷ In sum, the ways that a scientific and productivist vision developed within labor movements, how it both drew from and contrasted with other visions of the future (such as labor republicanism), and why it triumphed still remain to be investigated.

Examining public discourse within a cultural frame that draws on, while recasting, Habermas's theory can shed some light on these issues, as well as providing a preliminary answer to the problem posed by Sabel and Zeitlin at the beginning of this chapter. Habermas is well known for his concern with epistemology and rationality. His pragmatic approach to knowledge critiques instrumental, "scientific" rationality while offering a communicative alternative. Though Habermas examines these issues primarily within the context of philosophical debates, his work is rich in implications for the study of public discourse and social movements. For example, Johnson has recently discussed in general terms the potential significance of Habermas's distinction between lifeworld and system for the exploration of labor history.²⁸ Further, though Habermas's classic work on the public sphere does not investigate the role of social movements in challenging the constitution of a bourgeois political culture, he has recently realized the importance of the "plebeian" public realm as an alternative source of communal meanings.²⁹ As Postone states, social movements "were certainly constitutive of new forms of public discourse at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century and . . . were engaged in a struggle to reconstitute the public sphere."³⁰

Nevertheless, Habermas's abstract perspective must be situated in specific social and cultural contexts in order to adequately account for the dynamics of labor movements. His theory of developmental rationality grounded in language overlooks the complex interplay of knowledge claims, metaphorical vocabularies, and particular cultural traditions. Moreover, Habermas's approach to public discourse neglects issues raised by Bourdieu's perspective on culture, such as the internal organizational structuring of public spheres and the distinctive power struggles within such publics.³¹

A focus on revolutionary syndicalism in France is particularly propitious for such an endeavor. A suitably historicized Habermasian

perspective can contribute to a linguistically sensitive analysis of the rise of an instrumental productivism in French syndicalism, and its interaction with more communicative alternatives and the dominant public sphere. The high point of the syndicalist movement coincided with the rise of Durkheimian social science and the political doctrine of *solidarité* to prominence in France. Though Durkheimian sociology and syndicalism were not directly linked, they shared certain family resemblances, so to speak. They formed the right and left wings of a democratic spectrum in fin-de-siècle France, which, despite fundamental differences regarding issues such as class struggle and state-sponsored social reforms, shared concerns with creating a more democratic, participatory, and morally solidary society. They faced the similar problematic of synthesizing scientific and republican themes into a viable theory of social solidarity and economic growth, while facing the crisis of positivism. Further, their respective moral and participatory dimensions faded as a more conservative and productivist vocabulary slowly became prominent in France.

Syndicalist discourse shared dominant conceptions of science and industrial progress. These ideas, combined with the weakness of its revolutionary theory and its internal *ouvriériste* assumptions, helped lead the CGT to gradually replace the vision of a federalist socialism of skilled workers with an image of industrial society like that of many elites. This new conception consisted of large, centralized worker unions participating in social progress defined in terms of an ever-expanding production, which was guaranteed by a new type of state capitalism based on corporatist bargaining between unions and the government. Though the corporatist outlook was slow to develop in France, by World War I the CGT was one of its most ardent proponents.³² An integral component of this outlook, shared by syndicalists and many republican and capitalist elites, was that positivistic science offered an insight into the natural order of production, and could lead to a healthier and more productive workplace.³³ Syndicalists' adoption of this vocabulary was not simply imposed on them, but derived in large part from an elaboration of their own labor-based discourse in the context of a crisis of revolutionary ideology and belief. The experience of World War I reinforced this productivist doctrine.

In addition, this volume's attention to the theories of Bourdieu and more importantly, Habermas, raises specifically theoretical issues. The relevance of sociological theory for historical investigation will be discussed at different points throughout the book. I will touch on the modern/postmodern debates in which Habermas has been involved. While avoiding Habermas's strongest rationalist and evolutionary claims, I

also do not wish to validate the excessive deconstructionist equation of all forms of rationality with an exclusionary power. My examination of the complexity of the historical context of the Third Republic demonstrates that different pathways for the very shape of modernity were at issue in debates between and among syndicalists and solidarists. Their visions of the world were not necessarily determined by the evolution of a differentiating system that tended to marginalize more radically democratic concerns, as Habermas would have it; nor were they just another dimension of a disciplining and imperialistic rationality tied to the social sciences, as deconstructionists argue. Rather, their discourses were contingently tied to the concrete problems that they confronted, and depended on their particular interpretations of the cultural traditions at their disposal. Finally, the study of syndicalism can also help illuminate many of the questions confronting today's new social movements, such as gay, lesbian, and ecological movements. Like them, revolutionary syndicalism faced issues including the balance of democracy vs. bureaucracy, and the relationship of movements arising in civil society to political parties.

Yet this study has a limited focus in many ways. This book does not address in detail other social movements and public spheres, such as the women's movement, that were developing in the Belle Epoque.³⁴ While touching on the Socialist Party, the CGT's principal competitor within the proletarian public sphere, it does not thoroughly examine the discourse and dynamics of French socialism. The study does not analyze in great depth the non-verbal "language of labor," such as strikes. Finally, it concentrates on the discourse of the leaders of the CGT, and does not attempt to probe the everyday life of workers. Yet the significance of the CGT should not be underestimated. There is no a priori reason to believe that the leaders of revolutionary syndicalism did not represent significant segments of the French working class. Most importantly, like other unions, the CGT was a major institution which, to paraphrase Johnson, filtered social relations of production and realized organized struggle.³⁵

Chapter 1 sketches the relationship of revolutionary syndicalism to social and cultural trends in the Belle Epoque. Part I explores theoretical issues involved in the study of French syndicalism and the public sphere. Chapter 2 examines historians' perspectives on French syndicalism, and then critiques the more theoretically informed approaches to labor, including Tilly, extensions of the New Orthodoxy by Calhoun and Sewell, and the poststructuralist claims of Scott. Chapter 3 discusses

Habermas's conception of public discourse and the public sphere, and its extension and reformulation by Keane and Cohen and Arato. My criticisms of the cultural and historical insensitivity of these approaches draw on some of Bourdieu's ideas about the structuring and organization of public spheres.

Part II discusses the rise of the French liberal and proletarian public spheres, and the emergence of social science in the Third Republic. Chapter 4 explores the respective histories of these public spheres, exploring their different interpretations of shared republican and scientific themes. After 1848, the two realms split from one another, and created the conditions for the rise of revolutionary syndicalism, solidarism, and Durkheimian political theory. Chapter 5 examines Durkheim's sociology, solidarism, and Emile Levasseur's social economic perspective in the context of the emergence of new intellectual and academic fields. I then discuss how these new approaches, particularly social economics, influenced the outlook of several syndicalist leaders.

Part III addresses the rise and transformation of revolutionary syndicalism. Chapter 6 examines how the French language of labor was developed by Fernand Pelloutier, Georges Sorel, and later revolutionary syndicalists into a unique vision of labor republicanism and workers' control. Chapter 7 investigates the crisis of revolutionary syndicalism, and the emergence of Jouhaux's and Merrheim's productivism. Syndicalists rethought their revolutionary strategy as membership stagnated and the general strike appeared to be unrealistic in the context of an increasingly conservative public sphere and a rationalized proletarian public realm. In Chapter 8, I discuss in detail how the new productivist approach emerged from debates about the goals of the movement, including the implications of Taylorism and the European Science of Work for production. Accelerated by World War I, this productivism became a New Orthodoxy within the plebeian public sphere, exemplified in the CGT's Minimum Program of 1918, influencing even the communists in the interwar years.

The Belle Epoque and revolutionary syndicalism

On May 6, 1889, the Universal Exposition of Paris opened its doors to hundreds of thousands of excited French men and women. The Exposition's impressive iron and steel architecture was dominated by the controversial Eiffel Tower, "the symbol of machinism" and "the aggressive embodiment of calculation" for a new age.¹ Topped by the tricolor, its 1,792 steps seemed emblematic of France's march toward an industrial, scientific, and prosperous future. During the six months of its existence, the Exposition displayed to thirty-two million visitors the usefulness of science and technology for everyday life, promising a future of unlimited possibilities because of their benefits. Since 1851, Universal Expositions had celebrated the "wedding of knowledge, technique, and industry."² The 1889 Exposition, with its *palais des machines*, pavilions of electricity, telephones, and natural gas, continued this tradition. Indeed, the Exposition is often viewed as the inauguration of the Belle Epoque, an era that would see impressive technological and scientific achievements, ranging from the construction of a subway system linking Parisian arrondissements to the expanding suburbs, to the initial implementation of citywide electric light. Though France was still predominantly an agrarian country at this time, it seemed clear that industrialization and urbanization were the waves of the future.³

Conceived by the school reformer and colonial advocate Jules Ferry, the Exposition was a centerpiece for the liberal achievements of the young Third Republic, and its populist spirit infused the great Fair. Still shaky from the threat of a coup by the popular General Boulanger, the government was eager to visibly promote its scientific credentials for the people. In fact, the enthusiasm which the Exposition generated appeared to justify the Republic's hopes, for the linkage of science and progress seemed palpable for French men and women of all backgrounds. For

example, the printer and future reformist syndicalist Auguste Keufer, then the young secretary of the fledgling printers' federation, saw in this "marvelous exposition" not only technical progress but an anticipation of "the normal organization of humanity."⁴ Workers, like others in French society, could share in the benefits of industrialization.

The condition of the working class and its place in French life was a major theme of the Exposition. Its new exhibition on social economy drew on the ideas of the paternalistic social reformer Frédéric Le Play. Commissioner-general of the 1867 Universal Exposition under Louis Napoleon, he had been among the first to attempt to study laborers scientifically in his monumental work, *Les Ouvriers européens*. His disciple, Emile Cheysson, and the liberal economist, Léon Say, who together arranged the 1889 exhibit, also mobilized science to address the social question. Their exhibit idyllically portrayed the lives of workers while offering implicit suggestions about how to ameliorate their condition. Say and Cheysson recognized, if only implicitly, that industrialization might morally and economically damage some workers. Like Le Play, they believed that class conciliation based on shared morality was a better answer than "misguided" state-centered or socialist solutions to the social question. This spirit informed their building of a rational, well-ordered model of a "worker village," consisting of laborers' houses, cafés, and restaurants. This company town was akin to the Exposition's representations of colonial villages (Chinese, Indian, etc.). At the center of the village was the town circle, where all classes could mingle and find "agreeable and sane distractions."⁵ This picture of working-class life followed many of Le Play's paternalistic and reformist assumptions. Say and Cheysson depicted "thrifty, prévoyante [provident], and disciplined" proletarian families embedded in well-organized communities, which helped produce the social harmony necessary for a successful industrial society.⁶ Just as foreign administrators romanticized the conditions of their colonial subjects, so French elites could assume that working-class neighborhoods were, and could increasingly become, "peaceable kingdoms" that assured tranquil class relations.⁷

This portrait of working-class life was far removed from the proletarian hovels sketched by Zola in *Germinal*. Indeed, the one-third of the French who were urban workers at this time tended to congregate in increasingly class-segregated, crowded, and unsanitary suburban housing that grew haphazardly throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.⁸ Nevertheless, the metaphor of the village did capture an important part of the working-class neighborhood. Workers did congregate in taverns, restaurants, and the like. Yet these meeting places often

promoted a distinctive working-class sensibility, proud of manual labor and suspicious of any authority emanating from outside its ranks, rather than any belief in class conciliation.⁹

As representatives of this working-class culture, later revolutionary syndicalist leaders such as Victor Griffuelhes or Emile Pouget would have undoubtedly scoffed derisively at this exhibit. They believed that the "amelioration" of the working class entailed the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the Republic. The society of the future would be based on the free and voluntary association of producers, federally organized in decentralized *syndicats*. The exhibit's construction of the working class as a kind of internal colony showed the gulf separating elites and the newborn social sciences from such a syndicalist vision, and from the real lives of working people.

Thus, the republican desire for a democratic, scientifically progressive *patrie* sustained by the support of *le peuple* was still a dream in the *fin-de-siècle*. A large segment of the people were members of a growing proletariat who did not share in French prosperity. In late nineteenth-century France, industrialization was slowly developing, and small shops dominated manufacture. The dirty, oppressive factories that did appear were hardly an advertisement for a bright industrial future.¹⁰ The founding of the Second International in Paris during the 1889 Exposition punctuated the rift between elites and a growing proletarian movement.¹¹ The killing of twelve striking workers and the wounding of thirty others by soldiers on May 1, 1891, in Fourmies, as well as the sympathy of many workers for the anarchist bombs that terrorized the rich from 1890 to 1894, graphically demonstrated their alienation from the nation. The founding of the CGT in 1895 and its rapid advocacy of a revolutionary general strike followed the waves of strikes in the 1890s, which were larger than any previous surge in French history. These strikes were in turn dwarfed by the outbreak of labor militancy some fifteen years later. This worker radicalism demonstrated that the class conflict of the 1848 June Days and the 1871 Paris Commune had not disappeared, but rather seemed to be evolving to a new stage of confrontation. Demonstrations and strikes were symptomatic of an "escalation of political battle from the purely parliamentary field to mass struggle," as republican and proletarian interests radically diverged.¹²

Led by many former anarchists, the CGT tried to unify this proletarian radicalism, calling for the revolutionary overturning of bourgeois society and its replacement by workers' control of production. Yet beneath the proletarian militancy of the *fin-de-siècle*, the image remained of the worker who, like others in French society, embraced the technological

utopia of the 1889 Exposition. For all their opposition to the emerging capitalist and republican order, workers tended to accept industrial change as they problematized its capitalist form. Yet the CGT's advocacy of decentralized, participatory production conflicted with a vision of inevitable, large-scale technological change. As the CGT grew, this tension resulted in political and ideological struggles, as bases of legitimacy were rethought. In so doing, syndicalist leaders drew on positivistic and democratic themes that were raised in both the plebeian and liberal public spheres.¹³ The rise of a sophisticated social science superior to its paternalistic ancestors complicated this discursive controversy, as did syndicalism's grounding of its theory of industrial society in a positive evaluation of labor and production. The stakes of this reconsideration were formidable. The complex interplay of these themes and publics not only sealed the fate of the CGT, but contributed to the distinctive industrial vision of modernity that helped stabilize a fragile Third Republic in post-World War I France.¹⁴

By 1900, the industrial vision of the 1889 Fair had given way to a much more complicated image of social life. Eiffel's technological utopia was challenged by a more private and subtle perception of future possibilities. These differences were exemplified in the 1900 Parisian Universal Exposition. While the Herculean architecture of 1889 was a paean to technological progress, the fifty million people who attended the 1900 Exposition saw a World's Fair emphasizing the distinctive decorative style of French design. Dominated by the interior designer Siegfried Bing, the "art nouveau" of the 1900 Exposition covered the iron and steel girders of 1889 with traditional stone, ceramic, and plastic exteriors. Silverman believes that this new architectural style expressed an emerging, particularly French, nationalist discourse of "private organicism," the interior world of refined sensibility in contrast to the public spectacle of confident technology.¹⁵

This concern with elaborate interior space did not simply represent a haven that afforded refuge from the tribulations of modernity, for it also pointed to a complex rethinking of the self and its relationship to society. Electricity infused the 1900 Fair; as the harbinger of the second Industrial Revolution, it seemed to confirm the promise of a clean, more subtle technology which could illuminate great spaces while avoiding the dangers of flames, smoke, and steam associated with the first Industrial Revolution.¹⁶ Like an electric current, the new interior world of the self throbbed with movement and energy.

The interest in the private world intersected with other cultural and

social trends which complicated the relatively innocent technological and positivist faith of 1889. The "dream world" of consumption was an important part of the 1900 Fair. It signified the emergence of an embryonic consumer culture, represented by department stores such as the Bon Marché, which promoted individualistic desires for goods and supported a growing split between work and leisure. Further, symbolism helped inaugurate a cult of the self in opposition to the nineteenth-century large-scale technological sensibility. Medical research correlated the growth of city life to a rise of nervousness, labeled neurasthenia. The private sphere was no longer a realm free from the problems of social life, for its sanctity was invaded by urban ills. Coupled with a surge of interest in the psychological phenomena of suggestibility, hypnotism, and dream states, and the fascination with Bergsonian *élan vital*, such beliefs helped break down the clear distinctions between inner and outer, rational and irrational, self and society, that had framed so much nineteenth-century liberal and positivist discourse. In sum, the faith in technological expansion leading to a good society needed to be supplemented, if not replaced, with a more chastened perspective that recognized the distinctive and often mysterious characteristics of mental life and its complicated connection to the enigmatic problems of cultural and social solidarity.¹⁷

The new complexity of self/society relations contributed to a rethinking of the social question and its relationship to the Republic, as the fragility of social bonds was recognized. A new basis for the solidarity linking workers and the Republic occupied a prominent symbolic place in the 1900 Exhibition. The newly erected Porte Binet, crowned by a statue of a woman, *La Parisienne*, replaced the Eiffel Tower as the entryway to the exhibit. This "bejeweled and mosaic-covered" archway was decorated with carvings, the *Frieze of Labor*, which paid homage to the corporations of craft workers who had helped construct the Exposition. The gateway signified that the Republic and labor could work together in the spirit of national solidarity.¹⁸

Indeed, by 1900, solidarity was the watchword of the moment. At this time, the reformist socialist Alexander Millerand was minister of commerce and industry. He was a supporter of the new doctrine of *solidarité*, formulated by Léon Bourgeois, which stressed the organic interdependence of organized groups, such as *syndicats*, with a government oriented toward social welfare. The social economy exhibition of 1900 expressed this new solidarist philosophy. The paternalistic worker villages of 1889 were replaced with exhibits extolling the benefits of state intervention and labor associations in addressing the social question. Displays accented the social legislation of the Third Republic, from the

1898 law on accidents to child labor laws. The improvement of worker hygiene, tied to expert medical and engineering knowledge, was a major theme. These concrete advantages demonstrated the efficacy of *solidarité*, which began to displace both paternalist discourse and the revolutionary language of fraternity among social reformers and radicals. During the Exposition, from July 30 to August 4, 1900, the first International Congress of the Teaching of Social Science was held in Paris. The objective of the Congress was to assemble proponents of *solidarité* and forge links between politicians and intellectuals. Participants included Millerand, Bourgeois, Georges Clemenceau, the historian Charles Seignebos, the economist Charles Gide, the journalist Gustave Geffroy, and the sociologist Emile Durkheim.¹⁹

In such an atmosphere, the great sociologist Durkheim surveyed the evolution of French social science. By 1900, having eclipsed Le Play and his school, Durkheim found the *solidarité* of Bourgeois too dependent on legislative action. He searched for a new version of social science that rejected paternalism and overt state control, and could prove adequate for a republican society. Though finding its earliest practitioners such as Saint-Simon and Comte simplistic, he believed that these social science pioneers helped overcome the hegemony of tradition and superstition, pointing the way toward a science of society. Like his contemporaries Weber and Tönnies, Durkheim saw the rise of the scientific worldview as an integral component of the great transformation of the West. Despite developing in different intellectual cultures, Durkheim's positivism, along with that of his more hermeneutically oriented German counterparts, recognized that the legitimation of social power in the modern era had become tied to rationality, democracy, and individualism. In the wake of the triumph of Enlightenment rationality, the spectacular scientific advances of the nineteenth century, and the growth of democracy and individual freedom, the foundations of government and society were altered. For Durkheim, the democratic conditions of France proved especially favorable for the emergence of sociology, which could grasp the laws governing modern organic solidarity, and its transformation of tradition into a more rational form of social authority. In his words, "everything predestines our country to play an important role in the development of this science."²⁰

His confidence in the future of a sophisticated social science tied to democracy seemed justified during the Belle Epoque. The authority of science was an integral part of the democratic promise of the Third Republic. The intricate bonds between science and republicanism were expressed in the rise of the social sciences to prominence in the complex

intellectual and academic milieux in the fin-de-siècle. Exemplified most powerfully in Durkheim's sociology, and in opposition to the literary perspectives that had dominated the academy, these new social sciences advocated a sophisticated positivism that could lead to the understanding of the patterns of "social facts" ordering everyday life.

For Durkheim, the emerging social sciences entailed a new role for intellectuals. In the wake of the Dreyfus Affair and the rise of public opinion associated with a mass press, the modern intellectual should consider himself/herself an opinion leader who could help guide popular sentiment. As academics and scholars rather than aristocratic notables, modern intellectuals should educate rather than attempt to dictate beliefs to the public. In Durkheim's words, "our action must be exerted through books, seminars, and popular education. Above all, we must be *advisers, educators*. It is our function to help our contemporaries know themselves in their ideas and in their feelings, far more than to govern them."²¹ Intellectuals would foster the replacement of liberal, atomistic, utilitarian individualism with a new "moral individualism," in which people recognized that self-realization and the rights of man were inseparable from the increased social interdependence demanded by an egalitarian democracy.²² A public enriched with a scientific worldview and informed by moral individualism, accompanying a rationally organized industry bolstered by a free civil society and a reformist republican state, promised future prosperity.

Such a view no longer depended on a simple faith in technology. Like Tocqueville and Guizot, Durkheim recognized that autonomous intermediary organizations tying professional groups to one another and to the state were central building blocks in social stability. Further, by 1900 many republican leaders realized that their energies should be directed toward the promotion of republican values, rather than attempting to foster giant industrial projects. While some business elites advocated economic concentration, the rise of German and American industry in the late nineteenth century, coupled with French industrial stagnation, helped promote a sensitivity to small business and a protectionist approach to the economy. In such a context, the state turned to the tasks of social reconciliation, solidarity, and education. The government's concerns thus merged with those of the social sciences, a tie reinforced by the Comtean positivism of many early Third Republic political leaders. Despite differences between the relatively liberal positivism of Ferry and Gambetta and the *solidarité* of later Radicals such as Bourgeois, several themes remained constant. Like Durkheim, these politicians realized that scientifically educating French children could

guarantee a public able to make the sophisticated decisions required of a democracy. A rich civil society composed of a number of voluntary associations complemented by an effective school system would encourage such democratic sociability. Consequently, the Third Republic promoted the status of secondary education, hoping to realize Comte's dream of the university as a secular Church.

Yet French public life also revealed discomfort not only about the virtues of scientific progress, but also the viability of a republican government.²³ The Boulanger adventure was followed by the protracted Dreyfus Affair, which showed that powerful conservative elements in French society such as the army were ambiguous at best about republican principles. Further, Bergson's philosophy of *élan* and the rise of spiritualist philosophies demonstrated an uneasiness about the costs to spiritual and inner life that a disenchanting science invariably advanced. The memory of the Franco-Prussian War compounded fears of French decadence and loss of will, exacerbated by the low birth rate and the high incidence of suicide, alcoholism, and venereal disease.²⁴

The social question especially haunted the vaunted progress of the Third Republic. By the first decade of the twentieth century, the new social science and the republican state had not successfully quelled worker radicalism, and the revolutionary syndicalist movement grew in strength. The Catholic *Ralliement* of the early 1890s, while accepting the existence of the Republic, had contributed to the visibility of the social question, for it prominently championed the social improvement of the working class. Reforms benefiting labor, such as the eight-hour day, were slowly implemented in France, despite the doctrine of *solidarité* and republican attempts to integrate the workers into the nation. The gradual and uneven development of French industry left in place a workforce dominated by artisans proud of their independence, while many French employers intransigently demanded total control of the *atelier* and factory. A strong civil society tying classes to one another remained underdeveloped in the Belle Epoque.

Social science recognized this underside of modern material and social progress. Durkheim's rhetoric was suffused with the language of crisis; he and his school believed that a major indicator of anomie was the pervasive class conflict in French society. The Durkheimians recognized the immense power of the non-rational in social life, even if they believed its contours could be rationally grasped.²⁵ While Durkheim sympathized with many of the left's demands, for other, more conservative, social critics, democracy and particularly socialism promised the end of civilization. Many popular social psychological studies of collective behavior

echoed Le Bon's fear of *la foule*, and the rise of a new barbarism associated with it. The social question, and especially revolutionary syndicalism, provided perhaps the major challenge for social scientific and democratic aspirations of the Third Republic.²⁶

At first glance, syndicalism indeed seemed dangerous, backward-looking, and irrational, justifying Le Bon's fears. The rhetoric and actions of the movement helped fuel the most paranoid bourgeois anxieties, reaching a fever pitch in the early twentieth century. On April 13, 1906, Gaston Dru, journalist for the very conservative *L'Echo de Paris*, interviewed Griffuelhes, the revolutionary syndicalist leader of the CGT, by then the largest leftist union organization in France. The CGT had called for massive worker demonstrations on May 1, less than three weeks away. Reflecting the mixture of trepidation and curiosity that characterized many of his colleagues and middle-class readers, Dru painted Griffuelhes, a shoemaker who once followed the revolutionary conspirator Blanqui, as a modern-day *sans-culotte* who looked and acted the part of the revolutionary artisan. Griffuelhes, proud, defiant, with a touch of the authoritarian, had "the air of someone who is, and wishes to remain, a worker." For Dru, Griffuelhes seemed radically "other," an early twentieth-century representative of the "dangerous classes," with few ties to mainstream French society.

His interview only confirmed this perception. Dru asked Griffuelhes if he believed that worker strikes were responsible for the precarious condition of the French economy. Griffuelhes did not even bother to reply to this question, and instead confirmed Dru's fears by stating that "we [workers] demand nothing. We take."²⁷ Griffuelhes said that he cared little about the competitive position of France vis-à-vis other countries, for a vast class chasm separated laborers and *patrons*. Workers have nothing, he said, they will gain nothing by an accord with capitalists, and they have nothing to lose. For Griffuelhes, notions of civilization and patriotism were the creations of the bourgeoisie and held no meaning for the proletariat.

Griffuelhes's remarks reflected the sense of cultural difference cultivated by the CGT. Syndicalist militants, drawing on rich socialist and artisanal traditions, fashioned an *ouvriériste* discourse and cultural style emphasizing the social centrality of the producer rather than the citizen, the nobility of the worker, and the barbarism of the bourgeoisie and its republican lackeys. They stressed the importance of *élan* in energizing worker activity in opposition to bourgeois decadence. Direct action was a key component of this unique working-class sensibility. *Les gestes*, whether strikes or demonstrations, expressed workers' will and turned

their subordinate economic position into a powerful force. This “pragmatic of direct action,” incarnated in decentralized syndicates, increased worker solidarity while promoting concrete social reforms. As the historian Perrot states, “To go on strike was such a positive act, from the vantage point of working-class morality, that those who stayed out of it were called, by a significant twist of language, idle.”²⁸ Demonstrations and strikes also served as discursive laboratories, a “liminal space” where new conceptual vocabularies were forged and bourgeois culture was challenged.²⁹

These themes were exemplified in the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate death of a Mme. Chatel on January 25, 1907. The thirty-two-year-old Mme. Chatel and her husband owned a café across the street from the Parisian Bourse du Travail, the central meeting place of the CGT. The newly installed prime minister, the Radical Dreyfusard Clemenceau, had ordered the Bourse du Travail closed in the wake of CGT demonstrations demanding that the *repos hebdomadaire* law be observed. Enacted in July 1906, the law mandated Sunday as an obligatory day of rest for French workers. The CGT called for a massive demonstration on January 20 to show workers’ displeasure with the laxity of the enforcement of the law. Over 20,000 demonstrators showed up at the Bourse and the Place de la République, erecting barricades in the spirit of their revolutionary ancestors and shouting “Give us back our Bourse!” Clemenceau, showing the vengefulness that would later lead him to punish Germany after World War I, turned the area around the Bourse into a veritable fortress. He covered Paris with troops, deploying upwards of 20,000 men. Workers and police clashed in front of the Bourse and several laborers fled into the Chatel café with the police in pursuit. A fight then ensued as workers cried “Down with the assassins! Down with the army! Down with the traitors! Down with the cops!” Mme. Chatel became extremely excited and fearful, passing out in the midst of the struggle. She died five days later of an aneurysm provoked by the experience, according to one account.³⁰

Though Mme. Chatel was not a syndicalist, the CGT treated her as a fallen comrade. Her funeral on January 27 was attended by at least 1,500 workers (the socialist paper *L’Humanité* account puts the number at 5,000), slowly marching behind her carriage, many wearing red carnations and carrying wreaths of red flowers while singing the proletarian anthems, the “Internationale” and the “Carmagnole.” Luminescent red, the color representing the blood spilled by workers at the hands of the bourgeoisie, was everywhere; the CGT felt red was appropriate for what it termed a murder. Several syndicalist leaders spoke at the cemetery

before her burial. In part encouraged by the rhetoric of these eulogies, some workers passionately cried for vengeance. The funeral decorum broke down as one distraught young man threw himself on Mme. Chatel's casket, vowing revenge on Clemenceau and Lépine (the Parisian prefect of police).³¹

The language of the eulogies at the burial was particularly interesting, for it turned typical elite descriptions of radical workers against the ruling class. Many elites considered radical workers to be violent and uncivilized, fanatically bent on destroying the private rights of the bourgeoisie. CGT speakers at the funeral inverted these classifications, castigating police, government officials, and the bourgeoisie alike as assassins, the true perpetrators of violence and brutality. Mme. Chatel, who was compared to the working-class women of Zola's *Germinal*, was "the victim of an invasion by barbarians, by the Tartars," who were unfit to be called human. The police had violated the sanctity of her domicile, just as they had violated the private space of the Bourse du Travail. The "jackals" Clemenceau and Lépine were directly responsible for such "brigandage." The imagery of the unrestrained *foule* was transferred to the police, who were called a "gang" who "invaded" Mme. Chatel's establishment. This language dovetailed with other typical worker inversions of bourgeois categories. Overturning capitalist complaints about worker idleness, the bourgeoisie were depicted as lazy parasites living off the work of others. Factories, military barracks, and jails were all described as penal colonies, *les bagnes*.³²

This colorful language was a major aspect of the emerging proletarian public sphere in fin-de-siècle France. Radical workers turned the language of the ruling class on itself. As had peasants in Rabelais's time, workers recast derogatory terms directed at their class into an idiom critical of the elite. Further, like the passion displayed at the funeral, CGT discussions at their Congresses were often emotional, unruly, and demonstrative. Syndicalists also developed their own distinctive institutions and ideology. Union leaders attempted to create a positive picture of worker self-reliance, based on the centrality of the producer in society. Following Pelloutier, they stressed the importance of workers autonomously creating an egalitarian morality tied to the *atelier*, in contrast to the atomistic individualism of the bourgeoisie. The Bourse and the syndicat were concrete representations of such an independent space which belonged to the workers. According to the speakers at Mme. Chatel's burial, the actions of the police showed that workers could not trust the authorities, and reinforced this sense of autonomy. The only reforms worthy of worker allegiance were those brought about under the pressure

of proletarian direct action. Direct action was not only a means to this end, but most fundamentally a way to empower workers by building solidarity through participatory activity, such as strikes.

The funeral eulogies also invoked the modern language of rights. Militants drew on republican themes while radicalizing them, advocating a worker version of social republicanism which placed the republican virtues of egalitarian participation and moral development in the context of the workplace. Their republican *ouvriérisme* also called for an improvement in working conditions and a higher standard of living. Thus, while some leaders advocated sabotage at the workplace, syndicalists were far from Luddites. The majority sentiment among workers enthusiastically welcomed technological progress, a more efficient and well-organized workplace to lessen fatigue, the eight-hour day, and increased material abundance. They believed that workers' control would not only increase the power of laborers, but also improve the productivity of the economy. Science was integral to this progress. As the Nancy Federation of Syndicats told its working-class readership in 1899, "You must instruct yourself politically and scientifically in order to gain the knowledge necessary for the complete development of your intelligence and your faculties."³³ Pelloutier called for the working class to develop a *science de son malheur*, which would free workers from the oppression of capitalism while advancing the laws of material and moral progress.³⁴

This belief in science and productivity showed the complex relationship of the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres. Syndicalists embraced their cultural marginality, seeing the syndicat and the Bourse as the birthplace of a new proletarian morality. Further, radical workers had a clear awareness of governmental attempts to co-opt them through the passage of social reforms; they were extremely skeptical of the Third Republic's claims about democracy and popular sovereignty. Yet their inversion of bourgeois categories showed that they were tied to the liberal public sphere, if only negatively. More importantly, workers shared much of the same discursive terrain as their liberal counterparts. Both discourses centered upon the modern categories of rights, class, production, and science.

In the years to follow, the revolutionary impetus of French syndicalism began to wane. Socialists unified in 1905 and presented a parliamentary alternative to direct action, and the CGT faced union competition such as the conservative *les Jaunes*.³⁵ After 1907, CGT membership stagnated. The 1908 deaths of several workers at strikes at Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges were blamed by many within the CGT on the radical rhetoric of the syndicalist leadership. Shortly thereafter, Griffuelhes was

forced to resign the presidency of the union in a scandal which may have been masterminded by rivals, who accused him of embezzling union funds. He was replaced by the ineffectual socialist Niel, who was in turn supplanted six months later by the more militant Jouhaux.³⁶

In a May 1, 1909, interview with *L'Eclair*, the aging Georges Sorel commented on the evanescence of syndicalism's radicalism. His famous *Reflections on Violence* had painted a sophisticated portrait of syndicalist workers who rejected bourgeois morality in favor of a proletarian, heroic ethic motivated by the myth of the general strike. According to Sorel, this ethic had disintegrated largely because the syndicalist leadership after Griffuelhes was an ambitious coterie seduced by the socialist spirit of compromise. These leaders reduced the revolutionary ideal of the general strike to a mundane program concerned with consolidating gains and avoiding trouble with the police. The CGT ethic of direct action was subtly redefined to reflect this new passivity, for it now ritualized radical behavior, thereby domesticating it. As Sorel stated, CGT May Day demonstrations "habituated workers who descended to the Place de la République on this day to march docilely according to the commands of the police."³⁷ Sorel's fears about the reformist tendencies of the movement were realized several years later, when the CGT leader Jouhaux joined the French *union sacrée* during World War I rather than attempting to lead a general strike.³⁸

Like Sorel, many syndicalist militants recognized that the movement seemed to be losing its revolutionary *élan*. The militants' analysis centered on a crisis of leadership resulting from the introduction of "non-producer" values into syndicalism. Several CGT leaders commented on the syndicalist "malaise," engaging in an extensive discussion about the fate of the CGT after 1908. They contended that the movement was subtly involved in a *rectification de tir*; critics often pointed to insufficiently militant leaders as responsible for the syndicalist crisis.³⁹ By 1914, this debate had been for the most part effectively silenced, as the CGT president Jouhaux convincingly argued that radical action must take into account new economic exigencies which demanded more centralized union control, more reliance on expertise within the union and in the economy as a whole, and a corresponding de-emphasis on the moral component of direct action and its ties to federalist, worker control of production.

How can we account for this transition? Undoubtedly, the Republic's increased repression of the CGT, the concentration of some industries, the international tensions pointing toward war, and the seeming failure of the general-strike strategy played an important role. There are also

some interesting clues in Sorel's interview. Sorel's framing of the problems faced by syndicalism in terms of reformist and revolutionary orientations reflected the interpretation advanced by CGT leaders of all stripes. The revolution reform dichotomy had framed syndicalist self-understanding since the inception of the CGT, yet this binary opposition helped draw attention away from the language of science and technological progress that was profoundly influencing the movement.

The discourse of science and productivity so important to republicans was not problematized by the CGT, but was rather embraced by syndicalists. If anything, by 1908 many militants criticized republicans and capitalists as not being scientific enough, as preventing progress because their class prejudices inhibited an understanding of the functioning of the economic *ordre naturel*. As syndicalism adopted a thoroughly technocratic discourse, the organizational framework of the movement changed. Though critical of the bureaucratic tendencies that characterized political parties from the French Socialists and German Social Democrats to the "bourgeois" French Radical Party, the CGT gradually adopted a centralized, bureaucratic structure itself.

The syndicalist glorification of the laborer, whose nobility they contrasted with the murderers of Mme. Chatel, linked syndicalist productivism to the logic of the emerging industrial society. What the American sociologist C. Wright Mills calls, in another context, the left's belief in a "labor metaphysic" is important here.⁴⁰ For Mills, Marxist and socialist doctrine overemphasized the role of the working class as an agent of emancipatory social change. Such a perspective reduced the complexity of social change to the history of labor. While syndicalism embraced this philosophy of history, the labor metaphysic had more subtle consequences for the movement. The concept of labor supplied the CGT with a particular *ouvriériste* version of the positivism so important in the French public sphere, providing syndicalists with a vantage point from which to criticize bourgeois society as both inefficient (not allowing the maximum production of goods) and immoral (undermining the nobility of work). However, the assumption of labor did not prompt syndicalists to reflect upon the epistemological foundation of their theories of social action and change, for they viewed labor as the natural motor powering industrial society.

This valuation of labor helped furnish the CGT with a new definition of democracy and popular sovereignty, for the worker's place in production rather than the abstract political rights of the citizen provided the basis for social interdependence, social participation, and social power. However, the labor republicanism of revolutionary syndicalism had no

adequate theory of large-scale organizations and other "systemic" trends associated with the rise of an international economy. The labor metaphysic also had productivist implications, for it assumed that "human society and nature are linked by the primacy and identity of all productive activity," in particular labor.⁴¹ As Habermas argues, this *ouvriériste* epistemology contended that social solidarity and identity were based on the labor process, for people recognized and reproduced themselves through the products that they created. In good positivist fashion, the labor metaphysic's concern with the control of social and natural processes obscured differences between natural and social sciences, which merged in their instrumental orientation toward knowledge. Labor required technical rules, for the control of natural processes must be harnessed to human ends; it privileged instrumental or strategic logic over other, more hermeneutic types of knowing. Knowledge of the social world was tied to the history, functioning, and control of production.

Yet such a productivist perspective was not inevitable, as Habermas's rational, evolutionary perspective would have it. Syndicalist *ouvriérisme* also raised the themes of alienation and workers' control. The vision of work developed by Pelloutier and Sorel had a strong normative dimension, for it emphasized the aesthetic, moral, and expressive moments of labor, tying these themes to democratic control of the workplace.⁴² This laborist version of republicanism derived from many of the same roots as the solidarism of Bourgeois and Durkheimian sociology, and emphasized similar links between moral solidarity and democratic participation. However, in the context of the crisis of the CGT, the failure of the fin-de-siècle revolutionary approach to appeal to non-worker groups and develop a theory of large-scale organization, and the powerful positivism and conservative turn of the French public sphere, proponents of the productivist orientation redefined labor as a homogeneous, quantitative act, eclipsing in the process the social republican strands of the movement. In so doing, Jouhaux, Merrheim, and their comrades believed that they were adopting a scientific perspective on the labor process, in contrast to what they called the romantic version of fin-de-siècle syndicalism.

The leadership's interpretation of the problems of worker solidarity dovetailed with its analysis of the introduction of Taylorist methods of production, for both revolved around issues of fatigue and the dissipation of energy. They adopted an ostensibly neutral scientific vocabulary to discuss these issues, which subtly redefined the syndicalist conception of the private sphere, and ushered in a new abstract, cybernetic language of technical efficiency and control of social processes. By 1914, the CGT's

analysis of the problems faced by workers accepted the necessity of worker adaptation to the laws of the division of labor. Such adjustment focused on changing workers' aptitudes, energy, and morality rather than on altering the division of labor. The private sphere was invoked as the locus of consumption and the region where energy could be rekindled.⁴³

The presidency of Jouhaux and the rise to prominence of Merrheim, the leader of the metalworkers' federation, systematized this new orientation.⁴⁴ Jouhaux and his colleagues utilized the new psychological and scientific language of adaptation and equilibrium to focus on problems of increased productivity and consumption rather than the moral context of workers' participation in the *atelier*, arguing that experts could best arrange a healthier and more productive workplace. This *ouvriérisme* did not merely replicate the positivism of the liberal public sphere or institute the changes advocated by reformists within the CGT. Jouhaux's and Merrheim's language remained nominally revolutionary, focusing on worker autonomy while remaining suspicious of state action. Yet this new vocabulary abandoned any interest in creating new types of proletarian sociability, privileging increased production over these other aspects of the movement. In sum, they gradually replaced the myth of the general strike with the equally mythological belief in the inevitable development of a large-scale industry with a complex structure, to which workers necessarily had to adapt.

This new syndicalist mythology of a society organized around industrial and scientific progress was intensified by the experience of many leaders in the French government during World War I. Moreover, after World War I, syndicalist productivism could be understood as a radical position because of Clemenceau's conservatism and the attempts to return to a *laissez-faire* economy. Syndicalists thus allied with those elites and socialists, such as Albert Thomas, who favored state-sponsored rationalization of the economy, and joined them in denouncing as inefficient the small-scale production that still characterized much of the French economy. The CGT contributed to the rationalization of the emerging capitalist order, outdoing even elites in its enthusiasm for industrial society. With its socialist, progressive capitalist, and republican allies, the CGT advocated a version of a corporatist system in which consensus, in Maier's terms, was achieved through "bargaining among organized interests" of labor, business, and the state, rather than through mass public approval or parliamentary means.⁴⁵ This neo-corporatism provided the outline for a new postwar public sphere, based on the ostensibly shared interest of the French in increased production and the irrelevance of prewar models of class conflict and social organization.

While the formation of the Communist Party in opposition to reformist syndicalism in 1921 integrated many revolutionary syndicalist themes such as the primacy of class struggle and a suspicion of the republican state, the Party did not question the desirability or inevitability of industrial society, the importance of economic growth, or the viability of a neo-positivist "scientific" approach to social life. The French union movement thus helped contribute to a post-World War I "vision of society in which social conflict was eliminated in favor of technological and scientific imperatives [which] could embrace liberal, socialist, authoritarian, and even communist and fascist solutions."⁴⁶ It was an active player in the rise of the instrumental rationality in the West catalogued by the Frankfurt School, restricting more democratic, alternative visions of modernity, at least for this historical era.

Such an outcome was by no means inevitable. However, in the CGT's turn toward reformism, its distinctive social republicanism was forgotten by its leaders, as well as by later historians of the movement. A particular vision of social organization that might have oriented France, and possibly Europe, toward a more participatory type of society, perhaps in the direction of democratic socialism with an emphasis on workers' control, was branded as unrealistic.

It seems as if many contemporary Western social movements have learned these lessons well. In the wake of the decline of the hegemony of the labor movement in the West and the fall of communism in Europe, "new social movements" have become major agents of social change. Unlike syndicalists, both activists and theorists of new social movements, such as the environmental, women's, and gay and lesbian movements, are quite skeptical about the claims of scientific expertise, especially when tied to the ideology of economic growth. They reject the productivist discourse of the labor movement in favor of issues centering on the quality of life and social identity. New social movements also dismiss the proletariat as a universal, emancipatory class, looking to race, gender, and the like rather than class as sources of cultural identity. They are circumspect about the possibility and/or desirability of an apocalyptic revolution, a teleological philosophy of history, and any type of simple dedifferentiation.⁴⁷

Indeed, my approach shares many of these themes with the theorists of new social movements. However, these contemporary authors are too quick to consign labor movements such as syndicalism to the dustbin of history. The theorists of new social movements merge with neo-conservatives in rejecting the entire syndicalist tradition as little more than an authoritarian and productivist chapter in the history of the left, to be

dismissed out of hand. Such an approach conflates historical outcomes with historical inevitability. In so doing, authors from Habermas to Touraine grant too much to the liberal tradition, and do not draw on the rich legacy of the plebeian and proletarian public spheres, as exemplified in part by syndicalism. Even in its productivist form, syndicalism certainly helped promote a more open public realm. The CGT never completely abandoned the issue of some sort of workers' participation in and control of the labor process; it provided a necessary prelude for more radical claims for workers' control that surfaced again, for example, in post-World War II France. Syndicalism also brought concrete issues of labor practices, from wages to collective bargaining, into the public domain.

Moreover, syndicalism's advocacy of direct action, decentralized participation, and moral development clearly presages the new social movements, thus calling into question their newness. Further, many economists now recognize that flexible, small-scale firms with much labor participation may be more economically viable than large corporations.⁴⁸ In sum, in the context of the contemporary zeitgeist, the complexity of the "utopian" visions of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century social movements should be recognized. Not only revolutionary syndicalists, but also the Chartists and Guild Socialists in Britain, the Knights of Labor and the IWW in the United States, and the council communists in post-World War I Germany and Italy were very different from the bureaucratic, hierarchical, and state-oriented Marxist and reformist unions. The amnesia of the new social movements complements the earlier hegemony of Marxist and social democratic models of modern society on the left, for they restrict our view of historical possibilities and contribute to a scarcity of symbolic resources for contemporary attempts to devise new forms of decentralized community. A rethinking of the legacy of the syndicalist movement is no less than an attempt to stake a claim to the "popular sense of history" and not cede this terrain to liberals or neo-conservatives. It means giving the socialist tradition its due in "the debate over who shall inherit the old European vocabulary of freedom, equality, and solidarity."⁴⁹

To ground a theory of public discourse which can adequately inform an analysis of revolutionary syndicalism, the thicket of research surrounding these issues must be investigated. This involves not only examining the literature on new social movements, but also entails navigating through the studies of syndicalism and the French labor movement while drawing out their underlying theoretical assumptions. Finally, the Habermasian approach to public discourse must be critically examined, concerning especially issues of culture and the historically situated character of social movements.

PART I

*Reconfiguring the language of
labor: the advantages and
limitations of a Habermasian
historical sociology*

Syndicalism, the New Orthodoxy, and the postmodern turn

The study of French syndicalism raises general theoretical issues ranging from the relationship between ideologies and social structure to the conditions promoting or inhibiting collective action. Sociologists are not strangers to such concerns. Weber's classical formulation of sociology as the study of the coordination of social action raises these issues in their most abstract form. His monumental *oeuvre* distills basic sociological queries: what are the determinants of social behavior? Does social integration depend on social structural factors of which people are unaware, or is it based primarily on their conscious ties to one another?¹ All sociologists and historians must answer these fundamental questions, yet often they do not do so explicitly. Many explanations of social movements tend to underestimate the complexity of this problem, defining consciousness as simply a derivative of social structure or psychology. They often posit an image of the agent as influenced by imputed interests or social circumstances.²

The linguistic turn has fortunately problematized such assumptions. Yet the wealth of research on French syndicalism and the labor movement demonstrates the continuing appeal of structural as well as ideological approaches to historical explanation. This chapter critically examines a number of these works, attempting to elucidate the theoretical dimension of historical research. I begin by analyzing studies of French syndicalism. I then move on to Tilly's use of the resource mobilization perspective. Neither Tilly nor the historians of revolutionary syndicalism develop a complex view of the role of public discourse in French labor, though Tilly shifts the focus of historical research to an implicit, if undertheorized, notion of the plebeian public sphere. I turn to the "New Orthodoxy," exemplified in the work of Calhoun and Sewell, and to the deconstructionist positions of Reddy and Scott, for a

more sophisticated treatment of the "language of labor." These approaches do not sufficiently analyze the epistemological component of public discourse and its relationship to the public sphere. Finally, given the limitations of the collective action literature, I discuss the ways in which it can help inform abstract discussions of public discourse such as that of Habermas.

Studies of French syndicalism

French syndicalism has never lacked interpreters of all ideological persuasions. The movement has been variously described as a heroic alternative to Marxism; as an unimportant, transitory worker radicalism attempting to maintain the status of workers doomed by industrialization; and as the intellectual precursor of fascism. The most recent interpretations by Julliard and Jennings take a more balanced view of the movement, analyzing it in terms of the social context of the time.

The classical interpretations of French syndicalism examine the movement's dynamics in terms of the thought and personality characteristics of its leaders, the development of internal factions, and the relationship of these factors to social and political events. The analyses of Lefranc and Dolléans, though placing syndicalism in the context of social and economic changes, link the evolution of the movement to the heroism of its leaders. They argue that as syndicalist leaders lost their *élan*, the movement turned in a reformist direction. More systematic in his approach to ideology than Dolléans, Moss concentrates on the formal development of syndicalist and socialist theory. He sees the movement becoming increasingly reformist and "realistic," dropping its revolutionary rhetoric as French society industrialized.³

Cross, too, sees the CGT shifting toward a more progressive and realistic orientation in the decade before World War I. He shows that the productivist ideology of the CGT outstripped economic changes; that the CGT allied with the progressive bourgeoisie and industrial managers on the basis of this ideology; and that the craft basis of movement did not substantially change in the prewar and immediate postwar era, despite the syndicalist productivist strategy.⁴ Like the classical interpreters of syndicalism, Cross is so taken by the modernization model of industrial society that achieved hegemony in the post-World War I era that he sees other alternatives as unrealistic. Yet syndicalist productivism was as fantastic as any other, for the Saint-Simonian fully industrialized and scientific society that the CGT saw as inevitable did not, and has not, come about.

Perspectives concerned with Marxism also have shortcomings in their explanations of revolutionary syndicalism. Schöttler's Althusserian-inspired history of the Bourses du Travail in France stresses that the militancy of the Bourses was inhibited by the monetary support which they received from the government. Such a reductionist perspective is avoided by Judt, who analyzes French workers' collective action largely as a reaction to changes in the state during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet his belief that French laborers more or less adopted an implicit Marxist orientation without realizing it has difficulty accounting for the federalism of revolutionary syndicalism. Rosanvallon ties syndicalism to the rise of the "social" in the nineteenth century. His sophisticated perspective clearly connects the difficulties in the state's management of society to the crisis in syndicalism, but he does not explore the dimensions of public discourse among syndicalists in great depth.⁵ Despite the limitations of these studies, Marxism was undoubtedly a powerful influence in the proletarian public sphere, as its vocabulary of class struggle, historical materialism, and critique of capitalism in part informed the French labor movement.

Among the more pessimistic works, Stearns views revolutionary syndicalist activity as the work of a small minority of leaders out of step with the more moderate rank and file. His study does not account for the often spontaneous and violent strikes that occurred without leadership prodding; as Julliard shows, strike militancy was frequently a product of local conditions.⁶ Those historians concerned with the ideas of revolutionary syndicalism often see it as an "intellectualism of the fist"⁷ that was either a variant of the irrational revolt against reason in the late nineteenth century, as Ridley argues, or, as Sternhell contends, a precursor of fascism.⁸ These studies point to the often violent and militaristic rhetoric of revolutionary syndicalism and its emphasis on elites and *élan*; they see in it a potentially authoritarian doctrine similar to that used by right-wing groups. However, these authors, especially Sternhell, disregard Mannheim's caveat regarding the analysis of meanings: "words never signify the same thing when used by different groups . . . and slight variations of meaning provide the best clues to the different trends of thought in a community."⁹ Syndicalist ideas of the elite, its use of militaristic metaphors, its emphasis on *élan*, and its distrust of intellectuals take on particular meanings in the context of its interpretation of the republican tradition, which presupposed active participation in a consciously created community. Nevertheless, the arguments of Sternhell must be taken seriously. When the social republican moment waned in revolutionary syndicalism, the radical critique of democracy helped lead at least some intellectuals affiliated with Sorel to embrace fascism.¹⁰

The two best treatments of revolutionary syndicalism are the recent works of Jennings and Julliard.¹¹ Jennings develops a sympathetic and scholarly account of revolutionary syndicalist ideas. He not only deftly summarizes the various intellectual currents in the movement, he also shows that syndicalist leaders had much more to do with intellectuals like Sorel and Lagardelle than previously believed. Jennings also sees syndicalism as representing a rather inchoate *deuxième gauche* in France that offered an alternative, if a weak one, to the Jacobin tradition.

Julliard, the major contemporary French historian of revolutionary syndicalism, provides a complex account of its evolution, tying the dynamics of the movement to conflicts between its varied internal factions. He sees the syndicalist emphasis on autonomy rather than the revolutionary general strike as the major aspect of its originality as a social movement; combined with the belief in direct action, revolutionary syndicalism developed a working-class orientation quite different from the party-dominated unions of Britain and Germany. Unlike the situation in those countries, French syndicalism represented workers who were integrated politically (universal suffrage having been instituted as early as 1848), but who were socially marginal (the right to organize was granted in 1884). Workers wished to transform this social marginality into a strength by creating a distinctive working-class culture in opposition to its reigning bourgeois counterpart. Though revolutionary syndicalism is most often associated with the apocalyptic general strike, Julliard argues that by 1906 the movement accepted the legitimacy of all kinds of strikes, and moved toward the prosaic activity of influencing laborers and employers to recognize the CGT as the sole legitimate representative of the working class.¹²

Though insightful, Julliard and Jennings miss much of the movement's complexity. Despite their focus on syndicalist ideas and culture, they do not develop a sophisticated interpretation of the CGT's discourse. Neither places the movement within the tradition of social republicanism; they also do not see the ideological conflict between productivist and democratic currents. Further, Jennings and Julliard do not analyze the complex and subtle interplay between syndicalist discourse and the liberal public sphere. In sum, neither author grasps the role of cultural power, public discourse, and the public sphere in influencing the fate of the movement. Consequently, like the other interpreters of French syndicalism, both authors fall back on a variant of the modernization model when discussing the movement's evolution. They see revolutionary syndicalism as an interlude that workers surpassed as a modern economy developed.¹³

These perspectives negate the possibility of viable historical alternatives. They not only follow an implicit modernization paradigm; they also reproduce what Judt sees as the social historian's typical penchant for an "occupational determinism," which reduces worker ideas to an invariant expression of their economic position.¹⁴ Many modern historians' antipathy to abstract categories and theories is well known; yet, in retreating from sociological abstraction, scholars often resort to ad hoc explanations seemingly grounded in common sense (the syndicalist movement became more "realistic" according to Moss). Such explanations are not necessarily faithful to the richness and diversity of the historical record, but rather rely on taken-for-granted and perhaps faulty assumptions about human action and behavior.

These problems with the studies of French syndicalism are not due to a lack of original research. Rather, they result from theoretical positions that are not made explicit. Yet not all historians of French labor fall into the difficulties of the above studies. Authors such as Tilly, Sewell, and Scott develop broader theories of labor movements grounded in the study of French workers. They explicate in a theoretically informed manner the conditions leading to the rise and transformation of worker protest.

Tilly and resource mobilization

Tilly's work is grounded in the resource mobilization perspective on collective action, which emphasizes conflicts over the distribution of power and the mobilization of resources. Tilly sees three fundamental components of collective action: "the interests around which people were prepared to organize and act; their capacity to act on those interests; and the opportunity to defend or advance those interests collectively."¹⁵ The nature of these components has been determined by two master processes in the modern era: proletarianization and state-making. Tilly defines proletarianization as "how capitalists and landlords increased their control over the means of production, how they dispossessed workers from that control, how they drew workers into full-time wage labor."¹⁶ State-making refers to the growth of a large, centralized, bureaucratized state.

Tilly uses this model to analyze changes in the form of collective action in nineteenth- and twentieth-century France. In particular, he develops a theory of French worker protest. In France in the first half of the nineteenth century, Tilly notes a change in worker protest from reactive forms of collective action (based on maintaining traditional rights) to

proactive forms of collective action (based on claims "for rights, privileges, or resources not previously enjoyed").¹⁷ He argues that proletarianization, political centralization, and the growth of state power were the most important variables in the development of these organized and national (rather than local) forms of collective action.

Tilly's analysis captures the strategic dimension of social action. From his perspective, collective action is coordinated by instrumental meanings and/or interests. The polity is a realm which regulates and decides conflicts over power, where calculation of interest determines action. Tilly also sees that the master processes of state formation and proletarianization work themselves out through the growth of formal organizations on the terrain of civil society, though he does not conceptualize his theoretical approach in these terms.

However, his approach neglects fundamental aspects of collective action and political culture. For Tilly, any attempt to reconstruct the political realm, any view of a different reorganization of human affairs, whether by the right or the left, is primarily an instrumental struggle for power. He cannot account for attempts of radical groups to create a political or social realm based on ends different from the calculation of interest.

This instrumental approach is due to his theory of agency. Though Tilly recognizes an intersubjective moment in social action, his atomistic and instrumental assumptions lead him to posit a dichotomy of voluntarism and determinism.¹⁸ His view of reason and interaction precludes the possibility of a reflexive, non-instrumental, and creative form of social action. Structural changes largely determine individual behavior, and agents can only act instrumentally (or irrationally) when attempting to change society. Such assumptions eliminate possibilities of non-instrumental rationalization. Communication as contributing to normative consensus formation, as the expansion of mutual understanding and the formation of new values, has little place in this analysis.

In sum, Tilly underestimates the moral and ideological aspects of social movements in favor of an emphasis on organization and resources.¹⁹ His seminal work on the changes in the French state replicates these problems.²⁰ Thus, Tilly does not explore the development of a political culture justifying the nineteenth-century centralization and rationalization of political and economic power. Eley points out that Tilly shares this lacuna with other state-centered approaches to social and political development, such as Skocpol, Wallerstein, Moore, and Anderson. While Tilly demonstrates the repressive aspects of state growth, he does not examine its cultural and ideological dimensions. The crucial role of the public sphere and public discourse justifying state actions is missing from this analysis.²¹

The New Orthodoxy

The legacy of British labor historians Thompson and Hill accents the cultural and ideological frameworks that workers developed in their confrontation with capital.²² Their argument that militancy is most characteristic of skilled workers facing capitalist development and that working-class consciousness derives from cultural attachments and resources available to laborers have become central tenets of the New Orthodoxy of labor history.²³ This orthodoxy has evolved through a number of works on nineteenth-century European and American worker protest. These studies demonstrate that militant ideologies originated with skilled and artisanal workers rooted in traditional communities. Like Tilly, these authors discuss conflicts over the very composition of civil society without explicitly theorizing it in these terms. For example, this research shows that radical organizations in the revolutions of 1848 depended on close-knit social networks. Secret clubs, local taverns, and corporations, based on regional traditions and communities, mobilized peasants and rural craftsmen in the countryside, and artisans and skilled workers in the cities.²⁴ Sewell and Calhoun critically build on Thompson's core concepts, and provide a theoretical underpinning for the New Orthodoxy. In opposition to mechanistic Marxism, they stress the autonomous importance of cultural traditions in the development of labor militancy.

Though in the tradition of the resource mobilization perspective, in his work on the nineteenth-century working class Calhoun argues that Tilly's concept of proactive collective action underestimates the role that tradition and close-knit communities play in mobilizing collective action.²⁵ Traditions, like the communities in which they are embedded, are often conservative forces, but they may become radical in times of social change. Calhoun cites Sewell, who argues that the development of socialism in France was due not so much to changes in corporate structures and vocabularies as to changes in the social context in which these ideologies were articulated. For artisanal workers, the sharing of traditions predisposed them to similar analyses of situations, as well as guaranteeing an interdependence of interests.²⁶

However, communities fall apart when an "external or specialized agency" enforces social integration. Such transformations occur with the stabilization of capitalist industrialization and the growth of formal organizations. With these changes, traditional groups lose their potentially radical orientation. For example, the existence of large formal organizations characteristic of industrial capitalism makes it more rational for

workers to adopt reformist rather than revolutionary goals and strategies.²⁷

Despite his recognition of the shortcomings of the resource mobilization perspective, Calhoun does not sufficiently break with Tilly's strategic model of rationality and modernization. Within close-knit communities bound by tradition, individuals act instrumentally. Because the individual makes strategic decisions, Calhoun looks to changing social contexts to explain alterations in consciousness. He tends to replicate the "occupational determinism" model in a more sophisticated form. Shifts in ideology are determined by corresponding changes in social position. This outlook neglects the relationship of different cultural traditions to mutual understanding. For Calhoun, reciprocal meanings are achieved primarily through shared unconscious traditions or rationally calculated interests. Forms of collective action drawing on such understandings are either nostalgically looking to the past or acting on instrumentally rational interests. Attempts to implement a vision of social life based on cultural traditions different from a return to the past or instrumental reformism are difficult to conceive, given Calhoun's analysis.

Sewell is more sensitive to the complexity of cultural traditions than is Calhoun. In his study of the development of the "language of labor" in France, Sewell adopts the perspective that cultural traditions are part of the overall ideological constellation that informs society. Ideologies are "anonymous" and "transpersonal," encompassing the whole of social relations:

Ideology must be seen neither as the mere reflex of material class relations nor as mere "ideas" which "intellectuals" hold about the nature of society. Rather, ideologies inform the structure of institutions, the nature of social cooperation and conflict, and the attitudes and predispositions of the population. All social relations are at the same time ideological relations, and all explicit ideological discourse is a form of social action.²⁸

Sewell also moves beyond the occupational determinism model by demonstrating that the most proletarianized trades were not necessarily the most militant. Rather, militancy was intimately tied to government actions, for changes in the state inaugurated new types of political discourse that became available to workers. His focus on political culture thus avoids the neglect of discourse characteristic of most state-centered theories while emphasizing the important discursive dimension informing struggles within an emerging civil society.²⁹

In his most recent work, Sewell develops a cultural theory of structure. For Sewell, sociologists such as Giddens and Bourdieu do not present a

credible theory of structural change. They invoke outside forces to explain social change, resulting in "awkward epistemological shifts" in their perspectives.³⁰ Sewell wishes to develop a theory of structure that can account for social change without resorting to a *deus ex machina* such as population growth. In this approach, schema replaces ideology; structures are made up of schemas and resources which both promote and inhibit social action. Whether resources are considered valuable and utilized for mobilization depends on the "cultural schemas that inform their social use."³¹

Schemas are the "transposable" and "intersubjectively available" stock of meanings; their creative use in different contexts underlies human agency. Yet Sewell avoids an overly idealistic account by arguing that schemas are only effective if they mobilize resources away from one group toward another. Sewell believes that his theory captures what many social historians of the New Orthodoxy have been doing in their research without explicitly theorizing it. Their research shows that people are constituted by structures, yet they can change these structures – which then creates a new set of structural constraints within which people must innovate.³²

Interestingly, Sewell does not develop a clear role for reflexivity in social action, which is a central theoretical concern for Giddens and Bourdieu. This lack of attention to the relationship of reflexivity to cultural traditions hampers Sewell's attempt to construct a complex, internally coherent theory of structural change. For Sewell, ideologies (and/or schemas) underlay social action, yet the epistemological dimension of this connection is not systematically explicated. He does not analyze how cultural schemas provide implicit ways of knowing the world, as well as guidelines for how knowledge is generated. These epistemological assumptions structure the creation of mutual understandings within a group. This dynamic process of consensus formation escapes Sewell's analysis. How are the different knowledge claims of conflicting cultural schemas (as well as different interests) resolved within social groups?

Such unresolved theoretical questions have implications for his concrete analysis. In his historical work, Sewell stresses the relative autonomy of ideologies and cultural schemas in the formation of a militant class consciousness, yet he points to structural and institutional factors to explain the decline of working-class militancy. Sewell sees social changes undermining the "corporatist vision" of the French working class.³³ Like Calhoun, his emphasis on structural and institutional explanations for the decline of labor militancy contrasts with the

importance of cultural traditions in creating worker radicalism. He is forced to engage in the “epistemological shifts” to account for change that he wishes to avoid. Because he does not develop a theory of the relationship of social action to knowledge claims, Sewell does not investigate how a strategic, productivist vision of rationality came to inform the “schemas” of leaders of the French working class. He does not examine the internal dynamics of this “rationalization” of ideology. In the context of the decline of labor militancy, Sewell’s theoretical gaps point to relatively simple questions neglected by the New Orthodoxy – *which elements of worker ideology and culture (particularly those of artisans) contributed to the “productivist” orientation of the working class? Further, what were the subtle connections of this productivist worker ideology with the larger public discourse of fin-de-siècle France?*

The answers to these questions can be illuminated by an approach to culture and ideology that examines different types of rational-critical discourse. The New Orthodoxy does not explicate the distinctive kinds of rationality corresponding to different traditions. Though Calhoun places consensus formation at the center of his theory of tradition, neither he, Sewell, nor Thompson examines the specific manner in which consensus on cultural ingredients comes about. They do not analyze how cultural traditions and epistemological assumptions contribute to various types of social integration, nor do they examine the subtle links between worker and elite theories of knowledge within the bourgeois and proletarian public spheres. Although Calhoun has recently recognized the importance of the public sphere and contested cultural identities in explaining collective action, he has not reexamined in depth his earlier work in light of these concepts.³⁴ To grasp the vicissitudes of militant worker ideology, the role of contradictory cultural traditions and their competing epistemological claims must be examined.

Much recent social theory from Habermas to Foucault concentrates on such epistemological issues. In their different ways, the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism critically examine the genesis of instrumental reason, positing that such a form of rationality becomes the self-consciousness of a capitalist democratic polity.³⁵ They place what they consider to be the unwarranted epistemological hegemony of instrumental reason at the center of the development of Western society. Habermas especially has tried to differentiate alternative types and potentialities of rationalization. The New Orthodoxy, despite its cultural concerns, has not sufficiently explored this dimension of social experience.

The postmodern turn

Several historians of French labor have begun utilizing poststructuralist themes, from Reid's study of Paris sewer men to Rancière's discussion of nineteenth-century workers.³⁶ Reddy employs these ideas to examine critically the role of worker discourse and its associated models of knowledge in undermining the radical potential of labor. Reddy argues that historians reproduce the same mistake as the worker militants they study, for they reduce the complexity of worker protest to demands that can be categorized in quantitative, monetary terms. Historians do not problematize militant workers' acceptance of the category of monetary exchange as the major expression of worker discontent and desires. This shared belief in the naturalness of the "cash nexus" was a form of cultural power which militants did not recognize, and it led them to misinterpret the roots of labor militancy. Reddy contends that workers often mobilized in opposition to capital's standardization of their work life. The sentiments of honor and shame, rather than wages and workload, better capture worker motivations for resistance to capitalism.³⁷

Reddy's Foucauldian accent on the disciplining power of discourse moves the debate beyond a simple fit between ideology and social position. His focus on the acceptance by worker elites of the vocabulary of monetary exchange, and the corresponding blockage of alternative sources of militancy, is on the mark. In his most recent work, Reddy turns to Habermas's theory of the public sphere as a starting point for analyzing the restrictions imposed on public discourse, but he argues that it must be revised in light of the criticisms advanced by poststructuralists such as Foucault and Derrida.³⁸ Reddy states that the modern public sphere is based on the contractual relationship, which exercises a Foucauldian disciplinary function in mastering "appetites and gains."³⁹ Contractual relationships intersect with rise of expert publics to produce a "rational, authoritarian readership" which dominates the modern public sphere.⁴⁰ The escape from these constraints requires a "collective, public, political determination."⁴¹

Reddy's call for democratizing the public sphere highlights the advantages and drawbacks of the postmodern perspective. While the telos of rational consensus associated with Habermas's notion of the public sphere underplays the heterogeneous and transgressive moments of public life, the postmodern critique has few theoretical tools to provide for the solidarity and community necessary for "collective political determination." A better solution to the problems that Reddy sees with Habermas's theory of the public sphere might be to pluralize and historicize it in terms of competing visions of public life, while radicalizing the

notion of communicative action as a potential means of discussion across differences. For example, plebeian conceptions of the public sphere were not based on contractual relationships, but posited a more solidary and participatory version of collective life different not only from Habermas's discourse ethics, but from deconstructionist heterogeneity as well.

Reddy does not develop these alternatives because he thinks that worker militants lacked a vocabulary that could critically analyze the generation of this monetary doctrine.⁴² He thus does not investigate worker attempts to institute a new public sphere based on the principles of a laborist version of civic humanism that criticized the division of labor and the capitalist economy. Had he investigated this possibility, he would have seen that workers indeed potentially possessed a cultural vocabulary that could satisfy his wish of "uncovering the conditions in which human connectedness is itself liberating."⁴³ Moreover, while Reddy recognizes that left-wing militants adopted the monetary vocabulary, he sees it coming from outside, as it were. He does not see how labor elites elaborated a productivist doctrine on the basis of worker cultural traditions and epistemological assumptions.

Scott radicalizes this postmodern view, severing ideology from any "foundationalist" discourse whatsoever.⁴⁴ Following the approaches of Derrida and Foucault, her analysis highlights the exclusionary and internally contradictory aspects of all discourses.⁴⁵ For Scott, there is no preexisting reality determining linguistic conventions. Drawing on deconstructionist critiques of reason as power, she argues that discourse structures our world, often illegitimately, by making a heterogeneous existence fit into the straitjacket of a single definition of reality. Philosophers trapped by modernist assumptions are the producers and guardians of one-dimensional meanings. They restrict pluralism by appealing to a foundationalist concept that stands behind and determines reality, such as rationality or the transcendental subject. Historians have not escaped this quest for a secure philosophical home. Despite the self-understanding of many labor historians as pioneers of a new intellectual frontier that breaks decisively with their conservative predecessors' neglect of the everyday life of workers, their appeal to workers' experience as the source of labor unity is no advance; they merely replicate the foundationalist claims of the bourgeois historiography they claim to criticize. Researchers search for an essence, a Rosetta Stone, with which to uncover the true process of class formation. Yet whether the analysis focuses on changes in the state or workers' culture, historians grant themselves a false objectivity. They do not fully grasp that discourse is always contested, that it marginalizes some languages at the expense of others,

and that any linguistic unity must be questioned, for it means that some alternative constructions have been shunted aside.

Gender and the working class

Scott's poststructuralism informs her discussion of gender, which accents the dominant masculine images informing labor movements, the exclusion of women from them, and the inadequacy of the category of class to understand the structuring role of gender in working-class life and unions. This critique can be applied to the French labor movement. The earliest attitudes of French labor organizations were strongly patriarchal, aiming to relegate women to their "natural" domestic functions. Further, labor unions were dominantly male. Like many other late nineteenth-century labor movements, the CGT was based almost exclusively on male laborers, though women increased from 30 percent of the wage labor force in 1866 to 38 percent in 1911. While the percentage of women participating in trade unions increased from 5.2 percent in 1900 to 9.8 percent in 1911, the total number of organized women never rose above 100,000 in the CGT.⁴⁶

The role of women in the labor movement and the gendered categories of class were never central categories of analysis for syndicalist leaders. Much syndicalist discourse was patronizing at best, emphasizing women as helpless victims of capitalist brutality.⁴⁷ There was a strong anti-woman sentiment institutionalized in Keufer's printers' federation, the most reformist of CGT unions. Keufer's sexism intersected with the misogyny of Proudhon and Sorel, who believed that women should be limited to the domestic sphere. However, other attitudes were more progressive. The CGT called for equal wages for men and women.⁴⁸ As late as 1912, some syndicalist iconography showed men sharing housework with women.⁴⁹ Drawing on anarchism and Marxist/Guesdist theory, Pelloutier and Pouget viewed the family as an oppressive, patriarchal institution, linking the domestic servitude of women to the more general exploitation of labor under capitalism. They advocated experimentation and equality in personal relations, thus at least implicitly politicizing gender categories. However, like other revolutionary syndicalists, they did not escape the gendered cultural ambiance of their time. Their attitudes toward women demonstrated their doctrinaire proletarian exclusiveness and anti-state orientation. Just as syndicalists refused to ally with political parties such as the Radicals and the French Socialists, they dismissed many feminist initiatives as simply reflecting "bourgeois" attitudes which would disrupt the unity of labor.⁵⁰

As syndicalists entered their productivist turn and began to move toward an alliance with French socialism in the years immediately preceding World War I, they explicitly advocated equal political rights for women.⁵¹ Yet the productivist turn blinded the CGT to the politics of personal life, as concerns with the oppressiveness of the patriarchal family faded. The era's emphasis on work, science, and technics reinforced the exclusion of women from the public sphere. In fact, syndicalist productivism did little to challenge the general rationalist, patriarchal, and technocratic discourse of France in the interwar years that culminated in the Vichy Regime's emphasis on "the primacy of traditional domesticity and . . . a rationalized, modernized socioeconomic order."⁵²

Yet Scott's critique points to more fundamental problems than the blindness of the labor movement to issues relating to women. She argues that class as a category is gendered in its very core. For example, the Chartist conception of class "equated productivity and masculinity," opposing itself quite explicitly to utopian movements coded as female. This exclusivity found in class is symptomatic of the characteristic antinomies of much Western philosophical thought. Divisions from public/private to material/spiritual "are some examples of gender coding in Western culture since the Enlightenment."⁵³

Scott's criticisms of class intersect with critiques of the gendered nature of republicanism, which was a central discourse in both the liberal and proletarian public spheres. Landes argues that Rousseau's notion of republicanism fundamentally depended on the exclusion of women from the public sphere and the construction of a realm of feminine domesticity that invisibly supported public life. For Rousseau, men's and women's different natures translated into active public man and passive private woman, automatically foreclosing any attempts of women to participate in public life. Popular sovereignty was a male phenomenon in republican discourse.⁵⁴ Lehmann makes a similar argument about Durkheim's sociology, which was heavily indebted to the republican tradition. She states that "Durkheim's social theory actually comprises two social theories: a theory of the public sphere, capitalism, and men, and a theory of the private sphere, patriarchy, and women."⁵⁵

There is much truth to these critiques. No doubt the civic humanist tradition, like class analysis, could be used to strengthen a patriarchal masculinity.⁵⁶ However, feminist criticisms of these analyses collapse different conceptions of class and public life into a single category, making important differences imperceptible. Thus, the very different forms of public activity embodied in capitalist market relations and the participatory thrust of citizenship in republicanism are conflated into a

masculine public sphere. A new, narrow historical narrative is created which implicitly dismisses almost all of public life from the Revolution through the Third Republic as gendered and oppressive.⁵⁷

In addition, notions of class and skill that highlight the erosion of expressive creativity in the workplace are not distinguished from those that emphasize a standardized, uniform productivism. Many syndicalists searched for a novel type of skill that responded to new industrial contexts, and which was very different from the attempts of artisans to conservatively maintain skills in the face of proletarianization. Pelloutier's dream of free, decentralized workshops tied syndicalism to the expressive philosophical tradition that sees autonomous and creative labor as a fundamental capacity of human freedom, and which is a major source of the modern self, as Taylor argues.⁵⁸ This creative dimension is captured in Heller's discussion of free labor, which she believes provides a critical vantage point from which to critique types of oppression, whether capitalist or patriarchal. She argues that "every instance of human work is a claim to goal-rational creativity," and that "human freedom means socialization of our inner nature without repression, both in communication and creation."⁵⁹

In sum, Scott's deconstructionist analysis sacrifices much complexity. She does not explore the ties of social struggles to institutional settings and economic processes. Her conflation of text and context reproduces the problematic postmodern assertion that social life can be understood in literary and textual categories. Scott adopts an implicit foundational position herself, for she interprets all of history according to the essentialist concept of power. She does not examine under what conditions rationality excludes, and under what conditions it can reconcile. Given her assumption that any cultural unity imposes a particular discourse and excludes others, she cannot distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of social authority. Finally, Scott has difficulty accounting for cultural creativity. She especially misses how a "communicative" rationality can contribute to emergent ideals and illuminate new conceptions of social life that do not merely replicate previously existing ones.⁶⁰

As Bordo argues, perspectives such as Scott's tend to replicate the postmodern fantasy of "the dream of everywhere," forgetting that every discourse starts from a place, and that every language has exclusions and inclusions. The strong deconstructionist emphasis on difference tends to essentialize incompatible pluralities, and precludes the search for common ground across groups.⁶¹ A concern with commonalties leads to a different conception of discourse, evaluating it in terms of, in Habermas's words, its "potential for self-transformation."⁶² While

Habermas sees his notion of communicative action as having this self-referential quality that opens up the possibilities of critique and transformation in the public sphere, he has been criticized for assuming that prepolitical identities must be formed before rational discussion can even take place in the public sphere. Thus, issues pertaining to the identities of women and minorities are "bracketed" as private issues rather than publicly "thematized," and democratic public discourse suffers accordingly.⁶³

I believe that the social republicanism advocated by fin-de-siècle syndicalists radicalizes Habermas's liberal version of discourse ethics, and allows for the politicization of such seemingly private issues as identity. As Aminzade argues, French republicanism was "a rich and varied tradition with a variety of different visions rooted in diverse relations with liberalism, socialism, and participatory democracy."⁶⁴ Even conservative republicans publicly debated issues relating to family life, as Nord shows.⁶⁵ Though the French left did not escape the patriarchal aspects of republicanism, syndicalists and socialists looked to establish "a less chauvinistic, more benevolent, and more inclusive polity than the full-blown participatory republic associated with Greece and Rome."⁶⁶ Just as labor relations could be politicized, at least implicitly, in terms of more democracy and expressivity, so too could gender roles. That this critique did not occur was due primarily to historical context, rather than to essentially restrictive philosophical categories.

My analysis of French syndicalism demonstrates the shortcomings of the postmodern perspective. The CGT attempted to unify workers, but in so doing it drew on many cultural traditions which had different consequences for action. To see this process as simply a deployment of power negates the complexity of the movement, and obviates the study of the interaction of context and cultural vocabularies that shaped syndicalism. The ideological unity that did triumph in the CGT was based on a depoliticized productivism, which had very different consequences for worker self-understanding and action, as well as for the Third Republic, than did the competing federalist vision of decentralized, participatory workers' control.

A revised Habermasian perspective can illuminate the dynamics of revolutionary syndicalism. Following Habermas, I argue that cultural traditions structure our mutual understanding and provide resources for the coordination of social action.⁶⁷ As we solve problems, we develop learning processes which embody types of knowledge. Our collective problem solving can result in approaches to knowledge that are more or less democratic and participatory. Scott's model does not allow for these

distinctions, and consequently not only distorts the historical record, but also underestimates capacities for egalitarian responses to social change.

As I argue in the next chapter, in any historically informed work, Habermas's rather bloodless account of interaction must be supplemented by a consideration of the context in which social action takes place. Further, his evolutionary theory of history underplays the contested nature of civil society and the complex cultural discourses informing it. Despite its limitations, the collective action literature can help provide at least some of the sensitivity to conflict and historical substance that is often lacking in Habermas's work.

Specifically, the collective action literature emphasizes the role of political and social crises in forging new types of public languages. Such crises are not necessarily exceptional, for social movements derive from an everyday life characterized by ongoing struggles between social groups. Consequently, there is an important material moment in all ideological conflicts. As Sewell and Calhoun state, ideologies are only effective if they help mobilize symbolic and strategic resources from one group to another. Further, the New Orthodoxy, and especially Sewell, document the importance of worker cultural traditions in defining a distinctively French language of labor, embodied in particular moral meanings and concretized in working-class communities, villages, taverns, and the like. These studies demonstrate that conflicts between workers, possessing their own relatively autonomous culture, and elites were integral to the formation of French civil society in the nineteenth century. Such historical specificity can also inform Habermas's undeveloped notion of a plebeian public realm, which created expressly proletarian criteria for evaluating social action and promoting social solidarity.

Scott's discussion of the instability of any ideological unity, the inevitable rhetorical moment in any discourse, and the foundationalist, gendered, and exclusionary dimensions of a laborist ideology also must complement Habermas's analysis of rationality conflicts in actually existing languages. The role of cultural beliefs and metaphors in structuring discourse, which Habermas's critics often point out, also must inform any discussion of rationality. As Rabinbach and Reddy show, epistemological and cultural hegemony owe considerable force to the dominance of particular metaphorical images about the nature of the human body, society, and motivation that define and confine discourse.⁶⁸ Finally, working-class identity was not preformed outside the public sphere, but was part of an ongoing public debate.

Such conceptions can only be demonstrated in concrete historical

analysis. Before moving to such an examination of revolutionary syndicalism and the public sphere in the Belle Epoque, Habermas's approach to public discourse and social movements must be examined in greater detail. In the following chapter, I address these themes in the context of Habermas's discussion of the public discourse and the public sphere and its extension and reformulation by his sympathetic critics Keane and Cohen and Arato.

Public discourse and civil society: Habermas, Bourdieu, and the new social movements

The previous chapter's criticisms of the collective action literature point to the constitutive role of public discourse in shaping social movement identities and political positions. Drawing on specific cultural traditions, public discourse establishes a symbolic definition of good and evil, a representation of interests, and a definition of legitimate action, while advancing knowledge claims. These discursive positions in turn become new fields of struggle and contestation.

The most sophisticated analysis of the epistemological dimension of public discourse and the public sphere occurs in Habermas's work and that of his sympathetic critics. Habermas does not analyze discourse as a strategy aimed solely at securing power, or as simply an ideology legitimating class interests. He also distances himself from theories that focus exclusively on structural changes in the state and/or economy to the neglect of language. Rather, Habermas emphasizes the always-contested epistemological dimension of shared, public languages within the context of the public sphere.¹ He analyzes conflict in terms of struggles over the legitimate uses and democratic implications of different types of rationality, rather than as a variant of class antagonism. Finally, his distinction between system and lifeworld points to an important tension faced by any social movement.

Theorists of new social movements and civil society, such as Keane and Cohen and Arato, have engaged in a dialogue with Habermas, attempting to refine and extend his approach. These friendly critics accent the crucial role of social movements in creating new forms of public discourse and in shaping the identity of participants, processes relatively neglected by Habermas. Their conception of civil society supplements Habermas's rather vague understanding of the lifeworld and the public sphere, for they demonstrate that innovative democratic

discourse necessarily arises from associations grounded in a differentiated civil society. These approaches are integral to understanding revolutionary syndicalism and the public sphere in fin-de-siècle France.

However, these perspectives share with Habermas several theoretical deficiencies. They tend to rely on an overly schematic model of historical development, transforming the particular conditions informing the rise of the "bourgeois" public sphere into a transcendental model of the public realm. Because they do not analyze the various strands of republicanism in detail, they miss the more radically democratic possibilities inherent in the liberal or bourgeois public sphere. Further, their lack of a complex view of the cultural and social conditions informing competing public spheres often caricatures nineteenth-century labor movements such as syndicalism, dissolving the possibility of historical alternatives into an implicit philosophy of history. Thus, new social movement theorists underplay the importance of a plebeian public sphere in influencing public discourse.² In addition, their discussion of public discourse does not sufficiently address perspectives such as Bourdieu's regarding the often-conflicting positions of power and goals animating various public spheres.

The concluding section of this chapter develops these criticisms in more detail. First, Habermas's approach will be reviewed, followed by a critical exploration of the new social movement theories in the Habermasian tradition, represented by the perspectives of Keane and Cohen and Arato. Reintroducing some themes from the collective action literature, I will then draw out the implications of this theoretical discussion for the examination of revolutionary syndicalism and the liberal public sphere in fin-de-siècle France. In these cases, rationality, civil society, and collective solidarity were culturally defined and contested in the specific French historical context.

Habermas and communicative action

Habermas develops a comprehensive analysis of the genesis of instrumental rationality in the modern world, and grounds possible alternatives to it in his theory of communicative action. He distinguishes his theory of communicative action from the Marxist fixation on labor and class struggle, arguing that the *Diamat* of the Second International, associated with Engels, actually has roots in Marx's theory. For Habermas, Marx's productivist epistemology assumes that self and social identity are based on labor. Because knowledge arises from the labor process, the history and control of production and the conflicts of social classes define the

essence of social life. According to Habermas, Marx's *ouvriériste* reductionism fails to recognize the complexity and historical achievements of modern differentiation processes (such as universal morality and liberal rights).³

Habermas argues that the evolution of modern society progressively differentiates system practices (the economy and bureaucratic polity) from their original lifeworld context.⁴ These realms entail different types of social action corresponding to the exigencies of social and system integration. The diversity of social action corresponds to distinctive ways of knowing the world. Habermas writes, "social actions embody different sorts of knowledge."⁵ System integration involves a technical and functionalist rationality attempting to control economic and bureaucratic-political life, while social integration is based upon a communicative reason oriented toward the unconstrained sharing of meanings within the lifeworld. Modernization involves the ideal-typical rationalization of both system and lifeworld; however, because these twin processes of rationalization follow different logics, there is possible conflict between instrumental and consensual bases of action. The settling of such conflicts requires a vibrant public realm where citizens can freely debate public issues of mutual concern. For Habermas, bourgeois society always held out the possibility of the transformation of domination into the rule of reason, guaranteed by an informed public opinion. Public discourse in an egalitarian public sphere would be the necessary component of democratic will formation.⁶

The public sphere

The public sphere was thus crucial for the democratization of Western society, inseparable from the rise of the modern democratic state and capitalist economy. Constituted by independent property owners, the bourgeois public sphere guaranteed rights of speech, press, assembly, and privacy while providing the context (in principle) for the democratic and rational discussion of issues of general interest.⁷

Habermas argues that the bourgeois family represented, in idealized form, a private sphere of interaction free from outside interference. This "haven in a heartless world" informed the small groups such as salons, lodges, and cafés where the ideal of a reasoning public first emerged. The literary public sphere created a space where the values of intimacy could be transformed into those of criticism and debate. As capitalism developed, property owners attempted to secure the necessary information regarding commodity exchange in the market, thereby demanding more

information from the press.⁸ Through newspapers, a large-scale, critical public grew which contributed to the formation of public opinion and promoted discussion based on principled argument. This in turn encouraged a more professional criticism in the public sphere, where law was interpreted as the expression of reason.⁹

For Habermas, rational public opinion provided a new principle of sovereign power. This universalistic rationality was not just another rhetorical strategy camouflaging elite interests, for it postulated a form of public authority which could guide state decisions without abolishing government. By bringing the control of the state under the guidelines of the franchise and an opinion guaranteed by public discourse, any rule of law had to answer to the sovereignty of the people.¹⁰

According to Habermas, the public sphere declined as it democratized, for the incorporation of new groups such as workers created an unwieldy public space. The lack of substantive equality in the bourgeois public sphere made rational discussion difficult, and promoted corporatist, undemocratic bargaining between interest groups.¹¹ The interpenetration of state and society and the growth of the culture industry "refeudalized" the public sphere, as critical debate on public issues of mutual concern became subordinated to interest-group bartering and charismatic politics.¹²

Thus, Habermas recognizes that the bourgeois public sphere has been unable to fulfill its rational-critical function. Its invasion by instrumental interests mirrors similar processes in the lifeworld. For Habermas, the colonization of the lifeworld occurs with the illegitimate extension of economic and administrative rationality into everyday life, resulting in cultural destruction and anomie.¹³

Habermas has recently qualified his theory of the public sphere, stating that he uncritically accepted the Frankfurt School's interpretation of the decline of modern culture and its associated one-dimensional view of rationality. Moreover, he acknowledges the historical centrality of an alternative plebeian public sphere, embodied in groups such as anarchism and the workers' movement, which challenged the limits of the bourgeois public sphere from its very inception. However, Habermas believes that these criticisms do not undermine but rather reinforce his theory of communicative action. He links his changed view of the public sphere to his recent metatheoretical project, shifting his focus from an explication of the historical dimensions of the public sphere to an account of the linguistic and universal bases of communicative action. In rejecting the philosophy of history that informed his analysis of the public sphere, Habermas has

suggested, therefore, that the normative foundations of the theory of society be laid at a deeper level. The theory of communicative action intends to bring into the open the rational potential intrinsic in everyday communicative practices.¹⁴

Habermas's analysis has become increasingly formal, and his comments on groups and institutions that could provide opportunities for resistance and new interpretations of modern life, such as new social movements, are correspondingly abstract.¹⁵

Despite his formalism, many strands of Habermas's approach are potentially fruitful for the study of labor movements and public discourse. His conceptualization of a public sphere independent from the state can account for the influence on public discourse of intellectuals such as Durkheim, who developed social theories that did not merely mimic government ideology. His analysis of the rise of instrumental rationality in the public sphere, coupled with criticisms of positivism in his early work, are interesting pathways into the discussion of cultural power.¹⁶ Further, the concept of the colonization of the lifeworld captures much of the research characteristic of the New Orthodoxy in historical research, yet refashions it in a manner that is more sensitive to questions of language and epistemology.

For Habermas, social movements can be conceived as "processes through which latently available structures of rationality are transposed into social practice . . . structured by cultural traditions."¹⁷ The political positions developed by modern social movements must take up the gauntlet of the public sphere. Only in this realm, through processes of rational debate and justification, can their beliefs achieve persuasive public power. In Habermas's words, "Empirical and evaluative questions are frequently inseparable and evidently cannot be dealt with without reliance on arguments."¹⁸ Arguments in turn assume specific claims about knowledge. Given these epistemological concerns, and viewed from the perspective of the colonization of the lifeworld, worker movements were as much struggling to define their relationship to the emergence of new forms of instrumental and communicative knowledge as they were responding to the loss of occupational autonomy through the rise of capitalism. Though militant workers tried to develop an autonomous public space, they also had to advance their demands regarding the reorganization of society in the context of the liberal public sphere.

Habermas can also illuminate how workers themselves contributed to the growth of instrumental rationality. Though in a typically abstract manner, Habermas's analysis of Marx provides some clues as to why worker groups were unable to effectively challenge this new form of

epistemological domination, but often actually came to embrace many aspects of it. Like Marx, worker elites tended to reduce all social processes, from policies adopted by the state to social interaction, to the history, functioning, and organization of the labor process. This *ouvriériste* epistemology was thus not confined to the theoretical work of Marx and Engels. While Postone argues that Marx avoided this *ouvriérisme*, he states that it characterized the “traditional Marxism” that informed ostensibly Marxist labor organizations.¹⁹ In sum, in different guises, a “labor metaphysic” informed the productivist strategies within many working-class movements.²⁰

Yet Habermas’s analysis cannot account for the internal history of the plebeian public sphere, nor the complexity of the subtle links between syndicalist discourse and the liberal public realm. In particular, Habermas’s elaboration of an abstract and formal theory of system and lifeworld differentiation underestimates the role of particular social and cultural contexts in shaping public discourse and the relationship between insurgent social movements and the public sphere.

As several critics argue, Habermas’s discrepancy between the particularity of cultural traditions and the ostensible universality of rationalization processes highlights his insufficient conception of culture. Habermas’s later work clearly moves beyond Marxism by rejecting the association of discourse with a class. However, by grounding rationality in the quasi-transcendental categories of lifeworld and system, Habermas underplays the significance of cultural discourse that is historically constituted within and across social groups, and the ways in which such discourse shapes political culture(s). He does not examine how ideas like public opinion and republicanism could be used by various groups and interests for different ends, nor how the concepts changed over time. His strong separation of public and private spheres neglects the extent to which all seemingly private identities (such as gender) are thematized in public discourse.

Further, Habermas tends to universalize an early model of the bourgeois public sphere to the exclusion of other variants. He does not analyze how labor struggles and other social movements such as feminism helped shape the liberal public sphere. In addition, Habermas’s view of labor, though grasping its productivist moment, reduces it to a single, instrumental dimension, without realizing its possibilities as a form of creative activity. In sum, in his move toward an evolutionary universalism, Habermas neglects the variability, complexity, and historical particularity of linguistic meanings.²¹

New social movements and civil society

Many authors have taken up Habermasian themes of public spheres, public discourse, and social movements, but developed them in a more socially and culturally sensitive manner. Often associated with the new social movements, these theorists, such as Cohen and Arato and Keane, move beyond Habermas by arguing for a plurality of public spheres, institutions, and social movements embedded in civil society. Influenced by the self-limiting radicalism of the German Greens and the Polish trade union Solidarity, they argue that an innovative public discourse, promoted by new social movements, emerges from civil society. In the turn to civil society and social movements, Habermas's theory acquires a phenomenological dimension, for to be effective democracy must be lived in actual communities.²²

Rejecting the orthodox Marxist theory of class struggle, new social movement theorists look to gender, race, sexual orientation, and other issues concerned with the quality of life as key factors in modern social movements. For these authors, new social movements do not merely reflect particularistic interests that respond to the colonization of the life-world. They also create innovative forms of democratic sociability, reformulating cultural traditions in new contexts. According to these theorists, modern social movements can revitalize the public sphere and free participants from the iron cage of strategic assumptions. They represent the main vehicle by which a non-instrumental rationality can be brought into public life.

Issues concerning building solidarity and the development of collective identity are central to these approaches. Public discourse, along with symbolic social actions such as demonstrations, is seen to construct a sense of collective life, forging a complex and relatively fragile shared solidarity. From this perspective, the identity of social movement participants is invariably tied to the kind of "movement culture" that is created. Such questions are continually contested and must be provisionally settled before issues concerning strategic choices can even be raised.²³

Many of these authors link the rise of new social movements to a renewed and vigorously democratic civil society. They argue that a new theory of civil society can advance critical theory past both outmoded nineteenth-century conceptions of state socialism and the utopian fantasies of anarchism and council communism. These theorists recognize that the socialist tradition's relative neglect of public life and civil society has impoverished its self-understanding.²⁴

In sum, despite the diversity of theoretical traditions informing these arguments, these authors tend to agree that any critical theory must recognize the achievements of differentiation in the state and the economy, such as the guarantee of individual rights and the complexity of modern "steering capacities," and correspondingly understand the limits of participatory democracy. Such self-limiting radicalism, embodied in new social movements and associations, democratizes the institutions of civil society while self-consciously restraining their influence on the state and government.²⁵

I will examine the recent analyses of Cohen and Arato and Keane in this context. Although they differ on some specific arguments, these theorists converge on criticisms of Habermas's theory of communicative action.²⁶ They attempt to supplement it with a more thorough discussion of the dimensions of civil society and the active role of social movements in shaping public discourse. While their perspectives do indeed improve upon Habermas's theory, these theorists replicate some of the difficulties encountered by his approach, for they also rest on several problematic assumptions about history, culture, and the relevance of the socialist tradition.

Cohen and Arato and Keane: civil society and social movements

Cohen and Arato and Keane argue that Habermas's undeveloped theory of civil society informs his theory of social movements, thus minimizing possibilities for the democratization of everyday life. Because Habermas lacks a strong theory of autonomous lifeworld institutions which can generate social action, he views social movements primarily as particularistic reactions to the colonization of the lifeworld. He does not adequately analyze how social movements create new solidarities and discourses which contribute to the formation of pluralistic public spaces. For Keane and Cohen and Arato, self-conscious social movements both preserve and develop the communicative potential of the lifeworld, while promoting the democratization of the system (within limits). Further, Habermas neglects the concrete cultural context in which such movements arise.²⁷

These problems can be rectified largely by a new theory of civil society. Cohen and Arato define civil society

as the locus of both democratic legitimacy and rights, composed of private but also of politically relevant public and social spheres in which individuals speak, assemble, associate, and reason together on matters of public concern and act in concert in order to influence political society and, indirectly, decision making.²⁸

A modern, reflexive civil society promotes communicative interaction while honoring the systemic independence of the steering capacities of the state and the economy. These theorists look to Durkheim's theory of professional groups and Tocqueville's analysis of the role of intermediary associations in a democracy to supplement Habermas's abstract theory of the differentiation of system and lifeworld. Only a more differentiated civil society grounded in mediating institutions will allow for the increased democratization of public spaces.²⁹

According to these authors, the lifeworld-based public and private spheres of civil society complement one another, for the prepolitical private sphere, where privacy rights are located, also provides psychological and cultural resources from which the associations of civil society draw their power. Though the state and economy interchange with the lifeworld, and these relations can become more complex over time, neither state nor capitalist intervention in the lifeworld can destroy civil society. In fact, through its economic and political mediating institutions, civil society can influence the political and economic systems.³⁰

These authors reject Habermas's theory that the administrative rationality of the system dries up meanings in the lifeworld through colonization. Thus, Keane argues that any extension of bureaucracy into everyday life is inherently fragile. Struggles over the credibility of expertise and the distribution of power always condition the process of bureaucratization. Such attempts at colonization stimulate criticism, and new cultural battles invariably result from administrative penetration into the lifeworld, which in turn create new conflicts over cultural meanings and authority. The novel forms of politics that arise from such contestation can only be understood in terms of their concrete social, economic, and cultural context.³¹ Active citizen participation, which institutionalizes democratic communication in many diverse publics, can liberate the intimate sphere from all forms of inequality and freedom. Such a combination of associations and rights would successfully decolonize the lifeworld, for these rights of communication and privacy should have priority over all political, economic, and social rights.³²

Yet contestation means argument, and Cohen and Arato defend Habermas's discourse ethics as the surest guarantee for a critical reflexivity necessary for a democratic society. Such an ethics, oriented toward egalitarian and principled agreement, promotes "rational consensus on the validity of a norm [involving] *symmetry*, *reciprocity*, and *reflexivity*."³³ The universalistic thrust of discourse ethics expresses a generalizable interest, functioning as a "metanorm" which can be counterfactually invoked to criticize any empirical consensus. Discourse

ethics mandates increasingly egalitarian discussion of both institutional legitimacy and particular rights, and thus promotes the democratization of civil society.

Cohen and Arato also recognize that the "selective rationalization" processes of modernity constructed a gendered dichotomy of the private sphere (usually the family) as the feminine domain, with men actively participating in a public sphere which excluded women.³⁴ However, they do not believe that such historical developments lead to a notion of an inherently gendered public sphere. They argue that a vibrant civil society guarantees that issues such as gender relations, historically defined as private, can become subjects of public discourse and debate. This points them away from any naturalistic conception of gender to one which sees it as "a generalized form of communication." Any attempt to naturalize gender thus contradicts the tenets of communicative action, for "gender norms and identities are based ultimately on the intersubjective recognition of cognitive and normative validity claims."³⁵

In sum, according to these authors, the Habermasian project provides the best starting point for a renewed theory of the democratic potential of civil society. Moving beyond Habermas, Cohen and Arato and Keane argue that the attempted colonization of the lifeworld does not dissolve meaning, but creates new struggles over cultural identity. To grasp this constantly evolving process, the role of civil society in the lifeworld must be better understood. A strong civil society, composed of associations which allow for the flowering of public discourse and new social movements, necessarily encourages the further democratization of public spheres. These sophisticated movements arising from civil society do not attempt to totalize one model to all of society, as did worker movements of the past.

This analysis of civil society can illuminate many of the conflicts within the Belle Epoque. The contours of French civil society developed in the context of struggles between syndicalists, socialists, and republicans. As each attempted to promote a form of solidarity that would appeal to the French public, they reinforced while transforming the spaces of public life. In so doing, republicans and syndicalists advanced arguments based on epistemological assumptions that were debated in different institutional public spheres, from universities to unions. As the administrative rationality associated with capitalism became part of everyday life, civil society was not simply colonized by this process, but rather gave rise to distinctive struggles over the legitimacy and very definitions of democracy and social solidarity.

Criticisms: history and the plebeian public sphere

Despite their insightful arguments, the theorists of civil society and new social movements replicate some of the problems encountered by Habermas. My criticisms involve four components. First, despite their cultural sensitivity, these theorists do not pay sufficient attention to the cultural and metaphorical vocabularies that structure discourse. Second, they do not ground their approaches in concrete historical and social circumstances. Third, these authors do not develop the plebeian public sphere. Fourth, they do not adequately theorize the distinctive "fields" of conflict and institutions within public spheres and civil society.

Cohen and Arato in particular show a curious lack of attention to the issues of cultural variability and autonomy. Their eagerness to dismiss Marxist perspectives such as Gramsci's theory of hegemony leads them to neglect how the discourse of social movements both intersects with, and is distinguished from, that of the larger public discourse(s). Like Habermas, they develop a rather evolutionary and static model of change, for they do not investigate the role of distinctive yet overlapping discourses in promoting or inhibiting social change, and their recombination in new, emergent forms.³⁶

Despite their awareness of many alternative publics, Cohen and Arato and Keane ultimately share Habermas's tendency to posit the bourgeois public sphere as a transcendental model of public space. This is especially demonstrated in their inattention to the historical and comparative dimensions of the public sphere. Many authors have concluded that the bourgeois public sphere was only one variant among many.³⁷ For these critics, the public sphere was a contested concept from its inception, shaped by particular cultural and national conditions and struggles between antagonistic social groups. Alternative forms of public life competed with their liberal counterpart, and drew on a variety of cultural traditions. Such divergent models are not taken very seriously by Cohen and Arato and Keane.³⁸

A sense of the exhaustion of historical possibilities, and the irrelevance of non-liberal historical models, tends to subtly pervade these perspectives. Cohen and Arato, like Habermas, verge on positing differentiation as an inevitable process, for the political and economic conditions underlying it are not sufficiently specified. Though they reject Marxism, they tend to submerge issues concerning the historical context and social structural constraints affecting social movements into a philosophy of history based on differentiation rather than class struggle. This approach underplays the objective circumstances in which social movements

develop, and the historical structuring of relations between social groups.³⁹

For example, the differentiation of state and economy and the pattern of capitalist development in nineteenth-century Britain followed a quite different path than that of nineteenth-century France. Struggles between elites and workers, conditioned by each nation's history, culture, and state/economy relations, shaped this process. To the extent that differentiation occurred, it was characterized by cultural conflict, crisis, rupture, and reversion to seemingly surpassed forms of political authority, especially in France.⁴⁰ Several authors have shown how different traditions, from republicanism to physiocratic notions of rationality, structured the emerging French *état* in the nineteenth century. The distinctive characteristics of French positivism and republicanism distinguished it from Anglo-Saxon variants. This interpretation necessarily complicates Habermas's explanation of the role of liberal, constitutional democracy in creating the bourgeois public sphere. The richness of Durkheimian sociology and French solidarism's vision of a democratic, morally solidary public life tied to civic participation simply cannot be adequately explained within the boundaries of Habermas's theory of the public sphere and procedurally based discourse ethics. Moreover, versions of these same traditions influenced the developing workers' movement.⁴¹

Further, like many other modernization perspectives, Habermas and Cohen and Arato neglect the historically important role of worker groups as potential agents of change. Though Keane is more sensitive to this issue, he too does not examine the beliefs of nineteenth-century workers' movements in any detail, nor does he examine their lifeworld context. Keane, like Cohen and Arato, believes that the labor movement represents primarily a discredited set of assumptions and errors from which new social movements can learn little of value.⁴²

Such a reductionist view of labor movements obviates any discussion of their historical context. In their later work, Cohen and Arato echo Cohen's earlier evaluation of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century utopian socialism, anarchism, revolutionary syndicalism, and council communism:

All of these anti-statist, anti-market movements imply the dedifferentiation of society, economy, and state. Their purely defensive character (they had no genuine political interest in reforming or taking power) thus implies the protection not of society, but of a utopian model of a pre-modern community against state and economy. Their rejection of achieved forms of democracy as "bourgeois," together with the dangerous myth of a community freed from power, sovereignty, or even competition, reveals their affinity with authoritarianism.⁴³

These theorists do not investigate tendencies within labor movements toward productivism, authoritarianism, or a more participatory socialism, nor do they examine the historical complexity that such tendencies entailed. Because of this negligence, they draw too great a distinction between totalizing nineteenth-century labor movements and the self-limiting radicalism of present-day movements.

This lack of historical sensitivity extends to the plebeian public sphere. To criticize the left-wing democratic and socialist traditions as fundamentalist misses much of their complexity. The establishment of individual rights that these theorists tie to the liberal tradition owes as much to the insurgent activities of workers as to the differentiation of system and lifeworld or the implementation of liberal philosophies.⁴⁴ Further, it was in socialist associations that social experimentation and new forms of democratic identity formation were most often marked. Syndicalists, like the new social movements, were especially concerned with issues concerning the quality of life and social solidarity. Worker demonstrations, strikes, and forms of direct action (such as the sit-down strike) prefigured modern forms of civil disobedience.⁴⁵ French syndicalism created innovative forms of organization in the Bourse du Travail and the syndicat which at least implicitly recognized the problem of dedifferentiation.⁴⁶

Cohen and Arato, like Keane, also do not sufficiently examine the version of social republicanism developed by syndicalism. They replicate Habermas's reduction of labor to its productivist moment, thereby limiting their view of how syndicalists might creatively combine labor and participation in a distinctive vision of workers' control. Derided by Cohen and Arato as an example of a dedifferentiating direct democracy, this *ouvriériste* republicanism did indeed stress the egalitarian participation of workers in economic institutions under conditions of material equality. Like Tocqueville and Durkheim, syndicalists believed that some form of economic equality, based on economic independence, was as fundamental as guaranteed rights in protecting civil society. Only economic independence could guarantee that rights would not simply be ideological. In rejecting a large part of this republican tradition, Cohen and Arato also jettison the central role of economic equality in a free society.⁴⁷ Moreover, they do not investigate the complex similarities between the republicanism of Durkheim and solidarism and that of revolutionary syndicalism in fin-de-siècle France. Had political and cultural conditions been different in the early twentieth century, some version of these perspectives may have contributed to a more egalitarian Third Republic.

Finally, in accounting for the productivist turn in labor movements such as syndicalism, Cohen and Arato do not examine the extent to which such productivism was an ideological achievement by labor elites, in the context of concrete social circumstances. Syndicalism did indeed turn toward a fully productivist path, but this occurred largely because of cultural and discursive transformations in the liberal and proletarian public spheres in prewar France that did not simply reflect objective differentiation processes.

Criticisms: fields and power

This lack of attention to the history and constitution of the plebeian public sphere dovetails with these authors' indifference to the role of competing cultural traditions, power, and conflict within all publics. These theorists tend to replicate the classic Marxist split between freedom and necessity in their categories of civil society and the system. Because of this dichotomy, they underestimate the extent to which public discourse, grounded in institutions from social movements to universities, is organized by competing centers of power. As Calhoun states, "any public sphere is necessarily a socially organized field, with characteristic lines of division, relationships of force, and other constitutive features."⁴⁸ A consideration of these issues not only specifies the dynamics of public discourse, but offers a more complex theory of differentiation as well. Institutions are sites of power and consensus, shaped historically and culturally, which can be more or less democratic or authoritarian.

These topics have been taken up most fruitfully in the work of Bourdieu. Following Weber, Bourdieu sees modernity as complexly differentiated, creating new networks of structured social relations which are concretized in a number of different, autonomous yet interdependent fields, each with its own logic. Occasionally individuals but most often groups occupy distinct and often antagonistic structural, socially defined positions within these fields, and struggle for status within them. Thus, fields always imply a distribution of power.⁴⁹

These fields are not simply economically determined, for each defines a particular orthodoxy against which alternative interpretations must compete. In every field, participants struggle to augment its specific symbolic and cultural capital (whether it be profit, honor, or prestige) by developing strategies that attempt to master its implicit *sens du jeu*. Profit and interest are always fixed within a particular set of rules, so that success is defined in terms of the imposition of a group's sense of the game over others.⁵⁰

Publics are structured by such fields. For our purposes, Bourdieu's discussion of the intellectual field, and its academic subfield, is especially appropriate, for they provide the context for the rise of Durkheimian sociology.⁵¹ According to Bourdieu, the struggle of different groups for power within the intellectual or academic fields is also a contest over competing epistemological claims. Several historians influenced by Bourdieu analyze the fields structuring the rise of nineteenth-century French disciplines from sociology to philosophy. These new fields created new forms of group conflict, each carrying its own epistemological agenda. The struggles usually pitted a rising scientific perspective against an established aesthetic or literary orthodoxy. Thus, as Favre states, the rise of political science in France must be understood as an innovative form of scientific knowledge, addressing a new conception of the political within an emerging social scientific academic field.⁵² These new disciplines also had political implications, for, in Bourdieu's words, "rationalism and the belief in progress and science . . . between the wars, in France as well as Germany, were characteristic of the left."⁵³

Bourdieu's approach is not without problems, for he tends to reduce culture to strategies, and to privilege conflict over consensus. This leads him to neglect the "merits and social conditions of different institutional patterns" in their promotion or inhibition of democratic discourse. Nevertheless, public discourse in fin-de-siècle France cannot be understood apart from the emergence of new fields and their associated epistemological conflicts.⁵⁴

Public discourse, the French public sphere, and revolutionary syndicalism

My approach draws on the best of the above approaches in devising a perspective on public discourse. The tension that Habermas sees between the competing epistemological claims of a communal and instrumental rationality informs my analysis of the relationship between revolutionary syndicalism and the liberal fin-de-siècle public sphere, as well as the internal dynamics of the CGT's public discourse. Yet in France communicative rationality was informed by a republican moment that distinguishes it from the more liberal discourse ethics proposed by Habermas. His analysis of the instrumental tendencies of labor-based perspectives also captures an important component of syndicalist thought. However, Habermas's strong developmental perspective must be grounded in a culturally and historically specific contextual interpretation of the tensions between communal and instrumental orientations.

In Bourdieu's terms, communicative and instrumental discursive tendencies, and their complex interaction with groups and cultural traditions, can only be distinguished in concrete historical and cultural circumstances bounded by fields, which in turn are structured by positions of power and tied to struggles for legitimacy. Further, as the new social movement literature makes clear, the institutions and associations of civil society formed the battleground for competing discourses, and it is on this terrain that an analysis of syndicalism and the French liberal public sphere should concentrate. The colonization of the lifeworld never simply eliminated struggles over meanings, but rather created new contexts in which they developed.

In sum, I argue that public discourse, emerging in public spheres, defines both moral and epistemological claims. Though conflicts between rationality types play an important role in such discursive disputes, they are informed by continually evolving symbolic codes and cultural traditions. In addition, the institutions of civil society, themselves structured by conflicting centers of power, provide the context for the "moral regulation of social life" which gives ethical substance to public discourse.⁵⁵

Yet civil society must be further specified, for it is composed of diverse and often competing publics. In particular, it is necessary to distinguish the liberal public sphere from its plebeian counterpart, and identify their links and differences. As the collective action literature shows, the republicans' vision of civil society was always contested by a proletarian alternative. Discursive struggles were also important in mobilizing not only symbolic but material resources away from one group toward another. The conflicts and connections of these spheres in the Belle Epoque cannot be clarified without examining the respective roles of republicanism in each realm, and its relationship to more positivistic orientations to social life. Finally, changes in French discourse and the syndicalist movement occurred within the context of historical crises, and the reinterpretation of particular cultural traditions and metaphorical vocabularies, rather than deriving solely from abstract master processes such as differentiation or proletarianization.

The conception of the future marked out by the French labor movement was indeed contested ideological terrain. In France, radicalized republicanism, refracted through the experience of revolts from 1789 to 1871 and combined with utopian socialist and laborist themes, informed the language of labor developed by artisans and many other workers as they experienced social change. Though this version of worker republicanism differed from that of the Third Republic, both drew on principles of participation and solidarity, tying them to moral development, while

criticizing political factions. They demonstrated the possibility of formulating a pragmatic, communicative, and democratic social theory. Yet this vision was not uncontested. Confronted by the positivism of the liberal public sphere and by positivist and productivist ideals from within, and taking place in the context of power struggles in the proletarian public sphere, this *ouvriériste* republicanism had to struggle to find its voice as new problems emerged. The liberal public sphere itself was transformed by the rise of a new intellectual field in the late nineteenth century. This field was in turn modified by the growing importance of universities and, within higher education, the increasing influence of social science. The rise of the social sciences and particularly Durkheimian sociology to prominence in France promoted a sophisticated positivism that combined democracy and science.

Syndicalists could not divorce themselves completely from the dominant public realm. The similar problems faced by the plebeian and liberal public spheres, as well as their subtle links, in part explain the fate of the CGT. As syndicalists attempted to rethink their revolutionary perspective, the movement turned to instrumental and ostensibly scientific solutions. The transformation of the *ouvriériste* republican tradition intersected with the broader crises of republicanism and positivism in France. The moral and participatory dimensions of this discourse lost their capacity to inform both elite and worker action, as an increasingly productivist vision of worker unity tied to expertise arose in the proletarian public sphere and a more conservative republican positivism came to prominence in its liberal counterpart.

Precisely because the shape of modernity was contested in the wake of the French Revolution, doctrines became more self-consciously subject to critique. Questions of social solidarity and collective action could no longer be tied to a taken-for-granted tradition. The legitimacy of these issues became inseparable from their justification on the basis of arguments formulated in the context of organic, republican, and scientific conceptual vocabularies. The internal struggles of the labor movement and the conflicts in the liberal public sphere thus intersect with the unfinished project of modernity and the rationalization of the lifeworld, in Habermas's terminology, which occurred within the twin frameworks of democracy and science in the nineteenth century.

PART II

*Visions of modernity in the
liberal and proletarian public
spheres: positivism,
republicanism, and social
science*

The liberal and proletarian public spheres in nineteenth-century France

Habermas is not the only major contemporary sociological theorist who views modernity as an unfinished project. Though rejecting the strong poststructuralist criticisms of reason, Giddens and Touraine, like Habermas, nevertheless construct a narrative of modernity which culminates in a reformed vision of rationality. Moreover, like Bourdieu, they view a differentiated modernity creating ever-new conflicts over social integration. Giddens sees "chronic reflexivity" as part of the modern condition, in which social practices are examined and reformed in light of new information about these practices.¹ Touraine calls this modern process of reflexivity "subjectivation," and defines it as the capacity of people to form culturally distinctive conceptions of self and community.² Similar to Habermas, Giddens and Touraine also recognize the insufficiency of interpersonal communication as the sole model for the achievement of modern social integration because of the complexity and interdependence of the contemporary worldwide economy and mass media. Like Habermas's turn to systems theory, Giddens's extensive discussion of expertise and Touraine's concern with mass communication can be understood in this context.

These theorists also recognize the costs of modernity. For each author, a modernist reflexivity shorn of its ties to solidarity can become oppressive. Touraine, like Habermas, sees in modernity tendencies toward a rampant instrumental rationality that destroys alternative visions of historicity.³ Giddens, in a manner reminiscent of Foucault, links the development of expertise to surveillance systems, which in turn are connected to the development of administrative centralization and control. Thus, like Habermas, Touraine and Giddens believe that many modern cultural changes oriented toward an instrumental rationality inhibit the extension of democracy into new areas of everyday life.

While Habermas proposes a formal discourse ethics grounded in democratic procedures as the alternative to a potentially colonizing instrumental rationality, he also sees new social movements as crucial carriers of new discourses. Touraine and Giddens grant a still-stronger role to new social movements in their respective theories of the possibilities of modernity, though more as spaces for the emergence of new forms of sociability, in Simmel's sense, than as places for the development of a communicative rationality. Touraine in particular sees social movements as the major agents in struggles over the constitution of civil society.⁴

In sum, like Habermas, Touraine and Giddens make several pivotal points that must inform any discussion of the context and substance of public discourse and social movements. As does Habermas, they view modern legitimacy as based on some form of rational discourse. Modern reflexivity and the decline of tradition create chronic problems of legitimation for rulers, who must defend their policies in the context of public debate. These theorists also argue that social movements, emerging in civil society, informed by particular democratic and rational orientations and circumscribed by large-scale systems, are key agents in the development of modernity. Further, they recognize the fluid processes of self and group formation in the constantly changing modern world, which problematize any relatively simple concept of identity grounded in foundationalist notions such as class.

However, in their attempts to theoretically surpass what they see to be an outdated Marxism and to distinguish new social movements from old, Touraine and Giddens, like those authors in the Habermasian tradition, do not sufficiently follow Bourdieu's lead. They do not investigate the extent to which the institutional complexes of modernity were an ideological and cultural achievement deriving from conflicts within and between groups in specific historical contexts and fields, rather than the result of objective modernization processes. Thus, their approaches lack the historical sensitivity to adequately contextualize the transition from liberal to organized capitalism. Though they wish to show the internal complexity of modernity, they underestimate the struggles around the rise of new publics, the emergence of social democratic ideologies, the various strands of republicanism, and their complex relationship to a new political system of neo-corporatist bargaining, in Maier's terms.⁵

Further, like Habermas, Giddens and to a lesser extent Touraine tend to downplay the importance of the labor movement in constituting key features of modernity. They do not sufficiently analyze the significant role that nineteenth-century labor movements played in determining the very shape of modern democracy and capitalism. While Touraine

recognizes labor as an important actor in the nineteenth century, neither he nor Giddens examines worker movements' experimentation with new forms of democratic sociability, or the specific ideological and institutional processes that led to the assimilation of many unions into organized and/or monopoly capitalism.

Finally, labor movements such as syndicalism implicitly attempted to answer what Habermas sees to be a key question of modernity – what the moral foundations of a secular community might look like. Habermas believes that his theory of communicative action satisfactorily responds to this issue, building in part on Durkheim's moral individualism while rejecting Weber's view that the creation of an ethical standpoint was impossible in a non-religious context.⁶ However, in ignoring the contributions of the proletarian public sphere to such debates, Habermas replicates the very problems that he criticizes in Weber, for he narrows the possibilities of the moral foundations of modernity to a rational discourse ethics. More powerful visions of moral community, inflected with an expressivist moment, were developed in social movements such as syndicalism and solidarism, and a consideration of their fate can only enhance "the philosophical discourse of modernity."

Frederick Engels had no such reservations about the importance of the labor movement and class struggle in the determination of the very shape of modernity in the West, particularly its political institutions. For Engels, it was in France where such processes achieved their clearest outline. As he wrote, "France is the land where, more than anywhere else, the historical class struggles were each time fought out to a decision, and where, consequently, the changing political forms within which they move and in which their results are summarized have been stamped in the sharpest outline."⁷ Despite its ostensible function as a model for historical materialism, the political and economic history of France has all but refuted many of Marxism's central tenets. From the role of the radical artisan rather than the revolutionary proletariat in constituting the militancy of the French working class to the democratic and social reforms of the Third Republic, Marx's framework has proved to be inadequate.

Nevertheless, Engels's statement captures the importance of the interplay of different classes in constituting public spaces. Indeed, the history of the French Republic and the working class is inseparable from such conflicts. However, as the sociologists discussed above argue, the notion of class, as used not only in Marxism but also in much of the literature of the New Orthodoxy, implies an overly rigid understanding of social identity. The concept of the public sphere affords a more fluid approach

to the constitution of social relations, for it stresses discursive contestation in the very creation of identity. Tying identity to the public sphere places, in Robbins's words, "more emphasis on actions and their consequences than on the nature or characteristics of the actors," moving analysis away from a fetishistic class determinism.⁸ The public sphere's accent on competing discourses also illuminates which ideologies have been discarded or transformed, and the arguments justifying such processes. The concept of the public sphere thus can clarify a sense of the forgotten possibilities of the past, while highlighting the discursive changes that are pivotal to these changes.

The remainder of this chapter explores the rise of the French proletarian public sphere in tandem with its liberal counterpart. Such a thematization can give a concrete historical grounding to the sociological analysis of the rise of modern rationality and its ties to social movements. Despite the pitched battles between workers and elites in the Belle Epoque, the liberal and proletarian spheres faced common problems, for they had to construct at least implicit economic and social analyses of capitalism and the Republic, and develop the cultural grounds for social solidarity. Each realm drew on common and internally complex scientific and republican traditions which created a democratic spectrum in the fin-de-siècle, from syndicalism to solidarism. However, these two spheres developed these traditions in distinctive ways, which contributed to different conceptions of solidarity, class struggle, and the like.

Further, each sphere was also involved in battles with, for lack of a better term, a "reactionary" public sphere, composed of royalist, Bonapartist, Catholic, and quasi-fascist elements. Though a thematization of the major contours of this latter realm is beyond the scope of this study, its anti-republican themes, combined with a nostalgia for a more traditional if not authoritarian society, remained a strong competitor for the allegiance of the masses throughout the nineteenth century and the Belle Epoque. It proved able to adapt to the changes wrought by capitalism and democracy, as a populist and nationalist orientation emerged in the *ligues* of Paul Déroulède and the Camelots du Roi of the Action Française, as well as in Bonapartism.⁹ Thus, the history of the liberal and proletarian realms was inseparable not only from struggles within each and with one another, but also in opposition to a strong conservative challenge. Finally, the changes in the liberal and proletarian public spheres were tied to the political and social crises of 1830, 1848, 1871, and 1918.

The liberal and proletarian public spheres

The French liberal public sphere that gradually solidified in the Third Republic thus had to face opponents from the left and the right. As Habermas states, this sphere consisted of private, property-owning males coming to reason together under the rule of law. The central institution of government was the parliament, guided at least in part by public opinion. In addition to the franchise, a civil society composed of political clubs, a competitive press, and economic organizations provided the citizen, the key agent of democratic action, with the resources by which he could influence the government. By the 1880s, the liberal values of individualism, expertise, discipline, and achievement based on ability were widespread.¹⁰

However, the particular history and culture of France, as well as its intersection with the plebeian public sphere, modified this Habermasian ideal type in several significant ways. French revolutionary and republican ideas gave the public sphere a radical democratic flavor that distinguishes it from Habermas's rather arid discourse ethics. Ideals of moral community were often linked to active participation rather than constitutional guarantees of liberties. The experience of the Revolution diffused the ideals of equality, justice, nationalism, and appeal to the people as the basis of political sovereignty throughout the population. As these ideals could be interpreted in several different ways, many variants of republicanism emerged, which made simple agreement on one form of governmental legitimacy difficult to institutionalize. Jacobinism, moderate radicalism, socialism, and direct democracy each claimed to be the heir of republicanism.

Yet some general themes united these disparate perspectives. For each of these approaches, the republican emphasis on the unity of the people stood in an uneasy tension with the existence of political factions, which were often criticized as egoistic destroyers of the general will. The public/private split central to liberalism was modified, as theorists from Guizot to Bourgeois to Durkheim attempted to develop a type of social solidarity that could integrate workers within the polity while preserving liberal rights and encouraging economic growth. Such conceptions of social solidarity also drew on versions of the positivistic science, deriving from the physiocrats through Saint-Simon and Comte, that were so powerful in France. However, this positivism often left little room for democratic will formation.¹¹

The proletarian alternative, developed as an independent public sphere largely after 1848, initially drew on a medieval, plebeian popular culture

cultivated in carnivals, fairs, and independent spaces among peasants and craftsmen, and later on the "artisanal ethos" that the New Orthodoxy has documented.¹² The constitution of workers' own experience was the goal of the proletarian public sphere.¹³ As Eley states, this proletarian public sphere was bound by the dominant discourse, yet also developed its own specific "forms of expression."¹⁴ As in the American Knights of Labor and British Chartism, the French language of labor valued the "producer," often the skilled union worker, as the central agent of social life, rather than the citizen. The primacy of work blurred public and private spheres; militants argued that "moral collectivism" should inform all aspects of life, in opposition to bourgeois individualism. As Negt and Kluge state, the proletarian public sphere emphasized sociality, cooperation, and production.¹⁵ Throughout the nineteenth century, this realm stressed local, decentralized worker organization, in the Proudhonian mold, rather than the large, centralized associations and parties characteristic of Marxism. Workers often turned to collective action, such as the strike, rather than the ballot box, to express their grievances.¹⁶

The proletarian public sphere, like its liberal counterpart, also drew on scientific and republican traditions. Though worker militants struggled to establish a separate proletarian identity by redefining these traditions within the context of a new valuation of labor, they rarely problematized the importance of technological and economic growth.

Such a schematic summary of the characteristics of these public spheres does not do justice to their rich, crosscutting, and often contradictory substance. After the Revolution, the plebeian and liberal public spheres often united against royalism under the banner of republicanism. Following 1830, an independent proletarian sensibility began to develop. After 1848, the liberal realm was cut off from its basis in popular social movements, while the emerging proletarian sphere became increasingly hostile to state action in the context of nineteenth-century governmental repression.

The liberal public sphere in France

As historians from Furet to Judt note, French political culture since the middle of the eighteenth century has been marked by contentious public discussion.¹⁷ Judt sees debate as a central component of the French radical political style, embodied in the clubs of the Great Revolution and extending to the *cercles* of the 1840s and the spontaneous political meetings of the 1960s. Such debate has been a major source of political legitimacy.¹⁸

Yet these public languages did not develop in a vacuum. They were intimately tied to new constellations of social and public life that developed in the wake of the Revolution. In the waning years of the Old Regime, the public was likened to a theater; hierarchical and heterogeneous, it came together only to witness a spectacle. "Reasonable," stable ideas formed through deliberation by a social elite contrasted with the "vulgar" and changeable public opinion of the masses.¹⁹ However, Old Regime conceptions of the public and political rule were not without critics. One critical voice, centered in eighteenth-century voluntary organizations such as Masonic lodges, clubs, and literary societies, attempted to forge a new political culture and an alternative democratic sociability. These groups saw legitimate political representation embodied in enlightened and reasonable men, outside existing royalist institutions.²⁰ A plebeian consciousness of critical difference from elites also existed. From its mocking Rabelaisian laughter to early modern carnivals of excess and the pornography of the Old Regime, *le peuple* often criticized and ridiculed elite figures, inverting their symbols of governing into objects of scorn and insult.²¹ For Tocqueville, this radical disjunction between the people and its rulers, their separate spheres of existence, hastened the French Revolution.²²

The Revolution helped transform the dominant idea of the public. Though historians have gone to great lengths to demonstrate that the capitalist class did not carry out a bourgeois revolution, the abolition of the obligatory associations of the Old Regime and the freeing of private property from customary bonds promoted a new public idiom. In the wake of the Revolution, not only did public opinion assume a new importance, but its defining concepts also changed. Public opinion did retain several Old Regime characteristics. Like monarchical rule, it was a universal and rational form of authority above contestation and compromise. As Furet argues, the French revolutionaries took over the monarchy's notions of nation and sovereignty, substituting the people for the king, democracy for divine right, and the free individual for the estate.²³ However, the new public opinion based on open, rational public discussion was consciously contrasted with the secrecy and arbitrary rule of absolutism. Revolutionaries, often drawing on the same themes as Old Regime government ministers such as Necker, invoked an abstract and universal reason against the particularism of the Old Regime, for the rule of rationality would dissolve arbitrary authority and thus eliminate domination.²⁴

This new public sphere was not without contradictions. It had to resolve democracy and revolutionary nationalism with the inequalities

generated by a developing capitalism. The rise of a market society and the concomitant "great transformation" demanded a new conceptual vocabulary. As Sonenscher states, by the nineteenth century "matters that had been couched previously in an idiom centred upon slavery, freedom, rights, and duties were incorporated into a vocabulary centred upon property, money, social cooperation, and independence."²⁵ These new conceptual categories were linked to a growing middle class which joined an increasingly literate working class during the nineteenth century.²⁶

However, this new discourse did not reflect a full-fledged industrial capitalism. Rather it emerged in the context of a largely agrarian economy growing at a relatively slow pace. Unlike British industrialization, French small-scale, decentralized economic development was based on a workforce with strong artisanal traditions. In France, peasants and artisans were central participants in the emergence of capitalism. The nineteenth-century French economy was characterized by the contemporaneous development of proto-industrialization in the countryside, urban artisanal production, and some factory-based manufacturing, though artisanal, family-owned, small-scale industrialization predominated. The economy grew at a steady rate, primarily producing luxury goods for local markets.²⁷

Any simple institutionalization of the values of the classical bourgeois public sphere was thus complicated by a relatively non-industrial environment. Moreover, the political instability of nineteenth-century French governments inhibited such institutionalization, and a strong right-wing opposition kept republicans from establishing secure rule. Further, the "people" began to assume a more dangerous cast. The Revolution and its aftermath had not brought disparate groups together and promoted mutual understanding. For example, in the era of the Second Republic, writers from Balzac to Sue commented on the radical otherness of *le peuple*, often depicting them as savages, akin to white European descriptions of native Americans.²⁸ Gradually, with the rise of the social question, this vague image of the people metamorphosed into a picture of the politicized, potentially revolutionary workers.

Despite these problems, liberal and republican values slowly took root in the nineteenth century, though often circumscribed by an aristocratic ethos of honor.²⁹ In the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century, a relatively homogeneous French elite based their unity principally on shared landed wealth. They dominated the intellectual and cultural life of the country. The lack of independent, university-based intellectuals contributed to an aristocratic legacy which marked many of the early

nineteenth-century variants of republicanism.³⁰ By the constitutional monarchy of Louis Philippe, a new sense of both the limitations and the possibilities of the Revolution was theorized, particularly in the work of Guizot and Tocqueville. These liberals realized that any stable republican regime had to be grounded in civil society. Further, they believed that elites had to confront the inequalities generated by capitalism.

Thus, the liberal public sphere's conceptual vocabulary developed in the context of incipient capitalism, revolutionary ideals, a lingering aristocratic ethos, and the new conflicts they engendered. Even constitutional monarchs throughout the nineteenth century had to define themselves in opposition to Old Regime traditions. For republicans, these criticisms of tradition meant that a democracy had to create its own legitimacy and convince the people that its institutions were the most reasonable as well as the most just expressions of the people's will. Yet republicans also tried to limit the consequences of the Revolution in the face of a growing fear of working-class militancy. French republican politicians and intellectuals of all persuasions, from Guizot to Bourgeois, drew on two distinct legacies to develop a theory of social order and republican citizenship. First, they rethought and selectively drew upon the republican tradition for explanations of popular sovereignty that could bolster the regime's democratic credentials. Second, they utilized physiocratic and positivist science in order to base republican rule on scientific insights into the *ordre naturel* of society.³¹ Socialists and worker militants also made use of such traditions in developing their consciousness of difference from capitalist and republican elites. Much of French nineteenth-century political thought, from Tocqueville to Proudhon, attempted to synthesize these two traditions, though often in radically different ways.

Republicanism

Republicanism provided a common ideological ground for workers and capitalists in opposition to royalism until the 1830s. It allowed a critique of the traditionalism of the right and the "egoistic" excesses of the market. French republicanism also had complex ties to the liberal tradition. Narratives of liberalism often portray its history from Machiavelli through Tocqueville as informed by self-interest and individual rights mixed with a fear of centralized governmental power. In France, this conception does not quite hold true.³² In the early nineteenth century, many French political theorists made an important distinction between economic and political liberalism. They argued that economic liberalism reduced public life to the aggregation of individual preferences, which

provided an insufficient basis for a democratic and moral order. Political liberalism, conversely, was linked to the republican emphasis on community.³³ The classical republican or civic humanist tradition was based on the "liberty of the ancients," the recovery of the polis, and sovereignty through the agonistic actions of a public of autonomous citizens.³⁴ As this tradition was transformed through the Enlightenment, its emphasis on the pursuit of glory faded, and the quality and mutuality of the ties between rulers and ruled became two of its defining concepts. Political virtue, the pursuit of excellence, and the capacity to apprehend the good rather than self-interest supplied the principle aligning the individual with the whole.³⁵

This tradition entered modern political discourse through the writings of Machiavelli. His politicized interpretation of civic humanism emphasized the Prince's pursuit of glory, with virtue "that constellation of abilities and qualities which achieves it."³⁶ Machiavelli was also concerned with the conditions for a virtuous populace. He believed that the people of a republic could not live in economic servitude, and must develop a martial spirit which would be immune from corruption by wealth. This virtue/corruption dyad characterized the discourse of civic humanism. Others in this tradition, including Harrington, also stressed the cultivation of virtue in a republic. Harrington, unlike Machiavelli, advocated the balance of powers as a key to the success of a republic.³⁷ Despite these differences, some common themes emerged, including a suspicion of the potential corruption engendered by commerce and credit, and a fear that a surfeit of wealth and luxury could endanger the concern for the public good and subvert the martial *esprit*. For proponents of classical republicanism, factions inhibited the development of a public-spirit-ness, while the possession of land and/or weapons was considered central to economic independence.³⁸

In France, the language of civic humanism was introduced into political culture largely through Montesquieu's discussion of republican virtue and the British constitution. This tradition was often denuded of its more radical implications, for it was understood as a guide to the importance of civic responsibilities in a monarchy. There were also different interpretations of this tradition in France. For example, Jacques Rutledge portrayed Harrington as a critic of all monarchies, which were corrupt and inhibited the development of political liberty. Though such an interpretation helped fuel anti-monarchist sentiment before the Revolution, Sonenscher argues that little of this Harringtonian tradition became part of mainstream political discourse in prerevolutionary France.³⁹

In part, the British model's lack of resonance in France was due to

the influence of Rousseau's republicanism. Rousseau distrusted Britain's political conflicts, which he saw as symptomatic of problems engendered by a politics of representation and self-interest.⁴⁰ Drawing on the ancients and the Republic of Geneva, Rousseau assigned citizenship its modern definition as the union of rulers and ruled, in which people made the laws that they obeyed. Only in a participatory political community composed of an activist citizenry could people develop the requisite moral qualities of responsibility and autonomy necessary for a functioning republic. Further, in a successful republic, virtue was dependent on people pursuing public happiness rather than private satisfactions. To achieve such a virtuous community, Rousseau stressed the importance of public education, a theme taken up by later republicans.⁴¹

Rousseau also emphasized the *amour-propre* and lack of authenticity that he thought plagued the modern world. Thus, his theory of republican virtue was linked to a notion of individual alienation. The tie of republicanism to the overcoming of alienation meant that, in Pocock's words, "no recourse was left short of the adoption of an idealist mode of discourse in which the personality was seen articulating in itself, and seeking to reunite, the contradictions of history."⁴² For Rousseau, an expressivist moment hence became tied to the republican tradition, and would surface in contexts as different as Durkheim's criticisms of the economic ethic of the division of labor and Marx's vision of unalienated labor. Finally, the exclusivist dimensions of Rousseau's version of republicanism were most prominent in his emphasis on a gendered public sphere, with women relegated to domesticity in the private sphere, which would intersect with the misogyny of later authors such as Proudhon and Sorel.⁴³

Thus, republicanism had many different versions in eighteenth-century France, ranging from radical critiques of the king to attempts to implement some of its themes into monarchical rule. The Revolution and the Terror heightened the saliency of republican discourse. The Jacobins tried to "establish citizenship as the dominant identity of every Frenchman – against the alternative identities of religion, estate, family, and region."⁴⁴ The rights and duties of citizenship were tied to the active creation of virtue and public-spiritedness, and a commitment to political and military activity on behalf of France.⁴⁵ Other discourses also contributed to the many shades of revolutionary republicanism. Sonenscher points out that the *sans-culottes'* popular republicanism of the Year II, based on direct democracy, material independence, and unlimited sovereignty, drew on traditions of natural law and natural rights. The *sans-culottes* redefined such rights to include sovereignty, and

problematized the relationship between natural rights and political institutions. Finally, they incorporated French religious and theatrical imagery to develop a vision of republicanism that was different in many ways from the civic humanist tradition.⁴⁶

By 1800 in France, the classical civic humanist tradition began to fade, as it was tied to a defense of landed property and the image of agrarian virtue. Antagonisms between labor and capital started to replace the civic conflict of virtue and corruption.⁴⁷ In the late eighteenth century, many middle-class radicals became concerned with socio-economic problems, basing their perspectives on natural rights and defining "virtue and corruption in terms of productivity, specialization, industriousness, professionalism – anything that distinguished them from the corruption of the idle nobility and the wretched poor – rather than in terms of citizenship and the public quest for the common good."⁴⁸ Some republicans attempted to tie industry and the republic together, for they believed that modern technology could dominate nature and prevent the dependence of people upon one another. However, this turn to industry by French republicans was mitigated by the slow economic growth and largely agricultural population of nineteenth-century France.⁴⁹

Yet many images and orientations of the republican tradition remained powerful throughout the nineteenth century. As Ryan states, the question was not so much whether classical republican themes were to be cast aside, but whether they could be reinterpreted in a new context.⁵⁰ For many nineteenth-century French republicans, this tradition supplied a vision of active citizenship, stressing political or social activity as the core of life, a strong responsibility to govern, and a full commitment to the public world. Throughout the nineteenth century, these values often conflicted with more representative and limited versions of democracy, and contrasted with liberalism's emphasis on guaranteed rights and the sanctity of private life. The republican concern with rights was based not so much on legal and institutional guarantees, but rather on the moral and communal foundations of such rights. Finally, the problem of sustaining virtue, a recurring problem in republican theory, was echoed in later debates about creating public-spiritedness or, in Durkheimian terms, social solidarity.⁵¹

Thus, for nineteenth-century republicans, the issue of forming a "political culture of citizenship" became paramount. The classical themes of responsible and active participation in a viable community based on economic independence and maintained by a strong social solidarity were major problematics of thinkers from Tocqueville to Durkheim. Though modern industry had made this process more complex, and transferred

the site for the emergence of virtue (increasingly understood in terms of social solidarity) from the political realm to civil society, new economic conditions had not made this vision obsolete. For many republicans, formal laws and institutional guarantees of democracy could only work in a community where the participants shared fundamental moral ties and demanded full participation in decision making while exercising responsible self-discipline and self-restraint.⁵²

Versions of republicanism intersected in many different ways with the conceptual vocabularies developed by nineteenth-century liberals, radicals, and socialists. Nineteenth-century republicans stressed the theme of fraternity, often emphasizing male authority to the exclusion of women.⁵³ French republicanism continued the classical attack on egoism and factions, identifying them with the privileges of the corporations of the Ancien Regime and their associated corruption. Such corruption severed politics from ethics and relegated virtue to the private realm, allowing private interests to govern public matters.⁵⁴

Yet especially after the June Days of 1848, the Jacobin aversion to the associations of civil society and advocacy of a strong, centralized state began to separate it markedly from the federalist strand of French republicanism. This federalism, associated with political theorists as different as Tocqueville and Proudhon, accented the link between the learning of political virtue and egalitarian participation in decentralized associations. In this tradition, closely tied to classical civic humanist themes, participation itself was a form of moral education, for it shaped the character of the individual. Political rule allowed morally autonomous individuals to exercise their capacity for self-government. Such moral independence could only be guaranteed by political equality, which promoted a proper regard for the public good. Knowledge was tied to action and communal consensus, in the context of participation and dialogue.⁵⁵ For thinkers such as Tocqueville, and more radical thinkers like Proudhon, this participatory orientation led to a critique of state and economic centralization.

The social science tradition

Republicanism was not the only cultural tradition influencing the self-understanding of French public life. The physiocratic scientific tradition, an "Enlightenment reworking of . . . natural jurisprudence" provided a specifically modern conception of freedom in contrast to the republican liberty of the ancients.⁵⁶ This rationalist vision posited the inalienable rights of man, the importance of the division of labor in social life, and the "apolitical rule of reason." These themes informed the development of social science.⁵⁷

The Old Regime physiocratic conception of *art social* attempted to realize the Enlightenment project by transforming royal authority into a rational political will which could harmonize the individual and the collectivity.⁵⁸ For the physiocrats, knowledge of the natural, essential, and rational principles of social order was the key to modern rule. They believed that the public had to be properly instructed to appreciate rational administration; such enlightenment depended on the educational ability of the government. A sufficiently educated populace could create a unitary public opinion that could replace the will of the monarch. Based on the principles of reason, rational administration and public opinion would merge to formulate a rational national will that could limit abuses because of its sovereignty, and thus would not have to rely on competing centers of power to do so.⁵⁹

Such rationalist imagery informed early conceptions of social science, from Sièyes's attempts to rethink the problem of representation and Condorcet's mathematical investigation of the rationality of collective decision making to psychological theories such as Cousin's spiritualism and phrenology.⁶⁰ The Ideologues especially developed this notion of a scientific reason that could stabilize political passions, recover stability, and effectively end the Revolution while maintaining the liberal principles of 1789. The Ideologue desire to found liberty on positive scientific foundations which guaranteed progress and the responsibility of an enlightened elite to lead and construct a social order was elaborated by Saint-Simon, who turned away from the political to the social realm as the true arena of human solidarity. He advocated scientism as the foundation of a new solidarity, for society should be governed by the most technically competent. Saint-Simon's valuation of the producer, based on the elevation of industrial production to the major organizing principle of modern society, gave a new productivist twist to Sièyes's distinction between active and passive citizens.⁶¹

Saint-Simonian and later Comtean conceptions of positivism left an important legacy for social science. Their positivism helped transform political theory into social theory, for the state was subordinate to society. Society could be rid of "fortune" or chance through scientifically elucidating the laws underlying social life. Applications of science and technology could guarantee continual economic expansion, and the growth of science provided a model for future social progress.⁶²

However, at this time science was not autonomously institutionalized in France, nor were the social sciences systematically developed. For example, the leading educational institutions in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century were quasi-aristocratic, embodying the ideal of the

honnête homme, oriented to state service rather than entrepreneurial enrichment.⁶³ Nineteenth-century French secondary schools emphasized the cultivation of civilization through the development of a cultured individual who could comport easily with the aristocracy. The classics were studied to learn the timeless virtues. Scientific training was largely the prerogative of the *grandes écoles*, which arose throughout the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in response to particular problems of administration.⁶⁴

Despite some calls for a more scientific education (from Saint-Simonians, for example), even the technical training of scientists in the *grandes écoles* had to be complemented by extensive reading in the classics. The classical ideal infused scientific training, for the teaching of elegant, abstract mathematics was privileged over the concrete applications of scientific knowledge. Nineteenth-century French governments looked to technocracy and science as bases of their rule rather than simply as responses to technical problems. As Tocqueville realized, French science helped distinguish rulers from subjects and furnished an ideology for administration. The training received in the state-supported *grandes écoles* represented social prestige and power. Largely the domain of the children of rich families, the *écoles* had a monopoly on the supply of high-level officials in government that guaranteed access to the state.⁶⁵

This scientific ethos was often in tension with classical republicanism. Industrialization and a linear theory of progress were anathema to classical republicanism, as was the physiocratic denial of the centrality of popular participation in constructing the social and political realms. Within the liberal public sphere, it was left to figures such as Guizot and Tocqueville to try to unify some variant of republicanism, liberal conceptions of rights, and social science. They attempted to grasp theoretically the interplay of state and society and elucidate the conditions for the fusion of public morality and scientific rationality, often turning to education as the key factor in this latter process. These authors accepted to some degree the Saint-Simonian vision of industrialization, but saw that any modern definition of the good society was bound to popular sovereignty and the civic morality of the people.

French liberals, like Guizot, tried to tie individual liberties to public participation, while avoiding the excesses of the Terror and the different despotisms represented by the Old Regime and Napoleon. They reinterpreted science as the best defense of the Republic, the surest guide to governing, and the guarantor of a sane path between radical and reactionary extremism. Yet the art of politics had to be rethought; given the changed social context, the Enlightenment science of government based

on a priori and normative principles no longer seemed effective.⁶⁶ As Tocqueville stated, a new political science with a sociological and democratic twist was necessary, for the political and the social were inextricably linked.⁶⁷

Such a new politics had to avoid the Old Regime distinction between local and administrative power, and the resulting split between state and society. Guizot and Tocqueville recognized the centrality of a vibrant civil society for any successful republican regime.⁶⁸ These thinkers also realized that civil society had not escaped the conflicts brought about by capitalism. They believed that a socially grounded rationality would inhibit the possibility of social decomposition resulting from the new egoism and class conflict that civil society tended to promote.⁶⁹ For Guizot especially, reason developed historically through society; the elite had to discover the laws of rationality, and promote their sovereignty. This idea of society as a rational, interrelated system not only promoted sociology as a new way of understanding politics and society, it also helped displace images of the social based on the body of the king and the liberal contract.⁷⁰ People had to participate, but do so rationally. Many republicans shared Guizot's concerns with creating a common public opinion through education.

Tocqueville did not share Guizot's faith in progress, and he was more concerned with understanding the relatively fragile moral and social conditions promoting democratic communities. Such democratic "habits of the heart" had to be cultivated in the context of strong, local citizen participation concerning issues of mutual interest. Only public participation could avoid the citizen's degeneration into egoism, or into the even more insidious culture of individualism. These deficient qualities of character were the psychological adjunct of a creeping governmental despotism separated from the people, which threatened to crush any chances for a democratic polity.⁷¹ Tocqueville's civic humanism helped supply "alternative political visions, critical of the instrumentalist, bureaucratic, and industrial society which was growing in the West," as Taylor argues.⁷²

These theorists were at the forefront of a rethinking of republicanism and science, as some variant of a socially oriented, moral, and rational republicanism gradually took hold in the liberal public sphere. By the middle of the nineteenth century, despite the divergence between federalist and Jacobin traditions, most middle-class republicans shared a commitment to constitutional government, a hostility to aristocracy and monarchy, a belief in secular progress advanced through scientific and moral education, and a refusal to accept tradition as the basis of

authority.⁷³ Yet it was not by accident that Guizot and Tocqueville became concerned with problems of governing and the nature of civil society in the 1830s. At this time, an independent labor militancy began to develop which would eventually burst the shared republican front that had been united in opposition to royalism. As the liberal and proletarian public spheres separated after 1848, many republicans such as Bourgeois and Durkheim realized that the solutions proposed by Guizot and Tocqueville were insufficient. They believed that the creation of social cohesion in civil society required not only moral solidarity, but also a more radically democratic social system and egalitarian class structure, which had to be reinforced by state-sponsored, pro-labor legislation.

The proletarian public sphere

The 1830s were a crucial decade for the emergence of worker solidarity. The rise of an independent labor militancy and a self-consciously proletarian public sphere was allied to an upsurge of worker associations promoted by the social and economic crises of the Second Republic. Before the 1830s, worker protest had been either exclusively corporate and/or a continuation of prerevolutionary types of revolt.⁷⁴ The highly charged political circumstances of the 1830s provided opportunities for the creation of worker associations with a socialist orientation. The reassertion of property laws in 1830, the enforcement of the laws against coalitions in 1834, and new socio-economic grievances drove workers to collective action. With these social and political struggles, trades began, however tentatively, to see their fate in common terms. This new consciousness of the unity of labor was centered in the urban trades in Paris, Lyons, and other cities.⁷⁵

As laborers engaged in strikes in the 1830s, many realized that collective action could overcome social injustices.⁷⁶ They began to conceive of their problems in a new vocabulary tying together the benefits of association, the sanctity of labor, and the evils of individualism.⁷⁷ Many workers believed that the new order had to be brought about by revolution, if necessary. They slowly created "the intellectual, linguistic, and organizational space" which provided the context for the development of socialist thought.⁷⁸

However, militant workers did not appear out of nowhere on the public scene with a rudimentary socialist consciousness in the 1830s. This emerging proletarian public sphere reflected the spread of capitalism throughout France, as clear differences between classes appeared. As in the liberal sphere, property and money became accepted terms of

discourse, just as science and democracy became legitimating principles. Their new discourse of association was also informed by older vocabularies, including Old Regime corporatism, and religious, scientific, and utopian socialist beliefs.

Worker associations and the language of labor

Sewell argues that the trade idiom that the new worker organizations inherited from the Old Regime was one of the most important discourses in the formulation of a language of labor. This reevaluation of work originated partly in the Enlightenment philosophes' theory of natural law. Diderot especially challenged the medieval assumption of labor as a necessary evil. He conceived of labor as useful and creative, and a key element in modern happiness.⁷⁹ The Revolution also provided the context for a positive interpretation of labor. Sièyes argued that the nation was constituted by useful work, while the sans-culottes emphasized the utility and importance of the laborer.⁸⁰

For Sewell, it was primarily within the artisanal trades that the discourse of labor developed emancipatory possibilities. He sees a continuity between the corporate sensibility of precapitalist trades and the eventual language of labor of French socialism and syndicalism. The moral collectivism of the Old Regime trades promoted internal participation, autonomy from regulation, and a sense of achievement and excellence in work. Unlike factory workers' individualistic conception of work, urban artisans understood their labor to be social. Shaped by the collective regulations of the corporation, the members of the trade formed a moral community.⁸¹ Artisans also emphasized their possession of skill. Intersecting with the Saint-Simonian tradition and the valuation of competence by eighteenth-century economists such as Say, this ideal of skill helped create a vision of labor as dignified, noble, and independent.⁸²

However, this trade sensibility did not translate into class consciousness. Artisans did not extend the definition of community beyond their particular trade; often wage workers and employers were members of the same association. Trades frequently competed with one another, and no shared sense of community among artisans existed under the Old Regime.⁸³ Only after the French Revolution did a rudimentary constellation of beliefs emerge that had some affinities to class consciousness.

Artisans controlled the initial labor organizations of the nineteenth century. Successive worker associations drew on the distinctive trade values of pride in work and labor as contributing to the public good.⁸⁴ Trade union organizations also built on the artisanal traditions of mutual

aid and friendly societies. Yet the nobility of labor conflicted with its degradation under emerging capitalism.⁸⁵ Despite the gradual rise of industry, artisans were particularly hard hit by the development of capitalism. Many of them, accustomed to regulating their work, were losing control over the labor process. The more militant realized that they shared a fate similar to unskilled workers; they helped promote a demand for worker control of labor. Further, workers' craft experience in the nineteenth century challenged divisions between home and work, craft and industry.⁸⁶ The artisanal association tied to the skilled workers' experience offered a cooperative alternative to capitalism.

Yet Sewell's notion of a relatively linear development of the language of labor does not fully account for the linguistic and social complexity of the rise of a distinctive worker discourse. Sewell overestimates the continuity between prerevolutionary and nineteenth-century socialist and syndicalist trade associations. Workers no longer framed social and legal demands in the corporate language of rights and privileges, as they had under the Old Regime.⁸⁷ Workers' new vocabulary did not develop solely from the experience of the trades; the language of utopian socialism and social republicanism developed by intellectuals mixed Christian ethics, science, republicanism, and a belief in the special nature of labor, in often inchoate packages.⁸⁸ Early nineteenth-century socialists proclaimed the importance of rationality, science, and moral education as counterpoints to an egoistic capitalism. Moral reform through persuasive scientific education which could appeal to all classes was often seen to be more important than political organization or the association of labor. Socialists frequently turned to producer and consumer associations, rather than to workers, as the agents of social change.⁸⁹

Early nineteenth-century worker militants often argued that owners must be reformed through a language of love and reconciliation informed by Christian virtues. Artisans did not necessarily claim a complete sovereignty for work, but rather saw labor as a participant in the public realm, deserving its fair share of the social product. Berenson argues that socialism developed in large part as a secularized populist religion, disseminated by intellectuals in the middle of the nineteenth century. This secularized religion promoted the socialist values of equality, fraternity, and moral change.⁹⁰

Other discourses also contributed to a distinctive language of labor. Utopian socialists such as Fourier, Saint-Simon, and Cabet helped provide the conceptual tools for a critical analysis of capitalism. Fourier's affective communities, aesthetic conception of labor, and his notion of the workshop as a site of moral development served as critical counterpoints

to the material and emotional fragmentation engendered by capitalism. His concept of solidarity demonstrated that there were common bonds apart from individual interest, foreshadowing the socialist vision of the person as primarily a social rather than a political being.⁹¹ Saint-Simon's interpretation of the primacy of the social over the political realm and the importance of class, technical experts, and producers contributed to this perspective.⁹² A feminist strand arising from Saint-Simon and Fourier provisionally raised issues of gender identity while tempering the masculinist exclusiveness that tended to dominate the trades.⁹³ Finally, the link of the social sphere to revolution, inaugurated by Hébert and Babeuf, was radicalized by the Blanquists, whose professional revolutionaries and secret societies would provide the leadership for the coming insurrection.⁹⁴

Thus, in the early nineteenth century, worker discourse consisted of a *mélange* of different vocabularies that did not necessarily support a radical split between workers and the bourgeoisie. Socialism did not simply derive from class conflict or proletarianization; it owed much to a moral sensibility guided by religious, republican, scientific, and utopian socialist vocabularies. As Rancière and Sonenscher in particular contend, the creation of a language of labor was in large part a discursive achievement, for class was a constructed category.⁹⁵ The development of a "socialism of skilled workers"⁹⁶ did not follow a clearly linear path. Differences remained among trades, regions, and ideologies throughout the early nineteenth century. Only in times of political crises and revolutionary situations did a sentiment of radical distinctions between worker and employer emerge.⁹⁷

By the 1830s, such crises were increasingly prevalent, and a more coherent worker sensibility arose. The republican opposition to aristocracy dovetailed with utopian socialist criticisms of social inequality. Saint-Simon's distinction between productive and idle members of society was invoked in this context; laborers were allied with scientists as the true producers of social life.⁹⁸ In 1830s Limoges, for example, Saint-Simonians envisioned a republic of producers enhancing industrial production. By the end of the Second Republic, workers began to see themselves as a class different from the capitalists not only by reinterpreting their own traditions, but also through building on the Saint-Simonian praise of producers and placing the bourgeoisie among the clergy, nobles, and other *oisifs*.

In sum, as the working class grew in numbers, the militancy of the 1830s, tied to political changes, encouraged discursive shifts. Many workers saw that they would have to make public demands in a new

idiom in order to be effective.⁹⁹ Labor militants modified the language of the French revolutionaries by countering the liberal vision of the "naturalness" of individual rights with a vaguely communal sensibility tied to labor. They began redefining the bourgeoisie as a new aristocracy which ruled through a tyrannical property franchise. For these new labor leaders, workers produced all social wealth. This valuation of labor provided a new source of ownership which contrasted with the bourgeois emphasis on property. The sense of common economic exploitation began displacing the particularistic trade mentality. Militants redefined the revolutionary value of fraternity in terms of producers. A workers' fraternity expressed the associated free wills of the producers, much as the laws of the nation expressed the general will. Workers were therefore able to tie their idiom to revolutionary discourse.¹⁰⁰

By the 1840s, socialist ideas were part of French public discourse.¹⁰¹ Working-class militants in the 1840s drew on republican and expressivist imagery, infusing labor with a spirituality, praising it "as the height of human creativity and the source of all social order," a new kind of poetry, and contrasting it with its debased condition in the workshop.¹⁰² Within this context, it was not surprising that Marx developed his famous theory of labor alienation in the 1844 Paris manuscripts.

This labor discourse intersected with developing conceptions of revolution, history, and society. While the idea of revolution retained the late eighteenth-century belief that all of society could be changed by a single collective act, its reinterpretation in the years preceding 1848 was based on a progressive conception of history rather than a cyclical return to an ideal past. A focus on the organization of labor and production replaced the sans-culotte concerns with distribution and exchange, and militants conceived of human suffering less as a consequence of evil intentions than as resulting from a poorly organized society.

Thus, left workers' vision of emancipation began to take on the attributes of modern political discourse that tended to see society in historical terms, as a "complexly evolving entity that was far more than the sum of its rational wills."¹⁰³ Such a perspective encouraged a more scientific view of societal dynamics, which could show the necessity of a social revolution that would both redistribute wealth and increase production. This notion of society and revolution, tied to the valuation of labor, included strong productivist themes. Louis Blanc argued that a central component of progress was to increase the productivity of labor. Artisans were likely to admire industrialization to some degree as an example of Enlightenment progress, while revolting against the processes of proletarianization that accompanied it.¹⁰⁴

By the middle of the century, the harsh repression of worker associations and the press by various nineteenth-century governments encouraged an autonomous workers' movement.¹⁰⁵ Migrant workers began to form a more stable workforce as capital concentrated in urban centers. The emergence of specific working-class sections in cities and urbanized industrial production brought many laborers together, and reinforced the strong solidarity of the working-class family to generate militancy.¹⁰⁶ Workshop solidarity was complemented by working-class taverns and cafés, which functioned as autonomous spaces where workers could socialize and debate among themselves.¹⁰⁷

These spaces and social changes allowed the language of labor to radicalize the discourse of republicanism. To conceive of liberation as a new social and economic order brought about by popular worker action, rather than a change in political regimes engineered by elites, required a rethinking of the role of the state and political power. A radicalized republicanism, derived in part from the radical wing of the bourgeoisie, contributed to this new consciousness. Though Aminzade states that the Republican Party constituted "the key institutional terrain on which mid-nineteenth-century French class relations were actively contested and redefined," an independent labor republicanism with a socialist slant was also developing.¹⁰⁸ Though workers throughout the nineteenth century benefited from the radical republican ideas of the more progressive wing of the bourgeoisie, they began to think of emancipation in terms of the "social republic."¹⁰⁹

By the 1848 Revolution, republican reforms such as freedom of assembly and association helped unite workers of different trades. When combined with the republican emphasis on the dignity of all men and the sanctity of labor, a new vision of socialism began to emerge. In the Stephanois region, Hanagan points out that in the 1840s many workers responded positively to the Cabetian communists' advocacy of republican control of industry and the establishment of republican practices within the workplace. Skilled workers would help regulate the *atelier* through democratic worker control.¹¹⁰ Their demands for a social republic did not dispense with republican ideas, but rather involved rethinking them in the context of worker association, autonomy, and class struggle.

Labor republicanism and the thought of Proudhon

Republicanism was central to the development of this new worker sensibility. Though this *ouvriérisme* was based in large part on modern beliefs

of progress, science, and productivity, it also recast several classical themes. The republican tradition's imagery of the warrior and the independent farmer/producer as well as the citizen had direct implications for the workers' movement. Warriors and producers, both categories of autonomous men, represented attempts to overcome the dichotomies of experience and expertise that created the dependence of some upon others and destroyed a virtuous community. Machiavelli saw autonomous citizen-soldiers as the basis of virtuous community.¹¹¹ This martial spirit would become a major characteristic of a French labor movement imbued with sentiments of class autonomy and class struggle.

As the market and the associated ubiquity of wage labor began to destroy the independence of the proprietor, labor militants gradually substituted *homo faber* for *homo politicus*, advocating the reorganization of work to promote "character-building discipline." As the virtuous individual was reconceived as a productive rather than a political animal, the arena for the restoration of virtue moved from the farm or the polis to the *atelier*, from the land to industry. For labor republicans, as for classical republicans, the creation of moral solidarity (or in an earlier language, republican virtue) was a predominant task.¹¹² Such solidarity had a strong expressivist dimension, as demonstrated in theories of the creativity of labor from Proudhon to Marx.

For labor republicans, these classical themes were reinterpreted in a discourse of class, property, and science. Just as armies could provide the grounds for virtue only when allowing the participation of soldiers, egalitarian solidarity was only possible in the economic realm when producers controlled the circumstances of production, combining skill, experience, and expertise. Just as Machiavelli's free citizens must possess arms and Harrington's free men must possess property in order to guarantee virtue, artisan radicals and later syndicalists believed that workers must possess skill as a prerequisite for independent participation in the community. Shared labor experience tied to democratic consensus building would guarantee moral solidarity among workers.

Further, republican discourse contributed to the secularization of socialist thought. Republicans constantly fought the influence of the Church in state and educational matters, advocating a scientific belief system in opposition to religious instruction. Workers increasingly adopted this discourse in their battles with the state and employers as they embraced the widespread "progressive" belief in the superiority of science over faith, although critical interpretations of Christian brotherhood would continue to play an important role in militant worker discourse until the twentieth century.¹¹³

Many of these strands came together in Proudhon's work. Proudhon advocated a decentralized social republic that synthesized worker association and radical democratic themes. Though he utilized religious concepts in his early thought, his later work contributed to the politicization of republican virtue. He separated civic humanist from religious issues in developing his moral socialism and anarchism after 1843. Proudhon drew on Montesquieu and Rousseau to create a theory of republican virtue as the animating force of social solidarity.¹¹⁴ He transformed the demand for virtue into a call for justice; the latter required equality, self-sacrifice, and an understanding of moral law and science. For Proudhon, association provided the context for meeting these exigencies, balancing competition and cooperation. Following Saint-Simon and Buchez, he believed that a moral order tied to association was inseparable from the organization of production. After the worker solidarity demonstrated in the strikes of the 1830s, Proudhon, like Buchez and Blanc, came to see the *autogestion* of workers as a key to moral development and liberation. The association of laborers, founded on shared productive skills, differentiated worker solidarity from that of the bourgeois state, which united atomized individuals on the basis of law and abstract reason. Proudhon's vision of a society of decentralized federations thus furnished an alternative to the centralized, bureaucratic French state.

For Proudhon, the machinations of parliamentary democracy invited the centralization of power, which threatened a self-governing people by encouraging passivity, lack of responsibility, and dependence. This corruption could be overcome solely by decentralized communes which generated an authority that rested on freely given, but active, consent.¹¹⁵ Worker associations not only prevented such corrupting concentrations of wealth and power, but they could also provide the context for the creation of a new egalitarian and virtuous individual through moral and scientific education. By the middle of the century, Proudhon had developed many of the themes that were to characterize some of the major aspects of the workers' movement in France. He argued that politics should not be based on electoral suffrage, but on democratically elected professional organizations associated in a decentralized manner. Moral development was tied to the workshop and autonomy of labor; in fact, free labor would "become divine," and "civilization would move to a higher sphere."¹¹⁶ According to Proudhon, workers should only trust themselves. These themes were echoed in labor militants' increasing emphasis on the right to control work in the context of self-governing syndicates.¹¹⁷

Proudhon thus furthered the tie of the working class to the revolutionary values of justice and equality, while promoting federalism. On the darker side, his misogyny and anti-Semitism reflected currents of sexism and xenophobia that emerged periodically in working-class discourse and action. As later working-class militants selectively adopted many of his ideas, they rejected Proudhon's attachment to small property and his romanticism of peasant virtues. Further, because of his distrust of strikes, Proudhon did not develop a theory of direct action, which became a central component of this new nineteenth-century worker self-understanding. Public debate and mass action had been joined to popular legitimacy since the Revolution.¹¹⁸ Workers adapted these traditions to their own ends. Their empowerment through strikes and clandestine organizations further opened up the possibility of a radically democratic and autonomous workers' culture that promoted revolutionary activity.¹¹⁹

1848

Many of Proudhon's ideas helped inform the artisanal associations which contributed to the political mobilization of workers in the 1848 Revolution.¹²⁰ The equation of virtue/solidarity and class autonomy, a form of social republicanism, and the freedom of labor acquired concrete form among workers in 1848. Sewell calls the worker associations of 1848 "little republics," for they demanded associated production on the basis of universal suffrage in the trades, led by elected delegates. Drawing on a rough synthesis of a radicalized republicanism, utopian socialism, and the tradition of moral community within the craft, the trades encouraged communal participation in and regulation of their own affairs. Thus, when these trades were under social and cultural siege, a radicalized *ouvriériste* version of the republican virtue tradition made sense to them.¹²¹

Yet in 1848 workers were but one part of a plebeian public sphere. Composed of diverse groups including small peasants, feminists, and critical Catholics, this realm drew on ideals of autonomy and dignity, rooted in visions of social justice, the right to work, and Christian brotherhood. Political clubs and demonstrations rather than electoral politics were the stuff of a new plebeian politics. In such a context, a new political party, the democs-socs, emerged.¹²²

This realm's emergence into French public life was short-lived. After the dismantling of the National Workshops, the isolation of Louis Blanc and the Luxembourg Commission, and the repression of the Parisian revolt, the gulf between the liberal and plebeian spheres widened

dramatically. Moreover, the crushing of this popular movement demonstrated that the liberal public sphere was developing in a new direction, creating "a manipulative, bureaucratic, and propagandistic format that was the harbinger of the contemporary neo-corporatist state."¹²³ This first blush of corporatism was outlined in the Second Empire. France did not experience the political liberalism of other countries after 1848, for state power was seen to be on the side of the ruling elite.¹²⁴

The Second Empire

The Second Empire of Louis Bonaparte, erected on the ashes of the Second Republic, helped promote, however tentatively, a new vision of the neo-corporatist state. Contemporary observers as disparate as Tocqueville and Marx recognized that the Second Empire embodied a centralized, bureaucratic state relatively independent of civil society, based on principles other than representative democracy. Marx and Tocqueville realized that, though Louis had national and military ambitions like his uncle, he went an important step further than did Napoleon I.¹²⁵ The new emperor tied the state's legitimacy and practice to technical progress and the expansion of the economy, introducing a Saint-Simonian vocabulary into the official public discourse of the state.¹²⁶ The Saint-Simonians, who entered the national elite for the first time under Louis's leadership, became France's initial proponents of technocratic rule.¹²⁷

The Second Empire's neo-corporatist ambitions could be seen in its centralized administration. Louis, after ridding France of his republican opponents, decreased the power of the assemblies and ministers while increasing censorship. The state took complete control of the educational process, enforcing strict intellectual, moral, and religious conformity. Moreover, the Second Empire controlled all public works and demanded governmental approval for directors of large companies.¹²⁸

Though Louis's regime constructed a French railway system, built new roads in the countryside, and reconstructed the whole of Paris through the work of Haussmann, his fledgling neo-corporatism was far from hostile to capitalists. Like the physiocrats, the emperor desired a managerial empire founded on "economic reason and the harmonious development of wealth, leaning for support on entrepreneurs."¹²⁹ He tended to be an advocate of *laissez-faire*. Much to the displeasure of some industrialists, Louis entered into free trade agreements with Britain and other European countries.¹³⁰ Yet his policies helped many of these very industrialists, for large firms tended to perform very well in the

Second Empire. Economic growth rates in the Second Empire were as high as in any decade in the pre-World War II era.¹³¹

Louis's incipient corporatism was best demonstrated in his proposals for integrating the working class into the nation. Though he disbanded the politicized associations of 1848, his legislative agenda departed from the harsh *Le Chapelier* law which banned worker associations. Louis decreed in March 1852 that workers' mutual aid associations (modeled on Social Catholicism and/or a peaceful Proudhonianism) could be freely constituted, and certain of them were eligible for governmental assistance. He introduced programs for worker housing and friendly societies, while allowing a delegation of 200 workers to visit the 1861 International Exhibition in London.¹³² Finally, Louis permitted workers the right to strike in 1864, and so began the first tentative steps toward the complete freedom of association for workers, which would be realized in 1884.¹³³

Louis also promoted a paternalist alternative to worker socialism. This paternalism required a new way of thinking about social relations, and accordingly a new type of social science arose. In the 1850s and 1860s, the economist Léon Walras developed his theory of marginal utility in opposition to the labor theory of value, shifting the analysis of value from production to individual demand and consumption.¹³⁴ More importantly, paternalism found its social theorist in the engineer Frédéric Le Play, who advocated what the Foucauldian Rabinow calls a "normalizing" discourse applied to workers and families, based on philanthropic and scientific reform.¹³⁵ A private adviser to Louis and the organizer of the Universal Exhibitions of Paris and London in 1846, 1855, 1862, and 1867, Le Play advanced a moral science of social order grounded in strong family bonds and a hierarchical society, to be managed by a responsible elite.¹³⁶ Fond of organic metaphors, he believed the scientific analysis of industrial society showed that a healthy social life demanded clear lines of authority in the family and the workplace. Society's well-being was tied to the strength of its moral ties; the moral center of such authority was the family. Consequently, much of Le Play's energy was directed toward strengthening the working-class family, which he argued was threatened by industrialization. Paternalistic social legislation designed to enforce the monogamous family, complemented by some rights for workers (such as peaceful trade unions), guaranteed social order.¹³⁷

Le Play's ideas came under critical scrutiny as the Second Empire began to crumble under the weight of foreign policy disasters. A renewed republican vigor, combined with worker strikes of 1868–1869, convinced many industrialists that paternalist schemes could not work.¹³⁸

Moreover, in the years preceding the Commune, a working-class radicalism began to reappear. Louis's attempts to integrate the workers into the nation ironically helped create the spaces for the elaboration of socialist ideas. In the 1860s, workers started to seriously develop alternative political and social organizations.¹³⁹ Though Louis tried to limit workers' associations to purely professional, economic concerns, and mandated state authorization for any strikes, this tolerance gave an impetus not only to worker organization but also to socialist *réunions publiques*, often outside the surveillance capacities of the government.

In Paris, the initial *réunions publiques* of 1868 often had a mixture of bourgeois and worker participants. However, Haussmann's rebuilding of Paris resulted in more specifically working-class suburbs where meetings could take place. With attendance at these meetings ranging anywhere from 800 to 10,000, workers gradually took over these meetings, and debated Blanquist and Jacobin ideas. In these often raucous *réunions*, unpopular speakers were frequently shouted down by the audience. Labor militants began developing self-confidence in their speaking abilities, often mocking the police and other authorities. A revolutionary social critique arose in these *réunions*. Orators made clear distinctions between the dynamic, producing class of workers and the corrupt bourgeoisie. They argued that only the proletariat could overcome the social malaise resulting from elite rule. These meetings were a kind of cooperative labor school, where ideas about society, class, and so forth were publicly debated. In the historian Cottureau's view, the public meetings drew on working-class culture, for they "brought the need for alternative models of social relations which was discussed on a daily basis in workshops and wine shops out in the open."¹⁴⁰

The Commune provided the concrete realization of many of these ideals. The very term "Commune," adopted in 1870, referred to the first Paris Commune of 1792, which saw the highest degree of direct democracy in the smallest unit of government during the Revolution. The Commune of 1871 witnessed the predominance of red flags over the tricolor, and its discourse often emphasized class hostility and equality over liberty. In the provinces, the decentralized, federalist version of socialism prevailed. Local Communes were not simply a vehicle for municipal liberties, but prefigured an alternative form of government, the social republic, characterized by a high degree of direct democracy.¹⁴¹

In the wake of the crushing of the Commune, working-class militancy declined. Yet the vision of labor solidarity that Proudhon and later militants systematized remained powerful, and would inform much of the discourse of revolutionary syndicalism. The nineteenth-century language

of labor supplied implicit epistemological and moral standpoints on the social world. This discourse morally judged the *patron* as "exploitative," while justifying the privileged social place of the worker as the source of all wealth. The epistemology of *ouvriérisme* posited that all knowledge of the social world was linked to the history, functioning, and control of production. While neither Proudhon nor labor militants subjected the belief in increasing production to criticism, the republican and communitarian influences in the language of labor prevented it from hardening into a simple productivism, despite tendencies in that direction. Like British Chartists and the American Knights of Labor, the French *ouvriériste* discourse incorporated expressive and democratic themes, criticized bourgeois egoism, promoted mass participation as the surest means for democratic reform, and placed the producer rather than the citizen at the center of its political discourse.

Marxism and the French labor movement

This worker federalism was not unchallenged among the aspirants for working-class leadership, and by 1880 it was joined by a new Marxist discourse. The conscious assimilation of Marxist ideas in France began with the formation of the Parti Ouvrier in the wake of the Marseilles National Labor Congress of 1879. The Parti Ouvrier, under the direction of Jules Guesde and to a lesser extent Paul Lafargue, was able to graft Marxist ideas onto the workers' federalist tradition.¹⁴² In so doing, the Parti Ouvrier helped introduce a more resolutely materialist and productivist vocabulary into the French language of labor.

In opposition to the abstract moral ideals of social justice typical of much of the republican tradition, and characteristic of the socialism of Jaurès and Malon, Guesdists employed a scientific, deterministic, and ultimately simplistic Marxist materialism. Guesdists had little respect for the autonomy of ideas, which invariably reflected class interests. They opposed appeals to the republican and populist conception of *le peuple* vs. the aristocracy and the Church with the theory that class was the determinant of social identity. This strong emphasis on class informed the French Marxist veneration of the industrial proletariat, who would usher in a socialist society. Their materialism posited labor as the source of all social life, for *le travail* "defined humanity, embodied creativity, and generated all wealth."¹⁴³

Guesdists formulated a deterministic theory of capitalist growth which reflected these assumptions. Tying social progress to technological development, they believed that capitalism inevitably created monopolies, with

a more homogeneous, economically concentrated, and revolutionary proletariat emerging accordingly. Guesdists had no understanding of the persistence of small-scale production in France. In Stuart's words, they "subsumed the working-class experience as a whole in the factory despotism of the northern textile mills."¹⁴⁴

Their productivist assumptions were demonstrated in the argument that capitalism produced an efficient, factory-based economy, characterized by internal hierarchical relations. For Guesdists, socialism would merely take over this industrial apparatus, maintaining a hierarchy to ensure continual increases in production. Moreover, they had little confidence that the working class could autonomously generate the organizational capacities that would be necessary to usher in socialism. Guesdists were reluctant to support strikes, which they saw primarily as defensive responses to capitalist development, and they were actively hostile to spontaneous worker strikes.¹⁴⁵ In opposition to the Proudhonian emphasis on decentralization and worker associations, the *Parti Ouvrier* was a centralized, tightly organized party by the mid-1890s, prepared to control the labor movement and take over the state.¹⁴⁶

In part because of the salience of this Marxist discourse and the split between the liberal and proletarian public spheres after 1848, the French version of labor republicanism developed in a more radical direction than its American and British counterparts. The repression of the workers' movement not only severed the two realms, but also forced the more radical labor republican vision of society underground, as it were; it reappeared in new forms and a new context in the aftermath of the Commune in the revolutionary syndicalist movement.

In many ways, the period from the Revolution of 1848 to the Paris Commune proved to be a major watershed in the history of public discourse in France. The 1848 Revolution raised the social question to new prominence. After 1848, the hegemony of at least a vaguely socialist discourse over the embryonic working class was established. Any republican politician who wished to cultivate worker support had to incorporate some version of socialist demands into his program.¹⁴⁷ Yet after the Commune republicans could not easily appeal to workers, as the proletarian public sphere jealously guarded its independence. Within the liberal public sphere, the separation of the revolutionary ideals of the sovereignty of the people, justice, and equality from their roots in popular mobilization promoted their gradual enthronelement in the academy as political theory.¹⁴⁸ Finally, the Second Empire raised the specter of a neo-corporatist state which could integrate workers into the nation on bases other than democratic or socialist ones.

Other important social changes occurred after 1848. Louis Napoleon increased the power and the size of the French state. After the middle of the century, the internationalization of capital, the unification of the country through shared education, media, roads, and the like, and the at least rudimentary beginnings of large-scale industry complicated any simple version of social solidarity. This growth of complex systems, in Habermas's terms, meant that simple face-to-face communication could no longer be the sole basis for social integration. Further, the old notion of revolution arising simply from the fashioning of barricades in Paris became increasingly unrealistic.¹⁴⁹

For republicans, these changes forced them to unite democracy with an economic program which promoted industrial growth and that could compete internationally, while integrating workers and the right wing into the polity. The version of republicanism that emerged after the Commune still placed the citizen at the center of its discourse. Republicans after Guizot and Tocqueville tended to favor a Comtean positivism, while incorporating elements of socialism and liberalism. They advocated government intervention in the economy, like socialists, while championing the liberal view of the inviolability of the rights of property.¹⁵⁰ However, by the 1860s and 1870s, a more conservative version of republicanism associated with men such as Thiers emphasized not only the sanctity of contract but also the separation of elected officials from their constituents in a parliament dominated by political parties, as concerns with direct democracy receded.¹⁵¹ Le Play's paternalistic legacy lived on through the journal *La Réforme sociale*, and he was also very influential in the thought of Third Republican social economists such as Levasseur and Leroy-Beaulieu.¹⁵²

Yet by 1900 two new initiatives emerged that attempted to systematize a new, expansive republicanism. Like social democratic reformers in Britain and the United States, the doctrines of *solidarité* and Durkheimian sociology called for more state intervention in civil society to create republican citizens and mitigate the disruptive consequences of the market. This intervention had an overridingly democratic and moral moment rather than a paternalistic one, for the growth of the state was to be tied to the emergence of participatory, solidary, and voluntary organizations. This solidarism thus was not only very different than the liberal discourse ethics that Habermas believes characterized the emerging bourgeois realm, but from the Jacobinism of many republicans and the neo-corporatism of Louis Bonaparte as well. Durkheim, Bourgeois *et al.* substituted a vision of the participatory, moral citizen for the liberal, private individual that Habermas sees as the basis of the bourgeois public sphere. The solidarists believed that liberal rights were

guaranteed only by a strong, shared moral community, rather than simply through formal laws. Finally, such rights were not necessarily superior to the moral demands for republican social solidarity.¹⁵³

The proletarian public sphere also faced problems posed by the growth of state power and capitalism. If worker militants wished to remain faithful to their vision of decentralized, participatory communes, they had to find a way to combine this orientation with the exigencies demanded by economic growth. For many workers, parliamentary versions of socialism could not solve these problems, in part because of a proliferation of competing parties, and also because of the distrust of many laborers concerning state action. The issue of uniting these decentralized traditions with a national labor movement became paramount, and informed the creation of revolutionary syndicalism.

Thus, by the era of the Third Republic, the more progressive wings in the liberal and proletarian public spheres shared a common problematic. Each wished to create the conditions for the emergence of a more independent, rational, yet morally solidary citizen (for liberal republicans) or worker (for labor militants). Despite their hostility and their different viewpoints, each sphere's goal was to expand the participatory, democratic moment that arose in part from their shared republican legacy. While for syndicalists this meant greater power for unions and workers' control of the *atelier* and the *usine*, for republicans it involved a more solidary civil society bolstered by social reform and state intervention. While the initiatives of the liberal and proletarian spheres undoubtedly rationalized civil society to some degree, their principal aim, though from radically different directions, was to democratize it in a more participatory and morally unified, as well as scientific direction.

Despite their relatively pragmatic social republicanism, early syndicalists and solidarists also shared a positivism which complicated their attempts to develop a more communicative orientation. In Habermasian words, the emphasis on a form of democratic, activist communicative rationality stood in uneasy tension with productivist and instrumental tendencies. Moreover, the manner in which both spheres resolved problems after 1910 pointed away from a "communicative" dimension, in Habermas's words, toward a greater emphasis on instrumental reason, or expertise, in Giddens's lexicon. Their meeting ground turned out to be a shared concern with increasing production and neo-corporatist bargaining, as the moral and democratic dimensions of the republican tradition were accordingly downplayed in favor of more "systemic" concerns. Especially in the proletarian public sphere, the labor republicanism inherited from the nineteenth century proved unable to resolve

the new demands posed by an increasingly international economy and activist state. Its turn toward productivism took place in the context of a liberal public sphere which took labor seriously as a major player in society. However, in so doing, the proletarian public sphere helped promote the very strategic rationality that Habermas, Giddens, and Touraine criticize, while weakening the reciprocal and mutual ties so important to visions of worker solidarity arising from the nineteenth-century language of labor. Had the emphasis on moral solidarity and participatory democracy championed in different ways by syndicalists and solidarists triumphed, the Third Republic, and perhaps even the entire modern era, may have had a very different countenance.

But we are getting ahead of ourselves. The respective democratic and moral impulses of both spheres provided a powerful discursive moment that influenced the postwar Third Republic, even if in weakened form. Moreover, the emergence of a more technocratic orientation within the proletarian public sphere was neither foreordained nor simple. Such a process took place within the changing proletarian and liberal public realms in the *fin-de-siècle*, and was tied to the internal conflicts and differentiation of each sphere. The next chapter concentrates on the rise of social science, which provided various syntheses of republicanism and positivism that helped to supply a rationale for the social outlook of the Third Republic.

The fin-de-siècle public sphere, the academic field, and the social sciences

When the forty-four-year-old Emile Durkheim moved from Bordeaux to Paris in 1902 to assume his teaching duties at the Sorbonne, he had already established himself as a force to be reckoned with among intellectuals, academics, and politicians. He seemed to embody much of the spirit of the rising social sciences in his very presence. A stern, forbidding man, he was labeled by his detractors “a sort of automaton . . . destined to preach a new Reform.”¹ Indeed, Durkheim represented a new breed of professor, dedicated to the advancement of social science. While Durkheim possessed a sense of high moral purpose that often intimidated colleagues, he nevertheless recognized that the creation of a scientific sociology was not a solitary endeavor. Durkheim, like other social scientists, realized that the success of scientific perspectives within the Third Republic crucially depended on the recruitment of followers to promulgate the ideals of the new discipline. Accordingly, he founded a *lycée sociologique* that helped carve out the necessary discursive space that would allow sociology to take its rightful place as a legitimate public language and an established academic discipline.

Durkheim had to build his new school in a Paris animated by a cross-cutting variety of philosophical, aesthetic, and political perspectives. From Bergsonian *élan vital* and the rise of aesthetic modernism to the resurgent monarchism of the Action Française and solidarist and socialist discourse, the French Third Republic gave rise to a proliferation of political discourses almost unheard-of in the world at that time.² The ascent of radicalism signaled a new type of bureaucratic political party that would come to dominate the political terrain. It symbolized a new conception of social life that outlined, however tentatively, an incipient welfare state in which state-supported groups and policies created “a web of solidaristic and mutualist networks” in civil society.³ Finally, *le social*

became more complicated as the new CGT, headquartered in Paris, was formed in 1902. Soon worker strikes and demonstrations would become part of the social landscape of Parisian and French life.

Durkheim did not shrink from the debates that these often-conflicting perspectives and social changes occasioned. He had already established himself as an able defender of Dreyfus. Indeed, Durkheim was a good example of the new public role that intellectuals assumed under the Third Republic. Durkheim maintained that intellectuals had a responsibility to involve themselves in the activities of the masses through "books, seminars, and popular education," especially when "a grave question of principle was raised."⁴ The Dreyfus Affair had demonstrated that French public opinion was responsive to the rational arguments advanced by social scientists. Moreover, a literate French public readily accepted many of the new knowledges generated by *la science sociale*. Le Bon's unabashedly positivistic analyses of collective behavior and the condition of French society sold well. While the number of books devoted to literature stagnated, volumes dealing with a kind of vulgarized science became very popular.⁵ The mass-circulation French press, though conservative culturally and tending toward the sensational, often explained important crimes in terms of the latest positivistic psychological and sociological theories of criminality.⁶

Durkheim's conviction that the Third Republic could rely on an educated public opinion thus seemed validated in the fin-de-siècle; this belief was shared by most other social scientists, notwithstanding Le Bon's more reactionary political views. Yet, despite links between scientific ideas and the French populace and the influence of independent scholars such as Le Bon, French social science became increasingly an academic affair. Social scientists had to negotiate their perspectives within the university politics of the Third Republic. Republican governments attempted to raise the status of the university, which in turn gave rise to battles between established *littérateurs* and the upstart social sciences for control of these newly important institutions.

Splits between perspectives were also commonplace within *la science sociale* of the academy, despite their shared allegiance to the Republic. Durkheim argued that public opinion informed the very nature of economic activity, while Leroy-Beaulieu of the influential social economy school regarded as spurious Durkheim's notion that collective representations could have an independent effect on the *ordre naturel* of the economy.⁷ Such differences translated into disagreements between social economists and Durkheimian sociologists concerning the role of the working class in the Third Republic. While both schools believed that the

integration of the working class into the polity was a key to a stable Third Republic, they differed regarding how to achieve this end. Durkheim envisaged a morally solidary democratic Third Republic informed by professional associations and occupational groups. Emile Levasseur's social economy proposed an apolitical future of mass consumerism determined by economic laws which posited an ever-expanding, efficient technology that lowered the price of production.

These theories were not just the abstract reveries of academics. They not only supplied visions of the future of French society, but also contributed to the terms of public discourse in which labor, republicanism, and positivism were discussed. This chapter examines the social economists, the solidarists, and especially Durkheim's sociology, for these three approaches represented key discourses in the liberal public sphere. They were also important in influencing, in often subtle ways, the discursive ambiance surrounding French syndicalism.

Levasseur's economic theory proved to be an important resource for syndicalist intellectuals such as Delaisi, who adopted his strong positivism, praise of technology, and support of a consumption-oriented society. Durkheim and solidarism did not directly influence syndicalist ideology, but shared characteristic problematics with it. In particular, Durkheim formulated the most sophisticated and ambitious theoretical attempt to distill democratic and republican themes with scientific positivism. His sociology showed both the problems and prospects of a more inclusive public sphere. Like early syndicalists such as Pelloutier, Durkheim wavered between instrumental and more hermeneutic orientations, developing a relatively pragmatic and reflexive epistemology that recognized the centrality of historical experience in shaping mutual understandings. He shared with syndicalists a broad commitment to more participatory and decentralized forms of democracy and to a more egalitarian social structure, and a belief in the efficacy of science. However, like syndicalists, the Durkheimian phenomenological moment always threatened to collapse into a positivistic theory of history.

In sum, Durkheim's sociology and revolutionary syndicalism showed the continuing power of scientific and republican cultural orientations both in the liberal and proletarian public spheres, and in the democratic traditions linking them together. While the CGT occupied the extreme left wing of this democratic spectrum, to its right were clustered groups in the liberal public sphere including the Socialists led by Jaurès, the solidarists such as Bourgeois, and the Durkheimian sociologists. The subtle yet acrimonious relationship of syndicalism to this democratic impulse, as well as the internal dynamics of each movement, helped determine the very contours of the Third Republic in the *fin-de-siècle*.

Had solidarism and syndicalism merged their visions of a democratic society, perhaps through the medium of the Socialist Party, the Third Republic may have been very different. Yet this did not occur. France did not develop the rich civil society anticipated by solidarists, in large part because syndicalism and solidarism were not free-floating doctrines that could be easily combined. Their animosity arose from the nineteenth-century split between the liberal and proletarian public spheres. Further, the internal dynamics of each realm influenced their respective orientations. In the fin-de-siècle liberal public sphere, the complex rethinking of positivism, a shifting view of the intellectual, and the epistemological orientations of the new social sciences intersected with changes in the academy. These factors problematized the relationship of the social sciences to syndicalism. By the eve of World War I, corporatist and laissez-faire alternatives predominated in the Third Republic, as the consumption-oriented and technologically driven social vision of Levasseur proved to be more influential than the democratic doctrines of Durkheim and solidarism.

Bourdieu and Habermas: theorizing the fin-de-siècle public sphere

Interestingly, many Marxist and more recent poststructuralist perspectives share an analysis which does not view the solidarism of Durkheim and Bourgeois as a credible democratic alternative in the Third Republic. These viewpoints conflate solidarism with more corporatist approaches, for they argue that Durkheimian sociology and solidarism were determined by a type of social logic which inevitably marked them as conservative. For Marxists such as Elwitt, Durkheim and the solidarists were the mouthpieces of the bourgeoisie. Authors such as Ewald, Donzelot, and Rosanvallon, influenced by Foucault, argue that the rise of Durkheimian social science represented an imperialistic "social rationality" that attempted to stabilize the Third Republic through creating and then colonizing a new conception of the "social," as an emerging *état providence* homogenized and disciplined subaltern groups. A new language of social rights and statistically calculable risk completed this process.⁸

The Foucauldians especially are on the mark in their linkage of the crisis of the Third Republic to a rethinking of the very knowledge appropriate for understanding social life. However, this crisis resulted in hybrid combinations of solidarism and positivism, from the paternalistic and technologically deterministic social economy of Levasseur to the communicative orientation of the later Durkheim. Neither the poststructuralist nor the Marxist perspective allows a clear understanding of the

complexity and differences among these discourses. Durkheim's sociology did not create an elitist science that inhibited public discourse, but rather attempted to promote an informed, democratic, and critical public opinion based on widespread scientific education. No doubt the discursive power of a positivism tied to sociology was augmented at this time; yet, its development owes much to the complex interplay of academic politics and the changing relationship of the intellectual to governmental and economic elites. Social science developed within the specific logic of an autonomous "intellectual field," and particularly its academic component, in fin-de-siècle France. Its evolution did not in any simple way reflect economic interests or an emergent disciplining rationality, and its ties to groups such as syndicalism were correspondingly complex.

Bourdieu supplies a more nuanced analysis of the rise of social science. In *Homo Academicus*, he attempts to map the political unconscious of academia, expressed in "the space of works or discourses taken as differential stances, and the space of the positions held by those who produce them."⁹ Such considerations of the academic "field of production" not only are important criticisms of the neo-Foucauldians and Marxists, but also modify Habermas's analysis of public discourse in two important ways. First, in his discussion of the transformation of the public sphere, Habermas does not examine in detail the important role of universities in this process. Second, Habermas does not analyze discursive and epistemological conflicts in terms of differentially structured positions of power within institutions, which Bourdieu highlights.

These themes of Bourdieu help conceptualize the evolution of public discourse in France. As the proletarian and liberal public spheres diverged after 1848, a version of revolutionary idealism and republicanism was developed as political theory, reaching its most profound expression in Durkheim. Thus, the university played a central role in the Third Republic's articulation of the republican ideals that it portrayed to the French public. The rise of social science was played out in the context of the "social field" of a new public sphere. Durkheim and other social scientists opposed an aesthetically formal orientation to education with a strong positivist and scientific alternative. Struggles over the legitimacy of types of knowledge intersected with the structural "space" of those people producing them, contributing to a more differentiated and scientific liberal public sphere. Yet, while Bourdieu's analysis of the institutional boundaries of public spaces alters in important ways Habermas's view of public discourse, Bourdieu neglects the internal tension between communicative and positivistic epistemological orientations within perspectives, such as Durkheimian sociology, that Habermas can illuminate.

Indeed, public discourse demonstrated not only the power but also the tensions and limitations of positivism in early twentieth-century France. While changes in academic and intellectual fields encouraged the institutionalization of positivism, Durkheim and many others realized that a simple positivism could not supply an overarching principle of legitimacy for a liberal and democratic public sphere composed of new, proliferating publics. Further, the Third Republic faced powerful critiques from Bergsonian philosophy to the Action Française, which problematized the passive subject of positivism as well as its assumption of an objective, predictable world. In this context, the positivist subject/object distinction was dislodged from its secure foundations. Like syndicalists, Durkheim, solidarists, and social economists recognized, if only implicitly, that society was undergoing changes that the old theoretical frameworks could no longer grasp, and that called for a new analysis of the nature of social solidarity.

Finally, though Durkheim and the solidarists helped open up the liberal public sphere to a new approach to the social question, they left an ambiguous legacy for a theory of an integrated public sphere. Though Durkheim advocated strong democratic ideals, he also helped transform the revolutionary ideal of *fraternité* into the more scientific and abstract category of *solidarité*, and solidified the positivism that was important in both the liberal and proletarian public spheres. He and other social scientists helped consolidate a narrative of industrial society that posited economic concentration as a more or less inevitable process. The eventual reintegration of the CGT into the polity would take place on the basis of a shared commitment to increasing production in a corporate economy, epistemologically bolstered by some version of positivism, rather than in terms of moral transformation and democratic renewal.

Yet this was not a simple process, and a discussion of Durkheimian and solidarist approaches complicates the Habermasian view that the liberal public sphere simply "declined" as it confronted the social question and attempted to integrate new groups. Durkheim's sociology and solidarism developed communal, activist, and moral theories of democracy that outlined a very different public sphere, more solidary than Habermas's constitutionalist discourse ethics. Moreover, the internal differentiation of the public sphere coincided with complex attempts such as those of Durkheimian sociology and solidarism to formulate a democratic discourse that expanded the positivistic limits of the public sphere without becoming a variant of neo-corporatist bargaining. These perspectives emerged in the context of changes in the intellectual and academic fields and institutions and the particular cultural milieu of fin-de-siècle France.

The politics of the Third Republic

In the wake of the Paris Commune and the turbulent founding of the Third Republic, republicans found themselves confronted from their left and right. Though weakened, many royalists and Catholic conservatives still hoped for the overthrow of the Republic. The proliferation of strikes promoted fears of the potential radicalism of *le peuple*. Like earlier elites, many republicans were alarmed by the possibility that an unorganized mob could destroy social institutions, and that such a crowd, more specifically workers, could not be organically integrated into society. In such a context, the political task of governing became inseparable from solving the social question.¹⁰ France's 1870 defeat exacerbated these fears of social decomposition. Many elites believed that France suffered from cultural decadence, from the slowness of French economic growth to the apparent increase in neurasthenic disorders. In particular, the declining birthrate in France promoted a fear of foreigners and xenophobic discussions of the future of the French "race." In the era of the Boulangist and Dreyfus Affairs, republicans believed that the stability of democracy was at risk.¹¹

Like all postrevolutionary republicans, politicians in the 1880s faced the dilemma of representing revolutionary principles yet ending the Revolution, establishing popular sovereignty without destroying society.¹² The Republic could not engage in outright repression of its opponents and maintain its legitimacy; further, republicans took their democratic and scientific principles seriously. Democratic institutions had to be legitimated in the arena of public opinion. The Republic could only exist to the extent that it convinced; all principles had to be freely aired and debated.

The republican rethinking of legitimacy relied on the insights of social science, for both drew heavily on a vaguely Comtean positivism. For fin-de-siècle republican politicians and intellectuals, a kind of positivism was "almost automatic"; it provided a common philosophy of science and method.¹³ As Ringer writes, "*Some form of positivism was to the French intellectual field of the late nineteenth century what philosophical Idealism was to the German academic tradition of the same period.*" This orientation followed Comte's dictum that social and natural life could be studied by the same scientific method, but the call for positive knowledge was usually broader than classical positivism. As "a cluster of incompletely articulated cognitive preferences, rather than a precisely formulated position," it posited the unity of science, and advocated the application of scientific methods to social and humanistic studies.¹⁴ It

drew on the general scientific climate of the late nineteenth century, particularly the prestige of the natural sciences. Biological imagery infused its categories, as organic metaphors were applied to social processes. While the positivist founders of the Third Republic hoped to inaugurate the new scientific age predicted by their master Comte, they wished to do so in a democratic community that resurrected France as a "new Athens," in the republican leader Gambetta's words.¹⁵

This orientation had gathered force in the wake of the election of Louis Napoleon, for republicans realized that universal suffrage meant little if the people were not republican. The first generation of Third Republican leaders, the "opportunists" such as Gambetta and Ferry, sought a solution to the problems of rule in anti-clericalism and the persuasive powers of positivism, while tying the prosperity of society to the progress of industry. Though they endorsed the rights of man, these nineteenth-century French republicans modified the civic republican image of *homo politicus*. Drawing on Fourier, Guizot, and others, Gambetta and his followers increasingly substituted the perspective of society for that of the individual. They utilized Fourier's concept of solidarity to show that social rights existed alongside individual interest; further, such social rights were embedded in the nation. Influenced by Littré's Comtean positivism and the neo-Kantianism of Renouvier, the opportunists emphasized social duties and responsibilities. They thought that the entire middle class should govern France, not just its upper echelons. Republican rule must take place through democratic institutions and universal suffrage, which would allow an elite of talent to rise. Finally, demonstrating the ambivalence that many of the French felt in the wake of the 1870–1871 war, some republicans (especially Ferry) believed that France should follow the modernizing model of Germany.¹⁶

The opportunists were displaced by the more left-wing Radical Party, the leading political force in France from 1900–1910. While the Radicals too emphasized the need for an enlightened and meritocratic elite, they were more firmly anti-clerical and oriented toward social legislation than were the opportunists. The Radicals also had intellectual affiliations with neo-Kantian and positivist approaches, and were intent on establishing the clear dominance of the Republic over the Church. They were wary of compromise with Catholics even after the *Ralliement* of the early 1890s. In the years before 1905, Radicals often formed coalitions with Socialists in the chamber to further their legislative agenda. After Ferry's initial proposals about secularizing the schools, Radicals were the major proponents of school reform. They argued that the schools were the most important institutions for establishing the legitimacy of the Republic in

the face of Catholicism and socialism. This emphasis on education led them to try to raise the status of university faculties and promote "the cultural authority of science" in the Republic.¹⁷

The social problem was the Radicals' second major interest. Social science was mobilized to find a basis for class conciliation. Many Radicals realized that sovereignty had to be rethought in terms of social solidarity rather than as a purely political phenomenon. Bourgeois's *solidarité* radicalized Guizot's attempt to integrate society and the government, for only a more organized society, composed of legitimate groups outside the state, could guarantee social stability. Yet differences between solidarists, opportunists, and other republicans often dissolved in concrete political practice. For example, various republicans agreed on a legislative agenda that aimed to protect the patriarchal family through welfare reforms, pronatalist policies, and changes in labor law. Yet republican policies on divorce and the provision of social services for all mothers in need helped to mitigate, to some degree, the worst excesses of the patriarchal family.¹⁸

In such a context, and especially after the rise of solidarists to positions of political power, the status of the social sciences was augmented. Accordingly, the funding of higher education increased, with the goals of renovating the elite and promoting scientific research and training. The Third Republic advocated the rise of new, professional social sciences such as Durkheimian sociology within the university. However, republicans often faced conservative opposition. Social and cultural differentiation among previously homogeneous elites in late nineteenth-century France did not diminish the struggles between many elites, but rather intensified the problems of rule. The growth of liberal intellectual professions encouraged by the Republic, and their conflict with the conservatism of many economic leaders still grounded in quasi-aristocratic traditions, exacerbated splits in the ruling groups.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century elite groups became more autonomous from one another. Despite its meritocratic limitations, the Republic brought some members of new social groups into positions of power. *Les couches nouvelles* developed professional qualities which helped them escape the control of elite-based patronage. The expansion of literary, teaching, and academic careers further increased differences between intellectual, political, and economic elites. Economic elites had the narrowest social base, while their intellectual counterparts came from the broadest socio-economic background. Political elites occupied an intermediate position.¹⁹ These differences between elites were indicative of a problematic legitimacy tied to the differentiation of the liberal public

sphere in the fin-de-siècle, which was linked to the rise of social science, the increased status of the university, and a new vision of the intellectual.

The intellectual field and the evolution of higher education

The position of intellectuals changed markedly in the Belle Epoque. They were no longer strictly tied to the Church or the state; and as patronage disappeared, intellectuals' links to privilege became increasingly tenuous and complicated.²⁰ More importantly, an institutionalized social science began to challenge the intellectual hegemony of the literary figure, dominant since the Old Regime. While many of this new breed of intellectuals supported the Republic, they also defended their autonomy from ruling groups, believing that they had a special claim to power because of their scientific expertise and professional status.²¹

Such changes occurred as the intellectual field grew dramatically in the late nineteenth century. As cultural reproduction became structurally autonomous and specialized, new publics developed and a new type of intellectual appeared with different criteria for success. New intellectuals often identified themselves as professionals, dedicated to an objective rather than a literary approach to their particular area of interest. They became more powerful as the number of people engaged in professions such as journalism, *hommes de lettres*, and secondary teaching swelled from the 1870s to the early 1900s.²² By 1890 established writers certified by literary academies competed with this new wave of socially committed, scientifically informed, and politically engaged authors.²³ A growing public eager for information about the latest scientific advances and theories also helped swell the ranks of this latter group. Moreover, after 1893 new specialized journals from *Revue internationale de sociologie* to *L'Année psychologique* and *Le Bulletin de la société française de philosophie* encouraged the ideal of professionalism.²⁴

Many new intellectuals were located in the universities, and their fate was inseparable from the changes occurring in French higher education. Several parliamentary representatives in the years after 1880 were university-trained academics, and the Republic looked to create an educated citizenry governed by an informed, scientifically literate elite.²⁵ Accordingly, the university student population grew from 11,200 in 1876 to 42,000 by 1914, and university personnel expanded considerably faster than did the numbers of practitioners in the liberal professions.²⁶

With the Republic's encouragement, new generations entered the expanded intellectual field, which in turn contributed to the restructuring of French education. Universities broke with their parent liberal

professions, as professors engaged in more specialized and autonomous research. Increasingly, academics shared career patterns, beginning as *agrégés* teaching in provincial *lycées* who attempted to attain the high-status faculty positions in Paris. This new community of scholars demanded more exacting professional standards. Advanced education also distinguished itself from its strict ties with secondary and public teaching. University professors, oriented toward research, gained a certain "social visibility" which differentiated them from mere teachers.²⁷

The New Sorbonne exemplified this new conception of university professors devoted increasingly to research rather than teacher training. In part because of the widespread belief in the important cultural role that German universities ostensibly played in sparking the patriotism and vitality central to the victory of 1870–1871, French universities were granted more power and autonomy. Republican reforms stressed the active pursuit of scientific research, often in explicit contrast to the tradition of humanistic letters that had dominated higher education. Very different from the classical *honnêtes hommes* pursuing elite studies that ignored social trends and problems, the practitioners of the rising social sciences favored by the Republic actively studied society. They demanded a scientifically oriented curriculum that could arrive at clear understandings of the inner dynamics of social life. In addition, many social scientists believed that intellectuals had a responsibility to use their knowledge to enrich and inform French public opinion, if not make concrete policy recommendations for the Republic.²⁸

Such views were not easily accepted within the academy, and the emerging social sciences were forced to battle the entrenched position of the humanities. Ministerial instability hampered the Republic's consistent support of the social sciences. Yet by the last third of the nineteenth century the social sciences had gained a strong institutional foothold in the university. As the Republic pushed for a more scientifically oriented curriculum, social science chairs in the thirteen faculties more than doubled to 198 by 1914. Between 1878 and 1898, there was little increase in positions in classical languages and literature, but much growth in modern languages, history, and related subjects.²⁹

Theoretical debates within the faculties mirrored the conflicts between literary and social scientific approaches. Durkheim was very influential in establishing the integrity of social science. For example, late nineteenth-century legal scholars influenced by Durkheim and the positivist legal scholar Duguit began examining law as socially determined and linked to other institutions, rather than following the more traditional literary approach based on aesthetically interpreting legal texts. This revision of

legal studies reflected widespread and growing differences between scientific and literary perspectives in academia. A scientific approach posited that texts should be understood in terms of their social context or for their explicit content, rather than analyzed for their pleasantness of form. Further, social science usually involved systematic methods of empirical research which allowed testable knowledge to accumulate, and differed from a priori or personal knowledge.³⁰ This position became increasingly prominent as the official ideology of the university establishment posited an overall unity to scientific method.

Thus, the link of social science to republican principles was a palpable one. For many newly enshrined university professors with a research orientation, the history of the French university demonstrated the interconnection of science, progress, and democracy. These French professors supported the Republic, just as German academics supported the monarchies which sustained them. French professors believed that they had good reasons for defending the Republic. Science could inform democratic, rational choice and distinguish it from pre-republican irrationality. While sociologists led by the Durkheimian François Simiand complained that historians were not sufficiently scientific, many republican historians saw themselves as educators of the populace, teaching the lessons of the past to the present generation.³¹ They often advocated a new type of social history which showed that the French nation was constituted by common experiences and interests, rather than by biology or fate. This common culture received its clearest expression in the principles of 1789, and required active citizenship and strong, patriotic civic solidarity to thrive. Education was a moral endeavor, its main purpose being to form character. Radicals, solidarists, leftist intellectuals, and social science academics thus informally constituted a loose alliance in the early twentieth century.³²

However, it took the Dreyfus Affair to forge concrete links between the increasing visibility of academic social science, the new public role of intellectuals, and their ties to the Republic and to one another. During the Affair, intellectuals developed an independent public voice while maintaining a critical distance from many ruling elites. The Affair demonstrated the important but relatively marginal position of these new intellectuals relative to economic power, yet their importance in public discourse. These new intellectuals exercised power through groups and "schools" by converting a democratic electorate to their ideas, rather than simply trying to influence the government and/or personally incarnate public opinion. The possession of scientific training distinguished Dreyfusards from their opponents, who based their claim to privilege on

wealth and faith. Dreyfusards tended to support progress and science in addition to the Republic.³³ After the Affair, these values of science and progress became general components of any progressive political position. This progressive perspective crystallized through the public debate generated by the Affair, and hardened with the emergence of a new threat to the Republic in the royalist Action Française.

The rise of the social sciences was not simply representative of a hegemonic bourgeoisie, the passive reflection of governmental policy, or the outcome of a rather anonymous form of social rationality that colonized the discursive options of the Belle Époque. Rather, the ascent of the social sciences owed much to the emergence of a new intellectual field and the internecine debates within academic politics. As the recent wealth of Bourdieu-inspired research conducted by Charle, Ringer, *et al.* demonstrates, the evolution of the social sciences and universities in France was more a "conflict-ridden exercise in social demarcation than a bureaucratic search for order."³⁴ Moreover, in Bourdieuan terms, conflicts between new social sciences immediately followed their establishment in the university. For example, social economists and solidarist sociologists fought over new positions within the university, as they used a variety of criteria, from subject domain to particular interpretations of science, to distinguish themselves from one another.

However, Bourdieu underestimates the important role of cultural traditions in shaping social life. The fin-de-siècle social sciences represented not only a scientific alternative to aesthetic understandings of social life, but also a new, broader method of reconceptualizing the links between democracy, participation, moral solidarity, and civil society. Further, Bourdieu and his colleagues neglect the extent to which the new social sciences entailed an internal tension between positivistic and communicative orientations, in Habermas's terms.

Such tensions could be seen in the attempts of social scientists to revise Comtean positivism in various ways. Bergson and the aesthetic modernists problematized the image of a secure, rational, consistent subject that underlay positivist science, while the popularity of the Action Française reflected not only a dissatisfaction with the Republic, but also a widespread revival of spiritual and religious themes. In this context, the social sciences developed diverse syntheses of republican and scientific cultural traditions. Elements of Durkheimian sociology and solidarism actually pointed toward a reformulation of positivism in a more pragmatic direction, while the social economists deepened the logic of positivism. Yet these differences moved beyond epistemological issues, as

Durkheimians and social economists developed conflicting visions of the future of the Third Republic and the role of the working class within it.

Walras, Leroy-Beaulieu, Levasseur, and social economy

The marginal and social economists exemplified the more conservative approach. The nineteenth-century economist Walras, a leading figure in the marginal revolution in economics, helped transform classical economics from the study of the dynamics of income flow and the interdependence of economic phenomena toward an analysis based on the principle of individual optimization. He popularized the belief that economic systems tended toward equilibrium, while focusing on the role of consumption in the determination of value.³⁵ Such an orientation criticized the labor theory of value so important to syndicalists and socialists.

Economics became a major social science in France in part through the efforts of Leroy-Beaulieu. Elected to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques in 1879, the following year he rose to the Chair of Political Economy at the Collège de France. His economic theory justified free enterprise, the growing concentration of business, and French imperialism. He argued that the telos of any economic system was to increase production continually, which would raise workers' wages and eliminate class conflict. Leroy-Beaulieu believed that his economic principles were grounded "objectively" in social life, for "these laws have the force of the laws of physics."³⁶

While Leroy-Beaulieu staunchly defended laissez-faire, many economists followed Walras in attempting to "chart a way to welfare and justice by constructing a 'scientific' synthesis between liberalism and socialism."³⁷ Fin-de-siècle social economists like Levasseur were more influential in their attempts to popularize a third path between liberalism and socialism, as they advocated versions of profit sharing and social engineering.³⁸ While wary of state intervention in the economy, Levasseur did not wholeheartedly embrace Leroy-Beaulieu's laissez-faire approach. Building on some of Le Play's paternalistic theories, Levasseur tried to find the common denominator between the classes that could allow the wage system to work best for owners and workers. For Levasseur, whom Elwitt calls the "*doyen* of social economists," industrial prosperity and the increased productivity associated with machinery provided the basis of all people's mutual interest.³⁹

Like Walras and Leroy-Beaulieu, Levasseur argued that the labor theory of value of Marx, Proudhon, and Pelloutier misconstrued the very

nature of the economy. Socialists and syndicalists felt that the wage system was a transitory phenomenon; Levasseur believed that the number of wage earners would increase with the concentration of industry and technological progress.⁴⁰

In fact, Levasseur declared, capitalism would thrive in the future because of the creation of more wealth by machinery, which was "one of the happiest consequences of industrial progress."⁴¹ The machine was the solution to the "economic paradox" that he saw at the heart of industrial production. Levasseur argued that as the cost of production decreased and the price of a product fell, wages and profits necessarily increased. Manufacturers could paradoxically pay more for labor and raw materials and sell their products at a cheaper price, yet earn greater profits. The solution to this riddle lied in the increased productivity of labor, which could be augmented through better machinery and a more efficient organization of production, as workers could then produce more per capita. This "general rule" of economics posited that augmenting levels of productivity meant more goods produced and higher wages.⁴² Further, Levasseur believed that machinery would not displace workers, for increases in consumption associated with a greater number of available commodities would always create more jobs.⁴³ Consumption stimulated ever more production. As industry advanced, laborers would be grouped in larger, more efficient firms, for this was a basic law of industrial development.⁴⁴

Walras, Levasseur, and the social economists helped create a seemingly scientific image of a classless society based on increasing economic prosperity, technological progress, large-scale industry, and mass consumption. They did not focus on issues such as democratic control of the labor process and the alienation of the laborer, but rather on the role of individual demand, consumption, and machinery in stimulating production. Their agenda was more conservative than the solidarists', for they tended to support a strong version of free enterprise rather than a full-blown legislative agenda that could interfere with the workings of the market.⁴⁵ Yet their perspective was very seductive for worker elites. Like social economists, many workers had little confidence that state intervention could solve social problems. Further, syndicalists such as Delaisi integrated what they saw to be the scientific ideas related to the economic paradox into their version of syndicalism, thus implicitly helping to promote the very changes toward an apolitical, large-scale, technologically driven, and consumption-oriented society that Levasseur advocated.

Solidarism

Other important perspectives emerged which implicitly critiqued some of the more positivistic and scientific assumptions which underlay the economists' perspective. Politically, the most important of these was *solidarisme*, the philosophy of the left wing of the Radical Party. Represented within the academy by professors such as Charles Gide, *solidarisme*'s economic doctrine promoted state intervention to help solve the issues surrounding the social question. Such an economics should be sensitive to historical differences among countries and cultures rather than positing the existence of universal economic laws.⁴⁶ Yet *solidarisme* was more closely associated with the politician Bourgeois. Solidarism united society and government in terms of shared social debts and obligations. An organic imagery stressed the mutual responsibilities of groups to one another and to the state, which were necessary for the smooth functioning of society.⁴⁷

Solidarisme was the most discussed social doctrine of the Belle Époque, and had affinities with social democratic reform efforts in Germany, Britain, and the United States.⁴⁸ Its philosophy justified the Radicals' agenda of social reform, from the income tax to social security. Like neopopulism, it was linked to the emerging social sciences. Solidarist social science, and especially sociology, attempted to uncover the laws governing social life which intervened with the growing rationalization of governmental procedures.⁴⁹ Yet it also had strong moral and normative elements. Like Tocqueville, solidarists searched for a way to make civil society more democratic and solidary. It drew on the prestige of recent findings in sociology in emphasizing the obligations that people owed one another.

Bourgeois and other solidarists contended that the state should enforce the merger of moral and legal debts. A progressive income tax was one step toward this goal, but their reconceptualization of the role of the state went further than merely advocating a slight redistribution of wealth. Solidarism reformulated the notion of state sovereignty, arguing that the state derived its authority from independent principles of law and justice. The government could not claim sovereignty apart from such principles; further, it owed obligations to the very people it served.⁵⁰ Such a position could justify more radical programs about the redistribution of wealth than earlier republicans had advocated. Moreover, solidarists advocated a web of associations in civil society apart from the state to guarantee the formation of moral solidarity. They supported the creation of unions, and when in power often intervened in strikes on the side of workers.⁵¹

Bourgeois justified this new sovereignty by positing a democratic theory of experience. Bourgeois, like the pragmatists in the United States and the Fabians in England, believed that there was no certain knowledge that could suppress the will of the people. He defended pragmatist criteria of truth, based on verification in experience and continual experimentation. This indeterminate conception of knowledge gave rise to a conception of democratic reform as an endless struggle, in which the people could not be simply dictated to by state officials or experts.⁵² This democratic pragmatism intersected with *solidarité's* attempts both to democratize and to rationalize social life.

In sum, *solidarité* problematized a simple positivism, as Bourgeois developed an activist theory of knowledge that was dependent on a participatory citizenship. Bourgeois recognized that his doctrine was tied to a strong sense of moral solidarity which united citizens with one another, and which could only be successful in a democratic Third Republic with a strong civil society that did not have extreme class divisions.

Durkheim

Though Durkheim disagreed with some of *solidarité's* concrete proposals and orientations, he developed the most interesting and complex version of many of these themes.⁵³ As an effective leader of the New Sorbonne, a staunch Dreyfusard, and a defender of the Republic, Durkheim was central in institutionalizing revolutionary ideals as political theory within the university.

Durkheim attempted to forge a new theory from many elements of the French revolutionary and liberal traditions. Like revolutionary syndicalists' efforts, Durkheim's resulted in an often-contradictory mixture of instrumental and communal themes, in part derived from his attempt to synthesize republicanism and positivism. For Durkheim, these conflicts were reflected not only in strains between individualism, social solidarity, and social justice, but also in tensions between decentralization and governmental centralization, and the associated recognition of the benefits and limits of reformism. His patriarchal view of women contradicted his emphasis on civic participation. Alexander points to the conflict between normative and instrumental orientations in Durkheim's work, and Habermas and Joas criticize his inadequate social psychology and theory of social action.⁵⁴ His later theory pointed toward a hermeneutically aware and reflexive approach to social life, as he implicitly developed a sense of the pragmatic nature of the subject and a culturally

sensitive social republicanism. However, such theoretical sensitivity often remained implicit because of Durkheim's positivistic self-understanding. Yet Durkheim tied science to a moral model of social solidarity and organizations grounded in civil society that, like *solidarité*, helped expand the vision of the liberal public sphere.

Durkheim's early work was explicitly positivistic in character, and he never expressly abandoned this methodological orientation. As Nye points out, Durkheim's vision of social science was informed by an adaptation imagery that drew heavily on the neo-Lamarckian biological theory of evolution prevalent at the time.⁵⁵ Though the organism had to adapt to the environment, this adaptation need not be in terms of a Darwinian survival of the fittest, but rather entailed a symmetry both between the organism and the environment and within the organism itself. Like the economist Walras, Durkheim adopted the metaphor of equilibrium in his discussion of this process. In Durkheim's organic imagery, a healthy society held social forces in equilibrium while a healthy individual balanced desires with morality (seen in *Suicide*, for example). These concepts of interdependence, equilibrium, and adaptation contributed to his early theory of society as a self-sufficient, interdependent system that exhibited lawlike behavior and that could change in a rational yet organic manner by incorporating new social forces.⁵⁶ Such ideas were demonstrated most clearly in *The Division of Labor in Society*, in which Durkheim argued that the division of labor created new tasks and jobs and a more complex social order as it progressed, while simultaneously promoting a consciousness of this new order.⁵⁷

Despite Durkheim's scientific aspirations and his criticisms of American pragmatism, his work had a hermeneutic moment that grew stronger over the years, and that has prompted one commentator to label him a "mild-mannered pragmatist."⁵⁸ Durkheim in fact retreated from the strict positivism of his early work by developing a more pragmatic and communicative conception of the subject and the public realm, which could not easily fit into positivistic categories. By the time he reached Paris, his social republicanism entailed a culturally flexible and sensitive sociology that necessarily demanded a more democratic polity. This epistemological orientation corresponded to a more open, inclusive, and democratic public sphere, for only such a realm guaranteed the type of qualitatively enriching communication that could decide, as Habermas puts it, "whether reason embodied in social practices is in touch with history and nature."⁵⁹

This hermeneutic sensibility could be seen in Durkheim's approach to history. While *The Division of Labor* posited a historical transformation

from mechanical to organic solidarity, his later work dissolved this contrast. By the time of *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Durkheim argued that people created reality, rationality, and truth, which in turn were necessarily historically grounded in concrete and diverse communities and cultural traditions. As human products, societies were necessarily open to change. According to Durkheim, "Man is a product of history; there is nothing in him that is either given or defined in advance."⁶⁰ This approach required a sensitivity to historical context. Thus, history and ethnography were the best methods for studying morality and human rights.⁶¹ In making such claims about history, Durkheim's beliefs about social solidarity had affinities to the civic republican notion of an always-fragile social order that was tied to temporality and varied historical circumstances, rather than an "imperialist" view of history which consisted of the discovery of universal laws.⁶² For the later Durkheim, freedom, linked to solidarity, was situated historically.

Such considerations could be seen in Durkheim's sociological and historical critique of Kantian categories. According to Durkheim, while Kant recognized that "acting morally is conducting one's self according to maxims which can be extended without contradiction to all wills," he could not satisfactorily account for the origins of such a moral vision.⁶³ For Durkheim, such categories owed their existence to social life. There was something impersonal and moral in us because there was something social in us.

Finally, Durkheim departed from positivism in developing expressivist themes. Though Durkheim did not embrace a philosophical anthropology of labor like Marxists and syndicalists, there was an expressivist moment in his analysis. Despite his acceptance of the specialization associated with the division of labor, he advocated that society place within the reach of people "all possible means of developing their abilities without hindrance, to work finally to make a reality of the famous precept: to each according to his labor!"⁶⁴ More importantly, in a way reminiscent of Marx's critique of commodity fetishism and Pelloutier's analysis of the alienating effects of money, Durkheim criticized the destructive hegemony of the commodity form. Adopting themes from the civic critique of an unbounded instrumental rationality that encouraged egoism and self-interest while dominating all other aspects of social life, Durkheim wrote, "the absence of all economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects beyond the economic world, and consequently weaken public morality."⁶⁵

Moral individualism and professional ethics

Durkheim's democratic vision was thus tied to a critique of instrumental rationality and an active view of people creating their identities through the use of existing cultural traditions. Prominent among such traditions available in early twentieth-century France was moral individualism, which could provide the basis for a secular ethics. Durkheim carefully distinguished utilitarian individualism, which he detested, from an individualism "of Kant and Rousseau, of the idealists – the one which the Declaration of the Rights of Man attempted . . . to formulate." Such an individualism required a morality that sought "out only that which our humanity requires and which we share with all our fellowmen."⁶⁶ This moral individualism, which defined the person as sacred, derived its dignity from humanity, "which is worthy of respect and sacred."⁶⁷

There was also an important institutional component in Durkheim's democratic vision. Moral individualism had to be grounded in concrete social groups, which in turn informed Durkheim's image of a rich, democratic civil society composed of a great number of voluntary associations. Secondary groups acted as intermediaries between the government and the people, allowing more coherent interaction between these spheres and creating favorable conditions for the development of social solidarity. As social and professional associations encouraged a sensibility of social rights and duties, professional ethics could be linked to a broad public opinion aware of the requirements of social solidarity. According to Durkheim, the insights and applications of social science contributed to a non-burdensome social regulation that transcended social and political divisions.⁶⁸

A larger state accompanied the growth of moral individualism and professional ethics. It expanded its moral and democratic role, which outweighed and indeed informed its legislative and executive acts. The state's directive function in modern society was informed by contact with the people. Democracy necessitated more public reflexivity, for democratic governments facilitated communication between the administration and the populace. A critical spirit and reflection were integral to the public affairs of a democracy, for only through reflection could new and better practices be discovered.⁶⁹ According to Durkheim, all of these factors pointed to the epistemological character of the state, its centrality in clarifying, creating, and disseminating knowledge. This interpretation of the government demonstrated the importance of science for the Republic, for only a scientifically informed elite and public could engage in the kinds of rational communication that democracy demanded.⁷⁰

Durkheim's theory of the state and professional groups thus justified the interpenetration of state and society and the creation of an expanded public sphere to mediate between the two. Durkheim advocated a more organic relationship between the political and social realms, reminiscent of Guizot and Tocqueville. He argued that society consisted of interdependent functions; the state must help coordinate and morally unify a differentiated society. Yet the state could not be separated from the needs and beliefs of the *conscience collective*. A large, centralized state coordinating the activities of a mass of isolated individuals would be for Durkheim a "veritable sociological monstrosity. For collective activity is always too complex to be capable of finding expression in the one single organ of the state."⁷¹

Durkheim and revolutionary syndicalism

Durkheim attempted to reunite the liberal and proletarian public spheres on the basis of moral solidarity and social science. He moved toward a complex version of a communicative and democratic sociology. Like the solidarists, his vision of society was less radical than the revolutionary syndicalists, for Durkheim and Bourgeois accepted and advocated a role for the state in promoting progressive social change, as well as the existence of an independent civil society, class differentiation, and some private property rights. But these reformers shared the revolutionary syndicalist emphasis on the creation of moral solidarity through democratic, decentralized participation, theorized in terms of particular historical circumstances and cultural traditions. Like early revolutionary syndicalists, they saw the creation of a moral community as the necessary guarantee of human and civil rights, which could not be accomplished simply by legislative fiat. Moreover, they realized that social harmony could only come about in a far less class-divided and more egalitarian republic.

Like his colleagues Mauss and Bouglé, and similar in many respects to the perspectives of Pelloutier and Sorel, Durkheim believed that socialism had to forge a new, more solidary culture. Syndicats and professional associations provided the framework for such a moral transformation. Despite their belief that industry was moving toward concentration, solidarists from Gide to Duguit advocated some form of decentralized worker association with a strong democratic component. For such quasi-socialist policies and theories to become genuinely popular, these theorists believed that socialists had to discard their fascination with technology and economic reductionism. The Socialist Party, unified

under the leadership of Jaurès after 1905, broadly shared Durkheim's commitment to a morally solidary and scientifically informed society, and Mauss and Bouglé forged many ties with the Socialists. In this spirit, like his friend Jaurès, Durkheim advocated a moral and voluntaristic socialism which realized the ideals of 1789.⁷² Their moral critique of capitalism envisioned at least the possibility of a qualitatively different future.

Despite Mauss's rather hyperbolic statement that Durkheim was responsible for many of Sorel's theories, Durkheim and the solidarists had trouble communicating their ideas to the working class.⁷³ Though the revolutionary syndicalist leaders Emile Pouget and Paul Delesalle joined Durkheim in the defense of Dreyfus, syndicalists maintained a strong suspicion of the moral theories of "bourgeois intellectuals."⁷⁴ Worker elites were not nearly so critical of positivistic science, as demonstrated in their response to the *universités populaires*, which emerged in France in the wake of the Dreyfus Affair. Energized by the Affair, liberal professors and students aligned with various worker study and self-help groups to promote the spread of scientific knowledge. The number of *universités populaires* grew from 15 in 1899 to 116 in 1900 and 124 with 50,000 participants in 1901. Almost all of the syndicalist leaders, including Jouhaux, Griffuelhes, Yvetot, Keufer, Delesalle, and Monatte, joined the anarchist Hervé and the Socialists Lagardelle and Thomas in these schools.

Positivist and republican academics such as Seignebos and Gide lectured at the *universités*. Followers of Durkheim were enthusiastic supporters; Bouglé, for example, founded the *université populaire* in Montpellier. The master himself was a fervent proponent of the *universités*, calling for their attachment to regular universities. It was the positivistic slant of the teachings of the *universités* that most attracted workers. Along with Jaurès, syndicalist leaders praised the liberating potential of science while arguing that workers needed a better scientific education to rid themselves of prejudices.⁷⁵

However, workers gradually left the *universités* as the CGT became more militant and skeptical of "bourgeois intellectuals," while professors lost interest in them as their *élan* faded along with the memory of the Dreyfus Affair. Worker elites such as Delesalle criticized the *universités* for their lack of a unified program of scientific study; if anything, he and other CGT supporters such as Delaisi believed that the *universités* had to be more scientific, to offer a more concrete and in-depth scientific perspective.⁷⁶ This sentiment was echoed by Durkheim, who wrote that it is necessary "to furnish workers with precise notions which can guide their political action, and technical knowledge which can serve them in

their professional practice and improve their moral as well as material condition."⁷⁷

Solidarism, social economics, and syndicalism

The syndicalist response to solidarist initiatives, as demonstrated in their reaction to the *universités populaires*, tended to be to reject their patriotic republicanism and accept their positivism. Thus, while Sorel praised Durkheim's understanding of professional groups as important vehicles of moral development (though inferior to unions),⁷⁸ syndicalists directly involved in the CGT were much more circumspect regarding his normative theory. To the extent that these latter syndicalists discussed Durkheim directly, they saw his moral theory as a clever attempt to disguise the reality of class struggle. They shared his scientism, which intersected with their own scientific aspirations, but did not develop the republican and hermeneutically sensitive implications of his thought. For example, Lagardelle, an intellectual sympathetic to syndicalism, and the CGT leader Pouget, in their 1905 debate with Durkheim, had a strong sense of the cultural differences of workers from capitalists. They vigorously opposed the argument that workers and elites could share common political and moral beliefs, such as patriotism. Yet they did not dispute the scientific bases of social theory, and in fact posited a more deterministic version of history and society than did Durkheim.⁷⁹

This syndicalist scientism was expressed most fully in Jouhaux's and Merrheim's post-1906 acceptance of an industrial model of a self-differentiating economy associated with the early Durkheim, and especially with social economists such as Levasseur. Like the early Durkheim, they saw society as a self-reproducing system evolving toward large-scale industry, an extensive, specialized division of labor, and a more centralized state.⁸⁰ Drawing explicitly on Levasseur, they accepted the notion that differentiation resulted inevitably from the introduction of machinery, entailed an increased number of specialized roles and tasks, and created new problems of supervision and expertise. They argued that such changes involved higher levels of organizational and technological complexity.⁸¹

Moreover, Jouhaux and Merrheim eventually followed the social economists in rejecting the labor theory of value. Durkheim, too, despite the expressivist moment in his discussion of work, concurred with the social economists' criticisms of the centrality of labor in determining prices. Durkheim developed a more or less marginal utility model that emphasized the role of satisfying needs in determining an object's "social

value.”⁸² Such critiques of the labor theory of value were indicative of a growing convergence of syndicalists, social economists, and Durkheimian solidarists on a theory of industrial society. This theory, which accepted the trans-historical nature of the wage system, posited a future economy guided by experts trained in complex scientific methods. Like Levasseur, syndicalists in particular came to praise the productivity of the machine as the agent which would lower costs while increasing consumption and wages.

Further, syndicalists and social economists shared with many republicans, socialists, and Marxists the belief that large-scale industry would characterize the future.⁸³ Durkheim, the social economists, and Bourgeois helped systematize some of these central assumptions about the future of industrial society that pervaded much French public discourse, despite continued political support for small business. Notwithstanding some hesitation, given his sensitivity to occupational groups, Durkheim believed that large-scale industry based on an extended division of labor, a correspondingly more activist state, and national unification would produce “a widening of perspectives” and “the awakening of a man’s consciousness to new wants as to new ideas.”⁸⁴ Despite conflicts between decentralized and centralizing visions of society, the social sciences ultimately helped to create a narrative of industrial growth which, in Kumar’s words, assumed “industrialization to be a form of endogenous change, arising naturally out of the preceding state of society and being propelled through the various states of growth and differentiation until achieving some sort of stable, mature state.”⁸⁵

Even given these internal tensions, Durkheim’s sociology and solidarism represented truly democratic alternatives in the liberal public sphere. Their approach shows that Habermas’s theory underestimates the complexity of the liberal public sphere in France. Drawing on themes of republicanism and positivism, Durkheim and the solidarists were part of a democratic impulse in the Third Republic that attempted to create a more radically democratic and solidary society than is envisioned in Habermas’s discourse ethics. Moreover, contra Habermas, the complex and historically specific cultural and political dimensions informing the intersection of the proletarian and liberal spheres could not be reduced to the inevitable instrumentalism associated with the rise of corporate capitalism.

Indeed, solidarist attempts to integrate the working class, like Socialist attempts to ally with the CGT, faced many problems that were specific to the Belle Époque. The very diversity of French elites, the conservatism

of many capitalists, and the continued strength of the right presented constant obstacles to social legislation. The immediate opposition to Bourgeois's call for an income tax showed the opposition to even minor forms of the redistribution of wealth in France. The approaching war only exacerbated these problems. As the fear of war grew, issues of economic growth and productivity overshadowed attempts at creating a more egalitarian polity and society.

Further, solidarism and socialism faced the problem of an anti-state, anti-socialist revolutionary syndicalism. Though their move toward a socially sensitive republicanism and the acceptance of a syndicalized, democratic, and participatory civil society raised the possibility of a rapprochement with revolutionary syndicalism, this union would not occur. Syndicalism's doctrinaire advocacy of class conflict, revolution, and tolerance of violence in its attempts to reach its goal would cause Mauss to leave the editorial board of *Le Mouvement socialiste* as the influence of Sorel increased.⁸⁶ The dogmatic CGT missed an opportunity to help forge a more democratic prewar public sphere in connection with solidarist initiatives. When the CGT did reach an accord with some republican and capitalist elites in postwar France, it was on the basis of a shared interest in productivism and corporatist bargaining.

The syndicalist transition to productivism corresponded to the loss of influence of solidarism in the liberal public sphere, as the democratic spectrum in France attenuated. Such an outcome was presaged partly in the revolutionary ideology of the fin-de-siècle CGT. As the proletarian public sphere was not nearly as internally differentiated as its liberal counterpart, themes of productivism, revolution, and anti-statism mixed with emphases on moral transformation, direct democracy, and critical approaches to science. Such disparate ingredients did not add up to a comprehensive social theory. The next chapter examines the main contours of revolutionary syndicalist discourse, exploring its attempts to fashion the traditions of science and republicanism into a radical *ouvriérisme*. In so doing, revolutionary syndicalists, like Durkheim, faced the problem of unifying a moral theory of social solidarity with appropriate organizational forms while satisfying demands for economic growth.

PART III

*Exploring revolutionary
syndicalism*

Pelloutier, Sorel, and revolutionary syndicalism

Fin-de-siècle revolutionary syndicalism represented the extreme left wing of the democratic spectrum in France, drawing on the same republican and scientific traditions as the solidarists and the Durkheimians. Like solidarists, revolutionary syndicalists attempted to create moral solidarity through mass participation in decentralized organizations arising in civil society. Moreover, their implicit criticisms of positivism, like those of Durkheim and Bourgeois, pointed away from determinism toward a more pragmatic epistemology. Within the context of the proletarian public sphere, syndicalists gave these themes an *ouvriériste* twist which radicalized them in a class-specific direction.

Further, revolutionary syndicalism's distinctive discourse is not merely of historical interest. Just as Durkheim can be understood in contemporary communitarian terms, so syndicalists foreshadowed several of the themes of the new social movements. Arising in civil society, French syndicalists, like participants in new social movements, emphasized direct democracy, small-scale organization, and a suspicion of massive bureaucratic attempts to transform society. Like many new social movements, syndicalists debated almost all aspects of the movement's goals, respected one another's opinions and autonomy, and attempted to create new organizational forms based on principles of decentralized democracy. Finally, French syndicalism faced the same dilemma that new social movements confront, i.e., that of integrating democratic practices with the requirements of more systemic, international forms of social integration. While the themes raised by revolutionary syndicalism question the newness of new social movements, its revolutionary *ouvriérisme* separates it from contemporary concerns with issues such as gender, race, and sexual orientation. It is this labor metaphysic, which many critics view as a major difficulty within the socialist

tradition, which makes its status as a model for new social movements problematic. Yet an investigation of the tension between democratic and productivist tendencies within the CGT precludes an easy dismissal of the syndicalist tradition, and provides a corrective to the often ahistorical assumptions of much new social movement theory.¹

A critical attitude toward the labor metaphysic has a long history within Western Marxism. For example, Theodor Adorno remarked that Marx wished to transform the world into a "giant workhouse." For Adorno, this was a nightmarish vision, indicating not only the concrete tendencies in Marxism that led toward the gulag, but also demonstrating its economism and insensitivity to the autonomy of culture.² Following in the Frankfurt School tradition, Habermas clearly articulates this view of the productivist character of Marxism. He argues that Marx developed an analysis of capitalism based on insights into the *ordre naturel* of production, which not only reduced social to natural categories, but also eliminated culture and communicative rationality as independent forces that shape history and society.³

Like the criticisms of the economistic character of socialist theory formulated by Durkheim, the Frankfurt School critique can easily be transferred to revolutionary syndicalism and the proletarian public sphere.⁴ A metaphysic of labor remained a central motif for syndicalists from Pelloutier and Sorel through Merrheim. Further, critics note an array of reductionist tendencies associated with the concepts of labor and class. As the deconstructionist Scott argues, "foundationalist" conceptions of labor and class had a strong masculinist bias, reinforcing the exclusion of women from the labor movement. Habermas joins Cohen and Arato in arguing that radical labor movements like syndicalism advocated a "dedifferentiation" of society. Such movements wished to abolish the achievements of liberal democracy, including individual rights, parliamentary government, and the like in the name of a utopian and conflict-free communism which did not recognize the legitimacy of minority perspectives or the necessity of institutionalized democratic procedures for resolving disputes.⁵

These criticisms have much truth to them. Revolutionary syndicalism's *ouvriérisme* had exclusionary and reductionist tendencies, which inflected the movement's view of class struggle, opposition to independent state and parliamentary initiatives, advocacy of direct action, the general strike, and the efficacy of active minorities. Yet, as critics of the Adorno/Habermas position note, the Frankfurt School itself tends toward a reductionist analysis. The Frankfurt School underestimates the range of traditions informing the laborist vocabulary, dismisses the

normative potentialities of the discourse of labor, and ignores the social and cultural context in which an *ouvriérisme* arises and subsists.⁶

Both Habermas's and his critics' arguments must be taken seriously, for a critical yet historically sensitive analysis of the labor metaphysic can help make sense of revolutionary syndicalism and the language of labor in France. In developing its vision of the possibilities of modernity, fin-de-siècle revolutionary syndicalism welded the disparate traditions of the proletarian public sphere into a sometimes-inchoate version of labor republicanism. Its emphasis on decentralized, democratic participation, critique of capitalist egoism, and fear of bureaucracies and the potentially corrupting power of economic and political centralization complicated its class vision. Revolutionary syndicalism offered an alternative, though rather weak and not well articulated, both to neo-corporatist bargaining and to the Marxist model of large-scale industrialization.

Moreover, the revolutionary syndicalist conception of labor was not all of one piece. Productivist tendencies had existed within the French discourse of labor since its inception and were especially pronounced in the Marxist Parti Ouvrier. Yet syndicalist productivism was circumscribed by more normative and expressive versions of the labor metaphysic, which led toward concerns with overcoming alienation, instituting some form of democratic workers' control, and pointed toward the possibility of a culturally sensitive social republicanism. The vicissitudes that characterized the syndicalist movement throughout the Belle Epoque and into the postwar era were intimately tied to its changing conceptions of labor and the work process. Syndicalists did not merely accept *tout court* the assumptions of increasing economic concentration and the inevitability of a consumption-oriented society that were emerging in the liberal public sphere. Such beliefs did come to characterize the CGT by the eve of World War I, but they had to displace themes associated with decentralized labor republicanism.

However, though revolutionary syndicalism radically critiqued the Third Republic, it implicitly shared much of the same epistemological terrain, for labor militants assumed an orderly, stable world that workers could qualitatively change according to their will. While positivism tended to eliminate agency in favor of a lawlike objectivity, it did not problematize the subject/object relationship. The expressive *ouvriérisme* of syndicalism returned the acting subject to prominence, but it too assumed an unproblematic and stable relationship between a creative agent (the worker) and object (society). This vision of a stable social world linked syndicalists to Durkheim and other social scientists. Their

worldview was reinforced by the ethical, organic, and increasingly medicalized cultural climate of the Belle Époque, as issues such as the French fertility rate and fear of immigrants were expressed in the widespread vocabulary of decadence and Bergsonian *élan vital*.⁷ Only when the sense of this organic world and the unproblematic relationship between a creative working-class agent and the social world broke down in favor of a flattened, homogeneous view of social evolution did syndicalism adopt a fully productivist perspective.

This chapter maps out the conceptual vocabulary of the fin-de-siècle revolutionary syndicalist perspective, especially its metabolic vision of labor, and its view of the worker and the *patron*. Revolutionary syndicalism had to develop its orientation in the face of socialist, Marxist, and positivist competitors within the CGT. Further, like Durkheim and the solidarists, revolutionary syndicalists confronted the problem of creating a theory and practice of social solidarity that was scientific, moral, and democratic, though of a particularly *ouvrieriste* slant. The writings of Pelloutier, Sorel, and revolutionary syndicalist leaders will be examined in this context. The conflicts that would later arise between popular activists and technical intellectuals in an emerging “political field” (in Bourdieu’s terms) were not yet apparent among the early leadership, for the proletarian public sphere was still rather undifferentiated in the late nineteenth century. However, as revolutionary syndicalism proved unable to integrate the theoretical issues raised by the rise of mass communications, transportation, an international economy, and other “systemic” trends, the conflict between democratic and productivist tendencies grew more pronounced after 1908.

In the wake of the Waldeck-Rousseau law of 1884 allowing workers to form unions, the proletarian public sphere became a site of conflicting parties and labor organizations fighting for the allegiance of workers. Splits occurred between revolutionary anarchists and reform-oriented socialists, as well as within the socialist movement itself. French socialists were able to unite in 1905 in the context of the political crisis of the Dreyfus Affair, after disputes between Marx and Bakunin and Proudhonists and Blanquists had begun to fade.⁸

Though Guesdists and socialists led by Jaurès united, splits over several issues remained. Philosophically, Jaurès’s and later Blum’s moral idealism differed from Guesde’s strong Marxist materialism. Jaurès tried to incorporate Marxism into the heritage of eighteenth-century French rationalism and republicanism. Like Marx, he saw the workers as the vanguard class in modern society, destined to supplant the bourgeoisie.

Fearful of Guesde's authoritarian tendencies, his Marxism was tempered with a strong republican and democratic emphasis, and he advocated a synthesis of democracy and socialism.⁹

There were also more pragmatic differences in the *Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière* (SFIO). Having little base in the CGT, Guesdists differed from other socialists such as Jaurès in advocating more control over unions rather than respecting their autonomy. The entry of Millerand into the French government in 1899 also precipitated a continuing discussion of whether socialists should participate in "bourgeois" governments.¹⁰ Moreover, the SFIO had wings consisting of followers of Gustave Hervé, who called for an insurrection and vehemently opposed the Republic, and reformists such as Albert Thomas, who favored incremental gains through legislation favorable to workers. Jaurès's ability to create coalitions and consensus in large part allowed these disparate tendencies to come together under the Socialist Party rubric.¹¹

One of the major differences between socialists and revolutionary syndicalists concerned the former's support of the parliamentary republic. While Guesdists were somewhat ambivalent about the efficacy of republican reforms, Jaurès argued that such reforms were a vital step toward the social republic. He believed that the state could contribute to social progress, for it need not necessarily reflect the interests of capital. Those on the right wing of the party such as Vaillant and Thomas saw republican social legislation as an indispensable basis for universal social rights that were necessary for the working class; such a republican form of government would continue to exist under socialism. The statism of these socialists was opposed within the conservative wing by the reformism of Malon, who advocated municipal, decentralized socialism.¹²

A vibrant consumer movement, divided between socialist and moderate republican wings, further complicated the allegiances of those in the proletarian public sphere. Influenced by the anarchist Jean Allemane, socialist consumer organizations were the fastest-growing cooperatives in the early twentieth century. They joined French socialism and syndicalism in critiquing capitalist exploitation, emphasizing the centrality of class antagonism, and advocating the goal of a social republic. Socialist consumers argued that the control of the exchange of goods meant command over the labor process.¹³

Given the array of different groups within the late nineteenth-century proletarian sphere, many workers believed that socialist parties and consumer groups were simply self-interested political forces. Accordingly, the CGT stressed proletarian independence from all political groups.

Deriving immediately from the many grass-roots strikes of 1878–1880 and a strong anarchist heritage, and embracing the Marxist notion of class struggle, revolutionary syndicalists attempted to create a union structure which promoted a “pragmatic of direct action.” They drew on a strong sense of autonomous worker culture expressed in an *ouvrier* argot, especially prominent in strikes, that distrusted hierarchy and stressed the hatred of exploiters while often advocating violence.¹⁴ Two organizational forms developed as the workers’ movement crystallized. The Bourses du Travail grouped together all unions within a particular region, while the CGT, created in 1895, organized unions of the same trade or industry into a national federation. The Bourses united with the CGT in 1902. Like the strike leaders that had preceded them, most CGT militants tended to be cultivated but self-taught, refractory to most forms of authority, advocates of free workshops, and, contra Proudhon, ardent defenders of sexual liberty.¹⁵ The CGT represented workers as courageous, autonomous agents who were catalysts for social change.

Such themes were expressed in syndicalist imagery. For example, writing of a mine collapse in Cransac, the syndicalist and miner Georges Dumoulin evoked the potential horror of the mineshaft, the often bleak situation of the miner, and the courage of the worker in confronting these conditions. In his words, “The mine was on fire, the coal slowly consumed itself, emitting its noxious gas.” Brave miners, many of them CGT members, descended into “the conflagration,” into “the flames and the murderous gas,” attempting to save the productive capacities of the mine, asking only that their loved ones be taken care of if they died.¹⁶ Dumoulin’s description portrayed the miner as carrying on the elemental struggle with nature akin to the Hegelian slave in the master/slave dialectic; the miner’s forceful and palpable corporeality corresponded well to a syndicalist movement imbued with organic and military imagery. As with workers in the construction and railway industries, the miner’s sweat, dirt, and very physicality seemed to radiate the virile, masculine militancy that underlay revolutionary syndicalism.¹⁷

This view of the miner was symptomatic of revolutionary syndicalism’s belief that solidarity was not grounded in the polity, but in the shared possession of manual labor.¹⁸ This organic, expressive, and generative view of labor was well captured in Thierry’s ode to work:

this profound knowledge obtained by workers by means of their labor; this incomparable reality of sweat and pain, of matter and tools, of intelligence incorporated into force . . . this profound communion of a kiss between man and the earth; this mystery whereby the hero embracing nature engenders a second nature, a society capable of justice . . . Civilization and Labor are the same.¹⁹

For Thierry, the "mystery" of labor provided the cultural and natural resources necessary for workers to build the coming egalitarian community. This heroic, sensual, powerful worker became part of revolutionary syndicalist mythology. In this context, the language of social republicanism supplied critical categories of corruption and virtue.²⁰ Organic metaphors also lent a concrete dimension to this ethical view of labor as a self-formative process, through which mankind humanized nature, changed itself, and created a new culture. As part of the organic world, labor had an irreducible, qualitative dimension that outstripped attempts to homogenize it into an interchangeable element in a uniform division of labor.²¹

While revolutionary syndicalists mobilized organicism to promote social change, the predominance of biological metaphors in the public discourse of the nineteenth century often encouraged a seemingly "natural" approach to social relations. A paternalist sensibility of family, shared traditions, and the like had been part of this organic nineteenth-century world, used by capitalists and followers of Le Playian social science to justify the hierarchical organization of the workshop.

During the Third Republic this paternalistic imagery declined, though organic metaphors were still very much a part of the Belle Epoque's conceptual vocabulary.²² However, these biological metaphors were no longer used primarily by conservatives to defend a predemocratic, "natural" way of life. Rather, they were mobilized in the context of the modern themes of democracy and science. The organic positivism of government officials and social scientists of the Belle Epoque justified an important role for educated elites in the Republic. Their public discourse often assumed that *le corps social* naturally differentiated into mutually interdependent functions; the republican elite was likened to a social brain that was necessary to coordinate these new social components. Elites rationalized *la foule*, just as the brain controlled the body. Concepts borrowed from biological sciences, such as milieu, equilibrium, and function, pervaded social science discourse.²³

Fin-de-siècle syndicalists and republicans shared a language of degeneration, decadence, and energy, informed by a conceptual universe filled with organic metaphors. Though their diagnosis of the ills facing France often differed, they both believed that *la patrie* confronted problems of external competition and internal turmoil. Organic metaphors gave the discussion of these issues an almost tangible quality. Even the anti-positivistic vocabulary of energy characteristic of figures such as Bergson was a part of this organic universe, for the naturalness of *élan* pointed to the possibility of an intuitive grasp of these vital forces.²⁴

Syndicalist discourse freely utilized such organic imagery. Typical was Griffuelhes's description of syndicalism as a movement in perpetual motion. In his words,

Worker action is like the earth revolving around the sun. Gravitation occurs therefore from a movement that the earth makes on itself: it is in everyday movement that worker action develops and marks its progress. This progress is not consequently, in my eyes, the expression of a science or of a formula, but the result of continuous efforts.²⁵

This biological imagery intersected with the metaphors of war and battle that syndicalists used in describing class struggle. The martial spirit was an important component in the republican virtue tradition that informed revolutionary syndicalism.²⁶ Further, Reddy argues that militaristic imagery grew in the nineteenth-century worker movement as employers imposed discipline on workers, creating a workplace replete with military significance, similar to a prisoner-of-war camp. Workers responded not only with strikes, but with a valuation of honor and courage in the face of *les bagnes*.²⁷ Yvetot tied the dignity of labor and the workers' desire for independence to the combative spirit of the proletariat.²⁸ Syndicalists could "conquer" the capitalist through engaging in a "battle" which demanded great sacrifice.²⁹ Militants often outlined preparation for battle and for the general strike in similar terms. The syndicat was frequently described as "an organization for battle, of defense against capital, of preparation for the great idea of the general strike . . . these are its arms of combat."³⁰ Finally, martial imagery informed the famous Charte d'Amiens of 1906, the Bible of the CGT. Class struggle was the dominant theme of the Charte, which depicted workers "in revolt against all forms of material and moral exploitation and oppression."³¹

This organic conceptual universe encouraged a personification of the *patron* as an overweight, cigar-smoking tyrant drunk on his egoistic luxuries, a particularly popular representation in worker iconography throughout the nineteenth century.³² The syndicalist *La Voix du peuple* continued this portrait. For example, the first issue of *La Voix* in 1900 promised an intimate, personal look at specific capitalists. The newspaper would "publicize and blight" the dirty acts of the *patron*, thus inhibiting his *zèle malfaisant* by publishing stories about the poor treatment of workers. Its subsequent issues devoted much space to this issue, and this imagery was also extended to the government.³³ The evaluation of the moral paucity of the state was expressed in a syndicalist leaflet of 1902, which opposed the government-sponsored bureaux de placement, criticizing them as "sellers of human flesh."³⁴

In sum, organic imagery gave to syndicalists a vocabulary that could oppose those aspects of capitalism that destroyed communal relations and encouraged rampant egoism. These metaphors provided the movement with a language of unity; society was interpreted as an interrelated organism growing in an evolutionary manner. Energy and combat metaphors also fit in well with the syndicalist emphasis on class struggle. Finally, such imagery gave their discussion of bourgeois decadence an almost tactile dimension which provided a concrete moral component, a very clear image of right and wrong, to their opposition to capitalism.

This panoply of metaphors drawn from the organic world were shared by the diversity of groups within the CGT. Besides revolutionary syndicalists, the CGT consisted of socialists, Guesdists such as Renard, leader of the textile union, and positivists such as Keufer. Proponents of these latter perspectives were grouped together as reformists in opposition to revolutionary syndicalism. Yet many reformists stated that they had the same long-term goals as revolutionary syndicalists. Keufer claimed that revolutionary and reformist syndicalists alike aimed to improve the everyday life of workers, as both advocated labor autonomy and a decentralized economy. He also appealed to the memory of the revolutionary Pelloutier in arguing that syndicalism's foremost duty was to elevate the intellectual and moral culture of the working class.³⁵ Moreover, the initial volume of the reformist journal *La Revue syndicaliste* (directed by the Socialist Albert Thomas) posited the syndicat as the central unit of social transformation, which would work best when free of all political influences. The journal conceived of itself as an adjunct to the official CGT newspaper *La Voix du peuple*, providing a forum for the dissemination of scientific information for the labor movement.³⁶

However, unlike revolutionary syndicalists, reformists supported a myriad of different tactics to reach their goals. While many socialists advocated an explicit alliance with the French Socialist Party, Thomas endorsed "free cooperation" between the party and the CGT, in which the union was not subordinated to the SFIO.³⁷ Thomas argued that the CGT needed to recognize that social evolution demanded a "division of labor" between socialists and syndicalists, so that local and central governments could work in tandem to solve social problems.³⁸ All socialists contended that the CGT should deemphasize revolutionary rhetoric in favor of concrete reforms which could immediately aid the working class.³⁹ Despite differences at the national level, in practice socialists and syndicalists often cooperated in local political and economic activities.⁴⁰

The revolutionary perspective was able to triumph over its more reformist adversaries, in part because of the influence of small, radical

unions in the CGT. Despite the diversity of views in the CGT, and in part because of the shared moral, organic worldview of leaders of all persuasions, few syndicalists advocated a neo-corporatist perspective that stressed bargaining by large unions and corporations in the context of an activist, reformist state. In a France that was still predominantly rural and where laborers usually worked in small-scale, slowly industrializing *ateliers*, a vocabulary emphasizing decentralized unions and highly skilled labor made more sense.

In 1906 France, there were on average 4.3 workers per *patron*. By 1913, this ratio had not appreciably changed, as 90 percent of firms had less than ten wage earners and employed close to 60 percent of the entire manufacturing/industrial workforce, while 72 percent of the labor force was employed in plants of less than 50 workers.⁴¹ In contrast to the American and British working classes, greatly affected by the highly mechanized textile and cotton industries, French workers were largely concentrated in industries that were only slowly transformed between 1860 and 1914. In such circumstances, French laborers were often able to retain their skills and develop new ones.⁴² As in other European countries, machine working, iron and steel, vehicle construction, and chemicals joined the textile industry as the most centralized industries in France, though a heavy degree of concentration was limited to coal and iron.⁴³

Small-scale industrialization encouraged the maintenance, and sometimes the development, of working-class *quartiers* within cities. In small towns, artisans lived together in close quarters, and shared a common working-class culture as they gathered in taverns, dance halls, and shops in their leisure time.⁴⁴ However, such a worker culture should not be romanticized, for small-scale industrialization did not necessarily translate into stable working conditions for laborers. After 1900, economic crises tended to be more sectional than systemic. At this time unemployment became a chronic problem, averaging between 300,000 and 400,000 by 1910. Workdays and work weeks were long and arduous, and small workshops often translated into worker poverty.⁴⁵ In 1905, the purchasing power of the average French worker was 60–65 percent that of the British worker, and his/her salary less than 50 percent of the real wages of the American laborer. Possibilities for social mobility were negligible for the working class.⁴⁶

Given these problems, combined with the concentration of industrial sectors such as iron and the rise of employer trusts such as the Comité des Forges, after 1908 Merrheim argued that only a more centralized and technocratic union movement could meet the demands of the future. Yet this very future was not yet determined, and in the fin-de-siècle a

revolutionary syndicalism based on the socialism of skilled workers and small-scale industrialization appealed to many laborers. Though never articulated into a systematic social theory à la Durkheim, its major themes can be reconstructed through an examination of the work of Pelloutier, Sorel, and syndicalist leaders. They utilized the same organic vocabulary as many Third Republic elites, but attempted to create a particularly *ouvriériste* version of social theory. Like Durkheim, Pelloutier and Sorel formulated a democratic theory connecting moral development to active participation, though grounded in *syndicats* rather than occupational groups. Like Durkheim, they developed a pragmatic conceptual vocabulary sensitive to historical context, while remaining committed to a scientific understanding of social life.

The leader of the Bourses du Travail, Fernand Pelloutier, was a central figure in the emergence of revolutionary syndicalism. A journalist who passed through Marxist, republican, and anarchist phases before devoting himself to the labor movement, he combined theories of labor militancy and social republicanism into a new synthesis. He forged a vision of decentralized federalism during his tenure as secretary-general of the Federation of the Bourses du Travail from 1895 to 1901, the year of his death.⁴⁷

Georges Sorel has a more controversial relationship to the history of French syndicalism. His influence on the movement has been much debated, for he was not an active participant in the CGT. However, recent evidence shows more intimate ties between Sorel and syndicalist militants than previously believed. Best known for his theories of the general strike and proletarian violence, Sorel had influence on the movement not only through these concepts, but more subtly by way of his views on the nature of labor and invention. His discussion of science also provided an epistemological dimension to syndicalist doctrine that was only implicit in many leaders' perspectives. Like Pelloutier, Sorel helped introduce the vocabulary of Proudhonian republican virtue into revolutionary syndicalism.⁴⁸ Sorel was also a major popularizer of Marxism in France, and he shared Marx's assumptions concerning the centrality of class struggle, the emancipatory mission of the proletariat, and the necessity of creating a scientific doctrine.⁴⁹ Sorel, like Pelloutier, differed from Marx in his distrust of politics, advocacy of decentralized organization, and the pragmatist tendencies in his thought. Sorel and Pelloutier developed a democratic *ouvriérisme* which expressed an unstable mix of federalist, republican, and Marxist themes. Yet Pelloutier embraced the modern ideology of progress that so bothered Sorel, and which contrasted with the "heroic pessimism" of the republican tradition.⁵⁰

Pelloutier and labor republicanism

Drawing on republican themes, Pelloutier fashioned a federalist theory of social development and organization that contrasted with the Jacobinism of much of the socialist tradition. Continuing the communitarian populism that Calhoun sees as an important component of the French left, Pelloutier elaborated Proudhon's ideas about the importance of class difference, decentralization, and proletarian autonomy.⁵¹ He differed from Proudhon in supporting the general strike as the key to proletarian emancipation.

Pelloutier believed that capitalist economic and political institutions generated subtle forms of oppression that crushed independence and initiative. The modern centralized state not only protected the interests of the ruling economic elite, but also promoted conformity at the expense of individuality. The government promulgated uniform laws which restricted possibilities of creative self-expression in the family and the workplace. The state's promotion of the monogamous nuclear family inhibited forms of experimentation within personal relations; its protection of private property and *patron* control made work a burden rather than a joy.⁵² Unlike Sorel's austere and conservative ethics regarding marriage and the family, Pelloutier's libertarian anarchism led him to critique any imposition of "bourgeois" morality on personal and sexual relations. Pelloutier advocated the "liberation of spirits and of bodies."⁵³ Drawing on Engels's *Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, he supported the abolition of penalties for adultery, the repeal of any legal differences between legitimate and illegitimate births, and equal rights for women, including divorce by mutual consent. Pelloutier believed that a strict tie existed between capitalist exploitation and the subjugation of women. An emancipated society could lead to the freeing of sexuality and a liberated private life.⁵⁴

In a manner reminiscent of Rousseau, Pelloutier argued that competitive capitalism encouraged an *amour-propre*, an egoism based on comparisons of wealth. This narcissism stifled independence and promoted the unlimited expansion of material wants and the exploitation of public riches for private gain. For Pelloutier,

in contemporary economic conditions, which open the door to the most horrible passions, one experiences well-being only through comparison with others . . . the man who reaches it is only happy with his fortune because the masses of people who produced it possess solely an atom.⁵⁵

The creation of a social republic, "a democratic regime, founded on economic equality"⁵⁶ involved the formulation of a new culture and

morality, expressed concretely in the Bourses and in preparations for the general strike. Thus, it was necessary that the Bourses teach the proletariat *la science de son malheur*.⁵⁷ Workers needed to develop a "culture of intelligence" based on moral, administrative, and technical understanding. Such an education must not be engineered by elites who believed that the evolution of worker consciousness followed laws akin to those of nature. Rather, Pelloutier's vision of social science consisted of people grasping their role in creating their history.⁵⁸ This perspective required a cultural sensitivity that tied concrete worker action to the diversity of French social conditions and refused to emulate foreign paradigms of unionization, such as the British model of large, centralized unions.⁵⁹

Following the Proudhonian demand for the cultivation of capacities, Pelloutier expanded it into a call for an *éducation intégrale* for laborers, which emphasized intelligence over memory, the understanding of relations over erudition, and general culture over specialization. Only free discussion and unlimited examination could promote this education.⁶⁰ These tasks relied on the republican themes of independence, activity, and virility. The worker needed to "regain the consciousness of his virility and the appetite for the ideal of independence."⁶¹ Solely an *éducation intégrale* tied to autonomous worker action could maintain "the timid and fragile flower which is the love of independence."⁶² Laborers had to realize that their action

is the law of progress . . . and put into action all their capacities for the common good . . . they know their tasks: civic devotion, consciousness of their dignity, attachment to the good, the notion of justice, virtues formerly latent and smothered by centuries of slavery, now erupting from the outside, working toward the prosperity of municipal institutions and creating a current of civilization which circulates in the social organism every day and which generates heroic action.⁶³

Sorel and science

Sorel too saw the future of revolutionary action in France as tied to syndicalism. A sympathetic interpreter of Marxism, he argued that Marx's central idea, class struggle, had been severely weakened in social democratic theory and practice. Sorel believed that labor leaders must recognize the primacy of class struggle, which would in turn encourage the creation of independent proletarian institutions and the development of an *ouvriériste* culture superior to that of the bourgeoisie.⁶⁴

For Sorel, workers underwent a complete moral transformation when they became revolutionary syndicalists, for they learned to rely solely on the action of the proletariat.⁶⁵ Sorel believed that the autonomy of the

working class was necessary for the proletariat to create this new morality. He wrote, "economic transformations cannot be realized if the workers have not acquired a superior level of moral culture."⁶⁶ In such a proletarian culture, the workshop would function "without bosses." The working class would become "capable of governing itself in an independent way, of understanding its own activity and of administering production."⁶⁷

According to Sorel, freedom was only possible when people broke the shackles of determinism and created a society after their own imagination.⁶⁸ While Pelloutier did not develop the epistemological implications of this syndicalist federalist approach, Sorel devoted much attention to this topic. As Joas has recently stated, Sorel constructed a pragmatic version of science that stressed the limits of all knowledge and the plurality of methods necessary to grasp social phenomena, while placing science in the context of particular social movements and a specific historical context.⁶⁹ According to Sorel, because of our limited knowledge, there was an inevitable moment of construction of the scientific object. Sorel coined the term *diremption* for the process of abstracting a phenomenon from social reality in order to study it. *Diremption* was an artificial and imaginative creation on the part of the scientist. Because of this creativity, science resembled art. The imperialistic Comtean positivism so popular in nineteenth-century France thus had little to do with true science.⁷⁰

Sorel's 1895 critique of Durkheim demonstrated these points. Sorel applauded Durkheim's tendency to examine empirical regularities inductively, his attempts to study historical change, and his belief that customs could only be understood in their social context. Yet he criticized Durkheim's proclivity for positing essentialist social facts and his inclination to abstract from concrete social conditions by using physical and biological analogies. Sorel believed that researchers must not forget that concepts did not mirror reality. He believed that movement was very hard to grasp scientifically, for "rhythm is a very exceptional thing" in nature and social life. Rather, history and movement followed a "coming and going," more akin to a whirlpool than a determinate evolutionary process.⁷¹ In an ever-changing modernity, local conditions were the major determinants of social action, and generalizations should be expressed with caution. Finally, the great role of sentiments in human activity made a science of society difficult because of the cultural sensitivity required to understand sympathetically the different conceptual and affective vocabularies which had emerged at disparate moments in history.⁷²

Sorel's reflections on Durkheim were a starting point for a broader

critique of positivism. He criticized mathematicians for equating their formulas with reality. Sorel viewed economists as the worst exemplars of a mathematical pseudo-social science. For Sorel, qualitative differences between groups could not be understood in terms of a numerical methodology; further, this latter approach tended toward a positivistic and deterministic philosophy of history. While social science could carefully examine the history and the relative importance of revolutionary forces, it could only formulate tentative hypotheses about the future. Thus, rigorous science was of little help in forecasting, for "we can only have *indeterminate* views about the future, which can be expressed solely in the language of artistic imagination."⁷³ For Sorel, science was not a transcendental form of knowledge, but intimately tied to social circumstances and social movements.

Sorel, Pelloutier, and labor

Sorel also assimilated Bergson's vitalism and emphasis on creativity into his opposition to a scientific positivism. However, Sorel tied creativity to concrete labor, science, and art, rather than to Bergson's abstract subjectivity. For Sorel, the unity of science, labor, and art would take place in a new workers' culture. Though Sorel did not believe that work could ever become playful, his vision of modern skilled labor involved both scientific and aesthetic elements, and dovetailed with Pelloutier's views of labor. For both authors, as for Vico and Marx, knowledge largely derived from the process of making, whether in developing ideas or in laboring on nature.⁷⁴

Pelloutier's speculations about unalienated labor demonstrated the merging of republican ideals of virtue and independence with the realm of work. He developed a theory of unalienated labor in a future "free society" remarkably similar to that of the young Marx and to the society of free producers advocated by Bakunin. An egalitarian workplace, and a fair distribution of the workers' products, would result in *travailleurs* "knowing that their effort will be rewarded; that they will receive the whole of the product of their labor; that ease will replace misery."⁷⁵ Such a social organization of labor would satisfy the anarchist and communist dream of "a redistribution so equitable that each can enjoy the whole of the fruits of his labor, the production of these fruits having no limit other than the full satisfaction of needs."⁷⁶

To "affirm the force of personality," the activity of work itself would become a creative, aesthetic act, transformed from a burden into an art. For Pelloutier, militant workers

dream of free workshops where authority will have been replaced by the personal sentiment of one's duty . . . workers, after for so long believing themselves condemned to the status of a machine, wish to become intelligent beings, to be simultaneously the inventors and the creators of their work.⁷⁷

Only this situation would lead toward "perfect blossoming of the individual."⁷⁸ Skilled work in the context of "free associations" was a major arena of human self-fulfillment and creativity.

Sorel too saw the future of society grounded in the "ethics of the producers."⁷⁹ His view of labor went beyond that of Pelloutier, explicitly incorporating technological progress into a new vision of skilled work. Neither Pelloutier nor Sorel believed that laborers should oppose the introduction of machinery into the workplace. Sorel thought that the progress of *machinisme* was one of the few social processes akin to a natural law, and worker opposition to it was necessarily reactionary.⁸⁰ Yet this emphasis on technological development at least potentially contradicted the critique of alienated labor so important to Pelloutier. As many later commentators have argued, technology could diminish opportunities for rich, satisfying labor.⁸¹

One major aspect of Pelloutier's and Sorel's implicit solution to the potential problems posed by technology emphasized the particular small-scale pattern of French economic development, and the corresponding federalism of the Bourses. They believed that working-class decentralization as embodied in the Bourses harmonized with the local spirit and decentralized economy in France, while providing a counterweight to the centralizing Jacobin tendencies of the French left. Labor and technology would necessarily be embedded in small-scale workshops. According to Pelloutier, the Bourses represented the best of the federalist tradition, while for Sorel they effectively limited any over-centralization of authority.⁸²

This view of small-scale economic organization did not specifically address how technology would interact with labor in the workshop. Pelloutier in particular did not speak extensively to this issue. Sorel's perspective on this question would prove to be very influential in later syndicalist doctrine. For Sorel, a federalist society without masters demanded a superior level of aesthetically informed work. Technology actually encouraged such labor, promoting processes of reskilling.⁸³

According to Sorel, work in the modern world was becoming "more intense and more absorbing."⁸⁴ The manufacturing process and the growing complexity of technology required workers to continually revamp their understanding of machinery and work.⁸⁵ In such a context,

the worker was similar to the artist and the inventor, for all needed to master new techniques and innovate constantly, while creating models which helped illuminate the world in a novel way. Sorel criticized the equation of technical progress with monotony, instead tying labor to an aesthetic, imaginative, and poetic moment, where the inventor, like the modern skilled laborer and the artist, engaged in creative freedom. For Sorel, the laborer did not "drift into automatism" in modern work, but developed new, professional skills as technology advanced, reaching a "method of reasoning that is concrete, individual, and therefore rapid." The free producer would constantly improve production, while experimenting with new methods of work.⁸⁶

Sorel believed that many economists, including Marx, had mistakenly taken the incipient mass production of the textile industry as a model for the nature of labor under capitalism. They assumed that modern industry entailed an equalization of work, what Marx called abstract labor and Sorel "despecialization." Such views posited a homogeneous, uniform labor undergirding the entire capitalist economy. For Sorel, such a quantitative redefinition of labor was an error, for the skills of different occupations were not reducible to one abstract, calculable standard. Sorel believed that the specialization of occupations actually encouraged the ever-increasing development of skill.⁸⁷

For workers to achieve the requisite level of skill in modern industry, an aesthetic education was necessary. Such training had to avoid rote exercises and develop the judgmental qualities of workers. Aesthetic education would help laborers realize "that economic relations are not exactly reducible to quantitative ones, that life is not equivalent to mathematical calculations and that the law of cost accounting does not govern the world rigorously."⁸⁸ Art would ennoble labor, encouraging a love of work among *ouvriers*, challenging them to make better products in greater numbers. As the cultivation of mind and the learning of a trade progressed together, manual work could become the equivalent of a creative science, for trades would require skill while promoting dignity. Art would help ensure moral and material progress, becoming "the means by which the worker will understand the infusion of intelligence into manual work."⁸⁹

Thus Sorel, like the critical theorist Walter Benjamin, believed that modern technology could fuse with art, creating a more democratic and aesthetically pleasing workshop. Work was a noble struggle to impose form on a recalcitrant nature, akin to an art; modern technology only transformed the aesthetic nature of work, creating more psychological complexity and replacing strength with skill. Sorel believed that the

worker could never subdue nature. The socialist fantasy that the postrevolutionary society would be based on increased consumption and leisure only undermined the *ouvriériste* ethic necessary for moral transformation.⁹⁰

In sum, Sorel believed that modern industry promoted a type of aesthetic reskilling. Further, Pelloutier's and Sorel's criticisms of capitalism reiterated several republican themes within a working-class context. They were concerned with establishing the institutional, intellectual, and moral conditions for the rise and maintenance of public-spiritedness, defined in terms of worker solidarity. For Pelloutier in particular, a corrupt government and capitalist private wealth inhibited the development of such conditions, and facilitated a personal competitiveness that made the realization of virtue difficult if not impossible. The Bourses could create a "state within a state,"⁹¹ providing the necessary coordination and centralization of information while encouraging direct action and local self-government. As the left wing of the democratic spectrum in France, Sorel and Pelloutier tied expressive labor to the maintenance of moral solidarity and a free workshop. They did not posit the inevitability of a consumption-oriented society, as their skepticism about a scientifically deterministic history helped them to retain a faith in small-scale economic development and an *ouvriériste* ethic. Like Durkheim, their historically sensitive republicanism linked moral development to participation in organizations grounded in civil society.

Later revolutionary syndicalists built on Pelloutier's labor republicanism and Sorel's approach to skilled labor. Following Pelloutier's death, Yvetot became secretary-general of the Bourses du Travail, with Delesalle as his assistant. Griffuelhes was elected secretary-general of the CGT in 1901, and he chose Pouget, editor of *La Voix du peuple* since its inception in 1900, as his deputy. With the merger of the Bourses and the CGT in 1902, these four men became the leaders of revolutionary syndicalism. All came from anarchist backgrounds, except the Blanquist Griffuelhes.⁹²

Syndicalist organization and discourse initially mirrored the principles of Pelloutier and Sorel. Leaders emphasized the diversity of conditions that characterized different occupations, for "the life of the worker, image of the life of the workshop, is too complex and diverse to lend itself to an arbitrary regulation."⁹³ Delesalle saw the CGT leadership as merely coordinating the local efforts of unions. He even initially opposed the merger of the Bourses and the CGT in 1902, fearing the "unitary centralization" that it could entail. In opposition, he called for "decentralization of . . . the greatest number of directing groups."⁹⁴

The CGT thus was organized according to federalist principles. It appealed to artisans and factory workers throughout France, though 30 percent of its prewar membership was concentrated in the Paris region.⁹⁵ After 1902 the CGT mandated that every syndicat had to join both a national federation of their trade or industry and their local Bourse du Travail. The Bourses and the Federation of Trades/Industries each had their own central committees, elected by member organizations on the basis of one delegate for each industrial/trade federation or Bourse. These two committees formed the Confederal Committee, the national organization of the CGT. Each local syndicat had complete autonomy regarding most important issues, including its particular organizational form and whether or not to strike. These local unions tended to follow principles of direct democracy and freedom of action. Many syndicates had a small number of members, allowing for the concrete intersection of rulers and ruled.⁹⁶ Union dues were very modest, which reinforced the independence of the rank and file from the leadership of the Comité confédéral.⁹⁷

For syndicalists, these organizational forms developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were not just tactically motivated. Rather, they prefigured the shape of the new society in their very structure. The initial issue of the syndicalist newspaper *La Voix du peuple* stated that self-governing syndicalist groups anticipated the society of the future.⁹⁸ The organization of the CGT had the function of teaching workers "the necessity of association, the beauty of work, and the desire of proletarian liberation."⁹⁹ This expressive desire for emancipation extended to the private sphere. Like Pelloutier, Pouget believed that personal relations should be a realm of experimentation, free from sexual conventions.¹⁰⁰

Revolutionary syndicalism self-consciously opposed capitalist and governmental institutions. As Pouget wrote, "the Confederation is not an organism of direction, but rather of coordination and amplification of the working class; it is thus contrary to democratic organisms which, by their centralization and their authoritarianism, suffocate the vitality of its components."¹⁰¹ The CGT opposed all affiliation with political parties, for mixing with parties tended to dilute the class basis of the movement. Syndicalism developed its organizational forms based in part on the trades into which they were organized. This allowed them to have a vision of a small-scale community that did not divorce the exercise of skill from the exercise of power. The Bourse and syndicat represented counter-institutions, an alternative public sphere for organized workers.¹⁰²

The syndicalist vision of a small-scale, decentralized economy and organization tied to "emancipated labor" was delineated in the Montpellier Congress of 1902, the first of the newly constituted CGT.¹⁰³ In a short essay that distilled many of these themes, Amadée Bourchet, the secretary of the federation of copper workers (later to become the first secretary of the federation of metalworkers) outlined his view of the society that would appear after the general strike. Though Bourchet clearly distanced himself from several of Proudhon's ideas, he embraced the latter's federalism. Bourchet believed that clean, free workshops and factories consisting of emancipated, unconstrained labor would characterize the future. The state's functions would be taken over by local Bourses du Travail, whose administrative tasks would intersect with a decentralized economy not substantially different from the existing division of labor.¹⁰⁴

Such a view of the future was echoed by the utopian tract *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution*, published in 1909 by Pouget and Emile Pautaud, secretary of the electricians' union. These authors believed that the revolution, occurring in the wake of strike waves, would abolish the conditions of alienated work and inaugurate the reign of free, expressive labor. New skills would be created as industry advanced. Further, such emancipated labor would allow a great diversity of occupations to exist. Craftsmanship would remain side by side with larger industries in a decentralized economy.¹⁰⁵ The distribution of tasks would be decided democratically "by means of deliberations and agreements between the working parties interested."¹⁰⁶ Workers' control would be realized in this society, for union organizations in different industries and trades would develop "plans suited to their special conditions."¹⁰⁷ Wages would be equalized among all laborers. To prevent a new hierarchy from arising, the views of worker representatives at national congresses would be closely tied to the perspectives of their constituents in their particular industry, and they would return to work after attending congresses.¹⁰⁸ Pautaud and Pouget also recognized the value of expertise. They advocated the creation of councils of scientists and engineers who would be available to give advice regarding the "scientific management of factories."¹⁰⁹ They believed that the decentralized and highly democratic organization of industry would prevent experts from ossifying into a new managerial elite.

Thus, like Pelloutier and Sorel, revolutionary syndicalists foresaw a decentralized future society in which the syndicat would play a central role in the moral and technical education of the worker. Skilled labor would not be abolished, but would in fact be allowed to blossom in the

free workshops of the future. Pelloutier compared syndicalist organization to an infant whose development was not foreordained.¹¹⁰ Sorel was more forceful in his rejection of a deterministic philosophy of history. Drawing on Marx's famous statement in *The Eighteenth Brumaire* that the poetry of the future cannot be drawn from that of the past, he believed that "*the future cannot be determined.*"¹¹¹

Small unions that favored a revolutionary syndicalist orientation dominated the CGT until World War I, despite the existence of more centralized, large unions such as the printers', the metalworkers', and the miners'.¹¹² However, though important syndicalists such as Yvetot and Péricat, president of the powerful construction union, maintained the revolutionary faith, the CGT leadership headed by Pouget and Griffuelhes gradually rethought some of the themes delineated by Sorel and Pelloutier. Julliard sees the most fundamental change in the CGT's shift toward proletarian autonomy and union power rather than revolutionary eschatology, as it grew into a broad-based workers' movement. The syndicalist leadership placed increasing emphasis on the acceptance by capitalists of the CGT's exclusive legitimacy to negotiate collective contracts for workers. The CGT also advocated concrete reforms for workers, from the eight-hour day to higher wages, and reduced its revolutionary rhetoric. The CGT leadership called for the extension of constitutional democratic reforms such as freedom of speech and association.¹¹³ The 1906 Charte d'Amiens stressed the union's political neutrality more than an active anti-governmentalism.

Yet anti-government rhetoric remained strong. If anything, in the context of the Third Republic's growing militarism and repression of union militants, leaders such as Pouget and Griffuelhes tended to be much more antagonistic toward the Republic than Pelloutier had been. They believed that the Republic duped the workers, for it created the illusion of actual participation, though power remained in the hands of the ruling class. For the revolutionary wing of the movement, reformist attempts at influencing the government through parliament only resulted in "corruption," fostering dependence on the state. According to these syndicalists, parliament institutionalized the separation of intellect and experience, power and skill, promoting interest over solidarity. Liberal democracy produced a special cadre of political experts and functionaries who were concerned only with maintaining and increasing their own power. Further, syndicalist participation in state actions would only create an aristocracy within the movement itself.¹¹⁴

Pelloutier's emphasis on the organizational function of the Bourses was complemented and to some degree superseded by a new emphasis on

the role of direct action in generating revolutionary sentiments. However, CGT leaders did not advocate blind action. Rather, they promoted action in the service of autonomy. In Pouget's words, "Direct action implies that the working class claim for itself the ideas of liberty and of autonomy instead of yielding to the principle of authority."¹¹⁵ For syndicalists, direct action consisted primarily of strikes and demonstrations, secondarily of the use of the boycott and the labeling of union-sponsored goods, and occasionally sabotage. These forms of collective action (particularly strikes and demonstrations) dissolved the dichotomies of thought and action, experience and expertise. They gave laborers a sense of their own power. Syndicalists argued that bourgeois democracy atomized and split people apart; their forms of direct action created worker solidarity, providing workers with a method of mastering reality through active participation. Sustained direct action was also the best guarantee that reforms benefiting labor would be enacted and observed.¹¹⁶

The syndicalist imagery of social change derived in large part from strikes, "the symbolic expression of worker revolt."¹¹⁷ Syndicalist experience was decisively shaped by the proletarian strikes of the nineteenth century. While Pelloutier had advocated the general strike, he had dismissed partial strikes as encouraging only a trade union consciousness. Later revolutionary syndicalists developed a very different point of view. For Pouget and Griffuelhes, strikes were not merely limited to "legal questions"; they were "an episode of social war."¹¹⁸ Syndicalist direct action provided a "gymnasium" where solidarity developed and the class struggle was highlighted, concretizing for the worker the links between individual autonomy, class, community, and virtue. Griffuelhes observed that a strike "educates, it hardens, it involves, and it creates."¹¹⁹ Like strikes, May Day demonstrations were highly participatory occasions of proletarian unity, a *levée en masse* which foreshadowed the general strike.¹²⁰

Though revolutionary syndicalist leaders saw themselves as a "conscient" elite, they stressed that the CGT could not take power through a coup, but rather must await and encourage the participation of the masses of workers. Only through collective action could workers create a society that was truly free of domination. The means to reach such a society were indistinguishable from the ends of the society itself.¹²¹

By the early years of the twentieth century, the growing CGT had made a strong impression on public opinion as well as the French working class. Many conservative elites were almost resigned to the coming proletarian revolution.¹²² Despite the historically low unionization rates in France, the CGT grew from 1,792 federated unions in 1904 to 2,399 in 1906. Strikes also increased. In 1904, 1,026 strikes took place,

almost twice as many as in 1903. During 1906, there was one striker per 16 industrial workers, as 438,500 laborers took part in 1,309 strikes with an average duration of 19 days, a record that was not broken until World War I.¹²³ May Day 1906 saw the first coordination of a major nationwide strike wave in France, with the most workers in history on strike. In the wake of these strikes, several important changes favorable to workers occurred in France. The *repos hebdomadaire* law mandating Sunday as an obligatory day of rest was passed in July 1906, and a separate Ministry of Labor was created in October 1906. Further, the symbolic victory of the left was demonstrated in Dreyfus's reintegration into the army in July, and the Chamber of Deputies' decision to transfer Zola's remains to the Pantheon.¹²⁴

Yet, after 1906, revolutionary syndicalism began to unravel. Many CGT leaders believed that the 1906 demonstrations and strikes had been a failure, for the eight-hour day was not instituted and there had been no revolutionary general strike.¹²⁵ Moreover, though 1907 also saw protests ranging from the revolt of peasants and farmers in the Midi to strikes by government workers, these strikes took a deadly turn.¹²⁶ Strikers were killed in Nantes, Narbonne, and Raon l'Etape. The worst cases occurred the next year. During a strike at Draveil on June 2, 1908, two workers were killed and ten wounded. At Villeneuve-Saint-Georges on the following July 30, a building strike left four dead and hundreds wounded.¹²⁷ For many militants, the revolutionary syndicalist perspective seemed to be endangering workers without furthering labor's interests.

These events, coupled with the rise of a new form of direct action associated with right-wing groups such as the Action Française, triggered the latent crisis within syndicalism, as the "malaise" of the movement became a topic of discussion. Moreover, disruptions in the leadership promoted a sense of chaos. Griffuelhes resigned his post as secretary-general on February 2, 1909, and was replaced by the reformist Socialist Niel, who was elected by a margin of only one vote. His reign proved to be short-lived and ineffectual. His leadership could not overcome internal divisions within the organization, and events outstripped his control. When post office workers went on strike in March 1909, the CGT Confederal Committee called for a general strike in support. The general strike failed to materialize, and revolutionary syndicalists blamed Niel for not sufficiently backing it. Police spies noted that by May Day 1909 the Comité confédéral was "not the master of its troops." Maverick syndicates had become so independent of the Comité's dictates that they refused to even listen to its suggestions.¹²⁸

Niel resigned on May 26, 1909, and Jouhaux succeeded him in July. Though handpicked by Griffuelhes, Jouhaux, with the help of his comrade Merrheim, would lead the CGT in a direction unforeseen by the revolutionary wing of the movement. Despite Jouhaux's leadership, the CGT was in continual crisis after 1908, which was exacerbated by World War I and the Russian Revolution.

Thus, beginning in 1906–1908, the revolutionary syndicalist movement began to splinter, and was eventually replaced after World War I by communist and reformist unions which advocated economic centralization, rationalization, and large-scale bureaucracy. As discussed in chapter 2, historians view governmental repression, economic changes, and internal infighting as combining to undermine revolutionary syndicalism. Indeed, such factors were clearly at work, for the government became increasingly hostile toward the radical wing of the CGT with the rise of Clemenceau's ministry in 1906 and the decline of the solidarists after 1910. Economic concentration and the rapid deskilling of workers were occurring in some industries. Revolutionary syndicalists also faced competition from socialists and the conservative union, *les Jaunes*. Finally, within the CGT, socialist, Guesdist, and positivist currents became more powerful.

The CGT and modernity

Most historians believe that the revolutionary, decentralized orientation was destined to fail, to be replaced by more rationalized, large-scale, reformist or communist unions. Interestingly, these analyses of revolutionary syndicalism imply a conception of social change that intersects with Habermas's, Giddens's, and Touraine's broader theoretical approaches to modernity discussed earlier. These perspectives converge on the view that a "premodern" labor movement ineluctably gave way to a form of inter-class neo-corporatist bargaining (in Maier's terms), in the context of structural changes that resulted in a refeudalization of the public sphere (for Habermas). Though Habermas and Maier date this transition anywhere from the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, they recognize that throughout the West this era saw the acceptance of rationalization and productivism within the labor movement, and the decline of parliamentary power.¹²⁹ Habermas and his compatriots such as Cohen and Arato, especially, view the evolution of a self-differentiating system as responsible for the demise of movements such as revolutionary syndicalism, which were the inevitable victims of modernization.¹³⁰ However, as discussed in chapter 3, this analysis is faulty on two counts. First,

revolutionary syndicalism was not a "premodern" movement. Second, a schematic evolutionism leads Habermas and many historians to neglect the possibility of historical alternatives to neo-corporatism.

Though revolutionary syndicalism often shared the Third Republic's patriarchy and fear of immigrants, it was not simply a reactionary movement. Syndicalism emerged in an already modernized lifeworld. France, a highly literate society by 1900, was the only full-fledged democracy in Europe at this time. The French economy was in no sense premodern, even if it was not fully industrialized. Tilly points out that French peasants and craftsmen were producing for a market by the nineteenth century. Moreover, the skilled workers that made up the bulk of the syndicalist movement were not relics of a bygone age. Recent economic historians have noted that the decentralized, skilled-labor basis of French economic growth captured the actual experience of economic development for most of Europe better than did the British model.¹³¹

Further, though revolutionary syndicalists opposed bureaucratic parties such as the German SPD, they did not advocate a simple differentiation of society. The distinction between the Bourse and the syndicat represented an at least implicit acceptance of the separation of administration and society. Though both were democratically organized, the Bourse discharged the many administrative and technical functions of worker organization, while the syndicat afforded a space for more "communicative" interaction.

Finally, syndicalists were not Luddites, for economic growth through increased labor productivity was a central theme of their discourse. Their reliance on a version of republicanism exemplified their ties to modernity, for republicanism is a rationalizing cultural tradition *par excellence*, according to Habermas's criteria. In Habermasian terms, syndicalists were able to reflect critically on republican themes without a reliance on dogmatic tradition; the learning processes associated with republicanism were institutionalized in the Bourse and the syndicat; and syndicalists distinguished between rational administration and communicative action, as demonstrated in the different functions accorded to the Bourses and the syndicats.¹³² Admittedly, syndicalists blurred these distinctions more than Habermas would like. Yet their revision of republicanism pointed in a radically democratic rather than an authoritarian direction. Most unions were internally democratic, voting on almost all issues of importance while eschewing private ballots, and subjecting leaders to recall at any time. Syndicalist national congresses, held every two years, were also arenas of free discussion and debate.¹³³

Revolutionary syndicalism and historical alternatives

The labor republicanism of the revolutionary syndicalist movement was not necessarily fated to disappear. Syndicalists did not face massive organized state and employer resistance, as did the Knights of Labor in the United States, for example. In fact, French social conditions may have been very favorable for the successful implementation of some version of a socialism of skilled laborers.¹³⁴ Unlike the US state, the Third Republic often intervened in labor disputes to force negotiations between recalcitrant owners and workers, while employer associations were relatively weak in France. Further, France's small-scale, skilled industry was very productive, as the economy grew at a steady rate. On a per capita basis, French economic growth rates and labor productivity were comparable to Germany and Britain.¹³⁵ French syndicalists often successfully integrated unskilled workers into their movement.¹³⁶ Finally, as syndicalism was part of the broad democratic spectrum in France, other groups, from consumers to socialists to solidarists, existed which shared at least the rudiments of the syndicalist vision. Much recent research has modified if not overturned the Marxist assumption of the inherently conservative peasantry, demonstrating that they were often amenable to leftist perspectives.¹³⁷

Yet why was some version of the labor republicanism desired by revolutionary syndicalism not implemented in the Belle Epoque? The explanation for the transition from revolutionary syndicalism to a more productivist, less democratic unionism cannot rely exclusively on the factors of hostile state actions and strong employer associations advanced, for example, by Voss and Hattam for the demise of the Knights of Labor in the United States, nor the structural factors invoked by Habermas.¹³⁸ Rather, a focus on the weaknesses of syndicalist discourse and its social and intellectual context is necessary.

Syndicalism's radical *ouvriérisme* contributed to the CGT's isolation from other groups. The movement's strong, "foundationalist" conceptions of labor and class made it wary of any alliance with non-proletarian groups, as well as fearful of parliamentary politics. To form coalitions with other groups successfully, syndicalism needed to develop its participatory and moral ingredients in a more inclusive, multidimensional direction. Further, despite small-scale economic growth in France, trends toward large-scale industrial units and the necessity of a more coordinated union organization had to be addressed. Like populist movements, revolutionary syndicalism had no real theory of social change associated with an increasingly internationalized economy, the complexities of social

integration that such changes would entail, and the new economic and political role of the state.¹³⁹ The theoretical and practical task for a revised syndicalist labor republicanism was to create a theory of large-scale organization that integrated democratic practice. Yet, in the context of an increasingly conservative French public opinion, a dominant productivist perspective within the CGT emerged which eclipsed the democratic dimensions of the labor republican vision.

Thus, revolutionary syndicalism's internal theoretical deficiencies in large part provided the space for new interpretations of labor and industrial society. After 1908, CGT leaders recognized these weaknesses, and eventually began a slow movement toward a conciliation with the Socialist Party. Further, the union attempted to ally with consumer and professional groups, especially after World War I. The second generation of revolutionary syndicalist leaders, Jouhaux and Merrheim, also provided the CGT's missing social theory. However, these leaders appealed to other groups almost exclusively on technocratic grounds, based on an interest in increasing production that they believed tied together all French people. While these leaders recognized that the CGT had to move toward a national organization and strategy and coordinate local action more effectively, they did so by elaborating a theory which eliminated any tension between democracy and centralization in favor of the latter. The possibility of qualitative change taking place in a tangible, organic world was also abandoned.

In many respects, Habermas's analysis of the inevitably productivist character of a laborist epistemology seems justified. Indeed, the doctrine of Jouhaux and Merrheim drew on the productivism that had always been part of the language of labor. Yet a Habermasian perspective neglects the extent to which productivism was an interpretive accomplishment on the part of CGT leaders, rather than simply a reflection of social changes. Further, the abandonment of the expressive *ouvriérisme* of revolutionary syndicalism took place in a particular historical era, within a changing proletarian public sphere, and did not occur without debate.

Nevertheless, by 1914 the communitarian tradition of the language of labor went underground again, not because of legal repression as in 1848, but in large part because of the new theory of industrial society developed by Merrheim and Jouhaux. This communitarian tradition would reemerge, though in very different contexts, in events such as the occupations of the factories in 1936 and the demonstrations of May 1968. By the 1970s, reflection on strains between requirements for democracy and

centralization would become a central motif for the new social movements. However, purged of connections to syndicalism because of the dominance of the proletarian public sphere by communism, these reflections often dismissed the relevance of the entire socialist tradition. Yet such theories did not address the variability and possibilities that had existed within the labor movement, nor the historical circumstances that led to the abandonment of the federalist perspective. The next chapter examines in more detail the historical context of *la crise du syndicalisme*, the differentiation of the proletarian public sphere, and the debates around the revolutionary perspective, particularly its conception of labor, that led to its reformulation in a more productivist key.

Reformulating revolutionary syndicalism

On May 1, 1911, thousands of workers took to the streets in support of the CGT's annual call for voluntary *chômage* on May Day. In Saint-Denis, following the burial of Victor Hout, a member of the masons' union, a large column of *ouvriers* crossed the city, preceded by a red banner representing the CGT and the stonecutters' federation. Several thousand laborers gathered at the Hôtel de Ville, disgustedly throwing their recently received, government-sponsored social security cards into a heap and setting them aflame. For these workers, such "pensions for the dead" were not only useless, given the life expectancy of French workers, but also represented an attempt by the government to control the proletariat by gathering information and "carding" it.¹

Thus, by 1911 syndicalist suspicions of government actions had not diminished, nor seemingly had the CGT's revolutionary *élan*. In fact, some of the demonstrations seemed to reflect a new audacity on the part of workers. Recognizing the rigid class divisions within the topography of Paris, approximately 4,000 laborers marched to the Champs-Élysées, where they were met by a platoon of *cuirassiers*. This show of force by French soldiers was not as intimidating as they had planned, for their horses kept slipping on the pavement. Delighted demonstrators applauded, whistled, and shouted "Vive le 17ème!" In the wake of these demonstrations, the CGT president Jouhaux wrote that "It is a sign of the times that workers obstructed these aristocratic paths that they dared not trouble in the past."²

Indeed, a multitude of workers attended meetings at various union halls throughout Paris, where revolutionary syndicalist speeches were vigorously applauded. CGT speakers commemorated the "bloody murders" of striking laborers at Chicago and Fourmies, lauding the bravery of proletarians in the face of such crimes. Authorities were

denounced in the familiar revolutionary lexicon as assassins and tyrants. Many references to government officials indicated that CGT leaders had if anything increased their vocabulary of insults. Clemenceau was described as an "old rogue" and an "aged, filthy carcass," Briand was castigated as the "unspeakable traitor" of the working class, and Lépine was branded the "Emperor of Paris." In a particularly vindictive article, Yvetot described the French prime minister Monis as an "old beast, dazed with ether," "an insipid snitch," and "a ridiculous Napoleon, a fantastic Nero, worthy of a flabby and pampered populace, fearing anyone who comes to power."³

Despite these *beaux gestes* and *mots dramatiques*, May Day 1911 also signaled a subtle reevaluation of the revolutionary perspective underway within the CGT. While workers marching in large, open "bourgeois" spaces such as the Champs-Élysées seemed to exemplify a growing desire for confrontation with elites, the call by the CGT leadership to congregate on the *grands boulevards* was actually a repudiation of the tradition of the barricades. Utilizing a logic uncomfortably close to that of Baron Haussmann, CGT leaders argued that demonstrations in broad spaces were the best means to avoid violence with the police and would bother Parisian citizens the least.⁴

This retreat from the barricades was a major theme of the CGT leadership in the wake of the killings at Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, for they wished to avoid what they considered to be theatrical and insurrectionary tactics that could only lead to the deaths of workers.⁵ Jouhaux, at a major meeting at the Maison des fédérations, stated that syndicalists should show *sang-froid* when facing the police, and treat soldiers with kindness. Despite the barrage of insults directed at governmental authorities, the revolutionary rhetoric of the CGT was rather subdued. The *ordres du jour* drafted on May Day did not emphasize the general strike, focusing instead on resistance to increased militarism, the adoption of the eight-hour day and the *semaine anglaise*, opposition to the social security law, and the release of jailed syndicalists.⁶ *La Voix du peuple* aptly summarized these *ordres*, stating that "the first of May presents . . . a formidable petition of just and modest demands."⁷

The abandonment of the confrontational *mentalité* that had characterized CGT demonstrations to 1909 was also subtly expressed in its organizational approach to the May 1, 1911, demonstrations. The leadership stressed discipline and non-violence, while the Comité confédéral increased centralized control over all aspects of the *manifestations*. It gave very precise instructions about where syndicalists should march and the very itinerary that workers should follow.⁸ The Comité delegated

militants to lead particular demonstrations, instructing them as to where they should go and at what precise times they should form and disband groups of *manifestants*.⁹ Leaders also utilized union cards (*cartes confédérales*) to ensure that only responsible workers participated in demonstrations and meetings. A police spy wrote that militants have “not only invented multiple controls regarding union cards, but have also come up with a visa of entry and exit at each meeting.”¹⁰ The results of this organizational effort were peaceful demonstrations and meetings in Paris – at the latter, only workers with union cards were admitted, and intoxicated workers were gently escorted outside the union halls.¹¹

The formulation of these demands and new organizational imperatives intersected with a more positive if still wary interpretation of the role of expanding technology and an extended industrial division of labor in the French economy, an issue that syndicalists labeled *machinisme*. At a meeting in Paris on May Day 1911, Henri Pasquier, a painter of porcelain dishes, recognized that “*machinisme* has taken from the worker a great part of his labor and he is frequently reduced to unemployment.” His solution to the problems raised by *machinisme* was to have the worker “one day seize the machines and the means of production for his own, and to seek revenge on the capitalist class.”¹² On the following May 1 (1912), Jouhaux echoed these sentiments, voicing the by-then established CGT perspective that *machinisme* could reduce the suffering at work if put to proper use.¹³ It was but a short step for CGT militants to praise the productive benefits of *machinisme* for society as a whole. By May Day 1912, CGT demands focused almost exclusively on issues such as more leisure time and higher salaries for workers. Jouhaux and his followers justified them with a productivist logic, arguing that the rise in consumption resulting from higher salaries would spur production. Finally, CGT meetings were very concerned with the specter of war, condemning the rise of French militarism and militant nationalism.¹⁴

The 1911 demonstrations were the last powerful show of autonomous revolutionary syndicalist strength before World War I. The CGT's rethinking of the philosophy of revolutionary *élan* converged with events and governmental actions that created a new and unforeseen context for the movement. The year 1911 also marked the beginning of what Eugen Weber has called “the nationalist revival” in France. On November 4, 1911, the Franco-German agreement on Morocco, Congo, and Cameroon was signed. Negotiated by Joseph Caillaux, the Radical Party prime minister, the accord attempted to satisfy both German and French colonial ambitions, and mitigate the intense rivalry over African territories that had developed between them. However, the French public, like

its German counterpart, interpreted the treaty as a diplomatic fiasco, a defeat at the hands of its adversary. Spurred by a strong chauvinistic right, France's increasingly nationalistic fervor only grew in the aftermath of the agreement.¹⁵

The conflicts over colonial spoils were indicative of problems associated with the internationalization of European economies. As new technologies of transportation and communication began to proliferate, business dealings and the circulation of information took on an international dimension. In this context, European governments could no longer assume that they had complete sovereignty over their internal problems. Further, an increasingly interdependent planet demanded that old concepts of politics, government, and labor relations be rethought.¹⁶

Yet in 1911 this new world order existed only in outline, and the emerging internationalist context only exacerbated a more rabid nationalism. The tensions between France and Germany that eventually led to war, the rise of a strong right-wing movement led by the Action Française, and the nationalist turn on the part of the Radical Party and its schism with the Socialists created a conservative climate in France after 1908 that was anything but hospitable to the CGT's working-class radicalism. After the Socialists merged in 1905, the new party followed the Second International's injunction to refrain from alliances with bourgeois parties. Though Socialists and Radicals still occasionally allied after 1905, the Radical Party began to move toward the right. Its policy in the face of the growing revolutionary sentiment of the CGT was demonstrated in 1906 by the repressive measures of Clemenceau. Any continuing initiatives for radically democratic solidarist compromise with the working class were overshadowed by Clemenceau's violent strike-breaking tactics from 1906 to 1908, which included arrests of CGT leaders, threats to abolish the CGT, the massive use of troops to maintain order, and dismissal of striking governmental workers. These repressive measures, and an increasingly conservative, nationalistic, and anti-German French public opinion, coincided with a rise in the cost of living after 1905. As many elites called for a new economic nationalism, the CGT's revolutionary and radically anti-nationalist outlook came increasingly under fire. Democratic solidarism also faded in this context.¹⁷

Revolutionary syndicalism's self-understanding was also complicated by the new type of militant nationalism that seemed to mimic many of its own revolutionary strategies and did not hesitate to try to convert workers to its beliefs. Led by the Action Française, this new nationalism not only challenged the legitimacy of the Republic, but also utilized

direct action in its attempt to crush its opponents and sway people to the nationalist cause. The Action Française leader Charles Maurras mixed anti-republicanism with anti-Semitism, a hatred of Germany, and an advocacy of violence. As this group became more powerful after 1908, its version of the storm troopers, the Camelots du Roi, physically attacked liberal Sorbonne professors in the Latin Quarter.

Yet the Action Française also actively supported worker strikes against the hated Republic, appealing to labor by pointing to the ostensibly superior position of workers in monarchies, in contrast to the lack of social legislation and the continued exploitation of *ouvriers* under the Republic. Its campaign to attract workers to its cause was not entirely unsuccessful, as a few revolutionary leaders, most notably Pautaud, the president of the powerful electricians' union, became active participants in demonstrations organized by the Ligue. *La Guerre sociale* editor Hervé, after his defeat at the 1907 Socialist Party Congress, converted to the Action Française's anti-Semitic and anti-republican cause from 1908 to 1911. Finally, Sorel and some of his followers briefly made common cause with Maurras, united by anti-republicanism and a critique of democratic decadence.¹⁸

Pautaud was thrown out of the CGT in 1911, and Sorel had little to do with the movement after 1909. Yet this new, activist right helped problematize the faith in revolutionary *élan* and direct action on the part of CGT leaders. Not only did direct action often endanger the lives of workers in the face of governmental repression, but the use of direct action by the Action Française helped discredit it as an exclusively *ouvriériste* form of revolt. As the Camelots increasingly took to the streets after 1908, many CGT leaders feared the role of *agents provocateurs*, whether of the government or of the Action Française, in worker strikes and demonstrations. Syndicalists increasingly criticized what they labeled as "Hervéism," or the attempts of non-worker "intellectuals" to incite violence on the part of laborers, which only resulted in governmental repression. These criticisms of Hervéism led many syndicalists to rethink their fin-de-siècle heritage, as leaders realized that direct action could not be uncritically applauded.

The rise of the Action Française had other, more subtle ramifications, for the popularity of its ideology demonstrated both the limitations and complexity of positivism in the decade before World War I. A sense of the spiritual paucity of positivism animated the Catholic revival that accompanied the emergence of the Action Française, a trend toward the appreciation of *la mystère* that could also be seen in Durkheim's turn to the study of the sacred. More radical critiques of positivism emerged in

Bergson's vitalist critique of scientism, and the rise of aesthetic modernism, especially after 1910. Post-Impressionist art such as Cubism severed the simple relationship between subject and object that had characterized positivism, emphasizing both the instability of any conception of the subject and the multiplicity of perspectives that the breakdown of the unitary subject entailed.¹⁹

However, many artists and spiritualists did not so much reject positivism as place it in a new context. For example, Maurras was in no sense an irrationalist, and he despised what he saw as the mysticism of Bergson's philosophy.²⁰ Though Maurras rejected republicanism, he pressed positivism and science into the cause of national order. For Maurras, positivist science demonstrated the "naturalness" and necessity of hierarchy, order, and stability. Democracy was a perversion of this natural order; the monarchy and its system of estates were justified by the scientific discovery of natural laws. Maurras wished to restore the monarchy to France through "reason and will."²¹ The Action Française complemented the activism of the Camelots with a positivist program which applied the findings of natural science to social life. For Maurras and his followers, the teachings of biology could inform, and indeed demonstrated, the superiority of the royalist organization of society.²²

Thus, the crisis of positivism did not necessarily mean the end of positivistic discourse, but rather, in Foucauldian terms, resulted in the proliferation of different versions of it. Maurras's philosophy clearly showed that some form of positivism was *de rigueur* for much of French public discourse, whether it took the form of solidarism, revolutionary syndicalism, social economics, or militant royalism. For example, Levasseur's economics promoted a vision of industrial society that reached its epitome in Taylorism. Although Taylorism did not achieve industrial dominance in France, as the Action Française did not reach political power, both helped create the climate for a nationalist revival based on the ideas of increasing productivity and preparing for war. As Radical Party politicians moved to the right and war with Germany came closer, a positivism concerned with questions about increasing the productivity of the French nation took center stage in public discourse.²³

This new nationalism was symbolized most dramatically by the rise of the conservative republican Poincaré to the presidency of the Republic in 1913. Though the fight over the implementation of an income tax showed the continuing power of Radicals and Socialists, Poincaré's presidency was indicative of the conservative ambiance in France. He quickly adopted the Action Française's call for a national holiday in memory of Joan of Arc, and raised the requirement for military service from two to three years.

This new conservative republicanism stressed national order, relaxed anti-clerical governmental initiatives, and increased military preparedness, dispensing with solidarist attempts to integrate the workers into the nation democratically and enlarge the contours of the liberal public sphere. Discarding the vocabularies of social debt, anomie, and the Bergsonian concern with the uniqueness of the inner world, the new conservatism had little patience with the complex relationship between self and society posited by Durkheim. Rather, in a watered-down version of Maurrasian positivism, it promulgated the necessity and naturalness of a nationalistic, disciplined social order, and readiness for battle with Germany.²⁴

Socialism too was undergoing important changes. After 1905, the number of its representatives in the Chamber of Deputies grew substantially, until the SFIO was the second-largest party in France in 1914. As the party gained parliamentary power, its Jacobin tendencies became more pronounced and it advocated nationalization of many industries and the gradual takeover of state power.²⁵ Further, as the Guesdists and the anarchists lost power in the party, their revolutionary hopes were marginalized. The SFIO increasingly defined itself as a responsible representative of socialist aspirations. Thus, its self-understanding as a revolutionary party was in doubt on the eve of World War I.²⁶

In this new political and cultural context, the CGT could no longer blithely reiterate its revolutionary slogans. Moreover, its expressive model of labor was under attack from several directions beyond Durkheimian social science and the social economists. Since the 1870s, "taste professionals" such as architects and writers, separated from actual production, had assumed increasing importance in determining what counted as aesthetically pleasing products.²⁷ Aesthetic modernism's critique of positivism and valuation of the flux of inner experience problematized the organic link between a creative agent and the external world that underlay the expressive model of labor. In such an unpredictable universe, there was no sure relationship between the learning of traditions and an efficacious skill; there was no guarantee that the latter could be used self-consciously and imaginatively to modify the world. Rather, as "artistic expression became totally subjective," artists "broke with the very idea of learned technique, of artistic skills transmitted by teachers."²⁸ For many of these artists, the complement to a fragmented subject was an abstract, meaningless, and fragmented external world. Ironically, such a vision of a flattened, objective space meant that it was amenable to Taylorist production methods, which could rationalize and quantify this meaningless and abstract environment according to the demands of capital.²⁹

The crisis of revolutionary syndicalism

The aesthetic ideal of labor that had been so central to the French language of labor seemed nostalgic in such circumstances. In fact, the ideal of the artisan was to suffer a fate much like Max Weber's Protestant idea of duty, for both lost their informing power in the modern world. Like Weber's ascetic ideal, destined to "prowl about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs," the artisanal ideal too took on the appearance of a specter. It could not challenge the "iron cage" of bureaucracy and an increasingly abstract labor; its phantom-like existence could only be faintly glimpsed in the interstices of *machinisme*.³⁰ Expressive *ouvriérisme* was gradually giving way to a conception of the skilled worker as efficient, specialized, and capable of directing the progress of *machinisme* while constantly increasing production.³¹ This new conception of labor did not develop in a straightforward manner, but had to be formulated in a syndicalist discourse of a new key.

Such ideological developments intersected with social changes that many syndicalists believed affected the very substance of the CGT's revolutionary *ouvriérisme*. Merrheim argued that in the wake of the second Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century, syndicalism faced the proletarianization of several important industries, including iron, steel, and coal, as electrical power became a new source of productive energy. He believed that the emerging internationalization of capitalism required new forms of union organization. When combined with factors ranging from the increase in the cost of living after 1905, to the deaths at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges and the unsuccessful general strike called in its wake, to a stagnation in membership, the CGT seemed to be at loose ends. Though its membership rose from 1902 to 1908, it would not exceed its 1908 membership levels until 1918.³²

Given these circumstances, Jouhaux and Merrheim engaged in a *rectification de tir* of revolutionary syndicalism, moving away from its emphasis on direct action and revolution. Unlike fin-de-siècle syndicalists such as Pouget, Delesalle, and Pelloutier, who developed their revolutionary orientation in the context of their cultural activity in literary and artistic avant-garde circles, Merrheim and Jouhaux formulated their perspectives from their work experience.³³ They directly drew on the social economist Levasseur's ideas about the cost of production, technology, and consumption, while also looking favorably on the emerging European Science of Work. Merrheim in particular developed a careful analysis of the economy, supplying the more sophisticated social theory that had been lacking in the revolutionary syndicalist perspective. Like many in the liberal public sphere, he centered his analysis on the problem

of increasing French productivity. He recognized that, for the socialism of skilled workers, "the day of the carpenter and blacksmith had passed on to the machine mechanics and fitters."³⁴ While Sorel argued that such trends would result in more and different levels of skill, Merrheim rejected this approach. Despite recent evidence which shows that France was still characterized by small-scale, skilled production well into the 1920s, Merrheim believed that a close study of the economy showed that an increasingly concentrated, large-scale capitalism was rapidly and inevitably creating a more specialized and proletarianized labor process.³⁵

Jouhaux and Merrheim were able to represent their perspective as continuing the best aspects of the revolutionary tradition, while discarding those parts of the revolutionary vocabulary that no longer corresponded to modern times. In so doing, Merrheim and Jouhaux had to negotiate their position within the rhetorical vocabulary established by the CGT and the proletarian public sphere. Despite the dramatic changes in the liberal public sphere after 1906, for most of the leadership the crisis was understood within the boundaries set by the *ouvriériste* conceptual vocabulary of syndicalism. Thus, much of the debate revolved around the nature of the labor process, the problem of creating *élan* among leaders and workers, and the role of the state in the social question.

By 1906, revolutionary syndicalist ideology had become an established orthodoxy within the movement. After coming to power, the new leadership upheld revolutionary values such as the importance of an active proletarian elite imbued with *élan*, the opposition to capitalism, the distrust of the republican state, the refusal to ally with the Socialist Party, the qualified support of direct action and occasional sabotage, and the centrality of work in society. Yet Merrheim and Jouhaux defined the revolutionary emphasis on the general strike and the organizational focus on the local *atelier* as romantic fantasies based on a fascination with the revolutionary tradition of the barricades. They redefined Pelloutier's expressive vision of labor in terms of uniform, homogeneous work, rather than developing a more culturally sensitive and pragmatic social republicanism. As did Durkheim in opposition to the literary doctrines of the universities, Merrheim and Jouhaux utilized a scientific outlook that examined the ostensible "realities" of capitalism to distinguish them from the old leadership of Griffuelhes and Pouget, as well as from anarchists and reformists. They represented a new type of technical intellectual whose cultural capital derived from expertise rather than activist *élan*.

Merrheim's and Jouhaux's technocratic theory, though having positivist roots, also differed from the reformist positivism that had been part

of the internal debates of the CGT since its inception. Best symbolized by Keufer, reformist positivism stressed moral over technical transformation. Keufer called for a new religion of humanity à la Comte, with workers cast as purveyors of public opinion rather than as producers. He advocated the creation of a group of highly educated and cultured *savants* to guide the working class and instruct it in its social duty. While Keufer opposed allying with political parties and concentrating on demands such as higher salaries and better working conditions, he did not favor the abolition of private property. Finally, his moral conservatism stressed the necessity and naturalness of hierarchy. He was especially adamant about maintaining the subservient role of women in society.³⁶

In sum, Merrheim's and Jouhaux's perspective, in opposition to reformism, championed the worker as producer, opposed class collaboration, and remained suspicious of non-worker intellectuals. They believed that their scientific and technical expertise justified their authority. In the context of a more differentiated and complex proletarian public sphere, they rethought the *élan* of the CGT in terms of an informed understanding of the complex workings of the economy. Thus, for Merrheim and Jouhaux, the preparation for revolution would entail a slow, evolutionary, and technical process in which leaders taught laborers the knowledge necessary for a new, specialized, large-scale industry.

Yet the changes in revolutionary syndicalism arose haphazardly and rather obliquely as leaders consciously reflected on a crisis in the CGT. The first debate about *la crise* began in 1908, culminating in disagreements about whether the movement had indeed engaged in a *rectification de tir*. Until 1912, the revolutionary wing had a more or less coherent interpretation of *la crise du syndicalisme*, which was interpreted in the familiar categories of revolution vs. reform. After 1912, the revolutionary consensus began to disintegrate as a second debate arose with Griffuelhes's criticisms of Merrheim, shattering the unity of *les révolutionnaires*.

During these disputes, though the narratives of industrialization subtly differed between militants, all converged on an implicit productivist epistemology. The criticisms leveled at Merrheim by the revolutionaries Pouget and Griffuelhes in 1912–1913 invoked the syndicalist conception of federalism that, at least to some degree, problematized the belief in the inevitability of economic concentration. They demonstrated the continuing influence of the fin-de-siècle revolutionary syndicalist discourse. Yet Pouget and Griffuelhes had difficulty articulating a consistent oppositional perspective to that of Merrheim, for they shared with him an

occupational determinism and *ouvriériste* positivism that saw workers' consciousness and actions determined by their place in the mode of production. For syndicalists of all stripes, such an organic connection between social position and ideology was a part of the lawlike behavior of the economy, whose most important function was to increase production incessantly. Thus Griffuelhes, like Merrheim, defined the syndicalist fin-de-siècle vocabulary of revolution as a romantic fantasy which a realistic, scientific perspective must transcend. In sum, syndicalist leaders of all persuasions, led by Jouhaux and Merrheim, shared a positivistic perspective, as did their counterparts in the liberal public sphere.

After 1908, the familiar revolution/reform debate was joined by a more subtle discussion of the necessity of the centralization of the CGT, the nature of skilled labor, and the future countenance of capitalism and industry. *La crise* was initially raised in the context of the "crisis of apprenticeship" in France and the appropriate syndicalist response to it. The crisis of the CGT itself was addressed shortly thereafter, as syndicalists attempted to understand the problems confronting the movement.

Apprenticeship and labor

The nature of apprenticeship in the modern economy became a central forum for the airing of assumptions about the industrial future of France. Apprenticeship began to decline throughout the nineteenth century as *patrons* increasingly utilized specialized labor. By the fin-de-siècle, two-thirds of apprentices failed to complete their training, and by 1910, 90 percent of workers had no training outside their workshop. Many observers deplored this decrease and the associated weakening of the master/apprentice relationship, and the Third Republic advocated various remedies for *la crise de l'apprentissage*.³⁷

By 1908, debates concerning the crisis of apprenticeship still revolved around the extent to which the government should be involved in providing vocational education for workers. They were given an urgency because of the crisis of the revolutionary perspective. The discussion of apprenticeship provided the context for a major rethinking of the nature of skilled labor that transcended the reformist/revolutionary split within the CGT, though the authors of this revolution in syndicalist thought did not boldly proclaim their new approach. Many syndicalists still believed that an expressive model of labor could be realized after the abolition of capitalism. For example, the syndicalist Dubreuil wrote as late as 1913 that in a free society, "each worker, being able to become an 'artist,' will work with love for an infinite progress."³⁸

However, in the more distanced, seemingly objective language that accompanied the rise of the productivist sensibility, this expressive view of labor faded as critics dispassionately discussed the implications of industrialization for syndicalism. The revolutionary syndicalist Delesalle was an important figure in this reevaluation of labor. Delesalle, like Merrheim, generalized his interpretation of the trends in the metal-working industry to the capitalist economy as a whole (he was a mechanic). For Delesalle, like his comrades Dret and Lauche, the increasing specialization of tasks dictated by an advanced division of labor in the metal industry adumbrated the industrial future for the French worker. In his words, "That which was hammered on the anvil is stamped today on the pestle." Workers might long for the artisanal labor of the past, but "the development of *machinisme*, and also the division of labor . . . is nevertheless progress."³⁹

Delesalle put the best possible face on this new industrial order, arguing that it had not diminished the professional status of the worker, but simply transformed it. Like Sorel, he argued that the modern workplace still demanded strong but now different qualities from laborers. But he quickly discarded Sorel's aesthetic interpretation of labor; any versatility that the new laborer might require had to be subsumed to the increasingly standardized exigencies of productivity.⁴⁰ According to Delesalle, contemporary workers no longer needed to control the entirety of their labor nor realize its connection to the whole of the labor process. Rather, *modern industry demanded that the worker be able to produce a great number of goods quickly*. In a way reminiscent of Durkheim's discussion of work in *The Division of Labor*, Delesalle argued that specialization in a particular task was the best means to realize this new, quantitative definition of skill. He went on to criticize the professional schools advocated by some republican elites as outmoded, for learning traditional skills actually made workers unfit for the rapid production of modern industry. Delesalle believed that syndicalism rather than the state should have the major role in this new industrial education, teaching workers their necessary specialization at the point of production.⁴¹

Thus, this new interpretation of skill subtly reformulated the fin-de-siècle revolutionary perspective. Delesalle in particular redefined labor in abstract, homogeneous terms. He reduced the multifaceted nature of skill to the ability to produce quickly, abandoning Sorel's definition of labor as a qualitative, artful encounter with nature. In so doing, Delesalle and his compatriots ignored Sorel's warning that the movement of history and social life was not analogous to the laws of the physical world.⁴²

The miner Dumoulin was one of the few syndicalists at this time to

criticize the "excessive division of labor" of modern industry. Yet he saw this problem resulting from exploitation, destined to disappear with the abolition of capitalism.⁴³ The power of this new productivist argument linked reformists and revolutionaries. Though many reformists were more concerned than revolutionaries with retaining a skilled labor force, they too adapted to what they perceived to be the new economic reality. Drawing on some of Delesalle's arguments, Keufer gave them a reformist twist. Though Keufer stated that the revolutionary wing of the movement had been irresponsible in advocating strikes and direct action, blaming it for the syndicalist crisis, he too embraced, if somewhat more conservatively, the productivist cause.⁴⁴

Merrheim and revolutionary syndicalism

It took Merrheim to elaborate these themes systematically into a new version of revolutionary syndicalism. Supported by a nucleus of militants that would shortly create the journal *La Vie ouvrière* (founded by the journalist and teacher Pierre Monatte in 1909), Merrheim attempted to appraise syndicalism of *les réalités positives* of capitalism. In close collaboration with the historian and economist Francis Delaisi, who in turn took many of his ideas from the social economist Levasseur, Merrheim's analysis of the crisis of apprenticeship was part of an emerging theory of modern society. For Merrheim, the crisis of apprenticeship was intimately bound to the nature of industrialization, which he believed to be the master economic trend in fin-de-siècle France and capitalist nations throughout the globe. He argued that the development of large industry in France resulted in the disappearance of apprenticeship. To call for the retention of apprenticeship in the modern world was reactionary. For capitalists and government officials, the crisis of apprenticeship was in reality a ruse to create docile workers who would simply follow the dictates of their *patrons*.⁴⁵

According to Merrheim, modern industry demanded specialized labor rather than the extended, time-consuming learning of a skill through apprenticeship. Nevertheless, Merrheim, like Keufer, at best reluctantly embraced this new economic reality, for he recognized the severe dislocations that it entailed. He felt that specialized workers, separated from their fellow laborers, were less apt to protest against the *patron* than skilled, knowledgeable *ouvriers*. Moreover, large industry created even more difficult living conditions for the proletariat, doing little to reduce working hours and only increasing the separation of workers from their families.

Thus, Merrheim recognized the heavy costs of industrialization. Marshaling arguments that he would later utilize in his evaluation of Taylorism, Merrheim contended that such technologically driven economic change made workers adapt to the machine, crushing their independent thought and initiative. Increased production invariably promoted uniformity of thought and action, thus shattering the spirit of worker solidarity alongside that of free reflection.

Despite the problems of modern industry, Merrheim believed that it was impossible to revive outdated, small-scale workshops which had provided the context for traditional apprenticeship. Rather, he argued that syndicalism had to create within workers a sense of the importance of their labor. For Merrheim, honorable, noble *ouvriers* could revitalize their attitudes toward work. Though workers were oppressed by machines, they need not be so, for *machinisme* could promote a stronger, more lively proletariat. Laborers were simply unprepared for the brutal transition period in modern production. Through regaining a sense of their dignity, they could dominate the production process, breaking the power of the capitalists. Yet the worker as productive warrior had limits. Merrheim thus advocated a reduction in the hours of work, for the "productive machine" that was the human laborer needed rest.⁴⁶

Merrheim also developed a theory of the overall functioning of the French economy to explain the problems of syndicalism. For example, he attributed the crisis in the automobile industry to overproduction, which in turn led to the disappearance of small firms, the increased concentration of capital, specialized jobs, and the formation of owner trusts which controlled the market and employee salaries. Some form of this same economic logic, he argued, would occur in all capitalist industries.⁴⁷ Yet productive progress demanded that workers adapt to this new economic condition, for such changes were inevitable. Militants should scientifically examine the "facts" of industrial life, and "adapt their action to this evolution, in order to achieve maximum results." Such actions would allow syndicalists to dominate events, though they would not be able to transform the composition of the division of labor. Only a more centrally organized union structure along industrial lines could allow workers to adequately face these new realities.⁴⁸

Merrheim couched this new perspective within the revolutionary legacy, which separated him from reformists such as Keufer. Drawing on themes repeated many times by revolutionary syndicalists when confronting *la crise*, Merrheim advanced several arguments in 1908–1910 that did not in any way break with the revolutionary tradition. He believed that politicians had contributed to disunity within the CGT. Syndicalist militants

had fallen under the spell of the ex-militant Briand, and they put far too much faith in the state as a guarantor of working-class benefits.⁴⁹ Workers had to separate themselves from the governmental apparatus, which for Merrheim, following traditional revolutionary syndicalist ideology, was solely a realm of corruption. Such a "crisis of domestication" within the CGT was evident in the vicious attacks directed at Griffuelhes that had forced him to resign the presidency, and the attempts of reformists and "false militants" at the 1908 Marseilles Congress to turn syndicalism from its revolutionary direction.⁵⁰

However, Merrheim argued that *la crise* pointed to some shortcomings of the revolutionary legacy. Aligning himself with Griffuelhes, he believed that militants were too theoretical and not sufficiently practical; they were tied to the barricade mentality of the past. They did not devote sufficient attention to changes in capitalist industry. Pointing to Pautaud and Pouget's *How We Shall Make the Revolution* as an exemplar, Merrheim argued that this book reflected the fanciful desires of many syndicalists for an apocalyptic revolution rather than any realistic appraisal of the future. Unfortunately, Merrheim stated, such fantasies tended to dominate much syndicalist discourse. Only a consideration of *les réalités positives* could break workers from the seduction of these reveries.⁵¹

As leader of the metalworkers, Merrheim could convincingly argue that his union's organization and actions foreshadowed the future course that the CGT should follow. The rise to importance of the coal, metal, and electrical unions within the CGT corresponded to their increasing visibility in French industry, and seemed to confirm Merrheim's perspective. As the most heavily concentrated and centralized industries, they accounted for an exaggerated percentage of French economic growth during the fin-de-siècle. The new leadership's vision of the future made sense to many workers; combined with Merrheim's ingenious recasting of the revolutionary vocabulary into the language of an *ouvriériste* science, even opponents who sensed that something was amiss with his perspective had trouble expressing a clear alternative.

Thus, Merrheim implicitly recognized that *machinisme* entailed the passage from labor as a creative, human act to an abstract, homogeneous notion of labor (what Marx called labor power). He rejected the possibility of qualitatively changing social relations, adopting instead a homogeneous view of the social world while ridding syndicalism of a belief in a creative subject. He saw the specialization and technological imperatives of the new capitalist division of labor as responsible for this shift, realizing as well the costs to workers of this "brutal transition."

Merrheim was seduced by the belief in industrial efficiency and the inevitability of industrial progress. Though he still invoked the love of work, he believed that the small-scale context in which this ideal had been formulated had been destroyed. Thus, Merrheim essentially followed Delesalle's redefinition of skill as the ability to produce rapidly, for this new type of labor was appropriate for work in the modern *usine*.

Such theoretical perspectives pointing toward a theory of industrial society intersected with the attempts of the Action Française to convert workers to its cause after 1908, and the increased repression of syndicalist leaders by the government. As the CGT felt compelled to repudiate the anti-Semitism of the Action Française, it was forced to rethink its advocacy of direct action. Increasingly, syndicalist leaders saw Hervéism, the co-optation of strikes and demonstrations by non-syndicalists, and/or any form of irresponsible, spontaneous action which brought on repression as equally destructive of worker *élan* as governmental machinations and strike-breaking. For Jouhaux and Merrheim, the only responsible solution to these problems was greater centralized control in the CGT. Finally, this orientation was reinforced by many French elites' increasingly shrill discussion of the necessity of increased production to meet the rising German threat.

The 1910 CGT Toulouse Congress resulted in general agreement on the new path advocated by Jouhaux and Merrheim. They based their arguments for organizational centralization not on contingent circumstances, but on a theory of industrial society. Centralization of the movement became imperative, they argued, as society became more complex and *patrons* correspondingly larger and more cohesive. For example, Merrheim's many articles on the metallurgy trust convinced Jouhaux that it "dominated and governed" the region of Meurthe-et-Moselle: "They are masters of administration, of the authorities, of the ground, and of the mines," and the government did nothing to counter their dominance.⁵² The state also had become larger and stronger, requiring in turn a more organized, centralized syndicalist union. Jouhaux argued that the CGT had recognized these trends, and was on the forefront "of a strong worker movement, becoming more homogeneous day by day."⁵³

For Jouhaux, a precondition of a powerful worker movement was the continued fusion of craft unions into industrial federations, mandated at the 1906 Amiens Congress. Such mergers indicated "the influence of a current pulling the syndicalist movement toward the mode of organization by industry and no longer by craft." Further, in Jouhaux's words,

It is undeniable that this is progressive from the point of view of worker defense. It is, in effect, indisputable that an organization centralizing workers from the

same industry has a power of action superior to that of the craft union, which would group together only a part of these same workers.⁵⁴

Stronger, more centralized syndicats could better adapt to the new necessities of worker struggle and the new power relations faced by labor.⁵⁵

These beliefs were more systematically elaborated in the 1912 Le Havre Congress. As the threat of war grew, and in the wake of the 1911 defeat of the railway worker strike, the CGT demanded more disciplined action and organizational centralization. Such organizational changes were placed in a new theoretical perspective. In the context of tumultuous arguments between revolutionaries and reformists, the Congress, spurred by revolutionary syndicalists, reaffirmed the Charte d'Amiens of 1906 on political neutrality and the efficacy of direct action.⁵⁶ Yet the necessities of the centralization of union authority and an increasingly disciplined organization were implicitly accepted by reformists and revolutionaries alike. The Socialist Renard contended that this new orientation should be made explicit. In his words, "Centralization is the only form of worker organization possible in the presence of capitalist concentration, against trusts and lock-outs."⁵⁷

Revolutionaries responded with a vague defense of federalism, usually limited to advocating the maintenance of the Bourses as a counterweight to the industrial unions. However, they recognized the importance of a more centralized CGT. The typographer Francis Million and the revolutionary Péricat advocated the creation of a large, independent administrative section to handle the great number of bureaucratic tasks a strong union demanded.⁵⁸ Yvetot too advanced the argument that large, organized employers demanded correspondingly large, powerful, centralized unions, which were necessary to overcome conservative, craft-specific corporatism. Jouhaux contended that propaganda must become more centralized because of the inadequacy of local efforts. In sum, in a complete reversal of past doctrine, decentralization was castigated as a danger to the unity of the movement. In Jouhaux's words, "decentralization follows the impulsion of a purely localist or regionalist spirit, pushed to the extreme, and thus becomes a danger for the indispensable cohesion of our movement."⁵⁹

In such a spirit, the CGT streamlined the Bourses du Travail, creating eighteen *unions départementales* for all of France to replace the several Bourses that often existed in one region. This change was justified in terms of advancing industrialization. Even the secretary-general of the Bourses accepted this logic. In Yvetot's words, centralization was necessary "to the extent that industrialism will develop . . . that *machinisme* will replace certain crafts and that industries will be obliged to fuse in order to resist a fusion of *patronal* organisms."⁶⁰

By the 1912 Le Havre Congress, the notion that the proletariat must become a powerful, consolidated, efficient force in the face of capitalist concentration had become widespread. In Jouhaux's words,

If one realizes that cohesion is the essential condition which must preside over the elaboration of every great national and international movement, one will realize that it is time to finish with particular decisions . . . and to make resolutions together, which, becoming incorporated into the confederal statutes, will provide forceful rules for the future.⁶¹

These concerns stipulated that the movement examine in particularly close detail the processes of production, for the objective study of these laws should guide syndicalist action in the future. Science and technical expertise were now the major bases of syndicalist action and doctrine. According to Jouhaux, the CGT must "research the conditions imposed on the working class, in order to discern the greatest means of battle which best respond to the conditions of labor."⁶²

The break-up of the revolutionary bloc

This call for a new syndicalism was not entirely successful. Many syndicalists did not believe that the Le Havre Congress had forged a new worker unity. Monatte bemoaned the lack of *élan* among militants, and the resurgence of the reform/revolutionary dichotomy that divided the movement.⁶³ The revolutionary credentials of the Jouhaux/Merrheim leadership were soon challenged by some revolutionary syndicalists as well as Hervéists associated with *La Guerre sociale*. According to the historian Julliard, these conflicts were presaged by divisions within the revolutionary wing in 1910 between the *politiques* such as Griffuelhes and Jouhaux, who combined revolutionary rhetoric with a cautious, practical approach to CGT action, and the *violents* such as Péricat and Yvetot, who demanded continual agitation and advocated the general strike.⁶⁴ As these debates became public, they not only led to more ruptures within the revolutionary group (for example, between Griffuelhes and Merrheim), but also demonstrated the influence of Merrheim's new approach. His economic arguments gradually became the official justification of CGT actions, disarming opposition by incorporating assumptions shared by all syndicalists about science and labor that implicitly guided the movement despite outward displays of disunity.

By 1913, these simmering debates became public. From their vantage point outside the CGT, the ex-leaders Griffuelhes and Pouget saw a weakening of the very ideal of syndicalism. In their opinion, the national

leadership had become overly concerned with centralizing its authority to the detriment of local action. Such centralization, they argued, corresponded to a fetish with negative critiques of the movement and the working class which inhibited creative, "offensive" action. For example, Pouget stated that little had been done after the Le Havre Congress of 1912 to implement the conquest of the *semaine anglaise*.⁶⁵

Griffuelhes worried that syndicalists were becoming awestruck in the face of industrial concentration. In his words, "And if we ascertain around us industrial concentration – which must not be confounded with owner concentration – we must be wary of hypnotizing ourselves before it and granting it an exaggerated importance, susceptible of weakening our enthusiasm and our faith."⁶⁶ Pouget concurred with Griffuelhes's criticisms of Merrheim, agreeing that centralization and unification in the CGT had been pushed to an extreme. Industrial syndicates monopolized local unions, tying together diverse and often unrelated workers.⁶⁷ Like Griffuelhes, Pouget appealed to the better adaptive capacities of local craft unions, arguing that "it is necessary that the confederal organism have the necessary subtlety to adapt to incessant scientific and industrial transformations."⁶⁸

Building on his earlier arguments, Merrheim responded to these criticisms by invoking the necessity of union centralization along industrial lines in response to owner and industrial concentration. He associated Griffuelhes's arguments with the romanticism of the revolutionary syndicalist tradition of the barricades, which he derided as illusory. Thus, Merrheim criticized Griffuelhes's desire to maintain the localist and decentralized flavor of syndicalist unions: "It is too late to do it today; industrial and owner concentration . . . render precarious this form of organization in the metallurgy industry." Economic realities demanded that old fanciful beliefs be jettisoned, for militants must "live in reality and not in dreams." Finally, in a bit of bizarre reasoning, Merrheim stated that unified industrial unions would actually avoid problems of overcentralization by enlarging recruitment and creating a more "subtle" organizational form. In making this argument, Merrheim astutely avoided the question of the centralization of decision making over the rank and file, turning the discussion instead to the necessity of coordinating different unions.⁶⁹

Merrheim supported his perspective by again arguing that increased industrial concentration affected all industries, not just metallurgy. He introduced a new image of an authorless, technologically driven social order. Changes in metallurgy provided a taste of the future, for in this industry the specialized factory was disappearing, replaced by an

"anonymous society" spurred by the growth of *machinisme*. Particular ties, whether of owners to the economy or of workers to one another, disappeared as large-scale manufacturing increased. Industrial unions simply were the response to the complex and incessantly transformed work environment.⁷⁰

Shortly after dispatching Griffuelhes, Merrheim also had to defend himself against several radical syndicalists and anarchists who attacked comments that he and Jouhaux had made about the nature of syndicalism during the Conference des fédérations et des bourses on July 13–15, 1913. At this conference, in the wake of the Republic's extension of military service from two to three years, Péricat called for a general strike in September to protest the law. While not explicitly dismissing Péricat's demand, Jouhaux endorsed a vague protest against militarism.⁷¹ For anarchist critics, following an earlier critique advanced by *La Guerre sociale*, Jouhaux's statements confirmed their view that the CGT, under the influence of the secretary-general and his comrade Merrheim, had embarked on a reformist orientation.

While Jouhaux fudged the issue of whether the CGT should still rely on the revolutionary general strike, at the end of July Merrheim boldly proclaimed that the CGT was indeed at a turning point in its history. He argued that syndicalism had not changed its aims, but rather needed to understand them in a new context. For radical workers to make a revolution and take power, "it is necessary to conquer the mines, the workshops, and the factories and be capable of managing, directing their equipment to the profit of the collectivity," rather than relying on the magical powers of the general strike. If the CGT did not develop such strong unions, it would be overwhelmed by owner trusts, aided by the bourgeois press and government, which would turn syndicalism into just another political party.

To his critics outside the CGT, Merrheim invoked a radical *ouvriérisme*, stating that such people had no legitimacy because they did not lead the life of syndicalist workers.⁷² His views intersected with earlier syndicalist attacks on *La Guerre sociale*, whose journalists were ridiculed as "intellectuals" without any real connection to workers. Jouhaux had denounced Hervéists for substituting "irresponsible" personal, theatrical acts for real proletarian collective action.⁷³ Monatte of *La Vie ouvrière* also castigated Hervé and his colleagues as "Blanquists" for advocating an unrealistic revolution of the street, rather than a more sane "revolution of the *atelier*." Monatte argued that workers themselves should decide about the timing of their revolutionary activity. They should especially ignore professional insurrectionists such as the

Hervéists. For Monatte, Merrheim had not renounced revolution, but rather denounced the politics of insurrection.⁷⁴

During these debates, many syndicalists had difficulty articulating their position. For example, Dumoulin recognized problems in the interpretation of the movement advanced by Jouhaux and Merrheim. In particular, Dumoulin feared that syndicalism could very well disintegrate into a large, state-oriented movement. Yet his criticisms still invoked the language of progress and assumed the inevitability of a "rational" labor process, leading to increased production and consumption. For Dumoulin, labor must develop "by the taste for rational effort, for an embellished production, satisfying the needs of all."⁷⁵ Thus, Dumoulin's perspective on the labor process intersected with many of Merrheim's assumptions.

In sum, this debate showed the growing power of the industrial model, which was shared in many ways by Merrheim and his critics. Even Griffuelhes's criticisms of the leadership, centered on a notion that the economy was not becoming centralized as rapidly as Merrheim believed, did not challenge the overall thrust of the metalworker secretary's narrative of industrialization. The weaknesses of the revolutionary perspective, combined with the necessity of creating a national organization and the productivist orientation that had always been a part of the language of labor, promoted this turn toward a technocratic *ouvriérisme*. Thus, Merrheim and his opponents agreed that the capitalist economy had indeed changed (though they differed regarding the extent of this change, especially concerning the concentration of industry), and resolved that the CGT had to adapt to this transformation. Finally, except for a few adherents of *La Guerre sociale*, syndicalists tended to glorify uncritically a quasi-positivistic science, while distancing themselves from the romanticism that they attributed to the revolutionary syndicalism of the fin-de-siècle.

With Merrheim in the forefront, as CGT leaders of all orientations came to define progress as the expansion of production, they advocated more technological and organizational efficiency for syndicalism and French society as a whole. They reconceptualized skill as the ability to perform a specialized task quickly. The capacity to produce rapidly was the cornerstone of an emerging redefinition of worker control. Though not fully developed until the postwar era, this prewar vision foreshadowed a workplace which required specialized expertise that the shop floor laborer did not possess.

Syndicalists thus implicitly rejected the philosophical anthropology that had informed their earlier self-understanding of labor as a "creative, life-generating activity."⁷⁶ Such a rethinking by syndicalists entailed a

new interpretation of self-determination, which they increasingly located in the sphere of leisure. As their conception of labor became more abstract and quantitative, the laboring act was no longer defined as the essence of freedom. Rather, it provided access to the leisure realm, outside work, in which freedom could develop. Only through expanding the productivity of labor and reducing working hours, and creating more time apart from the workplace, could true freedom be realized. Thus, a quantitative redefinition of labor as homogeneous led directly to concerns with reducing labor time while augmenting production. A redefinition of the labor metaphysic did not lead to a greater appreciation of the autonomy of communicative rationality à la Habermas, but rather pointed to a more instrumental interpretation of all cultural phenomena.

For most syndicalists, the best means for such increased productivity clearly lay in the expansion of technology. Realizing the best conditions for the growth of technology gradually displaced concerns about creating a democratic and participatory workplace, and about the moral transformation that such a process would entail. The historical progression of technology became the key to emancipation. Therefore, changes in the conception of labor not only promoted a philosophy of history which conflated the histories of labor and technology, but also encouraged a vision of the future in which the sphere of production, as the realm of necessity, became a self-regulating, technological, cybernetic process, which workers oversaw. The systemic imagery of an authorless society composed of social forces began to displace the organic conceptual universe of fin-de-siècle syndicalism. By 1913 Jouhaux and Merrheim celebrated the consumer realm as the locus of true freedom, which complemented an essentially unchangeable structure of production. An instrumental social science, in Habermas's terms, the province of experts and severed from ties to historical particularity, provided the methodological key to grasping the dynamics of society.⁷⁷

The CGT and the proletarian public sphere

The CGT leadership's reconceptualization of proletarian action and the role of the militant took place in a rationalizing proletarian public sphere, which shared broad resemblances to major changes within the liberal public realm. As we saw in chapter 5, the Third Republic promoted the rise of universities and a number of voluntary organizations in civil society, creating more varied and specialized publics. The new intellectuals associated with these publics legitimated their authority on the basis of science. In so doing, these emerging elites often opposed

the aesthetic and literary perspectives that had dominated previous academic, legal, and public discourse.

As the CGT developed, internal differentiation too occurred as it became more organizationally complex. At the Toulouse and Le Havre Congresses, demands for more administrative tasks that could be centralized in the Comité confédéral arose in conjunction with this new complexity. Just as in the liberal public sphere, these changes were justified by an appeal to a new, more efficient scientific approach, which contested and reformulated the fin-de-siècle syndicalist decentralized ideology. The call for industrial federations downplayed the function of the *métier* and the Bourses. By 1913, Merrheim called for French union organization along the lines of Germany and Britain.⁷⁸

The rationalization of the distinctive "political field" (to use Bourdieu's term) of French syndicalism entailed the resolution of the antinomy of popular activist and technical specialist in favor of the latter, whose cultural capital was based on expertise.⁷⁹ As in the liberal public sphere, the internal differentiation of the syndicalist realm resulted in attempts to distinguish true intellectuals from false, despite the professed syndicalist aversion to *les intellectuels*. In both spheres, there was an increasing specialization of knowledge. Just as the individual, cultured *savant* became a dinosaur in the liberal public sphere, the notion of a worker-artist benefiting from an *éducation intégrale* which combined the best of technical and cultural knowledge became obsolete in the plebeian realm. The syndicalist and engineer Robert Louzon, for example, tried to rid the ideal syndicalist worker of any remnants of aesthetic or cultural knowledge, refashioning the *ouvrier* into a type of technical engineer. He created a continuum from technically sophisticated workers to the expertise of the engineer, all of whom were "technical intellectuals" who advanced the production process. They contrasted with "useless" intellectuals, who were simply parasites on the realm of production.⁸⁰

These new technical intellectuals were tied to an ideal of professional research. Professionalization not only became a mark of distinction; it also spurred the rise of scientific journals to spread the gospel. Two new journals (*La Vie ouvrière* in 1909 and *La Bataille syndicaliste* in 1911), joined by the reformist journal *L'Action ouvrière* in 1909, were formed largely to promulgate the new scientific viewpoint.

Within syndicalism, professionalization based on technical research also became an important symbol of status. Militants such as Merrheim were accepted as experts, justifying their opinions on the basis of positivistic insights into the functioning of the economy. *La Vie ouvrière* provided the leadership for a turn toward studying the technical

dynamics of the capitalist system among the syndicalist press. While 270 articles in syndicalist journals were published on economic matters between 1905 and 1910, the number of such articles increased to 420 from 1911 to 1914.⁸¹ Just as in the liberal public sphere, these new proletarian intellectuals did not legitimate their position by appealing to the authority of a charismatic *savant*, but rather saw themselves as a collective school dedicated to advancing the technical knowledge of the working class. Finally, syndicalist productivism legitimated a rationalized CGT organizational structure. The new experts, like CGT leaders, called for the creation of permanent positions in the CGT. They argued that the modern division of labor required an increased number of specialized tasks and a larger union bureaucracy. Consequently, as these experts demanded, more power was centralized in the Comité confédéral.⁸²

Thus, the ideal CGT militant was gradually transformed into an economic expert by the eve of World War I. Yet the proletarian public sphere still maintained a vivid sense of difference from its liberal counterpart. Jouhaux and Merrheim affirmed a vision of workers' control and the difference of a specifically *ouvriériste* realm from *patrons*, however attenuated. They advocated concrete reforms for workers, from higher wages to more access to education, that became part of their agenda of "social rights" promulgated in the postwar era. This new agenda fundamentally changed the discourse and contours of the liberal public sphere, and helped pave the way for the victory of the Popular Front in 1936. Yet the CGT downplayed its democratic and participatory orientation in its turn toward a vision of industrial society.

The CGT's path to integration into the polity followed from its productivist orientation and belief in the power of science, which the union shared with a significant part of the republican and capitalist elite. This was a discursive achievement by the leadership, as tendencies toward concentration and centralization were recast as inevitable trends grounded in an *ordre naturel*, amenable to understanding through a technical science. In its focus on proletarianized labor and large-scale industry, the CGT "advocated an ideology appropriate for a labor movement that it could not organize and for an economy that did not yet exist," as Cross states.⁸³

By the eve of World War I, the CGT supported a form of what Maier calls neo-corporatist bargaining.⁸⁴ Its new orientation could be seen in its contributions to the controversies surrounding the entrance of Taylorism into France. Debates about Taylorism were symptomatic of the new accommodation that would be reached by syndicalism and many liberal elites in the post-World War I era.

Toward a new public sphere: Taylorism, consumerism, and the postwar CGT

In Habermas's perspective, the evolution of syndicalism could be understood as part of the refeudalization of the bourgeois public sphere, as the latter attempted to integrate workers into the polity without sufficiently challenging the substantive inequalities of capitalism. This effort to incorporate labor blurred distinctions between public and private, state and society; further, the emerging culture industry contributed to this process. In this context, an overburdened bourgeois public sphere could not maintain its democratic structure, and increasingly gave way to instrumental, interest-group bargaining and charismatic politics.¹

Habermas's approach intersects with Maier's view of the decline of parliamentary power and the emergence of a corporatist society in post-World War I Europe. Like Habermas, Maier argues that European politics in the postwar era were increasingly governed by organized social forces in a more bureaucratic and centralized system of negotiation, in which distinctions between public and private spheres no longer held. Maier also sees labor playing a prominent role in the development of a corporatist society, for workers were important agents in the new system of economic management. Maier is more concerned than Habermas with specifying the concrete historical circumstances informing the emergence of corporatism. He argues that tariff disputes and cartelization among industries in the late nineteenth century created increasingly concentrated centers of political and economic power. World War I furthered this centralization of power and the decline of distinctions between state and society. After the war, governmental and economic leaders realized that the old prewar hierarchies were no longer feasible in the new corporatist setting.²

While Habermas tends to analyze the refeudalization of the public sphere in terms of structural changes, Maier examines the ideological

moment that encouraged the rise of corporatism. A developing corporatism legitimated its rule in terms of what Maier calls the interwar scientific vocabulary of stability. This new perspective attempted to rid public discourse of overtly politicized and moral issues, and the possibility of qualitatively revolutionary change, by conceptualizing social order as the equilibrium of legitimate forces. Stability allowed for gradual change, and "implie[d] a cybernetic capacity for self-correction, a homeostatic tendency to return to equilibrium,"³ in which the decision rules for public issues were based on non-political criteria such as the market or science. To achieve such a new conceptual vocabulary, the prewar positivistic organic and ethical discourse had to be transformed into a more systemic, neutral, and scientific one.⁴ Management ideologies such as Taylorism were very influential in this context, for they provided apolitical yet utopian versions of class relations and economic growth that could ostensibly resolve social problems on a scientific basis.

These perspectives seem to make sense of the CGT's evolution toward a thoroughgoing productivism, as earlier notions of the public good and the necessity of a participatory citizenry in a democratic society faded in the liberal and proletarian public spheres. The CGT advocated policies promoting a more rationalized social order, in which corporate bargaining would play a large part. However, France of the Belle Epoque was an unlikely candidate for corporatism, as Maier recognizes. France did not quickly develop in a corporatist direction because of its gradual rate of industrial growth, low incidence of industrial cartelization, sensitivity to small business, and hostile class relations.⁵ Why then did the CGT move toward a seemingly quasi-corporatist perspective by 1914? The CGT's history points to three major conclusions which modify Habermas's and Maier's analyses.

First, at least in the French case, corporatism was not a simple merger of the minds and interests of different classes. Though corporatism was glimpsed in the regime of Louis Napoleon, the liberal public sphere was never completely depoliticized or overtaken by instrumental interests. Further, even in its more corporatist version, the CGT was still radically plebeian, as it demanded some form of workers' control, a redistribution of wealth, more leisure time, and many social programs and rights for workers.⁶ The demands of the CGT, and later the communists, changed French public discourse, and were not easily and eagerly met by the postwar elite.

Second, the rise of a corporatist perspective was tied to the internal dynamics of the proletarian and liberal public spheres, as new elites came to power. Under the leadership of Jouhaux, industrial unions such as

Merrheim's metalworkers and the miners played a more important leadership role, displacing those based in artisanal production such as the construction union. In tandem with this process, a new type of proletarian intellectual tied to expertise rather than radical oratory emerged. In Bourdieu's terms, this new intellectual, exemplified by Merrheim, justified his power on the basis of the possession of scientific expertise, which differentiated him from the unsystematic discourse of previous CGT leaders such as Pouget and Griffuelhes. A similar process took place in the Socialist Party. As the SFIO redefined politics almost exclusively in electoral terms, the party, like republicans after 1848, increasingly relied "on men (only) who possessed the skills specific to that type of politics; educated individuals largely of bourgeois and notable backgrounds with legal training or 'political experience.'"⁷ World War I accelerated these trends, as Jouhaux worked with elites such as Albert Thomas and Etienne Clémentel in the *union sacrée*. Like many capitalists and engineers associated with Taylorism and the European Science of Work, Thomas and Clémentel favored state-sponsored rationalization, Taylorist production methods, and the corporatist integration of the working class.

This points to the third conclusion. Because the modernized society advocated by Jouhaux and Merrheim did not yet exist, their version of corporatism was much more of an ideological achievement than Habermas and even Maier recognize. These new leaders had to recast the old revolutionary syndicalist doctrine as romantic, and the expressive vision of labor as surpassed by history. The CGT's program presented a social and cultural interpretation of modern society that did not simply mirror the objective experiences of the working class. French political and economic concentration was only in its infancy in the prewar years. In the context of a wartime concern with economic nationalism and a rejection of revolution, the CGT developed a version of "the regime of quantitative thinking" that Reddy sees as characteristic of many socialist and labor groups.⁸ A central aspect of this new vocabulary was the replacement of the organic metaphorical worldview of prewar syndicalism with a cybernetic scientism in which classes were recast as quantitatively calculable forces in an authorless system.

Undoubtedly the theoretical weaknesses of the prewar labor republicanism of revolutionary syndicalism helped promote such an outlook, for the fin-de-siècle doctrine had no theory of systemic social integration while advocating a dangerous and utopian revolutionary approach. Moreover, CGT leaders saw concrete benefits in corporatism and productivism, from higher wages to a more secure employment situation, which the prewar rhetoric of radical class division had failed to achieve.

Merrheim, Jouhaux, and their comrades justified these gains in terms of a vision of an inevitable future based on a large-scale economy, informed by values of competence, increased production, and expertise. They accepted moderate republicanism and welfare capitalism, bolstered by a conception of universal social rights.

Thus, the CGT helped to create the conditions for a provisional attempt at merging the liberal and proletarian public spheres, separated since 1848, in a reconstituted public realm in postwar France on the basis of a version of productivist corporatism. Even the conservative Bloc National elected in 1919 recognized the necessity of a more pragmatic and technocratic approach to class relations, while the postwar Radical Party leader Herriot advocated a more organized system of *patron/worker* negotiations. Yet much of the impetus for this system came from the CGT leadership of Jouhaux and Merrheim, joined by a number of syndicalists such as Louzon and Delaisi, associated with the journal *La Vie ouvrière*. Delaisi was particularly influential, for he helped popularize the social economist Levasseur's ideas among syndicalist leaders, and was in fact charged with ghost-writing many of Merrheim's articles.⁹

The remainder of this chapter explores this productivism in more detail, through examining the rise of new management ideologies associated with Taylorism and their relationship to an emerging vision of a consumerist society. The CGT was an active participant in this discussion. Its favorable evaluation of Taylorism and consumerism, tied to the rethinking of its revolutionary strategy and developed explicitly in the CGT's 1918 Minimum Program, helped outline the contours of a new public sphere in postwar France.

Taylorism and public discourse

The outline of a new corporatist discourse arose in the Belle Epoque, as an emerging economic nationalism in the years before World War I prompted some capitalists to reinterpret their understanding of the organization of production. France trailed the economic performance of Germany in all of the new industrial sectors; this fact, combined with France's penchant for small-scale development and a stagnant rate of population growth, caused many elites to fear that France could not compete in an international market. Many capitalists looked to German and American models for improving industrial performance. Jouhaux and Merrheim shared the emerging discursive terrain centered on how to increase production in the context of the approaching war, as did an SFIO

concerned with maintaining electoral power and a socialist consumer movement beset by competition from capitalist chains. As the consumer movement fell under the influence of the reformist Thomas, it turned toward large-scale administration, and an emphasis on profits and scientific rationalization.¹⁰ CGT leaders joined in this productivist chorus, arguing that the best path for France was for technically educated workers to at least supplement, if not replace, the French bourgeoisie, who did nothing but inhibit the expansion of productive technique.¹¹

Taylorism sparked the most debate concerning issues of production. The discourse around Taylorism signaled the emerging belief in the liberal and proletarian public spheres that the future economy would involve some version of large-scale industry tied to mass consumerism. Such a theory of industrial society was bolstered by the growth of large firms and semi-skilled workers in many economic sectors associated with the second Industrial Revolution.¹² The vogue of Taylorism also demonstrated the declining influence of fin-de-siècle syndicalist and solidarist concerns with creating an egalitarian, morally solidary society through increasing democratic participation.

The diffusion of Taylorism in France began in French newspapers such as *Le Matin* and *Le Petit Parisien* in early 1913.¹³ Taylorism also became a subject for syndicalist commentary at this time, as workers struck against the introduction of Taylorist methods at the Renault automotive factories in late 1912 and early 1913. The chemist-engineer Henry Le Chatelier, Taylor's major supporter in France, argued that Taylorism, in the engineering tradition of Saint-Simon and Comte, represented the triumph of experimental science over an arbitrary approach to production. He thought that the teaching of Taylor's methods should be part of a new industrial science for the elite engineering students of the Ecole polytechnique, whose expertise in organizing production would allow them to guide the French economy upon graduation.¹⁴ Taylorism was also supported by Henri Fayol, director of the Commentry-Fourchembault-Decazeville mines. Fayol saw Taylorism as a method for achieving efficient administration, based on the scientific study of the laws of human activity. For the positivist Fayol, the laws of the workplace were similar to biological laws of adaptation to the environment.¹⁵

These men were on the forefront of a new vision of industrial authority that was slowly emerging in France. Between 1880 and 1914, paternalistic values among French industrialists were gradually giving way to a new entrepreneurial culture based on technical progress, competency, and efficiency. Taylorism was an important part of this process, for its engineering orientation stressed expertise and science. Taylorism did not

necessarily advocate the introduction of new machinery in the workplace, but rather looked to the intensification of the division of labor to increase production.¹⁶

However, French businessmen, like their American counterparts, adopted only parts of the Taylorist system. The major impetus for Taylorism in France came from engineers rather than *patrons* (Taylor was an engineer himself). Engineers shared Taylor's belief in the growing importance of scientific and technical knowledge in the production process.¹⁷ French owners, on the other hand, wished to remain masters of their workplace. They were suspicious of ceding their authority to experts such as engineers.¹⁸ Moreover, it was not until World War I that French governmental elites, especially the Socialist war minister Thomas, actively promoted Taylorism in their attempt to rationalize the economy and increase production.¹⁹

Some elites preferred the new European Science of Work rather than Taylorism. Though similar in many respects to Taylorism, this new organizational approach did not simply replicate the Taylorist single-minded obsession with increasing productivity. Rather, it appealed to the state to enact laws limiting the exploitation of the worker and shortening working hours.²⁰

Proponents of the European Science of Work, such as Jules Amar and Jean-Marie Lahy, criticized Taylorism for neglecting the physiological aspects of the worker and the workplace.²¹ Some *ergonomes* supported workers and socialists. This new perspective focused on improving the social milieu of labor and lessening worker fatigue through finding the laws determining worker output. For the European Science of Work, engineers rather than foremen should be given the prominent role in the workplace. These engineers believed that they were autonomous scientists who could use the state as a neutral arbiter of social conflict and who could promote progress. The greater productivity resulting from the new Science of Work could lead to social happiness and class conciliation.²² Social reform and expanded productivity could be based on natural laws promoting optimal efficiency, akin to energy conservation.²³

Despite these differences, both Taylorism and the European Science of Work viewed labor as the ordering principle of society and nature; all activities were related to production. Their perspective on labor attacked the expressive *ouvriérisme* and vision of worker control that was central to Sorel and Pelloutier. For these new approaches to work, the human being was a continually producing machine. They looked to science as the key to solving the problems associated with labor. A major factor in this attempted solution was the redefinition of labor in terms of

measurable units of fatigue.²⁴ This new orientation fit in well with the positivism of the French liberal public sphere and the discourse of syndicalism. In Maier's terms, scientific management created an apolitical utopia based on a shared belief in economic growth as the cure for social ills, where experts could make the decisions that expressed the common good.²⁵

Syndicalism, Taylorism, and consumerism

Taylorism and the European Science of Work also furnished a forum where the productivist assumptions of the new syndicalist leadership could be aired and tested. Their somewhat ambivalent response to Taylorism, and their appeal to the European Science of Work in opposition to it, demonstrated the force of their emerging productivism, and set the stage for the acceptance of scientific management by many syndicalists during and after World War I.

Almost universally, syndicalists initially rejected Taylorism, condemning it in the harshest terms. Like Guesdists and British and American union leaders, the syndicalist leadership saw Taylorism as the systematic organization of overwork, solely benefiting capitalists.²⁶ For Merrheim, Taylorism represented the worst tendencies of capitalism. Scientific management, like capital, "proceed[s] from the same barbarous, inhuman, indignant spirit of men who call themselves civilized."²⁷ Pouget likened Taylor to a "slave-trader."²⁸

According to syndicalist militants, laborers often reacted to this irrational discipline by rejecting the introduction of machines and any improvements in production. Such attitudes developed because capitalism had crushed their dignity and morality, violating "the natural sentiments of workers."²⁹ If workers could not be turned into robots, Taylorism attempted to brutalize them. Such barbarity made laborers akin to a chain-gang, with foremen as prison guards.³⁰

Many syndicalists believed that *le patronat* capily utilized Taylorism to protect its interests. Capitalists encouraged the laborer's egoism through a system of bonuses; short-sighted workers, degraded by an ignoble workplace, thus could not recognize the *patron* or the stockholder as the source of their exploitation. By destroying their love of labor, *patrons* hoped to deprive workers of any progressive ideal. In sum, Taylorism promoted worker disgust with "their function," encouraging increased production even to the detriment of laborers' health.³¹ Such conditions crushed any possibility of worker solidarity. Pouget argued that Taylor wished to break the unions, so that workers would not have any recourse but to follow the *patron's* commands.³²

Notwithstanding this condemnation of Taylorism, the CGT's response to the scientific organization of work demonstrated its productivism. Merrheim in particular marshaled arguments that he had made commonplace during *la crise* of syndicalism. For Merrheim, despite the savagery of Taylorism, it was symptomatic of a new, organized, and scientific production process. Taylorism showed that workers must learn to dominate production. Only then would the proletariat be able "to rapidly break industrialism from the cadres of capitalist society" and become "capable of establishing, directing, managing the new society, where well-being and liberty are no longer at the mercy of a class."³³ For Merrheim, Taylorism was indicative of the fact that "we have arrived at a stage of industrial evolution which necessitates new methods of production and work." Taylorism had some merit, for it showed that "it was necessary to adapt new methods" of production and administration to replace the outmoded practices of a preindustrial environment.³⁴

The real problem was not the scientific planning of work, but its capitalist and especially French form. Echoing Le Chatelier, the French champion of Taylorism, Merrheim stated that France lacked engineers with adequate technical and practical competence because of the overly theoretical education at the *grandes écoles*. Showing faith in the predictive powers of his *ouvriériste* positivism, Merrheim confidently stated that better French engineers would appear in the future. Such an outcome would naturally result from the "centralization and the development of *ateliers* and factories and their production."³⁵ France would duplicate the experience of the United States and Germany, where an increase in technically competent engineers corresponded to the extension and specialization of the division of labor. Merrheim believed that these new engineers were the backbone of industrialism, and they had to be extremely well-informed and professional in carrying out their duties. For Merrheim, while capitalism destroyed the self-respect of all workers, strong unions could create technicians with dignity and initiative, who could then promote a more efficient production.³⁶

In separating industrialism from capitalism, Merrheim came perilously close to justifying some form of Taylorism as a necessary adjunct to modern production.³⁷ Other syndicalists were not so reticent, however. Yvetot stated that stopwatches and scientific work were not bad in themselves, for Taylor wished to diminish the length of the workday, raise salaries, and create a more efficient workplace. The true enemy was not Taylor, but the cowardly *patron* and the exploitative practices of capitalism.³⁸ Other syndicalists agreed that anything which contributed to a more efficient production was to be applauded. Even Pouget shared this

productivist viewpoint. He wrote, "If it turns out that Taylorism increases production, without overwork, one must not – one cannot! – put oneself in opposition to its expansion, just as one must not oppose the introduction of a machine of superior efficiency."³⁹ The syndicalist Bouchet echoed these sentiments. In his words, "Certainly, we know that the transformation and the amelioration of equipment brings each day a greater production and progress which is one of the inevitable laws of societies."⁴⁰ He hoped that a knowledgeable and progressive *patron* would use scientific management to reduce working hours, combining the benefits of both "capitalist" and "worker" science.⁴¹

Indeed, one of the major elements of *une science ouvrière* was the European Science of Work. Both Merrheim and Pouget appealed to its criticisms of Taylorism. Merrheim argued that Taylorism lacked a scientific study of the limits of human endurance. Relying on Amar, he stated that Taylorism had not adequately taken into account the physiology of the worker, for it minimized issues of fatigue and energy expenditure. Thus, Taylorism simply viewed the worker as a machine, not as a complete human organism.⁴² Jouhaux hoped that a more humanistic science of work could overcome the physical decadence, especially of women, caused by capitalism. The English week, owner observance of the laws of hygiene, and a better moral atmosphere in the *atelier* would create a healthier environment for the laborer.⁴³

The syndicalist response to Taylorism effectively demonstrated the pervasiveness of the productivist paradigm for the movement, as disparate figures from the "ultra" Yvetot to the revolutionary Merrheim and the reformist Bouchet embraced these arguments. Syndicalists even moved beyond Taylorism and the European Science of Work to advocate a mass consumerism that was more characteristic of Fordism than of the scientific organization of work. As real wages for workers declined in France after 1905, the procurement of consumer goods became increasingly difficult, and the call for higher salaries correspondingly increased.⁴⁴

More subtly, a new culture of time, space, and consumerism was developing. As Harvey states, by the eve of World War I, improvements in communication and transportation technologies had created a social world where "public time was becoming ever more homogeneous and universal across space."⁴⁵ While this new sensibility of experience could inform the experimental, multi-perspective novels of Joyce and Woolf, it could also give rise to a flattened vision of space and time which privileged efficiency and function in the service of the Taylorist scientific organization of space and time.⁴⁶

Further, the internationalization of capital produced in part by new technologies encouraged ever-expanding markets and a new array of consumer goods. In France, the rise of department stores symbolized this new culture. While Zola had captured the miserable conditions of miners and their working-class solidarity in *Germinal*, in *The Ladies' Paradise* he portrayed the emerging consumer-centered culture embodied in the department store, its sensuousness and seductiveness highlighted by the shadows and luminosity created by electric light. Especially in Paris, as *grands magasins* took root on the *grands boulevards*, commercialized types of leisure tied to tourism, fashion, and recreation displaced more privately improvised pursuits.⁴⁷ Electricity illuminated a new consumer landscape; "spectacular" forms of recreation, from football to the *café concert* to the Tour de France, emerged in which the production of culture was increasingly the domain of experts and entrepreneurs.⁴⁸ As the commodity took on increasing cultural dominance, the worlds of work, residence, and private life appeared increasingly separate from one another; the logics informing these spheres, and the complex interconnections between them, became more difficult to understand.

Though the cultural studies perspective has taught us that people are not simply "cultural dopes" who are dominated by capitalist commodities, the syndicalist leadership showed little creativity in rethinking the contours of consumerism.⁴⁹ Merrheim uncritically encouraged this new culture, and posited important links between increased production and a consumerist society. Like the social economist Levasseur, he argued that a more efficient industrial workplace would lower the cost of production, more products would then be consumed, and this continual interplay between production and consumption would spur industrial growth.

In developing his perspective, Merrheim drew on many of the ideas of Delaisi. In a series of essays in *La Vie ouvrière* in 1912, Delaisi presented the development of an increasingly technically complex and concentrated industry as an economic law, to which syndicalists had to adapt. Like Marx, he argued that capitalism tended toward a falling rate of profit. However, like Levasseur, he saw the machine as able to rescue capitalism from destruction by lowering the cost of production. Delaisi followed Levasseur in arguing that the incessant introduction of machinery into the workplace resolved the "economic paradox" of cheaper production costs and high wages, for lowering the cost of production increased the amount of goods produced and actually increased wages.⁵⁰ Delaisi defined the major problem facing any society, capitalist or socialist, as lowering the cost of production through the implementation of

machinery. Such a view led Delaisi to praise inventors and competition, which served to improve technology and equipment.

Finally, Louzon developed a technologically driven theory of history to complement this new theory. For Louzon, drawing on a *Diamat* reading of Marx, technical inventions and discoveries "must be the basis of history, as they are the basis of social life itself. Not only political phenomena, but economic phenomena themselves are the superstructure."⁵¹ His technological determinism conflated the histories of work and technology, so that the history of technique governed political and social change.

At this time, Louzon, Merrheim, and Delaisi still believed that the goal of increasing consumption could only come about through dismantling capitalism, followed by a "real application of an intelligent, scientific organization of work."⁵² Merrheim agreed with capitalists that there should be no limits to material well-being and consumption. Yet only in a society which abolished capitalist profit could a perfected consumption complement a proficient production.⁵³

Jouhaux adopted these views. He argued that it was necessary "to augment, at the same time as the force of consumption, the force of production, both inseparable. In the course of its direct action, the working class . . . obeys this elementary law."⁵⁴ Jouhaux, like Merrheim, invoked an image of a mass consumerist society as a key to proletarian emancipation. Following the logic of Levasseur's analysis, they saw lowering costs and raising production as the key to a better society. In a world where department stores were growing at a spectacular pace, and where consumption was valorized as a social good, such sentiments made sense. Linked with increased production and tied to an extended division of labor, their consumerist vision provided an *ouvriériste* version of the Fordism that became an important ideology in France in the interwar years.

Despite conflicts between the *La Vie ouvrière* team and Jouhaux, and Delaisi's disengagement from the movement, by 1914 this coterie of Merrheim, Delaisi, Jouhaux, Louzon, and their comrades developed the major themes that would characterize the CGT's explicitly productivist Minimum Program of 1918.⁵⁵ Their worker positivism justified their emphasis on technology, reliance on economic experts, consumerism, and retreat from the exclusive emphasis on the working class in the name of greater productivity. They reflected the new ideal of technical research and expertise that had emerged in the proletarian public sphere.

World War I and its aftermath quickened these trends. Though the

experience of World War I is often cited as a determinant of the CGT's productivism, the Great War reinforced beliefs that were already in place.⁵⁶ Because Jouhaux, Merrheim, and their compatriots viewed the production process as characterized by an essentially unchangeable division of labor, their demands for reforms consequently focused on issues such as hours of work, salaries, and an array of social rights that should accrue to the working class. Within the workplace, their demands concerned issues of hygiene and more worker control over the production process. This latter issue was coupled with the need for a better technical understanding of the modern labor process by the worker, and was justified in terms of a more efficient and expanded production.

In sum, any sense of the possibility of a qualitatively different system of social relations disappeared from their analysis of society. The productivist language developed by Merrheim, Jouhaux, and their comrades ostensibly fit the new industrial context of France, while legitimizing its own position in terms of the cultural traditions, particularly science, that characterized the CGT as well as dominant French public discourse. The federalist perspective no longer seemed to explain existing social facts; it was further discredited because of its ties to the apocalyptic general strike. The aesthetic idea of labor as *Bildung* was overshadowed by the notion of homogeneous work as a part of a new rationalized economy. This new conception of labor led to a focus on the most productive ways to increase the entire amount of social wealth, also a predominant issue in the liberal public sphere.

Such a shared discourse became essential to attempts to promote a form of corporatism in the postwar Third Republic. Because of the tenuous links between workers and political and economic elites, it took the experience of many syndicalist leaders in World War I, and the massive devastation of production that accompanied the enormous loss of life in the Great War, to promote a reunification of the proletarian and liberal public spheres, in a context of shared concerns about French productivity and the emerging scientific discourse of stability.

Syndicalism and World War I

With Jouhaux's entry into the *union sacrée*, organized labor became a part of a system of production supervised by the state. Further, World War I eroded public and private spheres, as government took over direction of much of the economy.⁵⁷ Jouhaux's increasingly close relationship with the Socialist Thomas, the minister of armaments from 1915 to 1917, also reinforced his turn toward nationalization and productivism.

Thomas was an ardent proponent of Taylorism, the rationalization of production, and the nationalization of industry. He also advocated raising worker salaries as an antidote to the scientific organization of production, pointing the way toward a mass consumer society.⁵⁸

Despite the anti-militarism of the CGT, the outbreak of World War I seemed to surprise the syndicalist elite. The movement was in disarray following the call for mobilization, as leaders realized that the proletariat would not engage in a general strike in opposition to the war. In the wake of the assassination of Jaurès, many leaders feared for their lives. The leadership also was concerned about the Republic's Carnet B, which listed critics of government to be arrested at the time of war. In addition, anti-CGT sentiment among many conservative government ministers was very pronounced. In this context, it was understandable that leaders from Keufer to Pouget supported the war.⁵⁹

With the onset of the conflict, as many syndicalists were called into military service, Jouhaux ran the CGT almost completely by himself, with advice from Griffuelhes. He and Bled followed Guesde and other French socialists into the *union sacrée*. Griffuelhes and Jouhaux saw the war as an opportunity to strengthen the CGT and improve the efficiency of French capitalism. They believed that industrial mobilization could solve employment problems while leading to military victory. Griffuelhes felt that the war demonstrated the obsolescence of the artisanal workshop. The war mandated that workers produce abundantly for the collectivity, rather than simply for personal satisfaction. Fearing that France would return to small-scale production after hostilities ended, Griffuelhes pointed to the modern, automated factories of Germany as a model for postwar French industry.⁶⁰

This productivism was solidified in new cross-class organizations that developed to face economic and social problems associated with the war. In September 1914 syndicalists and socialists created a Comité d'action oriented toward economic self-protection for workers. The Comité d'action, which included Jouhaux, advocated an end to laissez-faire and more state control of industry, justified in a language of increased production that bound employers and workers together. Many syndicalist leaders also took part in government-organized *commissions mixtes* with employers, which aimed to ensure good working conditions and wages, though revolutionaries such as Péricat opposed such inter-class participation.⁶¹

Other divisions among the leadership quickly developed, however. CGT critics of Jouhaux focused on his assignment of responsibility for the war solely to Germany, and his participation in government. Monatte

resigned from the Comité confédéral in December 1914 over the CGT's unwillingness to meet with labor leaders of enemy countries, and his journal *La Vie ouvrière* quickly became a center of opposition to the war. Merrheim and Rosmer too challenged the CGT's backing of the war effort.⁶²

While Jouhaux stubbornly maintained his governmental ties, his experience with the French *état* also reinforced his productivist tendencies. Merrheim too, despite his opposition to the war, tacitly maintained contacts with Jouhaux, Thomas, and the French government.⁶³ Thomas closely consulted with Jouhaux and Merrheim regarding labor policy. He had a complex view of the distinction between nationalization and *étatisation*, which increasingly influenced Jouhaux. While *étatisation* referred to the control of industry by the government, which Thomas opposed, nationalization concerned the tripartite control of industry by producers, consumers, and the state. Thomas believed that such management would encourage financial responsibility while limiting the degree of overt state bureaucratic growth and direction of the economy. This distinction between *étatisation* and nationalization was invoked by Jouhaux in the Minimum Program of 1918.⁶⁴

Thomas's entry into the French state and his belief in nationalization were but a part of the strong sense of *dirigisme* that arose in much of the French government during World War I. Thomas helped bring many intellectuals into the government, including the Durkheimian economist Simiand and the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, who had helped him conceive the theory of *étatisation* as early as 1907 at the Ecole normale supérieure.⁶⁵ War production encouraged the national control of resources and the rationalization of industry. The radical-socialist Clémentel, who became minister of commerce in 1915, furthered these trends. He believed that the material advancement of France could only be achieved through economic modernization. Progress entailed raising salaries, increasing production, and satisfying consumer demands by achieving an ever-growing "equilibrium between production and consumption."⁶⁶

Changing the Ministry of Commerce from a small, disorganized ministry at the outbreak of the war to a large bureaucracy staffed with industrial experts by 1918, Clémentel advocated the postwar public control of industry to prevent France from falling behind other countries economically. He argued that the public guidance of industry should be supplemented by a department of economic planning, which would be part of a civil service trained in detailed economic research. A state-supported National Economic Council could unite industrial organizations

with scientists to guarantee technological progress. Clémentel's corporatism extended to his advocacy of an economic League of Nations to rationalize worldwide production following the war.⁶⁷

The currency of such productivist ideas thus linked many syndicalists, socialists, and governmental elites. Further, the opposition to the war within the CGT was fractured by the Russian Revolution of 1917, leading to splits between Merrheim and Monatte. As the war approached its end, productivism provided the basis for the rapprochement of some anti-war syndicalists, such as Merrheim, Dumoulin, and Bourderon, with Jouhaux. All supported the Minimum Program of 1918, defending Jouhaux's claim that the CGT should adopt a "politics of presence in the affairs of the nation." Syndicalists agreed that the scientific organization of work, including even Taylorism, was an integral aspect of postwar economic reconstruction. Thomas's 1918 journal *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, which brought together reformist syndicalists such as Keufer, socialists, the CGT leadership, Durkheimian sociologists, and progressive elites, solidified the productivist doctrine.⁶⁸

Indeed, the postwar rebuilding of the nation provided economic grist for the productivist mill. Between 1913 and 1929, French industrial production increased by 40 percent, outpacing all other industrialized nations. Because of the centrality of the metal, chemical, and electrical industries after the war, employment in mechanical engineering increased by 260 percent and electrical engineering by 500 percent in the Parisian region.⁶⁹ In such a context, the postwar language of stability, centered on metaphors of equilibrium and control, began to take hold among many elites and syndicalists.

Productivism could only fully arise when the prewar organic conceptual vocabulary was discarded, and a new one elaborated to take its place. Like the interwar discourse of stability described by Maier, the syndicalist productivist vision of a homogeneous, self-reproducing, highly technical workplace based on abstract labor necessitated a new, more neutral, and systemic scientific vocabulary. This new imagery, based in large part on the physical sciences, could draw on the same master narrative of degeneration as its organic counterpart. For example, the second law of thermodynamics posited that the available energy in any closed system decreases over time.⁷⁰ Further, concepts such as equilibrium, function, and integrated system were transferred from their biological context to the new productivist approach. Merrheim's, Thomas's, and Jouhaux's cybernetic vocabulary posited social forces interacting within a self-enclosed system directed by technical experts.

By 1914, this new vocabulary had begun to redefine the *patronat* as a

strong, relatively anonymous social force in contrast to the fin-de-siècle tangible, personal vision of the owner. Much economic analysis by the leadership focused on the rise of trusts and the new prominence of international capital.⁷¹ Yet it was not until the Minimum Program of 1918 that this new conceptual vocabulary had largely replaced the organic imagery and many of the substantive claims and values of earlier revolutionary syndicalism. The Minimum Program's vision of technical elite leadership of society, the selective nationalization of industry, the inevitability of *machinisme*, and mass consumerism also had clear affinities with intellectual and elite technocratic doctrines developed in the early twentieth century, from the neo-capitalism of the businessman Ernest Mercier to the perspectives of Thorstein Veblen and Walter Lippman in the United States.⁷²

The Minimum Program of 1918

The CGT's Minimum Program of 1918, drafted by the Comité confédéral led by Jouhaux, brought to a head the productivist rethinking of the CGT's mission. There was no mention of an *ouvriériste* ethic, the general strike, or the possibility of qualitative social change. The Program focused on concrete reforms benefiting labor, and more power for the CGT through the nationalization of industry and a National Economic Council. The basis of the CGT program, and the major criterion to be used in evaluating reforms, concerned whether or not they increased production. Thus, in the words of the Program, "Economic reorganization must have at its base the uninterrupted development of national or industrial equipment and the unlimited diffusion of general and technical instruction."⁷³ A new denatured vocabulary of diverse forces reaching equilibrium in the context of a self-regulating system intermingled with the organic imagery so characteristic of earlier syndicalist discourse. The CGT leadership conceived of the working class as one legitimate, organized social force equal to others (such as consumers and owners).

In a December 1918 protest to the government's limitation of the role of the CGT in postwar issues such as demobilization, a committee composed of Merrheim, Jouhaux, and others specified their call for a National Economic Council. The "Projet de constitution d'un Conseil national économique" stated that France could only grow strong through "profiting from her genius of production."⁷⁴ Economic stagnation and demobilization had created "a disorder which makes urgently apparent the necessity of coordinating the national means of action for

a rational utilization of riches and an intensive development of the effort of production." The National Economic Council "must have for its goal the reunion of all *organized forces* capable of exercising a right of control on the rebuilding of the economic domain," and which can "correct the faults of organization or the weaknesses of management." Thus, the Council, the representative of the national interest, would "coordinate the efforts of the representatives of the *collective forces*," and correct any of their errors. Finally, the Council would draw on the advice of "technical counselors (engineers, chemists, etc.)," lawyers, and political economists.⁷⁵

In this document as well as in the Minimum Program, the National Economic Council was conceived to be a master director of the economy ensuring stability and equilibrium. Its establishment was justified as the best means for securing "the rapid *readjustment* of war production to peacetime production."⁷⁶ The scientific organization of production was taken for granted. Workers, aligned with *patrons* and technicians, were to control, direct, and manage this process, "following the indications of science and the needs of progress."⁷⁷

Control and management imagery, rather than the language of organisms and/or class struggle, pervaded the Minimum Program. The "control" of the forces of production would ensure "the best utilization of resources."⁷⁸ The CGT claimed a place "in the *direction and the management* of national production."⁷⁹ The proletariat was but one of the "representatives" of the new national coalition, which must exercise "a strict and vigorous *control* of all branches of production." Nationalization would allow more direction of production, for "*control* will be exercised in the name of the State for producers and consumers."⁸⁰ The Council could then "*master* the regulation of production," and, "thus established, this *control* will assure the functioning of the regime of association between industry and the state."⁸¹ The National Council would also oversee the self-correcting aspects of the system. Consequently, if problems in production arose, the state would "constantly maintain *equilibrium*," and "restore production to *equilibrium*." Worker migrations would also be handled through placement under the "*control*" of worker organizations of different countries.⁸² Following Thomas, Jouhaux carefully distinguished the nationalization the CGT from bureaucratic *étatisation*. He believed that the National Economic Council effectively avoided the pitfalls of substituting one master (the state) for another (the capitalist).⁸³

This rationalized orientation was reflected in changes in the structure of the CGT. In the 1918 Paris meetings, the CGT leadership dissolved the

old Comité confédéral. Its reorganization mandated one governing body, the National Confederal Committee, which would meet at least three times per year. This Committee in turn was composed of permanent directing bodies, including an Administrative Committee of thirty members, which met at least once a week; a Commission of Control, made up of six members; and a governing Confederal Bureau of five members, elected by the National Confederal Committee after each Congress, consisting of a secretary-general, three assistant secretaries, and a treasurer. This Congress effectively abolished the independence of the industrial federations and the *unions départementales*, combining them under the rubric of the National Confederal Committee. These changes gave the CGT National Bureau more centralized control over the movement.⁸⁴

The new organization of the postwar CGT solidified the new productivist vocabulary. The management and control of the forces within the economic system were the dominant concerns of the CGT. The prewar language of class struggle, revolution, and workers' democracy was abandoned in favor of a new corporatist orientation based on scientific expertise and interest-group bargaining. The advocacy of welfare measures by an activist state became core concerns of the postwar CGT. Finally, union centralization, corresponding to the perceived concentration of the French economy, was not only conceived of as inevitable, but justified as the best, because most efficient, form of organization.

The corporatist vision advocated by the CGT was not immediately implemented in postwar France. The conservative turn continued in the postwar era with the election of the nationalist and anti-socialist Bloc National in 1919, which was preceded by Clemenceau's rejection of the CGT's Minimum Program. However, the Bloc's program reflected a new, if very embryonic, corporatist sensibility, for it did not merely demand a return to the class relations of the Belle Epoque. While the Bloc called for a stronger executive, it also developed a more pragmatic conservatism. It shared the CGT's impatience with parliament; some of its members joined the left in calling for a more technocratic, expert leadership. Such views were becoming more widespread in France. Herriot, the technocratically inclined leader of the Radicals, advocated a vague anti-Bolshevism, to be fought by a government run by experts and a populace armed with a technologically sophisticated education.⁸⁵ Finally, given the decline of solidarism, the educational system reinforced a narrow scientism, as mainstream French philosophy and social science "remained in the thrall of neo-Kantian and positivist tendencies until well into the 1930s."⁸⁶ Léon Brunschvicg's spiritualist version of positivism, which dominated the Sorbonne, had little use for innovative or radical

forms of sociability.⁸⁷ There was no turn toward a pragmatic subject, no critique of Kant à la Durkheim in *The Elementary Forms*.

Further, while many French *patrons* were staunch advocates of *laissez-faire*, at least some initial signs of the rhetoric of corporatism could be seen in the language of many French capitalists after World War I. A postwar technocratic vocabulary accompanied a new entrepreneurial culture in the context of the planning and emphasis on productivity that had been so important in the war, in part to ensure a steady supply of labor.⁸⁸ Though this new functional view of management was relatively slow to develop among the French *patronat*, which resisted state interference and mandatory bargaining with unions, industrial leaders complemented their paternalistic vocabulary with one laced with rationality and expertise. A new technocratic elitism grew in France after World War I. As Maier states, demands for productivity competed with French elite's traditional penchant for total control of the workplace, and "*lèse majesté* became *lèse logique*."⁸⁹ Such an instrumental orientation extended even to the Durkheimian school, whose influence waned in the interwar years. Though Durkheim's disciples such as Bouglé, Mauss, Halbwachs, and Simiand were far from technocrats, after World War I they did not develop Durkheim's moral sociology, turning instead toward what Alexander sees as either scientific sociological determinism or apolitical ethnography.⁹⁰

In sum, the war experience and its aftermath delineated at least the beginnings of a new type of public sphere, which borrowed from both the proletarian and liberal realms and was very different from the prewar era. Synthesizing themes from solidarism and opportunism into a version of productivism, many republican and capitalist elites and syndicalists called for new social rights that would integrate workers into the polity and create a more socially responsible welfare capitalism. However, even this more moderate perspective faced intransigent opposition from conservatives favoring a free market.

This belief in scientific solutions to social issues was convincingly demonstrated in Jouhaux's and Merrheim's postwar acceptance, and indeed celebration, of Taylorism. For Merrheim especially, postwar productivism meant decrying mass direct action as "debased" and "wild," which could lead only to anarchy and/or Bolshevism, which he detested.⁹¹ More importantly, *fin-de-siècle* concerns with creating new forms of moral sociability, from Pelloutier's wish for a new proletarian morality to Durkheim's call for a new moral solidarity, had little place in the productivist postwar vocabulary, which tied increased productivity to a strongly social democratic program of selective nationalization of

industry, social rights, and an array of welfare-state benefits for workers. The assumptions of this emerging public sphere could be seen in a major new journal, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*. The 1918 founding of *L'Information ouvrière et sociale* intersected with the increased prominence of other organizations oriented toward worker/employer/state cooperation and heavily influenced by Thomas, such as the Comité national d'études sociales et politiques and the Comité permanent d'études relatives à la prévision des chômages industriels.⁹²

L'Information ouvrière et sociale

The Minimum Program of the CGT, and the call for a National Economic Council with regional affiliates, was promulgated by Jouhaux, Thomas, and others in *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*. Under the direction of Thomas, this *revue*, like his prewar *La Revue syndicaliste*, aimed to provide "objective" information for the study of the economy.⁹³ It furnished a forum for progressive capitalist and technocratic elites, solidarist sociologists such as Bouglé, the CGT leaders Jouhaux and Merrheim, and reformist syndicalists such as Keufer.⁹⁴ Most of the articles focused on the necessity of improving production in postwar France. Keufer and Thomas explicitly argued that productivism transcended classes, united all "men of progress, workers or *patrons*," and made old formulas of class struggle obsolete.⁹⁵ Thomas believed that the consensus on increasing production demonstrated the continuity and coalescence of prewar socialist and syndicalist concerns with the problems of economic organization.⁹⁶

The major economic themes of the journal reflected the orientation of the CGT rather than that of the SFIO. Many authors echoed the CGT's new slogan, promulgated in the Minimum Program, of a minimum work time for a maximum production and a maximum salary.⁹⁷ Jouhaux still maintained that a strong, unified working class was necessary to realize this maxim and stake its claim to "the control and management of public affairs," in the name of the nation and *l'intérêt général*.⁹⁸ The syndicalist program also advocated that the *patronat* follow the precept, the maximum development of equipment for the maximum efficiency with the least general cost. This maxim, combined with the syndicalist call for higher salaries, would increase production and "result in a greater consumption, a general well-being, a constant elevation for the life of the worker."⁹⁹ Jouhaux supported the mass production of standardized commodities, while Thomas exhorted workers to "Produce! Produce!"¹⁰⁰

Syndicalists such as Savoie saw the new economy replacing individual

with collective labor. A new collective, homogeneous work necessarily entailed an alternative view of labor's role in society. Rather than turning to class struggle to achieve their goals, these postwar syndicalists instead called for the implementation of the social rights that necessarily belonged to labor in the postwar community. Chief among these rights was that of labor's participation in the management and control of production.¹⁰¹

By March 1919, the CGT called for "new rights of work," embodied in a *Charte du travail*. These social rights included

the ascension of workers to management and control of national production; equal rights for women; the right of children to general and technical education; the possibility of the ascension of gifted children, no matter their social situation, to higher education; the limitation of the working day to eight hours and the working week to 44 hours; a minimum salary corresponding to the necessities of existence and to familial needs; guarantees for children, women, and men in work; the organization of social welfare; the free right of association and of coalition; equal rights for foreign workers and their families in the countries where they reside.¹⁰²

The Minimum Program preceded the 1920 crisis of the CGT that would usher in the Communist Party. By 1920, the CGT had swelled to two and one-half million members. The Socialist Party also grew rapidly at this time. Sympathy for the Russian Revolution was widespread among the working class. As soldiers returned to work and immigrants streamed into France, many laborers became upset over a variety of issues, from high inflation and low wages to the slow pace of postwar demobilization.¹⁰³

In this context, massive strikes shook France. Strikes by railway workers were especially important. The French government reacted by arresting railway union leaders and other leftists, threatening legal action against the CGT, and refusing, along with the railway companies, to negotiate until strikers returned to work. Jouhaux's leadership, never fully supportive of the strikes, wavered in the face of this governmental action. The CGT was further debilitated by splits between Jouhaux's faction and a newly powerful revolutionary communist wing. By the end of May, most laborers returned to their workplaces, and the government fired many still-striking railway workers. The CGT shrank to 600,000 members after the failure of the strike. In 1921, many members of the CGT left to form a rival union, the *Confédération Générale du Travail Unitaire* (CGTU) which quickly joined the *Profintern*, the *Communist International Union*.¹⁰⁴ The new union would ally with the French Communist Party, formed when the SFIO divided in December 1920.

Jouhaux and his colleagues had looked at the 1920 strikes as an opportunity to voice demands for the rationalization of the economy through the nationalization of railways and the electrical and mining industries, and a defense of syndicalist rights.¹⁰⁵ Rationalization was to be the key phrase for syndicalists of all persuasions throughout the 1920s, as British and American unions joined the French in endorsing the rationalization of industry. Shared by groups as diverse as communists and the neo-capitalists of the late 1920s, demands for industrial modernization and the expansion of mass consumption became major themes of French public discourse in the interwar years. Despite resistance to productivism by many employers and from time to time by workers, this vision in part led to the victory of the Popular Front, which helped realize demands for mass tourism and increased leisure time for French workers.¹⁰⁶

The CGT became a major player in the vision of a new public sphere that was outlined in the wake of World War I, which had strong elements of a new corporate society, in Maier's lexicon. The state/society distinction had been blurred; further, the legitimacy of some form of a republican regime was accepted by many groups on the left. Most importantly, progressive groups tended to converge on a model of industrial society composed of large industrial firms guided by scientific management and an interventionist, reformist state, to be run by technical experts, whether communist, syndicalist, or capitalist. These groups shared a commitment to increased productivity and a scientific understanding of the labor process.

Thus, by 1920, the dream of a solidary community, of grounding the political in the social, expressed in different ways by Durkheim, Jaurès, and Pelloutier, seemed to be a real possibility. Yet it was a fundamentally different kind of reality than these theorists had envisioned. Rather than shared moral and participatory ties serving as the basis of a new civil society that intersected with a democratic state reinforcing such moral solidarity, and a fundamentally different class structure, relations between state and society and between the classes were justified in terms of a common orientation to productivism. As such, much public debate shifted to issues of economic growth, efficiency, and power; the necessity of centralized authority and technical expertise were taken for granted in such discussions. Systemic concerns overshadowed those of the lifeworld, in Habermas's language. While the CGT recognized the importance of creating a national union movement in the context of growing large-scale industry and an international economy, its move to centralization did not theorize or include the democratic impulse of labor republicanism.

The integration of the working class into the polity, with the democratization of the public sphere, thus helped solidify a new vision of industrial society. This shared productivism seemed to confirm many of Habermas's arguments regarding the instrumentality of the labor metaphysic. For CGT leaders, the state, morality, and social interaction could be explained largely in terms of an increasingly standardized labor process. The many dimensions of social life were reduced to a single logic of labor; because homogeneous work and/or technology determined consciousness, no independent learning processes could arise from interaction or reflection. Thus, as the labor process changed, many syndicalists and elites argued, so did requirements for solidarity. The instrumental criteria by which labor was judged to be successful were applied to the social realm. Rabinbach's statement, first quoted in the prologue, is again pertinent here. The evolution of the CGT illustrated the larger problem of socialist parties and unions, namely "the constricting effects of productivism on the movement's vision and practices."¹⁰⁷

It must be stressed again that this productivist labor movement was not easily integrated into a new "refeudalized" public sphere, in Habermas's terms. After World War I, the Third Republic had not solved problems of class conflict, as the communists especially were to remain militantly suspicious of class collaboration in the postwar years. Many workers refused to accept the legitimacy of the market. Further, the productivist perspective could not maintain its hegemony for long. Though earlier themes of moral transformation, direct democracy, some form of decentralized organization, and the like faded in the interwar years, they would see a revival with the rise of existentialism in the 1940s and 1950s, and the emergence of new social movements in the wake of May 1968. However, their context would be very different, and the labor movement played a problematic role in debating and resolving such issues.

Conclusion

The legacy of syndicalism

Despite Merrheim's opposition to the Russian Revolution, for many militants it renewed hope in the future of revolutionary syndicalism. Griffuelhes, notwithstanding his productivist turn, viewed the soviets as the fulfillment of the revolutionary potential of the decentralized syndicat. His perspective showed the continuing influence of the communitarian tradition of the language of labor, even if in weakened form. Writing shortly before his death, he stated that syndicalism had "prepared imitators." "Formulated [in France], realized in Russia," syndicalism was still based on direct action, which he now called "the formula *soviétique*."¹ It was left to Russians, "considered the most backward of peoples, to give this formula its most audacious and exacting application."² The syndicat/soviet maintained "the eternal reaction against capitalism and its political expression, the State, because it contains all the elements of a producers' power – soviet power – erected to destroy autocratic power, whether it be in the form of monarchy or democracy."³ Griffuelhes's enthusiasm for the Russian Revolution and the founding of the soviets reflected the views of many syndicalists, who flocked to the Communist Party in the mistaken belief that it was a new form of revolutionary syndicalism. The French Communist Party was able to proclaim itself as the heir of revolutionary syndicalism for many years.⁴

Yet claims for the paternity of the soviets were not only voiced by aging revolutionary syndicalists in France. Despite the instrumentalism of many postwar Durkheimians, Mauss emphasized the similarities between Durkheim's theory of professional organizations and the decentralized soviet. In fact, for Mauss, the entire syndicalist tradition demonstrated the influence of Durkheim. According to Mauss, "One might even speak of descent, since Sorel's earliest ideas derive from Durkheim's

theories, and Lenin has admitted the influence of Sorel.”⁵ Mauss saw the soviets as a fulfillment of two of Durkheim’s “moral, political, and economic conclusions.”⁶ As “a simultaneously national and professional organization both of property and the state,” the soviet realized Durkheim’s view of professional organizations as developed in *The Division of Labor* and *Suicide*.⁷ Further, for Mauss, the soviets exemplified Durkheim’s recognition of the professional group as “an intermediary echelon, vested with property, wealth, disciplinary rights and powers, moderating the individual, but also the state.”⁸

However, as the transforming potential of the soviet faded under the pressures of Russian industrialization, so too did this decentralized, federalist moment wane in the discourse of the French liberal and proletarian public spheres between the wars. In the context of the volatile public discourse and social changes of the 1920s and 1930s, for many on the left the defense of republican and labor rights was paramount. For the CGT, when the focus on federalist decentralization was replaced with the new narrative of large-scale industrialization, social rights became its *sine qua non*.

The waning of federalism did not mean that class struggle in France necessarily abated. Class rhetoric infused French public discourse in the interwar years. Syndicalism had changed the dimensions of the French public sphere, and the working class was a major player in any discussion of the *patrie*. The rise of the Popular Front demonstrated this proletarian power. Over a million workers participated in sit-ins at factories in June 1936, leading to the establishment of the Popular Front’s alliance of the CGT and left-wing parties. However, labor and governmental leaders coordinated these *manifestations* in a direction conducive to large-scale, productivist organization, emphasizing the disciplined and often Taylorist design of the *usine*. Such a view of industrial relations was widespread, so that even Georges Valois, founder of the postwar Fascieuau, supported the implementation of Taylorism in the factory.⁹ While workers demanded the forty-hour week, with Saturdays and Sundays off, many rank-and-file laborers also engaged in a kind of guerrilla war against the disciplined workplace, manifested in slowdowns, mad rushes for the exit at closing time, skipping workdays, and the like. However, these “indirect revolts against work” did not coalesce into an organized movement.¹⁰ Given the growth of the state and the concentration of some industries, this refusal to return to prewar syndicalist strategies made sense. Yet this new industrial vision achieved a relatively unquestioned cultural dominance within the labor movement.

The evanescence of the decentralized, federalist, participatory orienta-

tion led some syndicalists to overemphasize the anti-parliamentary and activist aspects of syndicalism, and to embrace fascism. Several of Sorel's followers became avid defenders of fascism, and Mussolini acknowledged Sorel as one of his spiritual progenitors. Moreover, a few syndicalist leaders were at least sympathetic supporters of the Vichy regime.¹¹ For many scholars, these biographies were proof of a close tie between syndicalism and fascism. Durkheim too was not immune from this interrogation, as some authors counted him as a key figure in the ostensibly conservative origins of sociology.¹²

Attempts to tie syndicalism to fascism, and the now-discredited view of Durkheim as a quasi-corporatist conservative, are ultimately unpersuasive.¹³ Rather, the tradition of the decentralized syndicat and the professional association has achieved lasting importance through its attachment to a number of left-wing movements, often outside France. Eley points to syndicalism as the major alternative to a reformist, bureaucratic, and centralized social democracy in pre-World War I Europe. He argues that, filtered through the soviets and council communist movements of postwar Europe, its decentralized, participatory orientation was renewed in diverse ways in the Hungarian uprising of 1956, the 1968 Prague Spring, 1968 in France, 1969 in Italy, and finally in the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.¹⁴ Arendt also sees the council movements as a major expression of participatory democracy and self-rule in opposition to bureaucratic social democratic parties. Though Durkheim is not usually tied to these movements, Bellah explicitly attaches the council experience to the Durkheimian conception of associational life.¹⁵

The participatory and anti-positivist dimension of "Western Marxism" was especially marked by these council movements. In France after World War II, the "Socialisme ou Barbarisme" group associated with Cornelius Castoriadis revived issues of democratic workers' control, and was given an impetus by the Hungarian revolts against the Soviet Union. As self-management arose as a major theme in May 1968, it helped encourage trends toward workers' control in the *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail* (CFDT), theorized in part by authors such as Gorz.¹⁶ Yet the hegemony of Marxism was so complete within the French left after World War II that attempts by authors such as Merleau-Ponty and Sartre to develop a more participatory theory of socialism and/or communism did so through reanalyzing Marx, rather than by a consideration of the tradition of fin-de-siècle communitarian syndicalism.¹⁷

Outside France, decentralized, democratic, and syndicalist themes among the left were also prominent. Rosa Luxemburg tied her conception

of the spontaneity of the masses and her opposition to the German SPD to her belief in the self-managing capacities of workers.¹⁸ Both Lukács and Gramsci were very involved in the council movements in Hungary and Italy, while grappling theoretically with Sorelian and syndicalist themes.¹⁹ Ervin Szabó, who spearheaded the left opposition to the Hungarian Socialist Party in prewar Hungary and influenced Lukács, associated with French syndicalists.²⁰ Finally, Max Horkheimer of the Frankfurt School acknowledged an explicit debt to the history of decentralized workers' councils, which furnished a tradition of labor action in opposition to both the Leninist professional revolutionary party and the bureaucratic tendencies of social democracy. Horkheimer wrote, "The theoretical conception which, following its first trailblazers, will show the new society its way – the system of workers' councils – grows out of praxis. The roots of the council system go back to 1871, 1905, and other events. *Revolutionary transformation has a tradition which must continue.*"²¹

In various ways, the decentralized, federalist moment in Western Marxism was short-circuited. Gramsci's and Lukács's loyalty to Lenin led them to tortuous attempts to combine a disciplined communist party with the participatory dimension of the workers' councils. Gramsci and Szabo echoed Lenin's praise of Taylorism, thus exhibiting the same conflict between productivist and participatory orientations that characterized revolutionary syndicalism.²² Durkheim's advocacy of a participatory, moral socialism was also neglected, as his influence faded after World War I. His revival marked him not as a founder of a symbolic, culturally democratic sociology, but as a precursor of anthropological structuralism in France, Parsonian structural functionalism in the United States, and the "mechanistic functionalism" of British anthropology in the 1950s and 1960s.²³

While he avoided the pitfalls of productivism characteristic of these Marxists and developed a sensitive reading of Durkheim, the narrative of large-scale industrial development has exercised a powerful influence on Habermas, the contemporary representative of the Frankfurt School. From his analysis of the decline of the public sphere in terms of its invasion by corporations and an administrative state, to his attempts to incorporate systems theory into his approach, Habermas has argued that the logic of modernization entails a decrease in participatory democracy. Habermas surely demonstrates a sensitivity to the costs of modernity, even adopting the tragic Benjaminian perspective on the social and psychological damage caused by the erasure of historical memory, as embodied in monuments and symbols.²⁴ However, his attempt to recapture

"abandoned stages of reflection" has not stopped at the syndicalist epoch.²⁵ This oversight is symptomatic of Habermas's lack of attention to the historically concrete, affective, and necessarily variable types of solidarity that different social movements and historical eras create. Thus, Habermas is haunted by the fear that his theory may result in a "meaningless emancipation";²⁶ given that a liberal, overly rational discourse ethics forms the basis of his understanding of participatory democracy, and overlooks alternatives such as social republicanism, such consternation is justified.

My study not only calls for a rethinking of the legacy of syndicalism, but also raises many theoretical issues. Specifically, I argue for the modification of Habermas's approach in several significant ways. Not only must the role of cultural traditions such as republicanism in different historical contexts be specified for a more accurate history of the forms of discourse arising in the public sphere, but the autonomous role of the proletarian public realm in shaping public languages must also be examined. The belief in the possibility of a neo-corporatist public sphere in postwar France resulted from ideological argument and consensus on narratives of industrialization as much as from objective differentiation processes. Finally, the different spaces within the public sphere were shaped by institutional boundaries and positions, as Bourdieu argues.

Habermas now realizes, like his fellow theorists Cohen and Arato, that the public sphere was not simply refeudalized, but instead it displaced conflicts to new social groups. Thus, labor is no longer the privileged site for claims regarding social change. Further, as developed in chapter 3, Habermas and his sympathetic critics recognize the regeneration of participatory modes of activity in the new social movements. Yet their rational, teleological model underplays the conflicts of the past, and its potential as a cultural resource for the present. Indeed, the very model of Western Marxism that these authors utilize owes much to the syndicalist tradition, as I argue above.

The notion of a historical break and an emphasis on decentralized, participatory organizations are also present in more "postmodern" versions of new social movements. However, these approaches attack the very rationality that Habermas and Cohen and Arato defend. Theorists loosely affiliated with the rise of the new social movements often blame rationality as the modernist culprit that marginalizes the discourses of the Other(s). Tied to racism, imperialism, and sexism, a differentiating rationality must be overturned with new types of postmodern knowledge.²⁷ Further, these approaches to new social movements reject the structural

differentiation so important to Cohen and Arato, as groups such as ACT-UP recreate and recode private relationships in a public forum thus blurring lines between private and public spheres. Finally, many new social movements often criticize state reforms as an ideological justification of power relations. To the extent that they invoke a notion of the public sphere, they argue for a number of public spheres based not only on class, but on race, gender, and the like.²⁸

Several of these theorists also point to the terrain of consumption rather than institutions in civil society or work as the location of subcultural resistance. Institutionalized in the academy most prominently in the cultural studies approach associated with the Birmingham School, they argue that as mass media have become part of everyday life, television, radio, and the like have not colonized the quotidian, but rather provided materials for new cultural interpretations among various audiences.²⁹ The more postmodern of these theorists decenter all claims to the subject, positing that contemporary culture has seen the eruption of fantasy and desire into social spaces previously occupied by rationality, thus making subjectivity no longer comprehensible as a "private and compensatory reaction against public situations, but rather a way of reading those situations in its own right, of thinking and mapping them, of intervening in them, albeit in a very different form from the abstract reflections of traditional philosophy or politics."³⁰ The work of Deleuze and Guattari, for example, exemplifies this new perspective.³¹

Despite Jameson's valuation of Negt and Kluge's discussion of the proletarian public sphere as an attempt to "produce discursive space of a new type,"³² for most of these authors the labor movement has little to offer in terms of an understanding of "the potentially contradictory role of desire and fantasy in the work of hegemony and counterhegemony." Fiske in particular rejects the "nostalgia" for communities existing outside mass culture generated by the socialist tradition.³⁴

Such perspectives do not grasp how an account of syndicalism could enrich the understanding of these contemporary themes of fantasy and desire. Just as Stoeckl argues that Durkheim contributed to a transgressive version of anthropology that in part informed Bataille's fascination with violence and later merged with poststructuralism, so contemporary concerns with fantasy and desire have affinities with the carnivalesque and liminal aspects of syndicalist direct action and strikes, which may have influenced to some degree surrealism, the situationists, and Bataille.³⁵ Further, this postmodern dimension was foreshadowed in Sorel's positive reading of Nietzsche, his incorporation of Bergsonian philosophy, critique of rationality, emphasis on the inevitability of

struggle, and reflections on violence.³⁶ This study did not tell that story, and it remains to be written.³⁷ In linking syndicalism and postmodernism, I am not claiming that there is nothing new under the sun, nor engaging in the modernist obsessive search for origins. Rather, this interpretation of syndicalism simply demonstrates that the socialist tradition is a rich and multifaceted cultural resource for contemporary understandings of social life.

A neglect of the syndicalist and socialist traditions also results in other problems for these approaches. In their attempt to replicate empirically Derrida's and Foucault's break with humanism, postmodern versions of new social movements often unconsciously repeat some of the major *faux pas* of revolutionary syndicalism. Thus, the worst excesses of contemporary "identity politics" reproduce the syndicalist fetish of class purity, though often pointing to race, ethnicity, and/or gender as focal points. Like syndicalists, postmodern identity politics denies that intellectuals outside the oppressed can speak for them, or truly grasp their experience. Though not adopting the model of productivism that informed syndicalists, they too, like the postwar CGT, have difficulty conceiving of solidarity as based on the generation of shared moral meanings. Instead, they often implicitly adopt an interest-group orientation, with society conceived of as a battleground over the implementation of competing demands.³⁸

My study of syndicalism problematizes the notion that the present era breaks cleanly with the past. In part because of this historical blind spot, neither the postmodern nor the critical theorist view of new social movements adequately theorizes the formation of collective identity as a complex and fragile process with moral, aesthetic, and rational moments. Social republicanism was one such important form of egalitarian community, not necessarily tied to any one institutional form.³⁹ This egalitarian community depended on grasping and making effective the social and cultural resources bequeathed by history. Neither an evolutionary approach à la Habermas, nor postmodern conceptions of history as a never-ending power struggle or a kind of department store to be plundered at will comprehends this complexity. Moreover, the potential contributions of labor movements and struggles for democratizing society must also be stressed. Despite the weaknesses of contemporary unions in the West, workers' control remains an important theme in any broad-based movement for a more democratic society today.⁴⁰

However, conceptions of workers' control, public discourse, and the public sphere informed by social republicanism can contribute to understanding contemporary movements only if they are pluralized in terms of

the different publics and problematics constituted by gender, race, and sexual orientation. The proliferation of many different kinds of new social movements means that the "politically participatory thrust" of social republicanism must be "reinvented or relocated . . . and that it is now discoverable to an unprecedented extent in the domain of culture."⁴¹ This rethinking of social republicanism testifies to the late twentieth-century intersection of public spheres and culture. If social republicanism is to have contemporary resonance, it must redefine participation in terms of a cultural arena that emphasizes aesthetic self-presentation and pleasure.⁴² To the extent that notions of virtue and solidarity are invoked, they must be pluralized and redefined in terms of multiple solidarities, with the emphasis on their relations and recombination.⁴³

In sum, this examination of syndicalism helps understand the varied roots of social movements and theoretical perspectives in the twilight of modernity. The movements of the past cannot be ignored, for they often raised issues concerning the creation of spaces for participation and alternative cultural definitions of identity. Some methodological suggestions also arise from this study, which can contribute to a rethinking of the increasingly sterile debates about modernity and postmodernity. For example, Habermas's defense of modernity and postmodern criticisms of his approach have been carried out in the realm of philosophy. My analysis explores the concrete ways in which discourse has been historically shaped and in turn shapes history, showing the complexity surrounding the relationship of modernity to rationality. It avoids a culturally insensitive reduction of modernity to rationalization processes without validating the tendency of postmodernism to tie rationality to domination. I demonstrate that attempts to establish an egalitarian community cannot be simply understood as the illegitimate imposition of authority by one group on another.

Thus, this study shows that a relatively old-fashioned exploration of social contexts and institutions must complement the discursive turn of much contemporary theory. Specifically, social movements such as syndicalism had many different discursive strands in them, and their social and institutional context, as well as internal political struggles, often influenced their direction. The creation of instrumental rationality and alternative forms of more democratic sociability were historical achievements, carried out by concrete agents and social movements in the context of particular historical circumstances. Different conceptions of solidarity were debated and practiced; the temporary triumph of a neo-corporatist orientation did not result simply from the internal logic of foundation-

alist concepts such as class or masculinity, though such a logic was indeed important.

Yet the final assessment of the legacy of syndicalism must look to its particular approach to community and solidarity. No doubt the West has moved to a "post-corporatist" social order, wherein normative conflicts over the distribution of goods are being superseded by "post-traditional" concerns about identity. No doubt the emergence of new locations for the formation of alternative forms of identity, as well as the rise of mass media, large-scale organization, and the internationalization of capital have created distinctive issues for contemporary social movements. In such a context, calls for decentralization and participation cannot be uncritically affirmed. Nevertheless, though the task may now be to find "ways to make the space-transcending mass media supportive of public life,"⁴⁴ the problematic faced by syndicalism has not necessarily disappeared in the modern/postmodern world. Given a contemporary sensitivity to the problem of power in any social interaction, the issues raised by syndicalism continue to resonate in our cultural zeitgeist. Pelloutier's definition of anarchism perhaps best distills this motif; we still must develop "the art of cultivating oneself and of sufficiently cultivating others so that [people] can govern and enjoy themselves."⁴⁵

Notes

Prologue

- 1 Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century Industrialization," *Past and Present* 108 (1985), p. 174. See also William Sewell, Jr., "Uneven Development, the Autonomy of Politics, and the Dockworkers of Nineteenth-Century Marseilles," *American Historical Review* 93 (1988), pp. 604–637.
- 2 Charles Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (New York, 1987), p. 164. See also Albert Lindemann, *The Red Years* (Berkeley, 1974). On the council movement in Germany, see Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY, 1978); Jacques Droz, "Anarcho-syndicalisme et communisme de gauche dans les débuts de la République de Weimar," in *Mélanges d'histoire sociale offerts à Jean Maitron* (Paris, 1976), pp. 75–85. On Italy, see Martin Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That Failed* (New Haven, 1977).
- 3 For example, see Georges Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république* (Paris, 1967); Annie Kriegel, *Aux Origines du communisme français* (Paris, 1964); Nicholas Papayanis, "Masses révolutionnaires et directions réformistes: Les Tensions au corps des métallurgistes français en 1919," *Le Mouvement social* (October–December 1975), pp. 51–73.
- 4 On the language of labor, see William Sewell, Jr., *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (New York, 1980). On the split between workers and elites in France, see Craig Calhoun, "Classical Social Theory and the French Revolution of 1848," *Sociological Theory* 7 (Fall 1989), pp. 210–225; and Jacques Donzelot, *L'Invention du social* (Paris, 1984). Outside France, syndicalism was an important part of labor movements in Europe and the United States. On the syndicalist movement in Spain, see Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists* (New York, 1977); George Richard Esenwein, *Anarchist Ideology and the Working-Class*

Movement in Spain, 1868–1898 (Berkeley, 1989); and Michael Seidman, *Workers Against Work: Labor in Paris and Barcelona During the Popular Fronts* (Berkeley, 1991). For Britain, see Bob Holton, *British Syndicalism, 1900–1914* (London, 1976). For Italy, see Gwyn Williams, *Proletarian Order: Antonio Gramsci, Factory Councils, and the Origins of Communism in Italy, 1911–1921* (London, 1975); and Sidney Tarrow, *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven, 1967). For the United States, see Melvyn Dubofsky, *We Shall Be All: A History of the IWW* (Chicago, 1969), and Salvatore Salerno, *Red November Black November: Culture and Community in the IWW* (Albany, NY, 1989).

- 5 R. D. Anderson, *France, 1870–1914* (London, 1977), p. 138.
- 6 My definition of productivism is very similar to Carl Boggs's notion of "instrumentalism," which Boggs defines as "the focus of a movement or party on largely power-defined objectives that stress the role of interest-group bargaining and/or institutional engineering over the democratizing goals associated with popular mobilization and direct action": *Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West* (Philadelphia, 1986), p. 270 n. 70. I would add to this definition the obsession with increasing production.
- 7 Theorists and practitioners of the contemporary "new social movements" offer an interesting alternative to modern bureaucratic society. The complex relationship of these movements and revolutionary syndicalism will be explored in chapter 3.
- 8 See John Toews, "Intellectual History After the Linguistic Turn: The Autonomy of Meaning and the Irreducibility of Experience," *American Historical Review* 32 (1987), pp. 879–907; Lynn Hunt, ed., *The New Cultural History* (Berkeley, 1989); Martin Jay, "Should Intellectual History Take a Linguistic Turn? Reflections on the Habermas–Gadamer Debate," *Fin-de-Siècle Socialism* (New York, 1988); and Lenard Berlanstein, ed., *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis* (Urbana, IL, 1993).
- 9 See Lynn Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution* (Berkeley, 1984); William Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe: A Critique of Historical Understanding* (New York, 1987); Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York, 1989); and François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Paris, 1978).
- 10 Joan Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988); "The Evidence of Experience," *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991), pp. 773–797.
- 11 William Sewall, Jr., "Ideologies and Social Revolutions: Reflections on the French Case," *Journal of Modern History* 57 (1985), pp. 570–585; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York, 1973).
- 12 Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
- 13 Stanley Aronowitz, *The Politics of Identity: Class, Culture, Social Movements* (New York, 1992), p. 129.

- 14 Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*; Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*. On the move to discourse among labor historians, see Lenard Berlanstein, "Working with Language: The Linguistic Turn in French Labor History," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (1991), pp. 426–440; for a critical view, see Bryan Palmer, *Descent into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History* (Philadelphia, 1990).
- 15 Mark Traugott, "European Working-Class Protest," *American Journal of Sociology* 88 (1983), pp. 1019–1026.
- 16 E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (Harmondsworth, 1968). Alain Cottureau writes that Thompson identified a logic which seems to apply to all artisans experiencing industrialization. In Cottureau's words, artisans in such a situation proclaim the "illegitimacy of the new economic order; enhancement of independence and freedom; claims in the name of the rights of man against the liberal-utilitarian order; universalization of public references in the name of a working class": "The Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France, 1848–1900," in Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg, eds., *Working-Class Formation: Nineteenth-Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States* (New York, 1986), p. 124.
- 17 For the United States, see Herbert Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America* (New York, 1976); Sean Wilentz, *Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class* (New York, 1984); Leon Fink, "The New Labor History and the Powers of Historical Pessimism: Consensus, Hegemony, and the Case of the Knights of Labor," *Journal of American History* 75 (1988), pp. 115–136; and Stanley Aronowitz, *False Promises: The Shaping of American Working-Class Consciousness* (New York, 1973). For Britain, see Craig Calhoun, *The Question of Class Struggle* (Chicago, 1982); Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class* (New York, 1983); and Patrick Joyce, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1840–1914* (New York, 1991). For France, see Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*; Michael Hanagan, *The Logic of Solidarity: Artisans and Industrial Workers in Three French Towns, 1871–1914* (Urbana, IL, 1980); Hanagan, *Nascent Proletarians: Class Formation in Post-Revolutionary France* (New York, 1989); John Merriman, *Red City: Limoges and the French Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1985); and William Reddy, *The Rise of Market Culture: The Textile Trade and French Society, 1820–1870* (New York, 1984). For Germany, see Richard J. Evans, *Rethinking German History: Nineteenth-Century Germany and the Origins of the Third Reich* (London, 1987), pp. 194–215. Recent reformulations of the New Orthodoxy position, such as the work of Rancière and Sonenscher, argue that the very idea of class was a cultural construction on the part of labor and bourgeois elites. See Jacques Rancière, *The Nights of Labor* (Philadelphia, 1989), and Michael Sonenscher, *Work and Wages: Natural Law, Politics, and the Eighteenth-Century French Trades* (New York, 1989).
- 18 See Bernard Moss, *The Origins of the French Labor Movement, 1830–1914: The Socialism of Skilled Workers* (Berkeley, 1976); Sewell, *Work and*

- Revolution in France*; Fink, "New Labor History and the Powers of Historical Pessimism"; and Joyce, *Visions of the People*
- 19 David Montgomery, "Labor and the Republic in Industrial America: 1860–1920," *Le Mouvement social* 111 (1980), pp. 201–215.
 - 20 K. Steven Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism: Benoît Malon and French Reformist Socialism* (Berkeley, 1992); Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics* (New York, 1991). See also Leon Fink, *In Search of the Working Class: Essays on American Labor History and Political Culture* (Urbana, IL, 1994), pp. 179–181. On the development of republicanism and the civic virtue tradition, see the classic work by J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, 1975).
 - 21 For Britain, see Jones, *Languages of Class*; Joyce, *Visions of the People*; and Lasch, *True and Only Heaven*. For the United States, see Montgomery, "Labor and the Republic in Industrial America"; Wilentz, *Chants Democratic*; and Fink, "New Labor History and the Powers of Historical Pessimism." For France, see Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*; Claude Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France: Essai d'histoire critique* (Paris, 1982); Michael Kimmel, "Toward the Republic of Virtue: The Ideology and Organization of the Levellers and the Sans-Culottes," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change* 7 (1984), pp. 235–267; Richard Vernon, *Citizenship and Order: Studies in French Political Thought* (Toronto, 1986); and Kenneth H. Tucker, Jr., "How New Are the New Social Movements?," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 8 (1991), pp. 75–91.
 - 22 For France, see Cottureau, "Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*. For Britain, see Paul Pickering, "Class Without Words: Symbolic Communication in the Chartist Movement," *Past and Present* 112 (August 1986), pp. 144–162; and Robert Gray, "The Deconstructing of the English Working Class," *Social History* 11, no. 3 (1986), pp. 363–373. For the United States, see Leon Fink, *Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics* (Urbana, IL, 1983); Mary Ryan, "Gender and Public Access: Women's Politics in Nineteenth-Century America," in Craig Calhoun, ed., *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 259–288; and Victoria C. Hattam, *Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States* (Princeton, 1993).
 - 23 Judith Stone, *The Search for Social Peace: Reform Legislation in France, 1890–1914* (Albany, NY, 1985), p. 7. See also James T. Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American Thought, 1880–1920* (New York, 1986).
 - 24 For example, see David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925* (New York, 1988), and E. J. Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries* (New York, 1973). Jonathan Prude argues that such studies do not examine the cultural dimension of working-class repression. For Prude, the crucial question concerns how and

- why radical workers became culturally marginal. See "Directions of Labor History," *American Quarterly* 42 (1990), pp. 136–144. Christopher H. Johnson makes a similar point when he states, "As Lawrence McDonnell put it in a recent review essay against Herbert Gutman and David Montgomery, the central question is not why labor 'survived,' either by cultural maintenance or by active workplace struggle, but 'why capitalism triumphed': 'Afterword,' in Steven L. Kaplan and Cynthia J. Koepp, eds., *Work in France: Representations, Meaning, Organization, and Practice* (Ithaca, NY, 1986), p. 549.
- 25 T. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *American Historical Review* 90 (1985), pp. 567–593; Lears, "Power, Culture, and Memory," *Journal of American History* 75 (1988), pp. 137–140; Alan Trachtenberg, *The Incorporation of America: Culture and Society in the Gilded Age* (New York, 1982); Gary Gerstle, *Working-Class Americanism: The Politics of Labor in a Textile City, 1914–1960* (New York, 1989); Jones, *Languages of Class*.
 - 26 Anson Rabinbach, *The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity* (New York, 1991), p. 15.
 - 27 Lasch, *True and Only Heaven*.
 - 28 Christopher Johnson, "Lifeworld, System, and Communicative Action: The Habermasian Alternative in Social History," in Berlanstein, *Rethinking Labor History*, pp. 55–89.
 - 29 Jürgen Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 421–461.
 - 30 Moishe Postone, "Political Theory and Historical Analysis," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 170.
 - 31 See Pierre Bourdieu, *Choses dites* (Paris, 1984). See also Craig Calhoun, "Introduction," *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 38.
 - 32 On the notion of corporatism, see Maier, *In Search of Stability*, pp. 226–227, and *Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany, and Italy in the Decade After World War I* (Princeton, 1975), pp. 3ff.
 - 33 "Positivism" is a rather vague term and has a complex history. For my purposes, the central components of positivism include the merger of natural and social sciences, the unproblematic nature of empirical observations, and the belief that reality is lawlike and can be discovered through science. See Jeffrey Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. 1: Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies* (Berkeley, 1982), pp. 5–7. See also Leszek Kolakowski, *The Alienation of Reason* (New York, 1972). On positivism in France, see Christopher G. A. Bryant, *Positivism in Social Theory and Research* (New York, 1985), pp. 11–56.
 - 34 Craig Calhoun, "New Social Movements of the Nineteenth Century," *Social Science History* 17 (Fall 1993), pp. 385–427.
 - 35 Johnson, "Afterword," in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, pp. 562–563.

1 The Belle Epoque and revolutionary syndicalism

- 1 The first comment is from Poète, the second from Le Corbusier, cited in Philip Nord, *Paris Shopkeepers and the Politics of Resentment* (Princeton, 1986), p. 104.
- 2 Jean-Pierre Rioux, *Chronique d'une fin de siècle: France, 1889–1900* (Paris, 1991), p. 14. On the history of the Universal Expositions, see *Le Livre des expositions universelles, 1851–1989* (Paris, 1983), and B. Schroeder-Gudehus and A. Rasmussen, *Les Fastes du progrès: Le Guide des expos universelles, 1851–1992* (Paris, 1992).
- 3 Of the many books on the Belle Epoque, see in particular Eugen Weber, *France, Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge, MA, 1986).
- 4 Cited in Madeleine Rebérioux, “Au tournant des expos: 1889,” *Le Mouvement social* 149 (October–December 1989), p. 6. On the Exposition of 1889, see also Pascal Ory, *1889 L'Expo universelle* (Brussels, 1989); Debora Silverman, “The 1889 Exhibition: The Crisis of Bourgeois Individualism,” *Oppositions* 8 (Spring 1977), pp. 71–92; and Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology, and Style* (Berkeley, 1989), pp. 1–13. On workers and machinery in the 1867 Exposition, see Jacques Rancière and Patrick Vauday, “Going to the Expo: The Worker, His Wife, and Machines,” in Adrian Rifkin and Roger Thomas, eds., *Voices of the People: The Politics and Life of “La Sociale” at the End of the Second Empire* (New York, 1988), pp. 24–33.
- 5 Lauré Godineau, “L'Economie sociale à l'exposition universelle de 1889,” *Le Mouvement social* 149 (October–December 1989), p. 77.
- 6 Paul Rabinow, *French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), p. 91. On Le Play, see Catherine Bodard Silver, ed., *Frédéric Le Play: On Family, Work, and Social Change* (Chicago, 1982). On the relationship of paternalism to changes in working-class life and the family in the Belle Epoque, see Elinor Accampo, *Industrialization, Family Life, and Class Relations: Saint-Chamond, 1815–1914* (Berkeley, 1989).
- 7 Michael Zuckerman uses the term to refer to prerevolutionary colonial villages in the United States. See *Peaceable Kingdoms* (New York, 1973).
- 8 Michelle Perrot, “Les Classes populaires urbaines,” in Fernand Braudel and Ernest Labrousse, eds., *Histoire économique et sociale de la France, 1880–1914* (Paris, 1979), p. 500.
- 9 Of the many books on working-class sociability, see, for example, John Merriman, *The Margins of City Life: Explorations on the French Urban Frontier, 1815–1851* (New York, 1991), and Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*.
- 10 Perrot, “Les Classes populaires urbaines,” in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 469.
- 11 See James Joll, *The Second International, 1889–1914* (New York, 1966).
- 12 Enzo Collotti, “Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, Socialism, and Political Catholicism as Expressions of Mass Politics in the Twentieth Century,” in Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, eds., *Fin-de-Siècle and Its Legacy* (New York,

- 1990), p. 82. Madeleine Rebérioux states that there was an "explosion" of socialist activity between 1889 and 1895 in France. See J. Droz, ed., *Histoire générale du socialisme. Vol. II: 1875-1918* (Paris, 1974), p. 160.
- 13 I use the term "liberal public sphere" rather than Habermas's "bourgeois public sphere," for the latter connotes a rather reductionist class perspective. "Liberal" highlights the ideological (albeit not the class) aspects of the public sphere. Given my analysis, it might be more accurate to replace the term "liberal" with "republican," as this latter cultural tradition was much more influential in France than liberalism. However, because republicanism also influenced workers' discourse, the use of the phrase "republican public sphere" might be confusing, thus obscuring the major differences between the two realms.
- 14 On the importance of productivist beliefs in pre- and post-World War I Europe, see Rabinbach, *Human Motor*. *Motors, in Search of Stability and Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.
- 15 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 5-10, 285-288. On the 1900 Exposition, see also Franco Borsi and Enzo Cozzoli, *Paris 1900* (New York, 1977), pp. 25-54, *Le Livre des expositions*, pp. 108-120, and *Exposition universelle 1900* (Paris, 1900, rep. 1991).
- 16 On the symbolism associated with the first and second Industrial Revolutions, see Rosalind Williams, *Notes on the Underground: An Essay on Technology, Society, and the Imagination* (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 70-80. The 1900 Exposition had five times more electric lighting than the 1889 Exposition. See Leonard Berlanstein, *Big Business and Industrial Conflict in Nineteenth-Century France: A Social History of the Parisian Gas Company* (Berkeley, 1991), p. 14.
- 17 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 77-83. See also Karen Offen, "Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France," *American Historical Review* 89 (1984), pp. 848-875, and C. Prochasson, *Les Années électriques 1880-1910* (Paris, 1991). On the rise of consumer culture in France, see Rachel Bowlby, *Just Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreier, Gossing, and Zola* (New York, 1985), Rosalind Williams, *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1982), Michael Miller, *The Bon Marche: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1859-1920* (Princeton, 1981), and Etienne Thé, *Les inventeurs du commerce moderne* (Paris, 1966).
- 18 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 289-290.
- 19 Madeleine Rebérioux, "Les Ouvriers et les expositions universelles de Paris au XIX siècle," *Le Livre des expositions universelles*, pp. 205-206. See also Michel Bouille, "Les Congrès d'hygiène des travailleurs au début du siècle (1904-1911)," *Le Mouvement social* 161 (October-December 1992), p. 43. On the solidarists, see Theodore Zeldin, *France 1848-1945. Vol. 1: Ambition, Love, and Politics* (New York, 1973), pp. 640-682. Reid points out that French industry often used a language of paternal authority in the 1860s to discuss the nature of their firms. By 1901, French capitalists had largely

- abandoned the discourse of paternalism, and depopulation became a central issue. On these issues, and the general transition from paternalism to *solidarité*, see Donald Reid, "Metaphor and Management: The Paternal in *Germinal* and *Travail*," *French Historical Studies* 17 (Fall 1992), pp. 979–1000. On the International Congress of the Teaching of Social Science, see Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, p. 230.
- 20 Emile Durkheim, "Sociology in France in the Nineteenth Century," in Robert Bellah, ed., *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society* (Chicago, 1973), p. 22.
 - 21 Emile Durkheim, "The Intellectual Elite and Democracy," in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 59. See also Jaap van Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871–1899* (New York, 1992), pp. 206–207, 213–214.
 - 22 On Durkheim's notion of moral individualism, see Anthony Giddens, "Introduction," *Durkheim on Politics and the State* (Stanford, 1986), pp. 9–11.
 - 23 See, for example, Harry Paul, "The Debate over the Bankruptcy of Science in France," *French Historical Studies* 5 (Spring 1968), pp. 299–327.
 - 24 See Weber, *France, Fin de Siècle*, pp. 9ff.
 - 25 Thus, Durkheim's theory of the non-rational sources of the sacred influenced later anti-republican intellectuals such as Bataille. See Allen Stoekl, *Agonies of the Intellectual: Commitment, Subjectivity, and the Performative in the Twentieth-Century French Tradition* (Lincoln, NE, 1992).
 - 26 Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York, 1966). See also Susanna Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (New Haven, 1982), and van Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics*.
 - 27 *L'Echo de Paris*, April 13, 1906. This interview was part of the newspaper's series, "The Coming Revolution." The journal was extremely frightened by syndicalism. This fear seemed to resonate with at least part of the French elite, for the paper's circulation grew from 105,000 in 1906 to 150,000 on the eve of the war. See Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral, and Fernand Terrou, eds., *Histoire générale de la presse française, Vol. III* (Paris, 1972), pp. 346–347.
 - 28 Michelle Perrot, "On the Formation of the French Working Class," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 106. On the pragmatic of direct action, see Alain Cottureau, "Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France, 1848–1900," pp. 143–147 in the same volume.
 - 29 The notion of liminality is drawn from the anthropologist Victor Turner. See *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca, NY, 1977).
 - 30 *Le Petit Parisien*, January 27, 1907; on the Chatel affair, see the materials collected in the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris, Series Ba 1543. The above account draws on *Le Journal*, January 28, 1907, *L'Humanité*, January 26, 1907, *L'Eclair*, January 27, 1907, and *Le Patrie*, January 22, 1907. On the increasing political importance of funerals in the Third Republic, see Avner Ben-Amos, "Les Funérailles de Victor Hugo," in Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux*

- de mémoire, Vol. I: *La République* (Paris, 1984), pp. 473–522. On workers' politicization of funerals, see Madeleine Rebérioux, "Le Mur des Fédérés," pp. 595–618 in the same volume.
- 31 *L'Humanité*, January 28, 1907. See also *Le Soleil*, January 28, 1907, *Le Radical*, January 28, 1907, *Le Petit Parisien*, January 28, 1907, *Le Gaulois*, January 28, 1907, *L'Eclair*, January 28, 1907.
 - 32 *L'Humanité*, January 26, 1907, *L'Eclair*, January 28, 1907, *Le Gaulois*, January 28, 1907. The use of *les bagnes* to describe factories often appeared in the syndicalist newspaper *La Voix du peuple*.
 - 33 Cited in Lucien Mercier, *Les Universités populaires: 1899–1914* (Paris, 1986), p. 64.
 - 34 Fernand Pelloutier, *L'Ouvrier des deux mondes* 14 (January 4, 1898). See Pelloutier's texts collected in Jacques Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action direct: Textes choisis* (Paris, 1971).
 - 35 See George Mosse, "The French Right and the Working Classes: *Les Jaunes*," *Journal of Contemporary History* 7, no. 3–4 (July–October 1972), pp. 185–203.
 - 36 On the Griffuelhes episode, see Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*, pp. 146–147.
 - 37 *L'Eclair*, May 1, 1909.
 - 38 On the history of syndicalism, see Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*.
 - 39 On the syndicalist debate about the *rectification de tir*, see the many articles in *La Vie ouvrière*, *Le Mouvement socialiste*, and *La Bataille syndicaliste* from 1909 to 1914.
 - 40 C. Wright Mills, *Power, Politics, and People* (New York, 1963), p. 256. See also Aronowitz, *Politics of Identity*, pp. 225ff.
 - 41 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 3. My analysis of the productivism of labor in syndicalism parallels in many ways Habermas's similar critique of Marx. Habermas develops this critique in a number of different works, but in particular, see *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston, 1971), pp. 44ff., and *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, MA, 1987), pp. 75–82.
 - 42 See, for example, Axel Honneth's critique of Habermas's view of labor. For Honneth, skilled labor has a strong participatory and normative dimension: "Work and Instrumental Action," *New German Critique* 26 (1982), pp. 31–54.
 - 43 See, for example, Emile Pouget, *L'Organisation du surmenage* (Paris, 1914), and Georges Yvetot, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 17, 1913.
 - 44 See Alphonse Merrheim, *La Révolution économique* (Paris, 1919); Léon Jouhaux, *Notre syndicalisme* (Paris, 1912), and *Le Syndicalisme et la CGT* (Paris, 1920). On Jouhaux, see Bernard Georges and Denise Tintant, *Léon Jouhaux: Cinquante ans de syndicalisme*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1962). On Merrheim, see Nicholas Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim: The Emergence of Reformism in*

- Revolutionary Syndicalism, 1871–1925* (Boston, 1985). On the growth of European metalworkers and their centrality in labor militancy, see Leopold H. Haimson and Charles Tilly, eds., *Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1989). See in particular the chapter by Michelle Perrot, “From the Mechanic to the Metallo,” pp. 261–268.
- 45 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, p. 10.
- 46 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 272.
- 47 See Tucker, “How New Are the New Social Movements?”
- 48 See, for example, Michael J. Piore and Charles Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity* (New York, 1984).
- 49 John Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society* (London, 1988), p. 11.

2 Syndicalism, the New Orthodoxy, and the postmodern turn

- 1 Max Weber, *Economy and Society, Vol. I* (Berkeley, 1981).
- 2 For an example of psychological reductionism, see Ted Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, 1970).
- 3 Edouard Dolléans, *Histoire du mouvement ouvrier, Vol. II: 1871–1920* (Paris, 1967); Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*; Moss, *Origins of the French Labor Movement*.
- 4 Gary Cross, “Redefining Workers’ Control: Rationalization, Labor Time, and Union Politics in France, 1900–1928,” in James E. Cronin and Carmen Sirianni, eds., *Work, Community, and Power: The Experience of Labor in Europe and America, 1900–1925* (Philadelphia, 1983), p. 165. See also Cross, *A Quest for Time: The Reduction of Work in Britain and France, 1840–1940* (Berkeley, 1989).
- 5 Peter Schöttler, *Naissance des bourses du travail, un appareil idéologique d’état à la fin du XIX siècle* (Paris, 1985); Tony Judt, *Marxism and the French Left* (New York, 1986); Pierre Rosanvallon, *La Question syndicale* (Paris, 1988). See the critiques of Schöttler and Judt by Jacques Julliard in *Autonomie ouvrière: Etudes sur le syndicalisme d’action directe* (Paris, 1988), pp. 19–20, 285–293.
- 6 Peter Stearns, *Revolutionary Syndicalism and French Labor: A Cause Without Rebels* (New Brunswick, 1971); Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, pp. 15–16.
- 7 Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York, 1962), pp. 339–340.
- 8 F. F. Ridley, *Revolutionary Syndicalism in France: The Direct Action of Its Time* (Cambridge, MA, 1970); Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914: Les Origines françaises du fascisme* (Paris, 1978), and *Ni droite ni gauche: L’Idéologie fasciste en France* (Paris, 1983).
- 9 Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought,” in Kurt Wolff, ed., *From Karl Mannheim* (New York, 1971), p. 135. See also Julliard’s critique of Sternhell in *Autonomie ouvrière*, pp. 269–285.

- 1990), p. 92. Madeleine Rebérioux states that there was an “explosion” of socialist activity between 1889 and 1895 in France. See J. Droz, ed., *Histoire générale du socialisme, Vol. II: 1875–1918* (Paris, 1974), p. 160.
- 13 I use the term “liberal public sphere” rather than Habermas’s “bourgeois public sphere,” for the latter connotes a rather reductionist class perspective. “Liberal” highlights the ideological rather than the class aspects of the public sphere. Given my analysis, it might be more accurate to replace the term “liberal” with “republican,” as this latter cultural tradition was much more influential in France than liberalism. However, because republicanism also influenced workers’ discourse, the use of the phrase “republican public sphere” might be confusing, thus obscuring the major differences between the two realms.
 - 14 On the importance of productivist beliefs in pre- and post-World War I Europe, see Rabinbach, *Human Motor*; Maier, *In Search of Stability* and *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.
 - 15 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 5–10, 285–288. On the 1900 Exposition, see also Franco Borsi and Ezio Godoli, *Paris 1900* (New York, 1977), pp. 25–54; *Le Livre des expositions*, pp. 105–120; and *Exposition universelle 1900* (Paris, 1900, rep. 1991).
 - 16 On the symbolism associated with the first and second Industrial Revolutions, see Rosalind Williams, *Notes on the Underground: An Essay on Technology, Society, and the Imagination* (Cambridge, MA, 1990), pp. 70–80. The 1900 Exposition had five times more electric lighting than the 1889 Exposition. See Lenard Berlanstein, *Big Business and Industrial Conflict in Nineteenth-Century France: A Social History of the Parisian Gas Company* (Berkeley, 1991), p. 14.
 - 17 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 77–83. See also Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France,” *American Historical Review* 89 (1984), pp. 648–675; and C. Prochasson, *Les Années électriques, 1880–1910* (Paris, 1991). On the rise of consumer culture in France, see Rachel Bowlby, *Just Looking: Consumer Culture in Dreiser, Gissing, and Zola* (New York, 1985); Rosalind Williams, *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1982); Michael Miller, *The Bon Marché: Bourgeois Culture and the Department Store, 1869–1920* (Princeton, 1981); and Etienne Thil, *Les Inventeurs du commerce moderne* (Paris, 1966).
 - 18 Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 289–290.
 - 19 Madeleine Rebérioux, “Les Ouvriers et les expositions universelles de Paris au XIX siècle,” *Le Livre des expositions universelles*, pp. 205–206. See also Michel Bouillé, “Les Congrès d’hygiène des travailleurs au début du siècle (1904–1911),” *Le Mouvement social* 161 (October–December 1992), p. 43. On the solidarists, see Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945, Vol. I: Ambition, Love, and Politics* (New York, 1973), pp. 640–682. Reid points out that French industry often used a language of paternal authority in the 1860s to discuss the nature of their firms. By 1901, French capitalists had largely

- abandoned the discourse of paternalism, and depopulation became a central issue. On these issues, and the general transition from paternalism to *solidarité*, see Donald Reid, "Metaphor and Management: The Paternal in *Germinal* and *Travail*," *French Historical Studies* 17 (Fall 1992), pp. 979–1000. On the International Congress of the Teaching of Social Science, see Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, p. 230.
- 20 Emile Durkheim, "Sociology in France in the Nineteenth Century," in Robert Bellah, ed., *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society* (Chicago, 1973), p. 22.
 - 21 Emile Durkheim, "The Intellectual Elite and Democracy," in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 59. See also Jaap van Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics, 1871–1899* (New York, 1992), pp. 206–207, 213–214.
 - 22 On Durkheim's notion of moral individualism, see Anthony Giddens, "Introduction," *Durkheim on Politics and the State* (Stanford, 1986), pp. 9–11.
 - 23 See, for example, Harry Paul, "The Debate over the Bankruptcy of Science in France," *French Historical Studies* 5 (Spring 1968), pp. 299–327.
 - 24 See Weber, *France, Fin de Siècle*, pp. 9ff.
 - 25 Thus, Durkheim's theory of the non-rational sources of the sacred influenced later anti-republican intellectuals such as Bataille. See Allen Stoekl, *Agonies of the Intellectual: Commitment, Subjectivity, and the Performative in the Twentieth-Century French Tradition* (Lincoln, NE, 1992).
 - 26 Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York, 1966). See also Susanna Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors: Visions of the Crowd in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (New Haven, 1982), and van Ginneken, *Crowds, Psychology, and Politics*.
 - 27 *L'Echo de Paris*, April 13, 1906. This interview was part of the newspaper's series, "The Coming Revolution." The journal was extremely frightened by syndicalism. This fear seemed to resonate with at least part of the French elite, for the paper's circulation grew from 105,000 in 1906 to 150,000 on the eve of the war. See Claude Bellanger, Jacques Godechot, Pierre Guiral, and Fernand Terrou, eds., *Histoire générale de la presse française, Vol. III* (Paris, 1972), pp. 346–347.
 - 28 Michelle Perrot, "On the Formation of the French Working Class," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 106. On the pragmatic of direct action, see Alain Cottereau, "Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France, 1848–1900," pp. 143–147 in the same volume.
 - 29 The notion of liminality is drawn from the anthropologist Victor Turner. See *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (Ithaca, NY, 1977).
 - 30 *Le Petit Parisien*, January 27, 1907; on the Chatel affair, see the materials collected in the Archives de la Préfecture de Police, Paris, Series Ba 1543. The above account draws on *Le Journal*, January 28, 1907, *L'Humanité*, January 26, 1907, *L'Eclair*, January 27, 1907, and *Le Patrie*, January 22, 1907. On the increasing political importance of funerals in the Third Republic, see Avner Ben-Amos, "Les Funérailles de Victor Hugo," in Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux*

- reason in a much broader narrative, seeing it as grounded in the West's desire to dominate nature. See Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1973). Foucault too sees the disciplining tendencies of the West extending into the early modern era. See *The Order of Things* (New York, 1966).
- 36 Donald Reid, *Paris Sewers and Sewermen: Realities and Representations* (Cambridge, MA, 1991); Rancière, *Nights of Labor*.
 - 37 Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*. See also Reddy, *Rise of Market Culture*. On the "disciplining" aspect of class, see also Zygmunt Bauman, *Memories of Class: The Pre-history and After-life of Class* (London, 1982).
 - 38 William Reddy, "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere: Implications for an Historical Ethnography," *Cultural Anthropology* 7 (April 1992), pp. 135–168; Reddy, "Marriage, Honor, and the Public Sphere in Postrevolutionary France: Séparations de Corps, 1815–1848," *Journal of Modern History* 65 (September 1993), pp. 437–472.
 - 39 Reddy, "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere," p. 154.
 - 40 *Ibid.*, p. 152.
 - 41 *Ibid.*, p. 160.
 - 42 Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*, p. 208.
 - 43 *Ibid.*, p. 221.
 - 44 Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*; "Evidence of Experience."
 - 45 Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, p. 7.
 - 46 Robert Stuart, *Marxism at Work: Ideology, Class, and French Socialism During the Third Republic* (New York, 1992), p. 167; Jeremy Jennings, "The CGT and the Coriaux Affair: Syndicalist Responses to Female Labour in France Before 1914," *European History Quarterly* 21 (1991), p. 322. See also Madeleine Guilbert, *Les Femmes et l'organisation syndicale en France avant 1914* (Paris, 1966), and M. H. Zylberg-Hocquard, *Féminisme et syndicalisme en France* (Paris, 1978). On Britain, see Anna Clark, *The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of the British Working Class* (Berkeley, 1995).
 - 47 Patricia Hilden, "Women and the Labour Movement in France, 1869–1914," *Historical Journal* 29, no. 4 (1986), p. 821.
 - 48 Barbara Mitchell, *The Practical Revolutionaries: A New Interpretation of the French Anarcho-Syndicalists* (Westport, CT, 1987), pp. 110, 125, 130.
 - 49 Hilden, "Women and the French Labour Movement," p. 831.
 - 50 Jennings, "CGT and the Couriaux Affair," pp. 322–325.
 - 51 See La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XX Congrès national corporatif tenu à Lyon du 15 au 21 septembre: Compte rendu des travaux* (Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, 1919), p. 63.
 - 52 Mary Louise Roberts, *Civilization Without Sexes: Reconstructing Gender in Postwar France, 1917–1927* (Chicago, 1994), p. 217.
 - 53 Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, p. 63; on the gendered nature of Chartism, see Clark, *Struggle for the Breeches*, p. 220ff.

- 54 Keith Michael Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France: Variations on a Theme by Habermas," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 200; Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," pp. 307–319 in the same volume. See also Sonya Rose, *Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century England* (Berkeley, 1992), and Lionore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (London, 1987).
- 55 Jennifer M. Lehmann, "Durkheim's Theories of Deviance and Suicide: A Feminist Reconsideration," *American Journal of Sociology* 100 (January 1995), p. 906. Also see her book, *Durkheim and Women* (Lincoln, NE, 1994).
- 56 As Clark argues occurred in Chartism; see *Struggle for the Breeches*, pp. 142–143. See also Hanna Pitkin, *Fortune Is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolò Machiavelli* (Berkeley, 1984).
- 57 Jeff Weintraub, "The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction," paper presented at the 1990 meeting of the American Political Science Association (San Francisco, 1990), p. 20. Weintraub draws on Jean Bethke Elshtain's critique of socialist feminism in *Public Man, Private Woman* (Princeton, 1981), p. 256.
- 58 Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), pp. 388–389.
- 59 Agnes Heller, "Habermas and Marxism," in John B. Thompson and David Held, eds., *Habermas: Critical Debates* (Cambridge, MA, 1982), p. 35.
- 60 Two of the better critiques of poststructuralist philosophy from the Frankfurt School perspective are Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*; and Richard Wolin, *The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism* (New York, 1992).
- 61 Susan Bordo, "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender Scepticism," in Linda Nicholson and Nancy Fraser, eds., *Feminism/Postmodernism* (New York, 1990), pp. 136–145.
- 62 Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 429. See also Kenneth Baynes, "Communicative Ethics, the Public Sphere, and Communication Media," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 11 (December 1994), p. 320.
- 63 Calhoun, *Critical Social Theory*, pp. 241–248.
- 64 Aminzade, *Ballots or Barricades*, p. 263. Fink makes a somewhat similar argument for the transformative and self-critical capacities of the American "new labor history" of the 1960s and 1970s, despite its "gendered boundaries" derived largely from the Marxist concept of class. See *In Search of the Working Class*, p. 243.
- 65 Philip Nord, "Republican Politics and the Bourgeois Interior in Mid-Nineteenth-Century France," in Suzanne Nash, ed., *Home and Its Dislocations in Nineteenth-Century France* (Albany, NY, 1993), pp. 194–210.
- 66 Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, p. 4.
- 67 For Habermas, cultural traditions refer to the "linguistically organized stock

of interpretive patterns.” When these cultural traditions are utilized in communication, they entail “a linguistically organized stock of knowledge” (*Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II: Lifeworld and System, A Critique of Functionalist Reason* [Boston, 1987], pp. 124, 137).

- 68 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*; Reddy, *Money and Liberty*. For a critique of Habermas’s insensitivity to rhetoric and metaphor, see Iris Marion Young, “Impartiality and the Civic Public,” in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., *Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender* (Minneapolis, 1987), pp. 57–76.

3 Public discourse and civil society: Habermas, Bourdieu, and the new social movements

- 1 Rabinbach concisely states this perspective. He writes, “one of the most interesting consequences of this approach is that it permits us to see competing systems of knowledge as a central aspect of society” (*Human Motor*, p. 14).
- 2 On the proletarian public sphere, see Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience* (Minneapolis, 1993). See also Eberhard Knodler-Bunte, “The Proletarian Public Sphere and Political Organization: An Analysis of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s *The Public Sphere and Experience*,” *New German Critique* 4 (Winter 1975), pp. 51–75.
- 3 Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 44ff.
- 4 For Habermas, the phenomenologically derived notion of lifeworld provides the context for the generation of meaning. The lifeworld consists of the “culturally transmitted, prereflexively certain, intuitively available, background knowledge” (“A Reply to My Critics,” in Thompson and Held, *Habermas: Critical Debates*, p. 271).
- 5 Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society* (Boston, 1984), p. 332.
- 6 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*.
- 7 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pp. 15–18.
- 8 *Ibid.*, pp. 24–43.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 54.
- 10 As Cohen and Arato note, Habermas’s analysis of principled reasoning, based on private individuals coming together in public, did not replicate the republican ideal of citizenship. Citizens could influence state power without possessing it; thus they had a critical relationship to government, but not a participatory one (*Civil Society and Political Theory*, pp. 221–222).
- 11 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p. 132.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- 13 Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II*, pp. 332–374.
- 14 Habermas, “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere,” in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 442.

- 15 Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II*, pp. 391–396.
- 16 Some of Habermas's criticisms of positivism can be found in *Theory and Practice* (Boston, 1973).
- 17 Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston, 1979), p. 125.
- 18 Habermas, "Further Reflections on the Public Sphere," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 448.
- 19 Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory* (New York, 1993), pp. 43–71.
- 20 See Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 44ff.
- 21 Lloyd Kramer, "Habermas, History, and Critical Theory," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 243–244; see also Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," pp. 181–211 in the same volume. See also the criticisms raised in Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York, 1986); Jack Mendelson, "The Habermas–Gadamer Debate," *New German Critique* 18 (1979), pp. 44–73; David Rasmussen, *Reading Habermas* (New York, 1990); Richard Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity," in Richard Bernstein, ed., *Habermas and Modernity* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 161–176; Charles Taylor, "Language and Society," in Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds., *Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's The Theory of Communicative Action* (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 23–35. Habermas's intervention in the German historians' debate raises these questions about the universality of rationality and cultural traditions, and their relationship to ethical life. In contrast to the emphasis on German particularism by historians such as Nolte, and their attempts to relativize the brutality of Nazism, Habermas advocates a critical historiography which draws on the universalistic political culture of the West. For Habermas, learning processes have an evolutionary logic; one cannot regress behind stages of enlightenment, but can only repress them (Habermas, "A Reply," in Honneth and Joas, *Communicative Action*, p. 229). Raising validity claims forces the critical evaluation of cultural traditions, and allows movement to higher stages of reflection. Yet, in his discussion of the ambiguity of cultural tradition in the context of his conflict with the conservative historians, Habermas seemingly retreats from such strong claims. He asserts the necessity of the German people's acceptance of responsibility for Germany's past, which involves a choice about Germany's future. In Habermas's words, "With the life forms into which we were born and which have stamped our identity we take on very different sorts of historical liability (in Jaspers's sense). For the way we continue the traditions in which we find ourselves is up to us" (Habermas, *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate* [Cambridge, MA, 1989], p. 251). The claim to rationality arises in the context of concrete problems and crises – and it involves a moral and political choice based on interpretations of cultural traditions. That he phrases this as an act of moral obligation does not negate the existential choice involved.

Further, Habermas's passionate defense of a rational universalism demonstrates its fragility. In the German context, the ideal of communicative rationality and democratic universalism was forged contingently through a crisis-ridden history. It did not result from an "inexorable immanence." Habermas writes, "In the cultural nation of the Germans, a connection to universalist constitutional principles that was anchored in convictions could be formed only after – and through – Auschwitz" (*New Conservatism*, p. 227).

Finally, Habermas argues that Germans have a moral obligation to keep alive the memory of the victims of Nazism, and to pass this sensibility on to future generations. Yet Habermas does not discuss how such an act of solidarity can be transformed into criticizable validity claims; indeed, Habermas might feel that the horror of Auschwitz transcends such rational reconstruction and debate. These considerations show that something beyond rational debate structures and coordinates action and historical memory, and point to the autonomy of culture (Jeffrey Alexander, "Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems," *American Journal of Sociology* 91 [1985–1986], pp. 400–424).

- 22 See, for example, Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*; Alberto Melucci, *Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society* (Philadelphia, 1989); Alessandro Pizzorno, "On the Rationality of Democratic Choice," *Telos* 14 (1985), pp. 41–69; Alain Touraine, "Beyond Social Movements?," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 9 (1992), pp. 125–145.
- 23 On the notion of movement culture, see Lawrence Goodwyn, *The Populist Moment* (New York, 1978).
- 24 See, for example, Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, pp. 52–53; Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 109–142; Rita Felski, "Feminist Theory and Social Change," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 6 (1989), pp. 219–240.
- 25 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*; Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, pp. 49–52.
- 26 Thus, Cohen and Arato criticize Keane for advocating state planning of the economy, thus collapsing aspects of modern differentiation processes. See *Civil Society and Political Theory*, pp. 712–713 n. 125.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp. 528–531.
- 28 *Ibid.*, p. 564. For an overview of civil society from a different perspective, see Adam B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York, 1992).
- 29 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, pp. 16–20; Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, pp. 12–13, 49–52. New social movements arising from civil society, while egalitarian and democratic, do not prefigure a new society based on a single organizational model, and thus maintain the advantages created by differentiation.
- 30 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, pp. 429–433. Cohen and

Arato root their differentiated conception of civil society in Habermas's theory of the lifeworld. Within civil society, they distinguish political society (such as political parties) and economic society (such as worker councils), which respectively mediate between the political and economic institutions of the system and the private realm.

- 31 John Keane, *Public Life and Late Capitalism* (New York, 1984), pp. 7, 64–67; *Democracy and Civil Society*, p. 227.
- 32 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, p. 455.
- 33 *Ibid.*, p. 348 (emphasis in original).
- 34 For a good statement of this position, see Seyla Benhabib, "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, especially pp. 89–95.
- 35 Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, p. 542.
- 36 See Jeffrey Alexander's critique of Cohen and Arato in *Contemporary Sociology* 22 (November 1993), pp. 797–803. See also Alexander, "Habermas's New Critical Theory," pp. 400–424, and n. 21.
- 37 See, for example, the many historical criticisms of Habermas's model in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, and Benjamin Nathans, "Habermas's 'Public Sphere' in the Era of the French Revolution," *French Historical Studies* 16 (Spring 1990), pp. 620–644.
- 38 This indifference can be seen in their respective discussions of republicanism. Cohen and Arato's and Keane's focus on Tocqueville, Durkheim, and the centrality of intermediary institutions for democratizing civil society is indeed salutary. Yet their judicious view of the complexity of the liberal tradition, as embodied in Durkheim and Tocqueville, downplays the degree to which Durkheim's and Tocqueville's theories represented variants of the republicanism that Cohen and Arato criticize in Arendt's work. Durkheim and Tocqueville often criticized the anti-democratic and corrupting effects of the market. They argued that a rough material equality, along with mediating institutions, was necessary to prevent the rise of an alienating or anomic individualism and an overcentralized government. Tocqueville's and Durkheim's central concerns revolved around the moral, intellectual, and institutional conditions for the rise and maintenance of a public-spiritedness and shared solidarity, major issues within the republican tradition. See, for example, Durkheim's critique of the commodity in the preface to the second edition of *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York, 1984), pp. xxxi–xxxv. For Tocqueville, see *Democracy in America, Vol. II* (New York, 1990), pp. 48–52, 158–161. Such republican themes in Durkheim and Tocqueville are underplayed by Cohen and Arato, so that the entire tradition can be more easily dismissed. See Cohen and Arato's critique of the republican tradition in *Civil Society and Political Theory*, pp. 177–200. Keane is more sensitive to the continuing power of the civic republican tradition, but it does not seem to inform in any substantive way his understanding of modern public life (*Public Life and Late Capitalism*, pp. 143–144).

- 39 Postone raises these issues in "Jean Cohen on Marxian Critical Theory," *Theory and Society* 14 (1985), pp. 233–246, and "Political Theory and Historical Analysis," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 164–177.
- 40 See, for example, Craig Calhoun, "The 'Retardation' of French Economic Development and Social Radicalism During the Second Republic: New Lessons from the Old Comparisons with Britain," in Edmund Burke, III, ed., *Global Crises and Social Movements: Artisans, Peasants, Populists, and the World Economy* (Boulder, CO, 1988), pp. 40–71.
- 41 See Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France"; and Geoff Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 289–339, and David Zaret, "Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres in Seventeenth-Century England," pp. 212–235, both in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*.
- 42 Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, pp. 52–53.
- 43 Jean Cohen, "Rethinking Social Movements," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 28 (1983), p. 104. See also Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, pp. 52–53.
- 44 Calhoun, "Introduction," *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 39.
- 45 On sit-down strikes in France, see Seidman, *Workers Against Work*, pp. 212ff.
- 46 See Tucker, "How New Are the New Social Movements?," pp. 75–98.
- 47 Thus, while Keane discusses civic humanism, he does not explore the workers' version of this form of radical republicanism (*Public Life and Late Capitalism*, pp. 143–144).
- 48 Calhoun, "Introduction," *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 38.
- 49 Pierre Bourdieu, *Choses dites*, p. 124; Fritz Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective, 1890–1920* (New York, 1992), p. 5.
- 50 Pierre Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus* (Paris, 1984), p. 107; *Choses dites*, pp. 85, 117.
- 51 As Bourdieu states, "the university field is, like any other field, the locus of a struggle to determine the conditions and the criteria of legitimate membership and legitimate hierarchy, that is, to determine which properties are pertinent, effective, and liable to function as capital so as to generate the specific profits guaranteed by the field. The different sets of individuals (more or less constituted into groups) who are defined by these different criteria have a vested interest in them." Bourdieu argues that the university field is also dependent on other fields which promote academic "morphological changes," such as an increase or decrease in the number of students which has ramifications for the composition and number of faculty (*Homo Academicus*, p. 11).
- 52 Pierre Favre, *Naissance de la science politique en France (1870–1914)* (Paris, 1989), p. 12.
- 53 Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), p. 185.
- 54 Craig Calhoun, "Democracy, Nationalism, and Political Communities," *Newsletter of the Comparative and Historical Sociology Section* 5 (Summer

1993), p. 3. On the rise of new intellectual fields and disciplines within the university, see Christophe Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels* (Paris, 1990), and Jean-Louis Fabiani, *Les Philosophes de la république* (Paris, 1989). Bourdieu's approach enriches any discussion of public discourse, for questions of objective, interlocking, and competing positions must be taken into account. Yet Bourdieu's approach is overly instrumental. He adopts *tout court* Weber's theory of rationalization; for Bourdieu, like Weber, rationality cannot reconcile. Reason cannot contribute to shared and meaningful solidarity that moves beyond interest and struggle. Further, it is difficult to envision, given Bourdieu's theory, how people can reflexively and collectively change social conditions and reconstitute their identities. In sum, Bourdieu has trouble accounting for the emergence of new cultural forms that transcend their particular field.

- 55 Jeffrey C. Alexander and Philip Smith, "The Discourse of American Civil Society: A New Proposal for Cultural Studies," *Theory and Society* 22 (April 1993), p. 161.

4 The liberal and proletarian public spheres in nineteenth-century France

- 1 Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, 1990), pp. 38–39. See also his *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Stanford, 1991).
- 2 Alain Touraine, *Critique de la modernité* (Paris, 1992).
- 3 Touraine defines historicity as the capacity to produce the cultural orientations by which society is normatively organized. See *The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements* (New York, 1981), p. 25.
- 4 *Ibid.* See also Giddens, *Consequences of Modernity*, p. 156. On Simmel's notion of sociability, see "Sociability," in Donald Levine, ed., *Georg Simmel on Individuality and Social Forms* (Chicago, 1971), pp. 127–140.
- 5 On the rise of social democratic perspectives in Europe and the United States, see Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*. On neo-corporatist bargaining, see Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.
- 6 Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II*, p. 50.
- 7 Frederick Engels, preface to the third German edition of Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York, 1963), p. 13.
- 8 Bruce Robbins, "Introduction: The Public as Phantom," in Robbins, ed., *The Phantom Public Sphere* (Minneapolis, 1993), p. xvii.
- 9 On the development of the right wing in France, see René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle* (Philadelphia, 1966); Eugen Weber, *The Action Française* (Stanford, 1962); Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism* (New York, 1965); Robert Soucy, *French Fascism: The First Wave, 1924–1933* (New Haven, 1986); and Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*.
- 10 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; see also David Blackburn, *Populists and Patricians: Essays in Modern German History* (Boston, 1987).

- 11 Most of the literature utilizing Habermas's notion of the public sphere concentrates on prerevolutionary France. On the development of the public sphere in France, see Patrick Champagne, *Faire l'opinion* (Paris, 1991); Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* (Durham, NC, 1991); Mona Ozouf, "L'Opinion publique," in Keith Baker, ed., *The French Revolution, Vol. I: The Political Culture of the Old Regime* (New York, 1987), pp. 419–434; Jeffrey Sawyer, *Printed Poison: Pamphlet Propaganda, Faction Politics, and the Public Sphere in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley, 1990); Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*; Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere*; Hunt, *Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution*; Dena Goodman, *The Republic of Letters: A Cultural History of the French Enlightenment* (Ithaca, NY, 1994); and Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley, 1993).
- 12 On the development of popular culture among the "plebeian" classes, see Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World* (Bloomington, IN, 1984); and Peter Burke, *Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe* (New York, 1978).
- 13 See Peter Uwe Hohendal, "Critical Theory, Public Sphere, and Culture: Jürgen Habermas and His Critics," *New German Critique* 16 (Winter 1979), pp. 105–107; Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*.
- 14 Eley, "Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 305.
- 15 Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*, pp. 83–84.
- 16 On the development of the proletarian public sphere in France, see Michelle Perrot, *Les Ouvriers en grève*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1974); Perrot, *Workers on Strike: France, 1871–1890* (New Haven, 1987); and Alain Dalotel, Alain Faure, and Jean-Claude Friermuth, *Aux Origines de la Commune: Le Mouvement des réunions publiques à Paris, 1868–1870* (Paris, 1980). For the United States, see Ryan, "Gender and Public Access," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 259–288. For Britain, see Jones, *Languages of Class*; Pickering, "Class Without Words," pp. 144–162; and the critique of Jones in Gray, "Deconstructing of the English Working Class." For Germany, see Mary Nolan, "Economic Crisis, State Policy, and Working-Class Formation in Germany, 1870–1900," pp. 352–393, and Jürgen Kocka, "Problems of Working-Class Formation in Germany: The Early Years," pp. 279–351, both in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*.
- 17 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*; Furet, *Penser la Révolution française*; Keith Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution* (New York, 1990).
- 18 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, pp. 7–8.
- 19 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*; Chartier, *Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, p. 33; Champagne, *Faire l'opinion*, p. 45.
- 20 Chartier, *Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, pp. 17–23; Margaret Jacob, "The Enlightenment Redefined: The Formation of Modern Civil Society," *Social Research* 58 (Summer 1991), pp. 475–495; and her book,

Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe (New York, 1991).

- 21 See Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*; Natalie Zemon Davis, *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1965); Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge, MA, 1982); Alain Faure, *Paris Carême-Prenant: Du Carnaval à Paris au XIX^{ème} siècle* (Paris, 1978); and Arlette Farge, *Subversive Words: Public Opinion in Eighteenth-Century France* (University Park, PA, 1995).
- 22 Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York, 1955).
- 23 François Furet, "Transformations in the Historiography of the Revolution," in Ferenc Fehér, ed., *The French Revolution and the Birth of Modernity* (Berkeley, 1990), pp. 275–276; Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 198; Chartier, *Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, pp. 30–31.
- 24 Chartier, *Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, pp. 27–28. See also Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 187; Champagne, *Faire l'opinion*, p. 47; Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, pp. 187–188; and Schama, *Citizens*.
- 25 Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*, p. 371; see also Reddy, *Rise of Market Culture*, p. 335; Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston, 1957); Sewell, *Work and Revolution*; and Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*. Schama sums up much of the literature refuting the idea that French Revolution was a bourgeois revolution. See *Citizens*, pp. 905–906.
- 26 See James Smith Allen, *In the Public Eye: A History of Reading in Modern France, 1800–1940* (Princeton, 1991), and François Furet and Jacques Ozouf, *Reading and Writing: Literacy in France from Calvin to Jules Ferry* (New York, 1982).
- 27 See Sabel and Zeitlin, "Historical Alternatives to Mass Production"; Patrick O'Brien and Charles Keyder, *Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780–1914* (London, 1978); and Craig Calhoun, "The Retardation of French Economic Development and Social Radicalism During the Second Republic," in Burke, *Global Crises and Social Movements*, pp. 40–71.
- 28 Tocqueville, *Old Regime and the French Revolution*; Lloyd Kramer, *Threshold of a New World: Intellectuals and the Exile Experience in Paris, 1830–1848* (Ithaca, NY, 1988), pp. 145–147; and Louis Chevalier, *Laboring Classes and Dangerous Classes* (New York, 1973).
- 29 Reddy, "Marriage, Honor, and the Public Sphere in Postrevolutionary France," pp. 437–472.
- 30 Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, pp. 11–20.
- 31 Vernon, *Citizenship and Moral Order*; Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*; Baker, "Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France," in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*.
- 32 On the history of liberalism, see Pierre Manent, *An Intellectual History of*

- Liberalism* (Princeton, 1994); George Armstrong Kelly, *The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville, and French Liberalism* (New York, 1992); and Stephen Holmes, *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism* (New Haven, 1984).
- 33 See Steven Seidman, *Liberalism and the Origins of European Social Theory* (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 152–160; Anthony Giddens, “Classical Social Theory and the Origins of Modern Sociology,” *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (1976), pp. 703–729; and Nicolet, *L’Idée républicaine en France*. See also Pierre Rosanvallon, *Le Moment Guizot* (Paris, 1985). This latter work refutes the idea that Guizot was a simplistic liberal who merely advocated individual rights. As Rosanvallon shows, Guizot’s arguments about grounding rationality in civil society were meant to bolster the rule of (an albeit limited) republicanism.
 - 34 Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France,” in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 202; Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*. On the civic humanist tradition, see the classic work by Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*. See also Quentin Skinner, “The Republican Ideal of Political Liberty,” in Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner, and Maurizio Viroli, eds., *Machiavelli and Republicanism* (New York, 1990), pp. 293–309.
 - 35 Maier, *In Search of Stability*, p. 235. See also Adrian Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (New York, 1990); and Nicolet, *L’Idée républicaine en France*.
 - 36 Alan Ryan, “Property,” in Terence Ball, James Farr, and Russell L. Hanson, eds., *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (New York, 1989), p. 317. See especially Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*; also Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (New York, 1981).
 - 37 James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana* (London, 1887).
 - 38 Ryan, “Property,” in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, pp. 317–325.
 - 39 Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*, pp. 334–340. See Montesquieu, *Spirit of Laws* (Berkeley, 1977). On Montesquieu, see Judith Shklar, *Montesquieu* (New York, 1987).
 - 40 Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, p. 181.
 - 41 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Baltimore, 1968). Of the many books on Rousseau, see Judith Shklar, *Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory* (New York, 1969); Jean Starobinski, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et l’obstacle* (Paris, 1971); and Alessandro Ferrara, *Modernity and Authenticity: A Study of the Social and Ethical Thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau* (Albany, NY, 1993).
 - 42 Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 505.
 - 43 Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*.
 - 44 Michael Walzer, “Citizenship,” in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, p. 211.
 - 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 211–212. On the Jacobins, see Michael Kennedy, *The Jacobin*

Clubs in the French Revolution: The First Years (Princeton, 1982); and Crane Brinton, *The Jacobins* (New York, 1930).

- 46 Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*, pp. 345–354. On the sans-culottes, see R. B. Rose, *The Making of the Sans-culottes: Democratic Ideas and Institutions in Paris, 1789–1792* (Manchester, 1983); and Albert Soboul, *The Parisian Sans-culottes and the French Revolution* (Oxford, 1964).
- 47 Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*, p. 353; see also Ryan, “Property,” in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, p. 321.
- 48 J. Peter Euben, “Corruption,” in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, p. 237. See also Nicolet, *L’Idée républicaine en France*.
- 49 William Leiss, “Technology and Degeneration: The Sublime Machine,” in J. Edward Chamberlin and Sander L. Gilman, eds., *Degeneration: The Dark Side of Progress* (New York, 1985), p. 150. See also Nicolet, *L’Idée républicaine en France*.
- 50 Ryan, “Property,” in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, p. 328.
- 51 *Ibid.*, p. 329; see also Walzer, “Citizenship,” Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, p. 216; and Euben, “Corruption,” p. 239 in the same volume.
- 52 Jeff Weintraub, “Democracy and the Market: A Marriage of Inconvenience,” in Margaret Latas Nugent, ed., *From Leninism to Freedom: The Challenges of Democratization* (Boulder, CO, 1992), pp. 57–60.
- 53 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 32–33. See also Mary Ann Clawson, *Constructing Brotherhood: Class, Gender, and Fraternalism* (Princeton, 1989).
- 54 As Pocock states, “The decline of virtue had as its logical corollary the rise of interest”: *Machiavellian Moment*, p. 521.
- 55 See, for example, Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, p. 5; and Ronald Aminzade, “Class Analysis, Politics, and French Labor History,” in Berlanstein, *Rethinking Labor History*, pp. 106–107. On the relationship between American and French republicanism, see Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics* (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
- 56 Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century France,” in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, p. 193.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 202.
- 58 Turgot was an early example of this perspective. See Keith Baker, “Closing the French Revolution: Saint-Simon and Comte,” in François Furet and Mona Ozouf, eds., *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, Vol. III: The Transformation of Political Culture, 1789–1848* (New York, 1987), p. 324.
- 59 Baker, “Defining the Public Sphere in the Eighteenth Century,” in Calhoun, *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, pp. 194–196. See also J. A. W. Gunn, “Public Interest,” in Ball, Farr, and Hansen, *Political Innovation*, pp. 201–202; and Albert Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph* (Princeton, 1977).
- 60 William Sewall, Jr., *A Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution: The Abbé Sièyes and “What is the Third Estate?”* (Durham, NC, 1994); Keith Michael Baker,

- Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics* (Chicago, 1975); and Jan Goldstein, "Foucault and the Post-Revolutionary Self: The Uses of Cousinian Pedagogy in Nineteenth-Century France," in Goldstein, ed., *Foucault and the Writing of History* (Cambridge, MA, 1994), pp. 100–107.
- 61 See Rosanvallon, *Le Moment Guizot*, p. 103; Baker, "Closing the French Revolution," in Furet and Ozouf, *French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Culture, Vol. III*, pp. 324–331; Krishan Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress: The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1978), pp. 39–40; and Robert Wokler, "Saint-Simon and the Passage from Political to Social Science," in Anthony Pagden, ed., *The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (New York, 1987), pp. 325–338.
- 62 Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, p. 46. See also Lasch, *True and Only Heaven*; Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France*, pp. 462–463; and Nicole Dhombres and Jean Dhombres, *Naissance d'un pouvoir: Science et savants en France (1793–1824)* (Paris, 1989). On positivism in France, see Bryant, *Positivism in Social Theory and Research*.
- 63 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, pp. 28–29. For an interesting Bourdieu-inspired account of the emergence of social science in France, see Johan Heilbron, *The Rise of Social Science* (Minneapolis, 1995).
- 64 George Weisz, *The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863–1914* (Princeton, 1983), p. 19; Terry Shinn, "Science, Tocqueville, and the State: The Organization of Knowledge in Modern France," *Social Research* 59 (Fall 1992), p. 540; Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, pp. 79–80; Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France*, p. 295; Priscilla Clark, *Literary France: The Making of a Culture* (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 24–25.
- 65 Shinn, "Science, Tocqueville, and the State," p. 544. See also R. D. Anderson, *Education in France, 1848–1870* (New York, 1975), and Jean-François Picard, "L'Organisation de la science en France depuis 1870: Un Tour des recherches actuelles," *French Historical Studies* 17 (Spring 1991), pp. 249–268.
- 66 Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, p. 46; See also Rosanvallon, *Le Moment Guizot*, pp. 15–18. On Guizot, see Marina Valensise, ed., *Guizot et la culture politique de son temps* (Paris, 1991).
- 67 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Vol. I* (New York, 1990), p. 7.
- 68 Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Vol. II* (New York, 1990), pp. 100–121. See also Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Vol. I*, pp. 62–69.
- 69 Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Vol. II*, pp. 98–106.
- 70 See Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York, 1979); Pierre Rosanvallon, *La Crise de l'état providence* (Paris, 1981), pp. 25–27.
- 71 Tocqueville, *Democracy in America, Vol. II*, pp. 98–106; see also Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven Tipton, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Berkeley, 1985).
- 72 Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, p. 414.

- 73 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 37–47.
- 74 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, pp. 56–59.
- 75 Robert Bezucha, *The Lyon Uprising of 1834: Social and Political Conflict in the Early July Monarchy* (Cambridge, MA, 1974).
- 76 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 210–214; Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 45–46.
- 77 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 195–201.
- 78 Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789–1848,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 64; Lynn Hunt and George Sheridan, “Corporatism, Association, and the Language of Labor in France, 1750–1850,” *Journal of Modern History* 58 (December 1986), p. 820; Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*; K. Stephen Vincent, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism* (New York, 1984), p. 132.
- 79 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 64–71; see also Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, pp. 7–8.
- 80 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 80, 110–113. See also Sewell, *Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution*.
- 81 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, p. 39; Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class, 1789–1848,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 53–56.
- 82 Patrick Joyce, “The Historical Meanings of Work: An Introduction,” in Joyce, ed., *The Historical Meanings of Work* (New York, 1987), p. 21; Vernon, *Citizenship and Order*, pp. 153–156. On Britain, see John Rule, “The Property of Skill in the Period of Manufacture,” in Joyce, *Historical Meanings of Work*, pp. 102–118. See also Michael James, “Pierre-Louis Roederer, Jean-Baptiste Say, and the Concept of *Industrie*,” *History of Political Economy* 9 (1977), pp. 455–475; and Thomas E. Kaiser, “Politics and Political Economy in the Thought of the Ideologues,” *History of Political Economy* 12 (1980), pp. 141–160.
- 83 Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 55–56; see also Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*.
- 84 *Ibid.*, p. 13; Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, p. 67.
- 85 Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern France*, p. 44.
- 86 Cottureau, “The Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 115; Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*.
- 87 See Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*, pp. 370–375.
- 88 Hunt and Sheridan, “Corporatism, Association, and the Language of Labor in France,” pp. 834–837; Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830–1852* (Princeton, 1984); Paul E. Corcoran, “Early French Socialism Reconsidered – I. The Propaganda of Fourier and Cabet,” *History of European Ideas* 7 (1986), pp. 469–488; Paul E. Corcoran, “Early

- French Socialism Reconsidered – II. Social Science, Rhetoric and Historical Progress,” *History of European Ideas* 7 (1986), pp. 651–660; Christopher Johnson, *Utopian Communism in France: Cabet and the Icarians, 1839–1851* (Ithaca, NY, 1974); and Gareth Stedman Jones, “Utopian Socialism Reconsidered,” in Raphael Samuel, ed., *People’s History and Socialist Theory* (Boston, 1981), pp. 138–145.
- 89 Stedman Jones, “Utopian Socialism Reconsidered,” in Samuel, *People’s History and Socialist Theory*; Hunt and Sheridan, “Corporatism, Association, and the Language of Labor in France,” pp. 839–840. See also Ellen Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France: The Politics of Consumption, 1834–1930* (Ithaca, NY, 1991).
- 90 Berenson, *Populist Religion*.
- 91 See Jonathan Beecher, *Charles Fourier* (Berkeley, 1987); and Vincent, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism*, pp. 74–75.
- 92 Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, pp. 39–44; see also Frank Manuel, *The New World of Henri Saint-Simon* (Notre Dame, IN, 1963).
- 93 See Claire Goldberg Moses, *French Feminism in the Nineteenth Century* (Albany, NY, 1984); and Claire Goldberg Moses and Leslie Wahl Rabine, *Feminism, Socialism, and French Romanticism* (Bloomington, IN, 1993).
- 94 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, p. 108. On the Blanquists, see Patrick Hutton, *The Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition: The Blanquists in French Politics, 1834–1893* (Berkeley, 1981). On the influence of the Blanquists in the *réunions publiques* preceding the Paris Commune, see also Dalotel, Faure, and Freiermuth, *Aux Origines de la Commune*, p. 93.
- 95 See Rancière, *Nights of Labor*, and Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*.
- 96 Moss, *Origins of the French Labor Movement*.
- 97 Berenson, *Populist Religion*; Hunt and Sheridan, “Corporatism, Association, and the Language of Labor in France.”
- 98 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 19, 38; Merriman, *Red City*, pp. 68–69.
- 99 For a collection of excerpts from worker literature and newspapers of the period, see Alain Faure and Jacques Rancière, eds., *La Parole ouvrière, 1830–1851* (Paris, 1976). See also Mark Traugott, ed., *The French Worker. Autobiographies from the Early Industrial Era* (Berkeley, 1993).
- 100 Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working-Class,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 61; Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 142, 195–205.
- 101 These ideas also influenced the development of consumer cooperatives. See Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France*.
- 102 Sewell, *Work and Revolution*, pp. 236, 240; Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, p. 65.
- 103 William Sewell, “Beyond 1793: Babeuf, Louis Blanc and the Genealogy of ‘Social Revolution,’” in Furet and Ozouf, *French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, Vol. III*, p. 524. See also Baker, *Inventing the French Revolution*, pp. 212–222.

- 104 Michelle Perrot, "Le Regard de l'Autre: Les Patrons français vus par les ouvriers (1880–1914)," in Maurice Levy-Leboyer, ed., *Le Patronat de la seconde industrialisation* (Paris, 1979), pp. 295–306; Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 42–44.
- 105 See Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*; Hanagan, *Nascent Proletarians*; Moss, *Origins of the French Labor Movement*; Joan Scott, *The Glassworkers of Carmaux: French Craftsmen and Political Action in a Nineteenth-Century Town* (Cambridge, 1974).
- 106 Merriman, *Red City*; Hanagan, *Nascent Proletarians*; Tyler Stovall, *The Red Belt of Paris* (Berkeley, 1990).
- 107 Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*; Susanna Barrows, "After the Commune: Alcoholism, Temperance, and Literature in the Early Third Republic," in John Merriman, ed., *Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1980), pp. 205–218; and Maurice Agulhon, "Working Class and Sociability in France Before 1848," in Pat Thane, Geoffrey Crossick, and Roderick Floud, eds., *The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm* (New York, 1984), pp. 37–66. On cafés, see Traugott, "Introduction," *French Worker*, pp. 24–27; and Susanna Barrows, "'Parliaments of the People': The Political Culture of Cafés in the Early Third Republic," Barrows and Robin Room, eds., *Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History* (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 87–97.
- 108 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, p. 12. See also Merriman, *Red City*, p. 106; Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*; and Jacques Viard, "Les Origines du socialisme républicain," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 33 (January–March 1986), pp. 133–147.
- 109 John Merriman, *Agony of the Republic*; Merriman, *Red City*, pp. 78, 106; Donzelot, *L'Invention du social*; Aminzade, *Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism*; Agulhon, *La République au village*; Ted Margadant, *French Peasants in Revolt: The Insurrection of 1851* (Princeton, 1979).
- 110 Hanagan, *Nascent Proletarians*, pp. 18–19; Merriman, *Red City*.
- 111 Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, pp. 200–203; see also his analysis of the republican critique of mercenaries (p. 89).
- 112 Lasch, *True and Only Heaven*, p. 302; Vernon, *Citizenship and Moral Order*, pp. 147–159.
- 113 See Alain Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France, 1800–1950* (Paris, 1989); Gerard Noiriel, *Workers in French Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1990), p. 90.
- 114 Vincent, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism*, p. 12. See Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Selected Writings*, ed. Stewart Edwards (New York, 1969).
- 115 Vincent, *Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and the Rise of French Republican Socialism*, p. 165; Vernon, *Citizenship and Moral Order*, pp. 74–75, 85–87.
- 116 Proudhon, *Selected Writings*, p. 82.

- 117 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, pp. 68-75. On the relationship of Proudhon to revolutionary syndicalism, see Annie Kriegel, *Le Pain et les roses: Jalons pour une histoire des socialismes* (Paris, 1968), pp. 33-50.
- 118 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, p. 8; Calhoun, "Classical Theory and the French Revolution of 1848," pp. 210-224.
- 119 Perrot, *Les Ouvriers en grève*; Hutton, *Cult of the Revolutionary Tradition*; Cottureau, "Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*.
- 120 Mark Traugott, *Armies of the Poor* (Princeton, 1985); Merriman, *Red City*, p. 105; Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France*; Charles Tilly and Lynn Lees, "The People of June, 1848," in Roger Price, ed., *Revolution and Reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic* (London, 1975), pp. 170-209; Ronald Aminzade, *Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism: A Study of Mid-Nineteenth-Century Toulouse, France* (Albany, NY, 1981); Christopher Johnson, "Economic Change and Artisan Discontent: The Tailors' History, 1800-1848," in Price, *Revolution and Reaction*, pp. 87-114.
- 121 Sewell, "Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 65-66; Aminzade, *Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism*; Agulhon, *La République au village*.
- 122 Christopher Johnson, *The Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc, 1789-1920* (New York, 1995), pp. 122-129. See also Margadant, *French Peasants in Revolt*; and Amann, *Revolution and Mass Democracy*.
- 123 Johnson, *Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc*, p. 128.
- 124 Cottureau, "Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures in France," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 144.
- 125 Karl Marx, *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*; Tocqueville, *Recollections* (New York, 1949).
- 126 François Furet, *Revolutionary France, 1770-1880* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p. 448. On the Second Empire, see also J. M. Thompson, *Louis Napoleon and the Second Empire* (New York, 1955); and Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945, Vol. I*, pp. 504-560.
- 127 Furet, *Revolutionary France*, p. 451.
- 128 *Ibid.*, p. 455; Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945*, p. 513.
- 129 Furet, *Revolutionary France*, p. 451.
- 130 *Ibid.*, pp. 463-464; Zeldin, *France, 1848-1945*, p. 545.
- 131 *Ibid.*, p. 556; Johnson, *Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc*, p. 151.
- 132 James Joll, *The Anarchists* (New York, 1964), p. 79.
- 133 Furet, *Revolutionary France*, pp. 468-470.
- 134 Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France*, pp. 34-35.
- 135 Rabinow, *French Modern*, p. 82.
- 136 Silver, introduction to *Frédéric Le Play on Family, Work, and Social Change*, pp. 20-22.
- 137 Rabinow, *French Modern*, pp. 82-94. On the "disciplining" of the working-class

- family, see also Jacques Donzelot, *The Policing of Families* (New York, 1979).
- 138 Rabinow, *French Modern*, pp. 102–103.
- 139 Rosanvallon, *La Question syndicale*, pp. 204–205.
- 140 Alain Cottereau, “Denis Poulot’s *Le Sublime* – A Preliminary Study,” in Rifkin and Thomas, *Voices of the People*, p. 166; Dalotel, Faure and Freiermuth, *Aux Origines de la Commune*, pp. 117–150.
- 141 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 249–251.
- 142 George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France* (New York, 1966), p. 6. On the Guesdists, see Claude Willard, *Le Mouvement socialiste en France (1893–1905): Les Guesdists* (Paris, 1965); and Stuart, *Marxism at Work*. On the 1879 Congress, see Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, pp. 75–78, and, more generally, Jean Maitron, *Le Mouvement anarchiste en France, Vol. I: Des Origines à 1914* (Paris, 1975).
- 143 Stuart, *Marxism at Work*, p. 63.
- 144 *Ibid.*, p. 128.
- 145 *Ibid.*, pp. 193–200.
- 146 *Ibid.*, pp. 242–243.
- 147 Sewell, “Artisans, Factory Workers, and the Formation of the French Working Class,” in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 65–66. See also Aminzade, *Class, Politics, and Early Industrial Capitalism*.
- 148 Calhoun, “Classical Social Theory and the Revolution of 1848,” p. 216; see also Donzelot, *L’Invention du social*, and Rosanvallon, *La Question syndicale*.
- 149 Calhoun, “Classical Social Theory and the Revolution of 1848.” See also Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, 1976); and Roger Price, *A Concise History of Modern France* (New York, 1993), pp. 143–149.
- 150 Aminzade, *Ballots and Barricades*, pp. 37–47.
- 151 Aminzade, “Class, Politics, and French Labor History,” in Berlanstein, *Rethinking Labor History*, pp. 106–107.
- 152 Sanford Elwitt, *The Third Republic Defended: Bourgeois Reform in France, 1880–1914* (Baton Rouge, LA, 1986), pp. 19ff.
- 153 See Kloppenborg, *Uncertain Victory*.

5 The fin-de-siècle public sphere, the academic field, and the social sciences

- 1 Quoted in Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim, His Life and Work: An Historical and Critical Study* (London, 1973), p. 371.
- 2 Stone, *Search for Social Peace*, p. 7.
- 3 Maier, *In Search of Stability*, p. 266.
- 4 Durkheim, “Intellectual Elite and Democracy,” in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 59.
- 5 Fabiani, *Les Philosophes de la république*, pp. 26–27. Self-help books on

hygiene were especially popular, as many doctors wrote popularized versions on medicine. The publisher Camille Flammarion had success with a popular astronomy series. The sales of science fiction, such as the novels of Jules Verne, were very strong at the end of the century. Amusing scientific books for children were very popular. More esoteric scientific works also occasionally sold well.

- 6 Edward Berenson, *The Trial of Madame Caillaux* (Berkeley, 1992), pp. 20, 209–217. See also Ruth Harris, *Murders and Madness: Medicine, Law, and Society in the Fin-de-Siècle* (New York, 1989); Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, pp. 65–75; and Jean-Yves Mollier, *L'Argent et les lettres: Histoire du capitalisme d'édition, 1880–1920* (Paris, 1988).
- 7 See the discussion between Durkheim and various economists, including Leroy-Beaulieu, in “De la position de l'économie politique dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales,” *Journal des économistes* 20 (April 1908), pp. 109–121.
- 8 Donzelot, *L'Invention du social*; François Ewald, *L'Etat providence* (Paris, 1986); Rosanvallon, *La Crise de l'état providence*. See also Donzelot, “Mobilization of Society,” pp. 169–179, Ewald, “Insurance and Risk,” pp. 197–210, and Daniel Defert, “‘Popular Life’ and Insurance Technology,” pp. 211–233, all in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., *The Foucault Effect* (Chicago, 1991).
- 9 Bourdieu, *Homo Academicus*, p. xvii.
- 10 Rosanvallon, *La Question syndicale*, pp. 100–101; Merriman, *Margins of City Life*, pp. 77–78. See also Barrows, *Distorting Mirrors*.
- 11 Allan Mitchell, *The Divided Path: The German Influence on Social Reform in France After 1870* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991), pp. 36–38; Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, pp. 21–22; Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France*, pp. 77–83. See also Weber, *France, Fin de Siècle*; Robert Nye, *Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France: The Medical Concept of National Decline* (Princeton, 1984); Berenson, *Trial of Madame Caillaux*; Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*; and Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*
- 12 Rosanvallon, *Le Moment Guizot*.
- 13 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 211.
- 14 *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 216 (emphasis in original).
- 15 Cited in Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France*, p. 482.
- 16 On the opportunists, see *ibid.*, pp. 156–157, 190–191, and Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, pp. 605–639. On Germany as a model of modernization, see Edward Tiryakian, “Emile Durkheim,” in Tom Bottomore and Robert Nisbet, eds., *A History of Sociological Analysis* (New York, 1978), p. 194; and Mitchell, *Divided Path*.
- 17 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 215.
- 18 On the issue of welfare reform toward women and the family in the Third Republic, see Mary Lynn Stewart, *Women, Work, and the French State: Labour Protection and Social Patriarchy, 1879–1919* (Kingston, Ont., 1989); Susan Pedersen, *Family, Dependence, and the Origins of the Welfare State:*

- Britain and France, 1914–1945* (New York, 1993); and Philip Nord, “The Welfare State in France, 1870–1914,” *French Historical Studies* 18 (Spring 1994), pp. 821–838.
- 19 Christophe Charle, *Les Elites de la république* (Paris, 1988); *Naissance des intellectuels*, pp. 11–20.
- 20 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 88; Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, p. 20. See also Clark, *Literary France*, and Antoine Compagnon, *La Troisième République des lettres, de Flaubert à Proust* (Paris, 1983).
- 21 Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, pp. 10–12.
- 22 *Ibid.*, pp. 48–55. See also Clark, *Literary France*, pp. 159ff.; Jerrold Siegal, *Bohemian Paris: Culture, Politics, and the Boundaries of Bourgeois Life, 1830–1930* (New York, 1986). As the ideal of professionalism emerged, many new social science journals appeared. The *Revue philosophique*, founded in 1876 by Theodule Ribot, helped pioneer the development of psychology in France. In 1893, the *Revue de métaphysique* was founded, followed shortly thereafter by many more specialized journals including the *Revue internationale de sociologie*, *L’Année psychologique*, *L’Année sociologique*, *Le Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique*, *La Revue de synthèse historique*, *La Revue universitaire*, *Le Bulletin de la société moderne*, and *Le Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*. The influence of Le Play’s school survived in the journals *La Réforme sociale* and *La Science sociale*. See Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, pp. 178–186.
- 23 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 88; see also Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, p. 20.
- 24 Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, pp. 178–186.
- 25 Weisz, *Emergence of Modern Universities in France*, p. 9; Fabiani, *Les Philosophes de la république*, p. 22. On the history of higher education in France, see Robert J. Smith, *The Ecole Normale Supérieure and the Third Republic* (Albany, NY, 1982); Harry W. Paul, *From Knowledge to Power: The Rise of the Science Empire in France* (New York, 1985); Terry N. Clark, *Prophets and Patrons: The French University and the Emergence of the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA, 1973); and John Weiss, *The Making of Technological Man: The Social Origins of French Engineering Education* (Cambridge, MA, 1983).
- 26 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 168; Prochasson, *Les Années électriques*, pp. 208–209. See also A. Prost, *Histoire de l’enseignement en France (1800–1967)* (Paris, 1968). Far from simply tying educational improvement to economic trends, reformers believed that students needed a more rational understanding of society and morality in the face of the increasing complexity of modernity. Despite governmental instability, the Third Republic’s desire for more engineers and researchers in high technology resulted in the founding of several applied schools of science, including L’Ecole supérieure de physique et chimie (1882), L’Ecole supérieure d’électricité (1894), and L’Ecole supérieure d’aéronautique (1908).

- 27 Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, p. 45; Fabiani, *Les Philosophes de la république*, pp. 9, 44; Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 215; Weisz, *Emergence of Modern Universities in France*, p. 19.
- 28 The emergence of social science was consequently shaped by the rivalries between faculties of law, letters, and the conservative L'Ecole libre des sciences politiques. See Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 237; William Logue, *From Philosophy to Sociology: The Evolution of French Liberalism* (DeKalb, IL, 1983); George Weisz, "The Republican Ideology and the Social Sciences: The Durkheimians and the History of Social Economy at the Sorbonne," in Philippe Besnard, ed., *The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Founding of French Sociology* (New York, 1983), p. 116.
- 29 *Ibid.*, pp. 92–93; Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 258.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 215–216; Weisz, "Republican Ideology and the Social Sciences," in Besnard, *Sociological Domain*, pp. 94–95. See also Durkheim's historical reconstruction of this debate in *The Evolution of Educational Thought* (New York, 1977).
- 31 On the conflict between sociologists and historians, see Madeleine Rebérioux, "Le Débat de 1903: Historiens et sociologues," in Charles-Olivier Carbonell and Georges Livet, eds., *Au Berceau des annales: Le Milieu strasbourgeois* (Toulouse, 1983), pp. 219–230; and Philippe Besnard, "The Epistemological Polemic: François Simiand," in Besnard, *Sociological Domain*, pp. 251–256.
- 32 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, pp. 217–218, 260–264; Weisz, *Emergence of Modern Universities in France*, p. 281; Emile Durkheim, *Moral Education* (New York, 1961).
- 33 Clark, *Literary France*, pp. 159–165; Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, pp. 223–225.
- 34 Ringer, *Fields of Knowledge*, p. 31.
- 35 On Walras, see Jurg Niehans, *A History of Economic Theory: Classic Contributions, 1720–1980* (Baltimore, 1990), pp. 207–220.
- 36 See Leroy-Beaulieu's remarks at the conference, "De la position de l'économie politique dans l'ensemble des sciences sociales," p. 121. On Leroy-Beaulieu, see Dan Warshaw, *Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Established Liberalism in France* (DeKalb, IL, 1991).
- 37 Niehans, *History of Economic Theory*, p. 209.
- 38 Elwitt, *The Third Republic Defended*, pp. 11–14. On the rise of political economy to academic prominence in nineteenth-century France, see Lucette Le Van-Lemesle, "La Promotion de l'économie politique en France au XIXe siècle jusqu'à son introduction dans les facultés (1815–1881)," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 27 (April–June 1980), pp. 270–292; and Madeleine Ventre-Denis, "Sciences sociales et université au XIXe siècle. Une Tentative d'enseignement de l'économie politique à Paris sous la Restauration," *Revue historique* 256 (1976), pp. 321–342.
- 39 Emile Levasseur, *The American Workman* (Baltimore, 1900), p. 461. This work distills most of his major ideas. See also his articles, "La Machine et

- l'ouvrier," *Journal des économistes* 20 (November 1908), pp. 176–198; and "Cause déterminantes du taux des salaires," *Revue d'économie politique* 22 (1908), pp. 721–758.
- 40 *American Workman*, p. 363.
- 41 *Ibid.*, p. 375.
- 42 Levasseur, "La Machine et l'ouvrier," p. 183. See also *American Workman*, pp. 369–371.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 441.
- 44 *Ibid.*, pp. 44ff.
- 45 *Ibid.*, pp. 472–473.
- 46 Warshaw, *Paul Leroy-Beaulieu and Established Liberalism in France*, pp. 116–118.
- 47 On the Radicals and *solidarité*, see Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, pp. 640–724. On Ferry, see Jean-Michel Gaillard, *Jules Ferry* (Paris, 1989). On *solidarité*, see also Stone, *Search for Social Peace*, pp. 26–36, and Elwitt's orthodox Marxist interpretation, *The Third Republic Defended*, pp. 170–216. Of Bourgeois's writings, see *De la solidarité* (Paris, 1896).
- 48 Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, p. 654. On the relationship of solidarism to movements in the United States, Britain, and Germany, see Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*.
- 49 Rosanvallon, *La Question syndicale*, p. 101. The census became standardized and centralized in 1896. The Ministry of Commerce, gradually giving way to the Ministry of Labor (created in 1906), published statistical reports on work and strikes in the *Bulletin mensuel* and the *Statistique des grèves et des recours à la conciliation et à l'arbitrage*.
- 50 Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, p. 670.
- 51 Gerald Friedman, "Capitalism, Republicanism, Socialism, and the State: France, 1871–1914," *Social Science History* 14 (Summer 1990), pp. 155–158.
- 52 Kloppenberg, *Uncertain Victory*, pp. 414–415.
- 53 I am not proposing a radically new interpretation of Durkheim's work here. I agree with those perspectives which see Durkheim as in the socialist tradition, rather than as a conservative. I also side with those authors who believe that Durkheim was responding to the social crisis of fin-de-siècle France. My own interpretation highlights the familiar conflict between hermeneutic and positivist themes in Durkheim's work (or, as Alexander states, between idealism and instrumentalism), while placing Durkheim within the republican virtue tradition. Like LaCapra, I argue that Durkheim wished to renovate classical rationality to inform the healing of society. See Dominick LaCapra, *Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher* (Ithaca, NY, 1972), pp. 6–7. See also Robert Alun Jones and Douglas A. Kibbee, "Durkheim, Language, and History: A Pragmatist Perspective," *Sociological Theory* 11 (July 1993), pp. 152–170. Those versions that have most influenced my approach include Jeffrey Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. II. The Antinomies of Classical Thought: Marx and Durkheim* (Berkeley, 1982); Habermas, *Theory*

- of *Communicative Action*, Vol. II; Bellah's introduction to *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*; and Pierre Birnbaum's preface to Durkheim, *Le Socialisme* (Paris, 1971).
- 54 See Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*, Vol. II; Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. II, pp. 43–112; and Hans Joas, *Pragmatism and Social Theory* (Chicago, 1993), pp. 73–74, 207.
 - 55 Nye, *Crime, Madness, and Politics in Modern France*, pp. 119–131. See also Rabinow, *French Modern*, pp. 13–14, and Georges Canguilhem, *Le Normal et le pathologique* (Paris, 1966). Bernard's notion of *milieu interne* also influenced Durkheim. See Tiryakian, "Emile Durkheim," in Bottomore and Nisbet, *History of Sociological Analysis*, p. 216. However, Durkheim was very aware of the problems in utilizing organic metaphors for social processes. See his review of Albert Schaeffle, *Bau und Leben des Sozialen Körpers: Erster Band*, in Mark Traugott, ed., *Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis* (Chicago, 1978), pp. 93–114.
 - 56 Equilibrium was an important concept in many different spheres of French society, from economics to science and the labor movement. In addition to Nye, see, for example, Rabinbach, *Human Motor*; Maier, *In Search of Stability*, pp. 262–265. For comparisons of Durkheim and Walras, see Philippe Steiner, "Le Fait social économique chez Durkheim," *Revue française de sociologie* 33 (1992), p. 647, and Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France*, pp. 34–35.
 - 57 Durkheim, *Division of Labor*.
 - 58 Mark Cladis, *A Communitarian Defense of Liberalism: Emile Durkheim and Contemporary Social Theory* (Stanford, 1992), p. 92.
 - 59 Habermas, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, p. 304.
 - 60 Durkheim, *Pragmatism and Sociology* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 67.
 - 61 Durkheim, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* (London, 1957), p. 1.
 - 62 On the republican view of history, see Pocock, *Machiavellian Moment*, pp. 54ff., 76; on the imperialist view of history, see p. 53. Durkheim's theory of history in *Division of Labor* clearly had affinities with the imperialist view.
 - 63 Durkheim, "Social Creativity," in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 221.
 - 64 Durkheim, "Intellectual Elite and Democracy," in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 56.
 - 65 Durkheim, preface to the second edition of *Division of Labor*, p. xxxiv.
 - 66 Durkheim, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," in Bellah, *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. 45.
 - 67 *Ibid.*, p. 48.
 - 68 Durkheim, *Professional Ethics*. See also Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, pp. 270–274.
 - 69 Durkheim, *Professional Ethics*, pp. 89–90.
 - 70 See Giddens, "Introduction," *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, pp. 7–9; Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, pp. 273–274, 353. See also Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology*, Vol. II, pp. 85–86; and J. E. S. Hayward, "Solidarist

Syndicalism: Durkheim and Duguit," *Sociological Review*, 2nd series, 8 (1960), pp. 17–36. Several of Durkheim's followers, such as Bouglé, were more active in political circles, seeking to ally the Republic with the working-class movement. See Alexander, *Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. II*, pp. 313–316; and Bernard Lacroix, *Durkheim et le politique* (Paris, 1981). Durkheim did not simply mimic solidarism, and his theory of the state showed the complexity of these differences. Like the Radicals, Durkheim sought a political theory that would demonstrate and promote the intertwining of state and society. Yet his particular conception of moral community differentiated him from many of the major viewpoints and policies of the solidarists. Durkheim thought the solidarists too instrumentally individualistic in their notion of the social contract.

- 71 Durkheim, preface to second edition of *Division of Labor*, p. liv.
- 72 For Durkheim's criticisms of socialism, see *Socialism and Saint-Simon* (New York, 1958). For Marcel Mauss's view of socialism, see "L'Action socialiste," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 19 (October 15, 1899), pp. 449–462; for Bouglé, see *Syndicalisme et démocratie* (Paris, 1908), pp. 14–26. On Durkheim's influence on Jaurès, see Birnbaum, preface to Durkheim, *Le Socialisme*, pp. 1–19. See also Alexander, *Structure and Meaning: Relinking Sociological Theory* (New York, 1989), pp. 126–127, 143; Jean-Claude Filloux, *Durkheim et le socialisme* (Geneva, 1977); and Lacroix, *Durkheim et le politique*. For the view of the solidarists, see Rabinow, *French Modern*, pp. 188–194.
- 73 Marcel Mauss, "A Sociological Assessment of Bolshevism," in Mike Gane, ed., *The Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss* (New York, 1992), p. 172.
- 74 Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, pp. 34–36.
- 75 Mercier, *Les Universités populaires*, p. 58. See also Weisz, *Emergence of Modern Universities in France*, pp. 309–314.
- 76 Mercier, *Les Universités populaires*, pp. 108–111.
- 77 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 111.
- 78 Georges Sorel, *From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy*, ed. John Stanley (New York, 1976), pp. 90–91.
- 79 See the debate between Durkheim and the syndicalists in "Sur l'internationalisme: Patriotisme national et lutte de classe," in *Libres entretiens*, 2nd series (1905–1906), pp. 412–436.
- 80 See Emile Durkheim's contribution to "Sur l'internationalisme," in *Libres entretiens*, p. 421. See also Lukes, *Emile Durkheim*, p. 543.
- 81 On the relationship of differentiation theory to these processes, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, *Power and the Division of Labor* (Stanford, 1986), pp. 55–56.
- 82 See Steiner, "Le Fait social économique chez Durkheim," pp. 652–653.
- 83 On the belief in industrial concentration among economists and some republicans, see Elwitt, *The Third Republic Defended*, pp. 178–194. On Bourgeois's belief that concentration was inevitable, see p. 171. On this assumption among socialists and Marxists, see Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, pp. 98–99.

- 84 Durkheim, *Professional Ethics*, p. 38. Durkheim's view of this process was complex. Though increasing concentration based on ever-denser social interaction was a master trope of his theory, as Traugott points out, Durkheim also believed that only decentralized professional groups could provide the moral atmosphere necessary for strong social solidarity. Like his nephew Mauss, he located the generation of new cultural forms in democratic, participatory, small-scale associations, akin to syndicates. See Traugott, "Introduction," *Emile Durkheim on Institutional Analysis*; Durkheim, preface to the second edition of *Division of Labor*; and Mauss, "L'Action socialiste," pp. 449–462.
- 85 Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress*, p. 122.
- 86 See Mauss, November 1936 letter to Elie Halévy, in Gane, *Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*, p. 213.

6 Pelloutier, Sorel, and revolutionary syndicalism

- 1 On the relationship of syndicalism to new social movements, see Tucker, "How New Are the New Social Movements?," pp. 75–98. See also Calhoun, "New Social Movements of the Early Nineteenth Century," pp. 385–427. On Durkheim as a communitarian, see Cladis, *Communitarian Defense of Liberalism*.
- 2 As quoted by Martin Jay, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923–1950* (Boston, 1973), p. 57.
- 3 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p. 140. See also his critique of Marx in *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 44ff.; and Jean Cohen, *Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory* (Amherst, MA, 1982). Other similar critiques were advanced by authors as diverse as the poststructuralist Jean Baudrillard, in *The Mirror of Production* (St. Louis, 1975), and the Catholic philosopher Jean Calvez. On the latter, see Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser* (Princeton, 1975), pp. 53–55.
- 4 See Durkheim's criticisms of socialism in *Socialism and Saint-Simon*.
- 5 Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*; Cohen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*.
- 6 Critics of Habermas include Postone, *Time, Work, and Social Domination*; Heller, "Habermas and Marxism," in Thompson and Held, *Habermas: Critical Debates*, pp. 21–41; and Negt and Kluge, *Public Sphere and Experience*.
- 7 Robert Nye, "Love and Reproductive Biology in Fin-de-Siècle France: A Foucauldian Lacuna?," in Goldstein, *Foucault and the Writing of History*, pp. 152–154. Organic imagery was also widespread at the end of the nineteenth century in the United States. In discussing John Dewey's criticisms of Henry Maine's vision of society, Robert Westbrook writes that "So pervasive were

- organic metaphors in the political discourse of the time that Dewey did not feel compelled to state in any detail the case against the atomistic theory of society which underlay Maine's criticism of democracy; he simply declared that it was *passé*": *John Dewey and American Democracy* (Ithaca, NY, 1991), p. 39.
- 8 Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France*, p. 14; Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, p. 114.
 - 9 Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France*, pp. 20–21.
 - 10 Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, pp. 117–119.
 - 11 On socialism in France, see Georges Lefranc, *Le Mouvement socialiste sous la troisième république (1875–1940)* (Paris, 1963); Stuart Williams, ed., *Socialism in France From Jaurès to Mitterand* (New York, 1983), particularly the articles by Jolyon Howorth, "From the Bourgeois Republic to the Social Republic," pp. 1–14, and Madeleine Rebérioux, "Party Practice and the Jaurèsian Vision: The SFIO (1905–1914)," pp. 15–26. On socialism and the Guesdists, see Stuart, *Marxism at Work*.
 - 12 Howorth, "From the Bourgeois Republic to the Social Republic," in Williams, *Socialism in France*, pp. 4–8. On Malon, see Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*.
 - 13 Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France*, pp. 120–137.
 - 14 Perrot, *Workers on Strike*, p. 57; Cottureau, "The Distinctiveness of Working-Class Cultures," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 146–147; Richard Sonn, *Anarchism and Cultural Politics in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Lincoln, NE, 1989), pp. 97–102.
 - 15 Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, p. 123; Leroy, *La Coutume ouvrière* (Paris, 1913).
 - 16 Dumoulin, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, July 24, 1913.
 - 17 On the disaster at Courrières, see Pierre Monatte, "Un Crime capitaliste: Courrières," in Colette Chambelland, ed., *La Lutte syndicale* (Paris, 1976), pp. 26–39. In the Belle Époque, the figure of the miner joined those of the metalworker and the independent skilled worker as the central working-class representatives in the ideological constellation of syndicalism. See Noiriel, *Workers in French Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, pp. 97, 134. The miners and metalworkers were also important symbols in the *ouvriérisme* of the French Communist Party. See Marc Lazar, "Damné de la terre et homme de marbre. L'Ouvrier dans l'imaginaire du PCF du milieu des années trente à la fin des années cinquante," *Annales: Economies, sociétés, civilisations* 45 (September–October 1990), pp. 1072–1076. Sewell points out that the image of the alienated proletarian was part of worker iconography even before the rise of the *usine*. See William H. Sewell, Jr., "Visions of Labor: Illustrations of the Mechanical Arts Before, in, and After Diderot's *Encyclopédie*," in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, pp. 258–286. On metalworkers, see Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, pp. 105–106; Perrot, "From the Mechanic to the Metallo," in Haimson and Tilly, *Strikes*,

- Wars, and Revolutions in International Perspective*, pp. 261–268; and Accampo, *Industrialization, Family Life, and Class Relations*, pp. 130–131. For Merrheim's exposés of the conditions of metalworkers, see his articles in *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 9 and November 12, 1912, and April 13, 1913.
- 18 The history of the miners' union's relationship to the CGT is very complex. The national miners' federation was controlled by the reformist Basly, who refused to join the CGT. There were strong revolutionary syndicalist minorities within the union, reflected in splits in the national federation throughout the late nineteenth century. In 1902, as Basly opposed a general strike, many miners bolted from the federation and formed their own union. However, the CGT did not want the union to enter its ranks until it was unified. Finally, after many union leaders were arrested in 1908, the miners' federation joined the CGT, though it remained a divided union. See the accounts in Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, pp. 224–226; and Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, pp. 75–93.
 - 19 Albert Thierry, *La Vie ouvrière* 63 (1912).
 - 20 Euben points out that notions of corruption were often tied to organic metaphors of degeneration, decay, and disease. See "Corruption," in Ball, Farr, and Hanson, *Political Innovation*, pp. 222–223.
 - 21 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, pp. 72–81.
 - 22 On paternalism, see Perrot, "The Three Ages of Industrial Discipline," in Merriman, *Consciousness and Class Experience*, pp. 149–168. Joan Scott, "L'Ouvrière! Mot impie, sordide . . . Women Workers in the Discourse of French Political Economy," in Joyce, *Historical Meanings of Work*, pp. 126–142; and Reid, "Metaphor and Management."
 - 23 Charle, *Naissance des intellectuels*, p. 80; Robert Nye, "Sociology and Degeneration: The Irony of Progress," in Chamberlin and Gilman, *Degeneration*, pp. 50–71.
 - 24 See, for example, Jay, *Marxism and Totality*, pp. 70–71.
 - 25 Victor Griffuelhes, *L'Action syndicaliste* (Paris, 1908), p. 4.
 - 26 The martial spirit of the republican virtue tradition was often utilized by Sorel in his description of class struggle. See *Reflections on Violence* (New York, 1972).
 - 27 Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern France*, p. 163.
 - 28 La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XV Congrès national corporatif tenu à Amiens du 8–16 octobre 1906: Compte rendu des travaux* (Amiens, 1906), Yvetot, p. 43.
 - 29 La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XVI Congrès national corporatif tenu à Marseilles du 5–12 octobre 1908: Compte rendu des travaux* (Marseilles, 1908), Jacquemin, pp. 62–63.
 - 30 La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XIII Congrès national corporatif tenu à Montpellier du 22–27 septembre 1902: Compte rendu des travaux* (Montpellier, 1902), Bourchet, pp. 132–133.
 - 31 Le Charte d'Amiens, reprinted in Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, p. 222.

- 32 Perrot, "Le Regard de l'Autre," in Levy-Leboyer, *Le Patronat de la seconde industrialisation*; Miguel Rodriguez, *Le 1er mai* (Paris, 1990), pp. 205–207.
- 33 *La Voix du peuple*, December 1–9, 1900.
- 34 *XIII Congrès national corporatif* (1902), p. 52.
- 35 Keufer, "Le Syndicalisme réformiste," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 15 (January 1, 1905), pp. 39–41.
- 36 "Notre tâche," *La Revue syndicaliste* 1 (May 15, 1905), pp. 3–5; Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 115. On the similarities of prewar reformist and revolutionary syndicalists, see John Horne, *Labour at War: France and Britain, 1914–1918* (New York, 1991), pp. 18–19, 37.
- 37 Thomas, "Notre tâche," *La Revue syndicaliste* 19 (November 1906), pp. 201–202.
- 38 Thomas, "Syndicalisme et municipalisme," *La Revue syndicaliste* 36 (April 1908), pp. 275–279.
- 39 Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, pp. 214–215.
- 40 Horne, *Labour at War*, p. 19.
- 41 Arno Mayer, *The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War* (New York, 1981), pp. 54–55; Perrot, "Les Classes urbaines populaires," in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 456; Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, pp. 100–101. Even metal workers were employed primarily in small to medium-sized firms. See Mayer, *Persistence of the Old Regime*, pp. 40–41; and François Caron, *An Economic History of Modern France* (New York, 1979), p. 166. On the textile industry, see Reddy, *Rise of Market Culture*.
- 42 Hanagan points out that many rural metalworkers often doubled as blacksmiths and dentists (Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*, pp. 8, 38). See also Caron, *Economic History of France*, pp. 165–166.
- 43 Noiriel, *French Workers in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 14; Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, pp. 103–104; Mayer, *Persistence of the Old Regime*, pp. 20–21. Concentration was also strong in mining, textiles, and glassmaking. See Perrot, "Les Classes urbaines populaires," in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 475.
- 44 Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, p. 118; Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*, p. 210; Perrot, "Les Classes urbaines populaires," in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 455; Perrot, "On the Formation of the French Working Class," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, pp. 85–87; Stovall, *Red Belt of Paris*; James Cronin, "Labor Insurgency and Class Formation: Comparative Perspectives on the Crisis of 1917–1920," in Cronin and Sirianni, *Work, Community, and Power*, p. 36; Edward Tannenbaum, *1900: The Generation Before the Great War* (Garden City, NY, 1976), p. 196. On the middle-class response to and exaggeration of the drinking habits of the working class, see Susanna Barrows, "After the Commune: Alcoholism, Temperance, and Literature in the Early Third Republic," in Merriman, *Class Consciousness and Class Experience*, pp. 205–218.

- 45 Jean-Louis Robert, *La Scission syndicale de 1921: Essai de reconnaissance des formes* (Paris, 1980), p. 29; Perrot, "La Classe ouvrière au temps de Jaurès," in Madeleine Rebérioux, ed., *Jaurès et la class ouvrière* (Paris, 1981), pp. 74–75.
- 46 Maurice Levy-Leboyer and François Bourguignon, *The French Economy in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Econometric Analysis* (New York, 1990), p. 9.
- 47 See the excellent biographical information in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier et les origines du syndicalisme d'action directe*.
- 48 See Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, pp. 1–4. For characterizations of Sorel as a "sociologist of virtue," see John Stanley, *The Sociology of Virtue: The Political and Social Theories of Georges Sorel* (Berkeley, 1981), and Vernon, *Citizenship and Moral Order*. On Sorel, see also Jeremy Jennings, *Georges Sorel: The Character and Development of His Thought* (New York, 1985); Jack Roth, *The Cult of Violence: Sorel and the Sorelians* (Berkeley, 1980); James Meisel, *The Genesis of Georges Sorel: An Account of His Formative Period Followed by a Study of His Influence* (Ann Arbor, MI, 1951); Larry Portis, *Georges Sorel* (London, 1980); and Irving Louis Horowitz, *Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason: The Social Theories of Georges Sorel* (New York, 1961).
- 49 The notion of class struggle had autonomous roots in the French left, stretching back to Saint-Simon, and did not derive in any simple sense from Marxism. See Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, pp. 2–3, and Leslie Derfler, *Paul Lafargue and the Founding of French Marxism, 1842–1882* (Cambridge, MA, 1991).
- 50 Georges Sorel, *Les Illusions du progrès* (Paris, 1908); see also Lasch, *True and Only Heaven*, pp. 304–310.
- 51 Calhoun, "Classical Social Theory and the French Revolution of 1848."
- 52 Pelloutier, *Almanach de la question sociale pour 1897*, pp. 102–103, in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 398. Julliard offers an excellent collection of Pelloutier's work. On revolutionary syndicalism more broadly, see the collection in Henri Dubrief, ed., *Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1969).
- 53 Pelloutier, *L'Avenir de l'anarchisme est dans les syndicats* (1899), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 419.
- 54 Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, pp. 180–181.
- 55 Pelloutier, *L'Art sociale* (January 1894), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 385.
- 56 *Ibid.* See also p. 516.
- 57 Pelloutier, *L'Ouvrier des deux mondes* 14 (April 1, 1898), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 497.
- 58 *Ibid.* See also Pelloutier's brochure in *Le Congrès général du parti socialiste français* (December 3–8, 1899), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 418.
- 59 Pelloutier, *Histoire des bourses du travail* (Paris, 1902), pp. 252, 258–259.
- 60 Pelloutier, in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, pp. 500–501.
- 61 Pelloutier, brochure of the conference of May 30, 1896, under the aegis of *L'Art social*, in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 515.

- 62 Pelloutier, *L'Art social* (December, 1896), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 396.
- 63 Pelloutier, "Manuscrit inédit de 1892," in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 303.
- 64 Georges Sorel, *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics* (New Brunswick, 1984), p. 323.
- 65 *Ibid.*, p. 286.
- 66 Sorel, *From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy*, p. 90.
- 67 Sorel, *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*, p. 46.
- 68 Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, p. 48.
- 69 Joas, *Pragmatism and Social Theory*, pp. 77–78 n. 50. See also the introduction by John Stanley, in Stanley, ed., *From Georges Sorel, Vol. II: Hermeneutics and the Sciences* (New Brunswick, 1990).
- 70 Sorel, *From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy*, pp. 238–239; "Science and Morals," in Stanley, *From Georges Sorel, Vol. II: Hermeneutics and the Sciences*, p. 126.
- 71 Sorel, "Les Théories de M. Durkheim," *Le Devenir social* 1 (April 1895), p. 15.
- 72 *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.
- 73 Sorel, "Les Théories de M. Durkheim," *Le Devenir social* 1 (May 1895), p. 163 (emphasis in original).
- 74 Sorel, "Etude sur Vico," *Le Devenir social* 9 (October 1896), p. 786. See also Stanley, "Introduction," *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*, p. 8.
- 75 Pelloutier, "Manuscrit inédit de 1892," in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, pp. 302–303.
- 76 Pelloutier, *L'Art Social* (January 1894), p. 385; Pelloutier, report to *Congrès des Fédérations des Bourses du Travail*, Tours, 1896, in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, pp. 411–412.
- 77 Pelloutier, *L'Art social* (October 1896), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 415.
- 78 Pelloutier, *L'Ouvrier des deux mondes* 14 (April 1, 1898), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 500.
- 79 Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, pp. 216ff.
- 80 Sorel, preface to Pelloutier, *Histoire des bourses du travail*, p. 31; Pelloutier, *Histoire des bourses du travail*, p. 257.
- 81 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston, 1964).
- 82 See Stanley, *Sociology of Virtue*, pp. 224–226.
- 83 Sorel, preface to *Histoire des bourses du travail*, p. 65.
- 84 Sorel, "The Social Value of Art," in Stanley, *From Georges Sorel, Vol. II: Hermeneutics and the Sciences*, p. 112.
- 85 *Ibid.*, p. 113.
- 86 Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, p. 242; Stanley, *From Georges Sorel, Vol. II: Hermeneutics and the Sciences*, p. 288.
- 87 Sorel, *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*, pp. 150–152.
- 88 Sorel, "Social Value of Art," in Stanley, *From Georges Sorel, Vol. II: Hermeneutics and the Sciences*, p. 117.

- 89 *Ibid.*, p. 118.
- 90 See Sorel, "Les Divers Types de sociétés coopératives," *La Science sociale* 28 (1899), pp. 172–201; Sorel, *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*, pp. 282–283. See also Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in *Illuminations* (New York, 1969).
- 91 Pelloutier, "Enquêtes et monographies," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 1 (November 1, 1899), pp. 553–562.
- 92 Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 24.
- 93 Griffuelhes, "Le Syndicalisme révolutionnaire," p. 6.
- 94 Delesalle, *La Voix du peuple*, June 1, 1902, quoted in Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 27.
- 95 Horne, *Labour at War*, pp. 12, 20.
- 96 Marjorie Clark, *A History of the French Labor Movement (1910–1928)* (Berkeley, 1930), p. 26; Leroy, *La Coutume ouvrière*.
- 97 Gerald Friedman, "Strike Success and Union Ideology: The United States and France, 1880–1914," *Journal of Economic History* 48 (1988), pp. 9–10.
- 98 *La Voix du peuple*, December 1–9, 1900; see also Emile Pouget, *La Confédération Générale du Travail* (Paris, 1908), p. 4.
- 99 "Un Instituteur syndiqué," *La Bataille syndicaliste*, April 29, 1912.
- 100 Emile Pautaud and Emile Pouget, *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution: Syndicalism and the Cooperative Commonwealth* (London, 1909, reprint 1990), pp. 229–231.
- 101 Pouget, *La Confédération Générale du Travail*, p. 23.
- 102 *Ibid.*, p. 25. On the structure of the Bourses du Travail, see Paul Delesalle, *Les Bourses du travail et la CGT* (Paris, 1909); Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*; Schöttler, *Naissance des bourses du travail*.
- 103 Revolutionary syndicalists defended proportional representation as the best means to represent syndicats given such an unpredictable economy.
- 104 *XIII Congrès national corporatif* (1902), Bourchet, pp. 225–229. For Bourchet, a better, scientific organization of production would require only three hours of work a day, while fostering the communist ideal of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs."
- 105 Pautaud and Pouget, *How We Shall Bring About the Revolution*, p. 123.
- 106 *Ibid.*
- 107 *Ibid.*, p. 127.
- 108 *Ibid.*, pp. 129–131.
- 109 *Ibid.*, pp. 132–133.
- 110 Pelloutier, in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 404.
- 111 Sorel, "Les Théories de M. Durkheim," *Le Devenir Social* (May 1895), p. 163 (emphasis in original).
- 112 Moss, *Origins of the French Labor Movement*, pp. 151–153.
- 113 Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, p. 19–20.
- 114 Paul Delesalle, *Les Deux Méthodes du syndicalisme* (Paris, n.d.), pp. 4–5, 11, 15; Emile Pouget, *The Basis of Trade Unionism* (London, 1908), p. 13.

- 115 Emile Pouget, *L'Action directe* (Nancy, n.d.), p. 1.
- 116 See, for example, Emile Pouget, *Le Sabotage* (Paris, 1910).
- 117 Pouget, *L'Action directe*, p. 18.
- 118 Pouget, *La Confédération Générale du Travail*, p. 37.
- 119 Griffuelhes, *L'Action directe*, April 23, 1908; see also Pouget, *La Confédération Générale du Travail*, p. 59. Delesalle writes that strikes are "an excellent gymnasium of action, of an efficacious, educational power": *La Confédération Générale du Travail – historique, constitution, but, moyens* (Paris, 1907), p. 26.
- 120 See, for example, the May 1, 1905, poster, in Fonds Delesalle, Institut français d'histoire sociale, Paris.
- 121 Jacques Julliard, "Discussion," in Rebérioux, *Jaurès et la classe ouvrière*, p. 117.
- 122 See Eugen Weber, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905–1914* (Berkeley, 1959), p. 41.
- 123 Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*, p. 245.
- 124 Tilly, *Contentious French*, p. 318.
- 125 Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*, pp. 247–248; Tilly, *Contentious French*, p. 318.
- 126 Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*, pp. 250–255.
- 127 *Ibid.*, p. 264; Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 138; on the Draveil and Villeneuve-Saint-Georges strikes, see Jacques Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur des grèves: L'Affaire de Draveil-Villeneuve-Saint-Georges* (Mesnil-sur-l'Estrée, 1965).
- 128 Archives Nationales, Paris (AN), Series F7 13268, police report of April 25, 1909.
- 129 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, pp. 142ff.; Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*.
- 130 For example, see Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. II*, p. 377.
- 131 Charles Tilly, "Did the Cake of Custom Break?," in Merriman, *Consciousness and Class Experience*, pp. 17–44; see also O'Brien and Keyder, *Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780–1914*.
- 132 Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. I*, pp. 71–72.
- 133 See Leroy, *La Coutume ouvrière*.
- 134 Kim Voss, *The Making of American Exceptionalism: The Knights of Labor and Class Formation in the Nineteenth Century* (Ithaca, NY, 1993), p. 238. Voss views France as providing a counterpoint to the American experience, for French employer associations were relatively weak because of the predominance of small firms and slow industrialization, while the Third Republic often encouraged, if not mandated, employers to negotiate with unions. On the relative weakness of French employer unions, see Gerald Friedman, "The Decline of Paternalism and the Making of the Employer Class: France, 1870–1914," in Sanford M. Jacoby, ed., *Masters to Managers: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on American Employers* (New York, 1991), pp. 153–172.

- 135 O'Brien and Keyder, *Economic Growth in Britain and France*, pp. 22, 191; Rondo Cameron and Charles Freedeman, "French Economic Growth: A Radical Revision," *Social Science History* 7 (1979), p. 8; R. Roehl, "French Industrialization: A Reconsideration," *Explorations in Economic History* 13 (1976), p. 245; and Robert, *La Scission syndicale*, p. 12.
- 136 See, for example, Hanagan, *Logic of Solidarity*.
- 137 See, for example, Margadant, *French Peasants in Revolt*; Peter McPhee, "Popular Culture, Symbolism, and Rural Radicalism in Nineteenth-Century France," *Journal of Peasant Studies* 5 (January 1978), pp. 238–253; and Tony Judt, *Socialism in Provence: A Study of the Origins of the Modern French Left* (New York, 1979).
- 138 Voss, *Making of American Exceptionalism*; and Hattam, *Labor Visions and State Power*.
- 139 See Craig Calhoun, "Populist Politics, Communications Media, and Large-Scale Societal Integration," *Sociological Theory* 6 (Fall 1988), pp. 219–241.

7 Reformulating revolutionary syndicalism

- 1 *L'Humanité*, May 2, 1911. The CGT leadership had multiple criticisms of the proposed social security law. They argued that the law should require only *patrons* to contribute to the retirement fund (workers and owners were each to contribute one-half); the taxes were too high for workers; only 5 percent of workers would live to collect at age 65; and the government would use the fund to support war-related adventures. See the poster composed by the Comité Confédéral, *XVII Congrès national corporatif tenu à Toulouse du 3–10 octobre 1910: Compte rendu des travaux* (Paris, 1911), pp. 17–18.
- 2 *La Bataille syndicaliste*, May 2, 1911. On the demonstrations, see *Le Petit Parisien*, May 2, 1911.
- 3 Yvetot, *La Voix du peuple*, May 6, 1911. The other comments are from a police spy. See AN F7 13269, police report, May 1, 1911.
- 4 AN F7 13269, leaflet of the CGT, April 25, 1911.
- 5 AN F7 13269, Parisian police report of May 2, 1911.
- 6 *Ibid.*, Parisian police report of May 1, 1911.
- 7 *La Voix du peuple*, April 23–30, 1911.
- 8 AN F7 13269, Parisian police reports of April 20 and April 30, 1911. See also *Le Temps*, May 2, 1911.
- 9 *L'Action*, May 1, 1911.
- 10 AN F7 13269, Parisian police report of April 26, 1911.
- 11 *L'Action*, May 2, 1911.
- 12 AN F7 13269, police report of May 1, 1911.
- 13 *La Bataille syndicaliste*, May 1, 1912.
- 14 *L'Humanité*, May 1 and May 2, 1912.
- 15 Weber, *Nationalist Revival in France*, pp. 95–96.

- 16 See Stephen Kern, *The Culture of Time and Space, 1890–1918* (Cambridge, MA, 1983); and David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Cambridge, MA, 1989), pp. 264–265.
- 17 Weber, *Nationalist Revival in France*, p. 71; Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*, p. 343; Anderson, *France, 1870–1914*, p. 27.
- 18 On the attempt of the Action Française to convert revolutionary syndicalists to its cause, see Paul Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979). The best book on the Action Française is still Weber, *Action Française*.
- 19 See Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, pp. 260ff.; on Modernist and Post-Impressionist art, see Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, “The Name and Nature of Modernism,” in Bradbury and McFarlane, eds., *Modernism, 1890–1930* (New York, 1976), pp. 19–55; and Eric Cahm, “Revolt, Conservatism, and Reaction in Paris, 1905–1925,” pp. 162–173 in the same volume. On Bergson, see Mark Antliff, *Inventing Bergson: Cultural Politics and the Parisian Avant-Garde* (Princeton, 1993), pp. 21–22. On the widespread controversy over Bergson, see R. C. Grogin, *The Bergsonian Controversy in France, 1900–1914* (Calgary, 1988).
- 20 On Maurras’s criticisms of Bergson, see Antliff, *Inventing Bergson*, pp. 21–22.
- 21 Charles Maurras, *Enquête sur la monarchie* (Paris, 1909), p. 463.
- 22 Colette Capitan Peter, *Charles Maurras et l’idéologie d’Action Française* (Paris, 1972), p. 95.
- 23 Weber, *Nationalist Revival in France*, p. 71; Kenneth Silver, *Esprit de Corps: The Art of the Parisian Avant-Garde and the First World War, 1914–1925* (Princeton, 1989), p. 23.
- 24 See Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, pp. 30–31.
- 25 On the belief in the inexorable concentration of industry, see Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, pp. 54–55; Vincent, *Between Marxism and Anarchism*, pp. 98–99; and Stuart, *Marxism at Work*, pp. 118–124. For a typical statement, see the article by Paul Louis, “La Concentration capitaliste en France,” *Le Mouvement socialiste* 10 (July 1, 1903), pp. 343–352.
- 26 Lefranc, *Le Mouvement socialiste sous la troisième république*; on this evolution in Languedoc, see Johnson, *Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc*, pp. 242ff.
- 27 Leora Auslander, “Perceptions of Beauty and the Problem of Consciousness: Parisian Furniture Makers,” in Berlanstein, *Rethinking Labor History*, pp. 158–159.
- 28 Robert Paxson, *Europe in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd edition (New York, 1985), p. 39. See also Bradbury and McFarlane, *Modernism*.
- 29 Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, p. 270.
- 30 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Winchester, MA, 1987), pp. 181–182.
- 31 Picart, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, November 8, 1912.
- 32 Rebérioux, *A Radical Republic?*, p. 305. The number of workers belonging to

- the CGT is a matter of some dispute, for CGT records were not consistent. Estimates of union membership range from Rebérioux's 350,000 after 1908 to Anderson's 700,000 (*France, 1870–1914*, p. 138). On the crisis of membership in the CGT, see the articles by Christian Gras, "Merrheim et le capitalisme," *Le Mouvement social* 63 (April–May 1968), pp. 143–163, and "La Fédération des Métaux en 1913–1914 et l'évolution du syndicalisme révolutionnaire français," *Le Mouvement social* 77 (October–December 1971), pp. 85–111. See also Michael DeLucia, "The Remaking of French Syndicalism, 1911–1918: The Growth of the Reformist Philosophy," Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1971, pp. 13–27.
- 33 On the literary and artistic milieu of many syndicalists, see Sonn, *Anarchism and Cultural Politics in Fin-de-Siècle France*; on Merrheim's work experience and his syndicalism, see Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim*, p. 5.
 - 34 Yves Lequin, "Apprenticeship in Nineteenth-Century France: A Continuing Tradition or a Break with the Past?," in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, p. 471.
 - 35 On the postwar economic portrait of France, see Robert, *La Scission syndicale*, p. 38.
 - 36 On reformist syndicalism, see Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, pp. 114–140. For a typical statement by Keufer, see "Le Syndicalisme réformiste," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 15 (January 1, 1905).
 - 37 Noiriel, *Workers in Nineteenth and Twentieth-Century France*, p. 87; Dewerpe, *Le Monde du travail en France*, p. 17. See also Lequin, "Apprenticeship in Nineteenth-Century France," in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, pp. 457–474. See also Auslander, "Perceptions of Beauty and the Problem of Consciousness," in Berlanstein, *Rethinking Labor History*, pp. 153–159.
 - 38 Henri Dubreil, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 30, 1913.
 - 39 Delesalle, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 23 (April 15, 1908), p. 243. Dret, secretary of the Fédération des Cuirs et Peaux, echoed Delesalle's arguments. See H. Dret, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 23 (April 15, 1908), pp. 248–252; and A. Lauche, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* (May 15, 1908), pp. 320–327.
 - 40 Lequin argues that workers did need new skills at this time, but that they required the professional skill of machinists and fitters rather than carpenters and blacksmiths ("Apprenticeship in Nineteenth-Century France," in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, p. 471).
 - 41 Delesalle, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," pp. 242–246.
 - 42 Sorel, preface to *Histoire des bourses du travail*, p. 30. Sorel and Delesalle carried on an extensive correspondence, so Delesalle was quite familiar with Sorel's views. See Sorel, *Lettres à Paul Delesalle*, ed. André Prouhommeaux (Paris, 1947).
 - 43 Dumoulin, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 25 (February 1909), p. 105.

- 44 See Keufer, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 23 (June 15, 1908), pp. 404–417.
- 45 Lauche advanced the same arguments. See his "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* (May 15, 1908).
- 46 Merrheim, "Enquête ouvrière sur la crise de l'apprentissage," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 23 (May 15, 1908), pp. 330–338.
- 47 Merrheim, "La Crise de l'automobile," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 23 (February 15, 1908), pp. 81–100.
- 48 Merrheim, "La Crise syndicaliste," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 26 (November–December 1909), p. 299.
- 49 *Ibid.*, pp. 291–292. See also Merrheim, "La Parlementarisation du syndicalisme," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 27 (April 1910), pp. 241–247.
- 50 Merrheim, "La Crise syndicaliste," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 26 (November–December 1909), pp. 292–298.
- 51 *Ibid.*, pp. 292–293. See also Griffuelhes, "Romantisme révolutionnaire," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 24 (October 15, 1908), pp. 293–295.
- 52 La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XVII Congrès national corporatif tenu à Toulouse du 3–10 octobre 1910: Compte rendu des travaux* (Paris, 1911), Jouhaux, Rapport de la Section des Fédérations Nationales, p. 40.
- 53 *Ibid.*, Lamarque, p. 191, and Jouhaux, p. 42.
- 54 *Ibid.*, Jouhaux, Rapport de la Section des Fédérations Nationales, p. 32.
- 55 *Ibid.*, p. 38.
- 56 See the account in *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 19, 1912.
- 57 La Confédération Générale du Travail, *XVIII Congrès national corporatif tenu au Havre du 16–23 septembre 1912: Compte rendu des travaux* (Le Havre, 1912), Renard, p. 46.
- 58 *Ibid.*, Million, p. 51; Yvetot, p. 73. See also Péricat's arguments in *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 18–19, 1912.
- 59 *XVIII Congrès national corporatif* (1912), Jouhaux, p. 41. See also Pierre Dumas, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 18, 1912.
- 60 *XVIII Congrès national corporatif* (1912), Yvetot, p. 73. See also Raul Lenoir, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 22, 1912; Pierre Monatte, "Le Congrès du Havre," *La Vie ouvrière*, November 5, 1912, p. 208; and Monatte, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 22, 1912. See also Jouhaux's critical comments on the "corporate spirit" in *Le Mouvement socialiste* 255–256 (September–October 1913), pp. 236–240, and the *XVIII Congrès national corporatif* (1912), Jouhaux, p. 78.
- 61 *Ibid.*, Jouhaux, Rapport sur la Délimitation des Fédérations, p. 52.
- 62 *Ibid.*
- 63 Monatte, "Le Congrès du Havre," *La Vie ouvrière*, October 5, 1912, pp. 7–10, 24; October 20, 1912, pp. 117–118.
- 64 Julliard, *Clemenceau, briseur des grèves*; Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 153.
- 65 Griffuelhes, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, January 24, 1913, and Pouget, *La Guerre sociale*, December 31, 1913–January 4, 1914.

- 66 Griffuelhes, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 1, 1913.
- 67 Pouget, *La Guerre sociale*, January 28–February 3, 1913.
- 68 *Ibid.*
- 69 Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 5, 1913. See also Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim*, p. 57.
- 70 Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 14 and 26, 1913.
- 71 Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, p. 156.
- 72 Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, July 30, 1913, and August 3 and 4, 1913. Many syndicalists rallied to Merrheim's defense, repeating his arguments almost verbatim. See Monatte, *La Vie ouvrière*, August 5, 1913, pp. 129–139; Bourchet, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 12, 1913; Lenoir, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, July 25, 1912; Jouhaux *et al.*, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, August 27, 1913; Dumas, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, August 17, 1913; Farnier, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, August 29, 1913; and Laisant, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, September 23, 1913.
- 73 See Jouhaux, Griffuelhes, *et al.* in *La Bataille syndicaliste*, August 20, 22, 1912; Harmel, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, August 24, 1912. See the summary of this debate in *La Vie ouvrière* 72 (September 20, 1912), pp. 806–815.
- 74 Monatte, *La Vie ouvrière*, August 5, 1913, pp. 129–139.
- 75 Dumoulin, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 3, 1913.
- 76 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 77. My discussion of the transition from an aesthetic to a quantitative conception of labor in the CGT parallels in many ways Rabinbach's analysis of a similar transition in Marx. However, while Rabinbach sees the late nineteenth-century scientific language of fatigue and energy as the major agent in Marx's productivist shift (and as later becoming the dominant vocabulary of the European Science of Work), I believe that the internal dynamics of syndicalism, as well as the productivist tendencies in any labor-based epistemology, are primarily responsible for this change in syndicalism. Nevertheless, Taylorism and the European Science of Work helped reinforce the productivist proclivities of syndicalism.
- 77 On Merrheim's and Jouhaux's celebration of consumerism, see Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière*, April 5–20, 1914, and Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, December 22, 1913.
- 78 Gras, "La Fédération des Métaux en 1913–1914 et l'évolution du syndicalisme révolutionnaire français," p. 100.
- 79 Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, pp. 176–191.
- 80 Robert Louzon, "Les Intellectuels," *La Vie ouvrière* 116 (1914), pp. 85–91.
- 81 Perrot, "Le Regard de l'Autre," in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 303.
- 82 Gras, "La Fédération des Métaux en 1913–1914," pp. 102–103; Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, *Strikes in France, 1830–1968* (New York, 1974), pp. 168–171; Leroy, *La Coutume ouvrière*, p. 148.
- 83 Cross, "Redefining Workers' Control," in Cronin and Sirianni, *Work, Community, and Power*, p. 165.

- 84 This new ideology did not necessarily lead to a stronger organization, as membership stagnated and the number of strike failures increased after 1911. See Julliard, *Autonomie ouvrière*, p. 64.

8 Toward a new public sphere: Taylorism, consumerism, and the postwar CGT

- 1 Habermas, *Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*.
- 2 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, pp. 10–11.
- 3 Maier, *In Search of Stability*, p. 262.
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp. 265–267.
- 5 On the slow development of the corporatist perspective in France, see Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, pp. 102–103.
- 6 Gary Cross, *Time and Money: The Making of Consumer Culture* (New York, 1993), p. 30.
- 7 Johnson, *Life and Death of Industrial Languedoc*, p. 131.
- 8 Reddy, *Money and Liberty in Modern Europe*, p. 213.
- 9 On the opinion that Delaisi was a ghost-writer for Merrheim, see Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim*, pp. 60–62. Delaisi explicitly draws on Levasseur in his book, *Political Myths and Economic Realities* (New York, 1927). Though he wrote the book after the war, Delaisi reiterates verbatim the theory that lowering the cost of production through the introduction of machinery was the key to establishing a good society. Such beliefs echoed exactly those of Levasseur in his various works such as *The American Worker*.
- 10 Furlough, *Consumer Cooperation in France*, pp. 234–246.
- 11 The poor performance of French capitalists had been a major theme of syndicalists since the movement's inception. For Sorel's criticisms of unproductive French capitalists, see *Social Foundations of Contemporary Economics*. For Griffuelhes's criticisms of the French *patronat*, see "L'Inferiorité des capitalistes français," *Le Mouvement socialiste* 28 (1910), pp. 329–332, and "Utopisme petit-bourgeois," pp. 30–36. Perrot points out this line of criticism among many French workers in the nineteenth century. See "Le Regard de l'Autre," in Braudel and Labrousse, *Histoire économique et sociale de la France*, p. 300. However, the concern with economic nationalism was a distinctive twist on syndicalist productivism. On economic nationalism, see Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, January 9, March 2, April 17, June 16, 22, 26, 1913; Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, April 1, May 12, June 13, June 16, December 13, 1913; see also Pierre Hamp, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, June 17, 1913; A. Picart, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, May 9, June 24, 1913; Delaisi, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, April 21, 1913; and Delaisi, "Comment connaître la situation d'un industriel?," *La Vie ouvrière* 62 (1912), pp. 81–107.
- 12 On the shared belief in industrial concentration, see Elwitt, *The Third Republic Defended*, pp. 4–7, 177–178.
- 13 Aimée Moutet, "Les Origines du système de Taylor en France: Le Point de vue patronale (1907–1914)," *Le Mouvement sociale* (October–December

- 1975), p. 42. On Taylorism, see, among many works, Harry Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1974).
- 14 Humphreys, *Taylorism in France, 1904–1920* (New York, 1986), pp. 118–123.
- 15 Moutet, “Les Origines du système de Taylor en France,” p. 16.
- 16 Perrot, “The Three Ages of Industrial Discipline,” in Merriman, *Consciousness and Class Experience*, pp. 149–168; Patrick Fridenson, “Un Tournant Taylorien de la société française (1904–1918),” *Annales: Economie, sociétés, civilisations* 5 (September–October 1987), pp. 1033–1039.
- 17 *Ibid.*
- 18 Moutet, “Les Origines du système de Taylor en France,” p. 26.
- 19 Fridenson, “Un Tournant Taylorien de la société française (1904–1918),” p. 1051; Humphreys, *Taylorism in France, 1904–1920*, pp. 4–8; Richard Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France* (New York, 1981), pp. 34–37; John F. Godfrey, *Capitalism at War: Industrial Policy and Bureaucracy in France, 1914–1918* (New York, 1987), pp. 183–194.
- 20 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 243; Rabinbach, “The European Science of Work: The Economy of the Body at the End of the Nineteenth Century,” in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, p. 476. See also Georges Ribeill, “Les Débuts de l’ergonomie en France à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale,” *Le Mouvement sociale* 113 (1980), pp. 3–36.
- 21 For example, see Lahy’s criticisms of Taylor in “Le Système Taylor et l’organisation intérieure des usines,” *La Revue socialiste, syndicaliste, et coopérative* (August 1913), pp. 126–138, and “L’Etude scientifique des mouvements et le chronométrage,” *La Revue socialiste, syndicaliste, et coopérative* (December 1913), pp. 502–520.
- 22 Rabinbach, “European Science of Work,” in Kaplan and Koepp, *Work in France*, pp. 498–502; Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 217; Fridenson, “Un Tournant Taylorien de la société française (1904–1918),” pp. 1048–1050.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 1050; Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 2.
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6.
- 25 Charles Maier, “Between Taylorism and Technocracy,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 6 (1970), pp. 27–63.
- 26 See Pouget, *L’Organisation du surmenage*; Merrheim, “La Méthode Taylor,” *La Vie ouvrière* 82 (1913), p. 226; Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 15, 1913; Bouchet, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, April 9, 1913; and Victor Roudine, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 13, 1913. On the initial American and British union opposition to Taylorism, see Cross, *Time and Money*, p. 29.
- 27 Merrheim, “La Méthode Taylor,” *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), pp. 298–309.
- 28 Pouget, *L’Organisation du surmenage*, p. 3.
- 29 Merrheim, “La Méthode Taylor,” *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), p. 306.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 302; Merrheim, “La Méthode Taylor,” *La Vie ouvrière* 108 (1914), p. 351; Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, December 15, 1913; Bouchet, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, March 14, April 9, 1913.

- 31 Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), pp. 308–309; Merrheim, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, December 15, 1913; Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 15, 1913; Roudine, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 13, 1913.
- 32 Pouget, *L'Organisation du surmenage*, pp. 23–24; see also Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), p. 309; and Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 15, 1913.
- 33 Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), p. 309. Jules Raveté was one of the few syndicalists to wholeheartedly embrace Taylorism before World War I. See "Une Défense de la méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* (March 5, 1914), pp. 257–267.
- 34 Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 109–110 (1914), p. 396.
- 35 *Ibid.*, p. 397.
- 36 *Ibid.* pp. 397–398.
- 37 Merrheim would come to embrace Taylorism after World War I. See Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 272.
- 38 Yvetot, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 17, 1913.
- 39 Pouget, *L'Organisation du surmenage*, p. 14.
- 40 Bourchet, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, March 14, 1913.
- 41 Bourchet, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, April 9, 1913.
- 42 Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 108 (1914), p. 346; "Réponse de Merrheim," *La Vie ouvrière* 116 (1914), p. 108. See also Pouget, *L'Organisation du surmenage*.
- 43 Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, February 15, 1913.
- 44 Perrot, "On the Formation of the French Working Class," in Katznelson and Zolberg, *Working-Class Formation*, p. 104.
- 45 Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernity*, pp. 266–267.
- 46 *Ibid.*, pp. 266–271; see also Kern, *Culture of Time and Space*.
- 47 Clark, *Painting of Modern Life*, p. 9.
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 204; see also Rancière, "Good Times or Pleasures at the Barricades," in Rifkin and Thomas, *Voices of the People*, pp. 47ff.; and Charles Rearick, *Pleasures of the Belle Epoque* (New Haven, 1985).
- 49 On the cultural studies perspective, see Stuart Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms," *Media, Culture, and Society* 2 (1980), pp. 57–72.
- 50 Delaisi, "Comment connaître la situation d'un industriel?," *La Vie ouvrière* 55 (January 5, 1912), p. 49. Delaisi praises Levasseur as a "learned sociologist" in *Political Myths and Economic Realities*, p. 78.
- 51 Robert Louzon, "Les Deux Grandes Révolutions de la technique au XIXème siècle," *La Vie ouvrière*, October 5, 1912, p. 48. See also his companion article in the October 20, 1912, issue of *La Vie ouvrière*.
- 52 Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 109–110 (1914), p. 395.
- 53 *Ibid.*; Merrheim, "La Méthode Taylor," *La Vie ouvrière* 83 (1913), p. 305.
- 54 Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, January 9, 1913. See also Jouhaux, *La Bataille syndicaliste*, January 11, June 26, December 22, December 23, 1913.
- 55 See the discussion of the founding and travaux of *La Vie ouvrière* in Pierre

- Monatte, “*La Vie ouvrière* (1909–1914),” in Chamberland, *La Lutte syndicale*, pp. 61–127. See also Mazgaj, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, pp. 142–143. Delaisi was thrown out of the CGT in 1912 for purportedly accepting government monies, though he kept in contact with Jouhaux afterwards. Delaisi apparently accepted government funds that were earmarked for rival left-wing newspapers in an attempt to weaken the socialist *L’Humanité*. Merrheim broke with Delaisi after this incident. Moreover, the editors of *La Vie ouvrière* had an often bitter relationship with Jouhaux, stemming from debates about the paper’s financial viability.
- 56 For a perspective that sees World War I as the major cause of the CGT’s reorientation in a productivist direction, see Horne, *Labour at War*, p. 15.
- 57 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, p. 11.
- 58 Fridenson, “Un Tournant Taylorien de la société française,” p. 1051. See also Martin Fine, “Albert Thomas: A Reformer’s Vision of Modernization,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 112 (1977), pp. 545–564.
- 59 Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, pp. 161–162. On the leaders’ fears, and unpreparedness for war, see Georges Dumoulin, *Carnets de Route* (Lille, 1938), pp. 64–66. See Jouhaux’s justification for the CGT’s support of the war in *A Jean Jaurès* (Paris, 1914).
- 60 Jennings, *Syndicalism in France*, pp. 162–164.
- 61 Horne, *Labour at War*, pp. 70–85.
- 62 *Ibid.*, p. 165; Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*, p. 200.
- 63 On Merrheim’s contacts with Jouhaux and the French government during World War I, see Papayanis, *Alphonse Merrheim*, pp. 105–110.
- 64 Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*, p. 204; Godfrey, *Capitalism at War*, p. 186–188.
- 65 Phillippe Besnard, “The Epistemological Polemic: François Simiand,” in Besnard, *Sociological Domain*, p. 248. See also Horne, *Labour at War*, p. 287.
- 66 Godfrey, *Capitalism at War*, pp. 82–88. See also Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*, pp. 37–48.
- 67 Godfrey, *Capitalism at War*, pp. 82–93.
- 68 Lefranc, *Le Mouvement syndical sous la troisième république*, p. 215. On the journal *L’Information ouvrière et sociale*, see Cross, “Redefining Workers’ Control,” in Cronin and Sirianni, *Work, Community, and Power*, pp. 156–157.
- 69 Noiriel, *Workers in French Society in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, pp. 109–120. The service sector and railways also expanded dramatically. In the wake of the wartime devastation, many jobs were taken by immigrants, who grew to 15 percent of the workforce by 1930.
- 70 Chamberlin and Gilman, “Degeneration: An Introduction,” in *Degeneration*, p. ix; Rabinbach, “European Science of Work,” in Kaplan and Koeppe, *Work in France*, pp. 480–481.
- 71 Rodriguez, *Le 1er mai*, pp. 208–209.
- 72 See Richard Kuisel, *Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat* (Berkeley, 1967),

- and Leiss, "Technology and Degeneration," in Chamberlin and Gilman, *Degeneration*, p. 155.
- 73 La Confédération Générale du Travail, "Programme Minimum de Revendications," reprinted in Jouhaux, *Le Syndicalisme et la CGT*, p. 208.
- 74 Reprinted in *XX Congrès national corporatif* (1919), p. 49.
- 75 *Ibid.*, pp. 50–51 (emphasis added).
- 76 La Confédération Générale du Travail, "Programme Minimum," in Jouhaux, *Le Syndicalisme et la CGT*, p. 207 (emphasis added).
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- 81 *Ibid.*, pp. 209–210 (emphasis added).
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- 83 See the debates in the *XX Congrès national corporatif* (1919), pp. 288–298.
- 84 Clark, *History of French Labor*, pp. 37–38; Tilly and Shorter, *Strikes in France*, p. 170. See the discussion and justification of this change by Merrheim in *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, October 13, 1918.
- 85 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, pp. 97–103.
- 86 Martin Jay, *Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought* (Berkeley, 1993), p. 263.
- 87 *Ibid.*, p. 264; see also Jacques Hавet, "French Philosophical Tradition Between the Two Wars," in Marvin Farber, ed., *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States* (Buffalo, NY, 1950), pp. 3–34.
- 88 Horne, *Labour at War*, p. 112.
- 89 Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, p. 83. See also Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*; Rabinbach, *Human Motor*; and Kuisel, *Ernest Mercier*.
- 90 Alexander, *Structure and Meaning*, p. 159. See also *Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Vol. II*, pp. 301–327. On Maurice Halbwachs's positivistic turn after World War I, see John Craig, "Sociology and Related Disciplines Between the Wars: Maurice Halbwachs and the Imperialism of the Durkheimians," in Besnard, *Sociological Domain*, pp. 263–289. Simiand found "in the statistical method the sociological equivalent of experimentation in the sciences of nature." See Besnard, "The Epistemological Polemic," in Besnard, *Sociological Domain*, p. 259.
- 91 See Merrheim, *De la société des nations* (Paris, 1918), and *La Révolution économique* (Paris, 1919).
- 92 Horne, *Labour at War*, pp. 126–136, 278.
- 93 Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, November 7, 1918.
- 94 Cross, "Redefining Workers' Control," in Cronin and Sirianni, *Work, Community, and Power*, p. 156. See the article by Bouglé, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, May 12, 1918.
- 95 Keufer, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, June 27, 1918; Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, November 7, 1918.

- 96 Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, September 22, December 15, 1918.
- 97 For example, Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, September 22, 1918; Savoie, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, August 22, 1918.
- 98 Jouhaux, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, August 4, November 21, 1918.
- 99 Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, September 22, 1918.
- 100 *Ibid.*; Jouhaux, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, November 21, 1918; and Savoie, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, August 22, 1918.
- 101 *Ibid.* See also Jouhaux, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, November 21, 1918; and Thomas, *L'Information ouvrière et sociale*, December 15, 1918.
- 102 *XX Congrès national corporatif* (1919), p. 63.
- 103 Wohl, *French Communism in the Making*, pp. 119–121. See also Annie Kriegel, *La Croissance de la CGT (1918–1921)* (Paris, 1966).
- 104 Wohl, *French Communism in the Making*, pp. 161–165. See also Papayanis, “Masses révolutionnaires et directions réformistes”; and Kriegel, *Aux Origines du communisme français*.
- 105 Wohl, *French Communism in the Making*, p. 163.
- 106 On rationalization, see Seidman, *Workers Against Work*, pp. 172ff.; Kuisel, *Capitalism and the State in Modern France*, pp. 77–93; Patrick Fridenson, “Automobile Workers in France and Their Work, 1914–1983,” in Kaplan and Koeppe, *Work in France*, pp. 514–527; Aimée Moutet, “Une Rationalisation du travail dans l’industrie française des années trente,” *Annales: Economies, sociétés, économiques* 5 (September–October 1987), pp. 1061–1078; and Lazar, “Damné de la terre et homme de marbre,” pp. 1076–1080.
- 107 Rabinbach, *Human Motor*, p. 15. See also Cross, *Time and Money*, pp. 30–32; and Judt, *Marxism and the French Left*, pp. 150–155.

9 The legacy of syndicalism

- 1 Griffuelhes, “Le Nouveau Millerandisme,” *La Revue Communiste* 1 (1920), p. 32; “La Lutte pour la nationalisation,” *La Revue Communiste* 1 (1920), p. 360.
- 2 Griffuelhes, “Le Nouveau Millerandisme,” p. 32.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 33.
- 4 On the initially positive assessment of the Russian Revolution by many revolutionary syndicalists, see Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France*, pp. 37, 70–71. On the Bolshevization of the party in the 1920s that jettisoned any residual syndicalist influence, see p. 73.
- 5 Mauss, “A Sociological Assessment of Bolshevism,” in Gane, *Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*, p. 172. Mauss may have been wrong about Sorel’s influence on Lenin, for the Russian leader referred to Sorel as “capable only of thinking the absurd”: quoted in Humphrey, *Georges Sorel, Prophet Without Honor: A Study in Anti-Intellectualism* (Cambridge, MA, 1951), p. 24.
- 6 Mauss, “A Sociological Assessment of Bolshevism,” in Gane, *Radical Sociology of Durkheim and Mauss*, p. 172.

- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 On Valois's support of Taylorism, see Soucy, *French Fascism*, p. 220.
- 10 Seidman, *Workers Against Work*, pp. 172–174.
- 11 See Roberts, *Syndicalist Tradition and Italian Fascism*; Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire*; A. James Gregor, *The Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism* (Berkeley, 1979).
- 12 For example, see Robert Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (New York, 1966).
- 13 See chapters 2 and 4 in this volume.
- 14 Eley, "Reviewing the Socialist Tradition," in Christiane Lemke and Gary Marks, eds., *The Crisis of Socialism in Europe* (Durham, NC, 1992), pp. 44–45.
- 15 Bellah, "Introduction," *Emile Durkheim on Morality and Society*, p. xxxii; see also Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York, 1965), pp. 217ff.
- 16 For the "Socialisme ou Barbarisme" group, see Arthur Hirsh, *The French New Left: An Intellectual History From Sartre to Gorz* (Boston, 1981), pp. 108ff. On the social movements of the 1970s, see pp. 208ff. For Gorz, see *Strategy for Labor: A Radical Proposal* (Boston, 1967). On the CFDT, see Mark Kesselman, ed., *The French Workers' Movement: Economic Crisis and Political Change* (Boston, 1984).
- 17 See for example Poster's analysis of Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in *Existential Marxism in Postwar France*, pp. 161–178. For a very different view, see Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley, 1992).
- 18 Rosa Luxemburg, *Rosa Luxemburg Speaks*, ed. Mary-Alice Waters (New York, 1970). Heller points to a tradition of republicanism emanating from Eastern Europe, which also influenced Luxemburg. See Heller, "The Great Republic," in Ferenc Fehér and Agnes Heller, *Eastern Left, Western Left: Totalitarianism, Freedom, and Democracy* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ, 1987), pp. 187–200.
- 19 On Gramsci and the councils, see Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That Failed*; on Gramsci's discussion of Sorel, see *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York, 1971), pp. 126–130, 197–198. On Lukács and the councils, see Russell Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat: Contours of Western Marxism* (New York, 1981), pp. 86–89; on Lukács and syndicalism, see Jacoby, p. 87. See also Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism* (New York, 1979).
- 20 Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat*, p. 87.
- 21 Horkheimer, "The Authoritarian State," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. A. Arato and E. Gebhardt (New York, 1978), p. 104, quoted in Jacoby, *Dialectic of Defeat*, p. 113 (emphasis in original).
- 22 On Lenin's advocacy of Taylorism, see Braverman, *Labor and Monopoly Capital*, p. 12; on Gramsci and Taylorism, see Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, pp. 300ff.; Clark, *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution That*

- Failed*, pp. 70–71. See also Szabó's favorable review of Taylorism in *Le Mouvement socialiste* 33 (January–February 1913), pp. 128–132.
- 23 Jeffrey Alexander, "Introduction: Durkheimian Sociology and Cultural Studies Today," in Alexander, ed., *Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies* (New York, 1988), p. 4.
 - 24 Habermas, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews*, ed. Peter Dews (New York, 1992), p. 139.
 - 25 Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. vii. On criticisms of Habermas's incorporation of systems theory, see Thomas McCarthy, "Complexity and Democracy: Or the Seductions of Systems Theory," in Honneth and Joas, *Communicative Action*, pp. 119–139.
 - 26 Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (Cambridge, MA, 1983), p. 158.
 - 27 For a good overview, see Steven Seidman, *Contested Knowledge: Social Theory in the Postmodern Era* (Cambridge, MA, 1994).
 - 28 See, for example, George Yudice, "For a Practical Aesthetics," in Robbins, *Phantom Public Sphere*, pp. 209–233.
 - 29 For example, see Hall, "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms," pp. 57–72; John Fiske, *Television Culture* (London, 1987); and Richard Johnson, "What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?," *Social Text* 17 (Winter–Spring 1987), pp. 38–80. For a critique of the cultural studies perspective, see Ronald Lembo and Kenneth H. Tucker, Jr., "Culture, Television, and Opposition: Rethinking Cultural Studies," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 7 (1990), pp. 97–116.
 - 30 Frederic Jameson, "On Negt and Kluge," in Robbins, *Phantom Public Sphere*, p. 66.
 - 31 See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris, 1991).
 - 32 Jameson, "On Negt and Kluge," p. 49.
 - 33 Dana Poulon, "The Public's Fear: Or Media as Monster in Habermas, Negt, and Kluge," in Robbins, *Phantom Public Sphere*, p. 39.
 - 34 Fiske, *Television Culture*, pp. 309ff.
 - 35 Stoekl, *Agonies of the Intellectual*.
 - 36 See Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*. See also his critique of Bergson's *Creative Evolution* in *From Georges Sorel: Essays in Socialism and Philosophy*, pp. 284ff.
 - 37 For some interesting approaches that at least point in such a direction, see Sonn, *Anarchism and Cultural Politics*; Greil Marcus, *Lipstick Traces: A Secret History of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA, 1989); and Jay, *Downcast Eyes*. Richard Wolin's interesting essay emphasizes the irrationalist moment in Sorel and the postmodern tradition, though in perhaps a bit too extreme a manner. See "Left Fascism: Georges Bataille and the German Ideology," unpublished manuscript (1993).
 - 38 For a critique that also focuses on the similarities of contemporary and nineteenth-century social movements, see Craig Calhoun, "Postmodernism as

- Pseudohistory," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 10, no. 1 (February 1993), pp. 75–96.
- 39 Weintraub, "Democracy and the Market," in Nugent, *From Leninism to Freedom*, p. 59.
- 40 For France, see Kesselman, *French Workers' Movement*; for the United States, see Christopher Eaton Gunn, *Workers' Self-Management in the United States* (Ithaca, NY, 1984).
- 41 Robbins, "Introduction: The Public as Phantom," *Phantom Public Sphere*, p. xix. See also Weintraub, "Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction."
- 42 Robbins, "Introduction: The Public as Phantom," *Phantom Public Sphere*, p. xix. See also Yudice, "For a Practical Aesthetics."
- 43 Jameson, "On Negt and Kluge," in Robbins, *Phantom Public Sphere*, p. 73.
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- 45 Pelloutier, *L'Ouvrier des deux mondes* 15 (May 1898), in Julliard, *Fernand Pelloutier*, p. 340.

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